Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Piltches were traveling in their 2003 Mercury Mountaineer in February 2007 when they hit a patch of black ice, causing the car to slide off the road and into a wall. Upon impact, none of the car’s air bags deployed and both were injured. They filed suit in 2010, alleging the vehicle was defective under Indiana law. The district court granted Ford’s summary judgment motion holding that, without expert testimony, the Piltches could not create an issue of fact as to proximate cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Piltches stated a claim for relief under the Indiana Products Liability Act; there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a defective product that expert testimony is not required; they are not required to produce expert testimony to establish proximate cause; and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, raising an inference of negligence on the part of Ford. The Piltches’ presentation of circumstantial evidence was not “one of the ‘rare instances’ where it is enough to negate all possible causes other than a product defect.” View "Piltch v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Footstar operated the footwear departments in various Kmart stores as though they were islands. Footstar employees could only work in those departments unless they had written permission from Kmart. In 2005, a Footstar employee tried to help a customer get an infant carrier off a shelf outside the footwear department and the customer was injured. She sued. Kmart sought indemnification from Footstar and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. A magistrate judge found that Footstar and Liberty Mutual both had a duty to defend beginning the day Kmart formally requested coverage since the injury was potentially coverable under the agreement between Kmart and Footstar and the insurance policy. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither Liberty Mutual nor Footstar had a duty to indemnify Kmart because the injury did not occur “pursuant to” or “under” the agreement between Kmart and Footstar. That agreement specifically precluded Footstar employees from working outside of the footwear department, where the injury occurred, and actions taken in contravention of the agreement were not “pursuant to” or “under” it. Liberty Mutual did not deny coverage in bad faith and that Kmart did not breach the relevant notice provisions such that Liberty Mutual and Footstar could withhold defense costs. View "Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc." on Justia Law

Minnick suffers from several serious medical problems, including fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and degenerative disc disease. Minnick was a truck driver for 24 years until taking short term leave in 2008 due to pain in his legs and hip. After returning to work, he was laid off. In 2010, he applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. After the Disability Determination Bureau denied Minnick’s claim, an Administrative Law Judge determined that Minnick is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ did not fully develop the record nor adequately articulate her analysis in discrediting the testimony of one of Minnick’s treating physicians. View "Minnick v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Bell sued attorney Ruben and his firm, alleging that they negligently and fraudulently mismanaged her trust, causing a loss of $34 million. Before arbitration, Ruben filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Bell filed an adversary complaint opposing discharge of Ruben’s fraud-based debt to her, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A), (4). The bankruptcy judge granted Ruben a discharge of his other debts, but not of that fraud debt. Ruben’s liability insurance did not cover fraud. Bell settled her negligence claims against Ruben and all claims against the other defendants in arbitration. The arbitration panel ruled, with respect to the fraud claim, that “damages proven to be attributable to the actions of [Ruben] have been compensated,” but ordered Ruben to pay administrative fees and expenses of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) totaling $21,200.00 and that compensation and expenses of the arbitrators, advanced by Bell, totaling $150,304.54 would be borne by Ruben. AAA rules, which governed the arbitration, provide that expenses of arbitration “shall be borne equally” unless the parties agree otherwise or the arbitrator assesses expenses against specified parties. Ruben refused to pay. The bankruptcy judge entered summary judgment in favor of Ruben. The district court reversed, in favor of Bell. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ruben v. Bell" on Justia Law

Maurer visited a Speedway gas station convenience store near her home. It was where she regularly purchased gasoline. After parking in front of the store, Maurer walked along the sidewalk to its front entrance. A permanent retail display, which housed windshield wiper fluid at the time, sat on the sidewalk to the left of the double door entrance and narrowed the adjacent walking area to a width of 24 inches. As Maurer approached, she saw the display, stepped around it, and walked down the narrowed length of sidewalk. As she neared the end of the narrowed path she rolled her ankle off the sidewalk curb and fell, seriously injuring her shoulder. In her injury suit, the district court granted a motion in limine, excluding as evidence of a municipal ordinance which Maurer sought to introduce to prove Speedway had notice that its retail display created an unreasonably dangerous condition by narrowing the adjacent walkway. A jury ruled in favor of Speedway. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Speedway had no reason to anticipate that Maurer would not discover the condition and protect herself against it just as every other customer apparently did nor did Speedway fail to exercise reasonable care. View "Maurer v. Speedway, LLC" on Justia Law

Stuhlmacher’s parents purchased a ladder from Home Depot so that their son, Kurt, a millwright technician, could work on the roof of a cabin he was building for them in Indiana. Kurt was using the ladder for the first time when it fell, causing him to fall. Kurt sued Home Depot and the ladder’s manufacturer, Tricam. The Stuhlmachers’ expert, Dr. Conry, testified that the ladder was defective, likely causing Kurt to sense instability and involuntarily shift his weight. The magistrate judge struck Dr. Conry’s testimony, finding that his explanation of how the accident occurred did not “square” with Kurt’s testimony that the ladder shot out to his left. Because the testimony was stricken, the Stuhlmachers did not have any evidence showing causation, so the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An expert’s testimony qualifies as relevant under Rule 702 so long as it assists the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case. Experts are allowed to posit alternate models to explain their conclusions. View "Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Doe settled his sexual abuse claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for $80,000 after participating in a voluntary mediation program. He later filed a claim against the Archdiocese in its bankruptcy proceedings for the same sexual abuse. Doe responded to the Archdiocese’s motion for summary judgment by contending that his settlement was fraudulently induced. The argument depends upon statements made during the mediation, but Wisconsin law prohibits the admission in judicial proceedings of nearly all communications made during mediation. Doe argued that an exception applies here because the later action is “distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation,” Wis. Stat. 904.085(4)(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese. Doe’s bankruptcy claim is not distinct from the dispute settled in mediation. The issue in both proceedings, which involved the same parties, is the Archdiocese’s responsibility for the sexual abuse Doe suffered. Doe sought damages in both the mediation and bankruptcy for the same sexual abuse; he did not seek separate or additional damages for the alleged fraudulent inducement. View "Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Zuppardi slipped and fell on the floor of a Wal-Mart store. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, finding that Wal-Mart had not caused the puddle and did not have actual or constructive notice of the puddle before Zuppardi’s fall, and denying Zuppardi’s motion to strike Wal-Mart’s reply for submitting a declaration in bad faith and violating a district court local rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The declaration was not a bad faith filing and the district court was within its discretion in deeming certain facts admitted and in determining that the local rule did not prevent Wal-Mart from replying in the manner it did.View "Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Berrey was injured in an automobile accident at work. The at‐fault driver, who did not work with Berrey, carried liability insurance, but the cost of Berrey’s injuries exceeded the policy’s limit. Berrey received partial compensation under her employer’s workers’ compensation scheme but, because her employer was not responsible for the accident, state law granted the workers’ compensation carrier a lien on any recovery from the at‐fault driver. The at‐fault driver’s insurer paid its full policy limit directly to the workers’ compensation carrier. Travelers provided underinsured motorist coverage to Berrey’s employer. The policy covered an employee injured by a third-party who did not carry adequate auto insurance to fully compensate for the employee’s loss. Travelers paid Berrey the difference between her total calculated damages and the at‐fault driver’s policy limit. Berrey claims that Travelers improperly deducted the at-fault driver’s insurance payment from the total it owed to Berrey because that payment was made directly to the workers’ compensation carrier rather than to Berrey herself. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the language of the policy supported Travelers’s calculation and that Berrey’s reading would undermine the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.View "Berrey v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law