Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed a lawsuit in 2007, alleging inadequate mental healthcare. The case developed into a class action, and in 2016, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required IDOC to meet specific mental-health treatment benchmarks. The agreement included a provision for $1.9 million in attorney’s fees to be paid to plaintiffs’ counsel if the court granted relief for violations of the agreement. In 2018, the district court found IDOC in breach and issued an injunction, triggering the fee provision. While the defendants appealed, the parties entered into further agreements, resulting in the $1.9 million being paid to plaintiffs’ counsel.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois later extended its enforcement jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, but after the expiration of that jurisdiction, the court returned the case to its active docket. The parties continued to litigate, with plaintiffs filing amended complaints and defendants moving to dismiss. More than a year after resuming active litigation, the district court raised concerns about its subject-matter jurisdiction, ultimately concluding that its jurisdiction over the underlying claims ended when its enforcement jurisdiction over the settlement agreement expired. The court dismissed all claims and denied the defendants’ motion to recover the $1.9 million in attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, under the parties’ agreements, the payment of $1.9 million in attorney’s fees to plaintiffs’ counsel was proper and did not need to be returned, even after the district court’s injunction was vacated. The court also vacated the district court’s dismissal of the underlying claims, remanding for the district court to determine whether the settlement agreement moots those claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion to recover the attorney’s fees. View "Daniels v. Jones" on Justia Law

A group of industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas in Wisconsin alleged that several gas companies participated in a conspiracy to fix natural gas prices between 2000 and 2002. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in practices such as wash trading, churning, and false reporting to manipulate published price indices, which in turn affected the prices paid by purchasers in Wisconsin. The plaintiffs sought remedies under Wisconsin antitrust law, including both a “full consideration” refund of payments made under contracts tainted by the conspiracy and treble damages.The litigation was initially consolidated with similar cases from other states in multidistrict proceedings in the District of Nevada, where class certification was denied. After the Ninth Circuit vacated that denial and remanded, the Wisconsin case was returned to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. There, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), relying on expert testimony to show that the alleged price-fixing had a common impact on all class members. The defendants countered with their own experts, arguing that the natural gas market’s complexity and variations in contract terms precluded common proof of impact. The district court certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, but did not fully resolve the disputes between the parties’ experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court was required to engage in a more rigorous analysis of the conflicting expert evidence regarding antitrust impact and the existence of a national market. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class certification and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to make factual findings on these expert disputes before deciding whether class certification is appropriate. View "Arandell Corporation v. Xcel Energy Inc." on Justia Law

Heather Schroeder and Misty Tanner, representing a class of Indiana car owners insured by Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company and Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company, filed a lawsuit claiming that Progressive breached its contractual duty by applying "Projected Sold Adjustments" to the list prices of comparable cars when determining the actual cash value of totaled cars. The insurance policy in question specifies that the actual cash value is determined by the market value, age, and condition of the vehicle at the time of the loss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, recognized that whether Progressive paid each class member the actual cash value of their car is not susceptible to classwide proof. However, it concluded that common evidence could establish that Progressive employed an unacceptable method for calculating actual cash value payments by applying Projected Sold Adjustments. The court certified a class on this basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Progressive’s policy does not preclude the use of Projected Sold Adjustments in calculating actual cash value payments, as long as the insureds are ultimately paid the actual cash value of their totaled cars as defined under the policy and Indiana law. The court found that individual questions about whether Progressive failed to pay each class member the actual cash value of their car would overwhelm any common ones. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s class certification decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schroeder v. Progressive Paloverde Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Eugene Westmoreland, an Illinois inmate who uses a wheelchair, filed a class action lawsuit seeking prospective relief to make the showers at the Northern Reception and Classification Center (NRC) accessible. He claimed the showers were inaccessible to individuals using mobility aids. Westmoreland filed the suit without first using the prison's internal grievance process as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Six weeks after filing, he was transferred to a different facility with accessible showers, which led to questions about the mootness of his claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Westmoreland's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding his claim moot due to his transfer. The court also determined that no exception to mootness applied, as Westmoreland had not exhausted the internal grievance process, making him an inadequate class representative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Westmoreland's transfer rendered his claim moot and that he did not qualify for any exceptions to mootness. The court also found that Westmoreland's failure to exhaust the grievance process as required by the PLRA made him an inadequate class representative, preventing the class action from proceeding. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. View "Westmoreland v. Hughes" on Justia Law

A group of nine plaintiffs, led by Alexander Carter, filed a class action lawsuit against the Cook County Sheriff, challenging a policy at the Cook County Jail that destroys inmates' government-issued identification cards if left unclaimed after the inmate is transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, finding that precedent foreclosed each of the plaintiffs' claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim was foreclosed by the precedent set in Lee v. City of Chicago. The court also found that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were indistinguishable from those rejected in Conyers v. City of Chicago and Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims but did not appeal the procedural due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Fourth Amendment claim was foreclosed by Lee, which rejected the notion of a "continuing seizure" of lawfully seized property. The court also found that the Fifth Amendment takings claim failed because the plaintiffs had abandoned their property by not following the jail's property retrieval procedures. Finally, the court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim failed because the plaintiffs did not show the inadequacy of state law remedies or an independent constitutional violation. View "Carter v. Cook County Sheriff" on Justia Law

A class member objected to the district court's award of attorney's fees in a class action antitrust litigation involving broiler chicken producers. The district court had awarded attorney's fees based on a hypothetical ex ante market for legal services, considering the risk of nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation at the litigation's outset. The objector argued that the district court included skewed fee awards in its calculation.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had awarded attorney's fees, but the objector, John Andren, successfully argued on appeal that the court erred by discounting certain auction bids and excluding fee awards from the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case, instructing the district court to reconsider these factors. On remand, the district court awarded a new fee, excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards, and giving significant weight to a specific fee agreement from a comparable case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's revised fee award. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain bids and Ninth Circuit awards but erred in relying on a skewed sample of ex post awards. The Seventh Circuit adjusted the fee award by removing non-representative data points, resulting in a revised award of 26.6% of the net common fund. The court affirmed the district court's fee award as modified and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Andren v End User Consumer Plaintiff Class" on Justia Law

John Wertymer purchased two bottles of Walmart’s Great Value brand honey in June 2022, labeled “Raw Honey” and “Organic Raw Honey.” He claimed he paid a premium for these products due to their perceived nutritional and medicinal benefits. In April 2023, Wertymer sent the honey to a laboratory for testing, which allegedly showed that the honey was not raw. He then filed a diversity suit against Walmart, seeking to represent a nationwide class of purchasers, or alternatively, an Illinois class, alleging violations under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and common law fraudulent misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Wertymer’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for lack of standing, which Wertymer did not appeal. The district court also dismissed the remainder of his claims, finding that the complaint failed to support any claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court found that Wertymer’s complaint did not plausibly allege that Walmart committed a deceptive act. The court noted that Wertymer’s own allegations and sources indicated that elevated levels of 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in honey could result from factors other than heating, such as storage conditions and geographic origin. The court also found that Wertymer’s claim regarding the presence of mannose in the “Organic Raw Honey” was speculative and unsupported by the sources cited in the complaint.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Wertymer’s complaint was too speculative and failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act or for common law fraudulent misrepresentation. View "Wertymer v Walmart Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiffs in a class action alleged that several corporations in the broiler chicken market violated antitrust laws by engaging in bid rigging and reducing the supply of broiler chickens. The plaintiffs claimed that these actions led to anomalous dips in sales, which they attributed to collusion on price and output. The class action was divided into two tracks: Track 1, which omitted bid-rigging allegations for faster discovery and trial, and Track 2, which included bid-rigging theories and state law claims by indirect purchasers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed the class to place claims against Simmons Foods, Inc. and Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. on Track 1. Simmons settled for $8 million, but several class members, including the Boston Market group, objected to the settlement. They argued that the settlement was inadequate and that they should not be included in the class because they had filed their own antitrust suits. However, they missed the deadline to opt out of the class, and the district court approved the settlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the settlement's release language was broad enough to cover bid-rigging claims and that the $8 million settlement was reasonable. The court noted that the Boston Market group did not provide evidence that the settlement amount was unreasonably low. Additionally, the court observed that the class had lost a related trial and that criminal antitrust prosecutions against some firms had ended in mistrials or acquittals, indicating uncertainty about the plaintiffs' prospects. The court affirmed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Boston Market Corporation v Mountainaire Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

James Hulce, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a putative class action suit against Zipongo Inc., doing business as Foodsmart. Hulce alleged that Foodsmart violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by making unsolicited calls and sending text messages to him, despite his number being on the national do-not-call registry. Foodsmart's communications were about free nutritional services offered through Hulce's state and Medicaid-funded healthcare plan, Chorus Community Healthcare Plans (CCHP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted Foodsmart's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the calls and messages did not constitute "telephone solicitations" under the TCPA because they were not made for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of services. Instead, the communications were about services that were free to Hulce, with Foodsmart billing CCHP directly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the calls and messages did not fall within the definition of "telephone solicitation" under the TCPA. The court concluded that "telephone solicitation" requires the initiation of a call or message with the purpose of persuading or urging someone to pay for a service. Since Foodsmart's communications were about free services and did not encourage Hulce to make a purchase, they did not meet this definition. The court emphasized that the purpose of the call must be to persuade someone who makes the purchasing decision to buy the services, which was not the case here. View "Hulce v Zipongo Inc." on Justia Law

Linda Thompson filed a putative class action against the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (the "Exchange") in Illinois state court, alleging that the Exchange printed her credit card’s expiration date on purchase receipts, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). The Exchange removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal agencies to remove cases to federal court. Thompson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing lack of Article III standing, while the Exchange moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Thompson’s motion to remand and granted the Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Exchange, as a federal entity, could remove the case without asserting a colorable federal defense and had an absolute right to litigate in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the Exchange did not need to present a federal defense to remove the case. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing the suit. The Seventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand the case to state court. The court noted that Thompson’s lack of Article III standing did not preclude state court jurisdiction, as state courts are not bound by Article III constraints. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service" on Justia Law