Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A female student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Isabelle Arana, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by two football players, Quintez Cephus and Danny Davis III. Following an investigation, the university expelled Cephus for sexual assault and harassment. However, after Cephus was acquitted in a state court trial on a related charge, he petitioned for readmission, citing new evidence. The university's Chancellor readmitted Cephus without consulting Arana or reviewing the full trial transcript, allegedly under pressure from influential donors and the football program.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the university, dismissing Arana's Title IX claim. The court acknowledged that a jury could find the university acted with deliberate indifference if it readmitted Cephus due to public pressure. However, it concluded that Arana could not show the harassment deprived her of educational opportunities, citing her continued academic success.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment Arana experienced was severe and whether the university's response was clearly unreasonable, potentially having a detrimental effect on her education. The court noted that Arana's fear of encountering Cephus led her to avoid certain campus areas, skip classes, and delay her graduation, which could be seen as a deprivation of educational opportunities. The court also highlighted the suspicious timing of Cephus's readmission and the university's failure to involve Arana in the process. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Arana v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Ruben Santoyo, proceeding without counsel, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago and two police officers, challenging the constitutionality of his arrest. Over three years, Santoyo repeatedly filed frivolous motions, many of which attacked the competence and integrity of the district judge. Despite numerous warnings from the judge that further frivolous filings would result in sanctions, Santoyo continued his behavior.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied Santoyo's motions to vacate the judgment. While Santoyo's appeal of the denial was pending, the defendants moved to recover their costs. Instead of addressing the merits of this motion, Santoyo accused the defendants of bad faith and requested disciplinary action against their counsel. The district judge, having lost patience, granted the defendants' motion for costs, imposed a $1,500 sanction on Santoyo, and referred him to the district's Executive Committee, which barred future filings until the sanction was paid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Santoyo argued that the district judge violated his due process rights by not notifying him of the sanction or giving him an opportunity to respond. The appellate court disagreed, noting that Santoyo had been warned multiple times about the consequences of further frivolous filings. The court held that the district judge provided sufficient notice and opportunity for Santoyo to respond, satisfying due process requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions. View "Santoyo v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Jeffery Johnson, a Black employee at Accenture LLP, reported racial discrimination while working on a client project. Accenture's internal investigation found his complaint was made in good faith but lacked merit. Subsequently, Johnson had difficulty securing new projects and was eventually terminated. He sued Accenture, claiming illegal retaliation for reporting discrimination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Accenture, dismissing Johnson's case. The court found that Johnson's difficulty in finding projects and his termination occurred after his complaint but concluded that the record did not support Johnson's argument that his complaint caused these issues. The court also determined that Johnson's filings violated local rules by presenting unsupported assertions and irrelevant facts, leading to the admission of many of Accenture's facts as uncontroverted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Johnson failed to show a causal link between his complaint and the adverse employment actions he experienced. The court noted that Johnson's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that his complaint was the "but for" cause of his difficulties and termination. The court also found that Johnson's arguments relied on speculation rather than concrete evidence. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Accenture, concluding that Johnson's retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not proceed. View "Johnson v Accenture LLP" on Justia Law

Melissa Myers, an instructional aide at an elementary school in the Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools, took FMLA leave at the end of the 2017-2018 school year due to grief from her husband's death. Upon returning for the 2018-2019 school year, she exceeded her paid leave days within the first two months. The school principal, Kelly Roth, warned her about her attendance, leading Myers to resign and subsequently sue the school district and Roth for violations of the FMLA, ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that Myers was neither eligible for FMLA leave nor had a qualifying condition in the weeks before her resignation. Additionally, she did not notify the school district of her intent to take statutory leave. The court also rejected her "anticipatory retaliation" theory due to insufficient evidence. The ADA claim failed because Myers did not experience an adverse employment action, and her working conditions were not objectively intolerable to constitute constructive discharge. The equal-protection claim was dismissed for lack of proof of differential treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Myers did not meet the eligibility requirements for FMLA leave, lacked evidence of a serious health condition, and failed to provide sufficient notice of intent to take FMLA leave. The court also found no evidence of constructive discharge under the ADA, as her working conditions were not intolerable, and there was no imminent threat of termination. Lastly, the equal-protection claim was dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. View "Myers v. Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools" on Justia Law

Anthony Sullers, Sr., an African American elevator mechanic, filed a lawsuit against his union, the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2 (IUEC), alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his claim of racial discrimination by his employer, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation (TKE). Sullers and another employee were laid off, and while Sullers was without work, TKE hired a white mechanic. Sullers informed the union of his layoff and his belief that it was racially motivated. The union filed a grievance on his behalf but did not include allegations of racial discrimination. Sullers followed the union's advice to file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of IUEC. The court found that the union had fulfilled its duty of fair representation by obtaining the maximum remedy available for Sullers, including his reinstatement and backpay. The court also noted that Sullers had not requested the union to file a racial discrimination grievance and that the union's actions were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the union's decision to pursue the grievance as it did, rather than filing a racial discrimination grievance, was within its discretion and not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The court also found that Sullers did not suffer harm attributable to the union's actions, as he was reinstated and received backpay. The court concluded that the union had properly represented Sullers and that he had not shown how he would have achieved a better outcome through arbitration. View "Sullers v. International Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2" on Justia Law

Santoasha Harris endured five years of sexual harassment at her job with the City of Milwaukee. When she reported the harassment in 2017, the City separated her from the harasser, conducted an investigation, compelled the harasser’s resignation, and restored Harris to her position within a month. Harris sued the City, alleging it knew about the harassment for years, failed to act, and retaliated against her for reporting it. Due to Harris’s bankruptcy filing, her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that Harris’s Estate had not shown the City unreasonably failed to prevent the harassment or that she suffered a tangible employment action as a consequence of reporting it. The court found no evidence supporting the Title VII and Section 1983 claims against the City.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not support the claims of quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII. The court found that Harris did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City acted promptly and reasonably once the harassment was reported. Additionally, the court found no basis for employer liability under Section 1983, as there was no evidence of intentional discrimination by the City. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find for the Estate on its claims against the City. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Harris v City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Jesus Zambrano was convicted of first-degree murder in Illinois state court in 2013. The Illinois Appellate Court later found that the trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction on accomplice liability, leading to a retrial where Zambrano was acquitted. Zambrano then filed a federal lawsuit against Detective Patrick Schumacher and sought indemnification from the City of Joliet, alleging that Schumacher fabricated evidence, violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.The case involved the murder of Robert Gooch, who was shot at his girlfriend's apartment in May 2009. Key evidence included testimonies and surveillance videos placing Zambrano at the scene. Detective Schumacher's police report stated that Zambrano identified his friends and the location of his girlfriend's apartment, which Zambrano claimed was false.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Zambrano failed to provide sufficient evidence that Schumacher deliberately falsified evidence in bad faith or that the alleged fabrication was material to his conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Zambrano did not present enough evidence to show that Schumacher knowingly falsified the police report or acted in bad faith. Additionally, the court found that the alleged fabricated evidence was not material to the outcome of the trial, as it did not affect the jury's judgment. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was upheld. View "Zambrano v City of Joliet" on Justia Law

Eric Holmes, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a lawsuit against the Marion County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes sought to proceed in forma pauperis, but the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts this ability for prisoners who have had three prior civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Holmes had incurred three strikes under the PLRA. The court determined that a previous case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey counted as Holmes’s third strike. Holmes did not contest the validity of his first two strikes. He filed a notice of appeal and moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but a motions panel of the Seventh Circuit denied his motion, identifying a different case dismissed due to judicial immunity as his third strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether dismissals based on affirmative defenses, such as those barred by Heck or due to judicial immunity, count as strikes under the PLRA. The court held that a case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck counts as a strike if the Heck bar is clear from the face of the complaint. Similarly, a case dismissed on judicial immunity grounds incurs a strike if the immunity defense is clear from the face of the complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Holmes’s current suit, concluding that both the Heck dismissal and the judicial immunity dismissal counted as strikes. View "Holmes v Marion County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law