Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On February 5, 2018, an abrupt spike in market volatility led to a sharp decline in the S&P 500 and a rapid increase in the VIX index. LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust pursued trading strategies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that assumed low volatility and suffered catastrophic losses when volatility soared. They alleged that several market makers manipulated the VIX by quoting inflated bid-ask prices for certain options, which artificially increased volatility and caused losses exceeding one billion dollars in managed assets over two days.Both LJM and Two Roads filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially naming “John Doe” defendants. The cases were coordinated into multidistrict litigation, and the plaintiffs sought expedited discovery to identify the defendants. After extensive litigation, they amended their complaints to name eight firms as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing, as its complaint only alleged injuries suffered by its clients, not by LJM itself. The court denied LJM’s request for leave to substitute the real party in interest and dismissed its complaint without prejudice. For Two Roads, the court found that its claims were barred by the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, declined to apply equitable tolling, and also dismissed for failure to state a claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that LJM did not allege a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, as its complaint failed to distinguish between its own losses and those of its clients. The court also held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court declined to reach the merits of the underlying Commodity Exchange Act claims. View "Two Roads Shared Trust v. Barclays Capital Inc." on Justia Law

LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust, both involved in options trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, experienced catastrophic losses on February 5 and 6, 2018, when volatility in the S&P 500 surged unexpectedly; LJM lost approximately 86.5% of its managed assets and the Preservation Fund (managed by Two Roads) lost around 80%. The plaintiffs alleged that eight defendant firms, acting as market makers, manipulated the VIX index by submitting inflated bid-ask quotes for certain SPX Options, which artificially raised volatility and resulted in inflated prices on the plaintiffs' trades, causing over one billion dollars in combined losses.After initially filing complaints against unnamed "John Doe" defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs pursued extensive discovery to identify the responsible parties. The cases were swept into a multidistrict litigation proceeding (VIX MDL), which delayed discovery. Eventually, after several rounds of amended complaints, the plaintiffs identified and named eight defendant firms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing because it failed to allege an injury in fact, as the losses belonged to its clients, not LJM itself. For Two Roads, the district court held that its claims were time-barred under the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, and equitable tolling was denied due to lack of diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that LJM’s complaint failed to establish Article III standing, as it did not allege that LJM itself—not just its clients—suffered actual losses. The court further held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing equitable tolling. Both dismissals were affirmed. View "LJM Partners, Ltd. v. Barclays Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

37celsius Capital Partners, a Milwaukee-based firm specializing in healthcare-related businesses, sought to acquire Care Innovations, a subsidiary of Intel Corporation. The parties entered into a nondisclosure agreement containing a “Hold Harmless” clause that limited damages, and subsequently executed a term sheet outlining the proposed transaction. The term sheet required 37celsius to contribute $12 million by a specified closing date and granted it an exclusivity period during which Intel could not negotiate with other parties regarding Care Innovations. The term sheet expressly limited legal obligations, stating that no binding contract would exist until a definitive agreement was executed, except for certain provisions such as confidentiality and exclusivity.After 37celsius failed to provide proof of the required funds by the closing date, Intel sold Care Innovations to another buyer. 37celsius filed suit in Wisconsin state court, alleging breach of contract based on Intel’s communications with third parties during the exclusivity period. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which ruled that 37celsius was not entitled to expectation damages under the NDA and subsequently granted summary judgment for Intel, finding no reliance damages and no evidence of causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. It held that the term sheet was not a binding “Type II” preliminary agreement under Delaware law, as its language did not obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith. Further, even if a binding obligation existed, 37celsius could not show that Intel’s alleged breach was the but-for cause of the failed transaction, as 37celsius did not have the required funds. The court also concluded that the NDA barred expectation damages and 37celsius did not appeal the denial of reliance damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Intel. View "37celsius Capital Partners, L.P. v Intel Corporation" on Justia Law

Jerome and Shaun Cohen operated a Ponzi scheme through their companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC, from 2010 to 2018. They solicited funds from individual investors and institutional lenders, promising high returns secured by real estate, primarily in Chicago. In reality, the Cohens used new investors’ funds to pay earlier investors and overvalued properties to retain excess capital. By 2018, the scheme collapsed, leaving over $75 million in unpaid obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened, obtaining a temporary restraining order and having a receiver appointed to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to victims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois oversaw the receivership and determined how proceeds from the sale of two properties—7749 South Yates and 5450 South Indiana—should be distributed. Both a group of individual investors and Shatar Capital Partners claimed priority to the proceeds, with Shatar arguing its mortgages were recorded before those of the individual investors. The district court found that Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ preexisting interests and thus not entitled to priority, limiting all claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, minus any amounts previously received.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s distribution order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois law, Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ interests in both properties at the time it invested, given multiple red flags about the properties’ financing and EquityBuild’s business model. As a result, the individual investors were entitled to priority in the distribution of proceeds. The court also found Shatar’s challenge to the distribution plan moot, as there were insufficient funds to benefit Shatar after satisfying the investors’ claims. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Duff" on Justia Law

Two psychiatrists challenged the practices of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN), alleging that ABPN unlawfully tied its specialty certification to its maintenance of certification (MOC) product, thereby violating antitrust law and causing unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs argued that ABPN’s monopoly over specialty certifications forced doctors to purchase the MOC product, which includes both activity and assessment requirements, in order to maintain their professional standing and employment opportunities. They claimed that the MOC product functioned as a substitute for other continuing medical education (CME) products required for state licensure, and that this arrangement harmed competition in the CME market.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an illegal tying arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, specifically because they did not show that ABPN’s MOC product was a viable substitute for other CME products. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to amend their complaint and had not demonstrated how further amendment would cure the deficiencies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that psychiatrists and neurologists view ABPN’s MOC product as reasonably interchangeable with other CME offerings. The court found that, even if MOC participation could partially or fully satisfy state CME requirements, the additional time, cost, and effort required by the MOC program made it implausible that doctors would choose MOC over other CME products. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Lazarou v. American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology" on Justia Law

Earl Miller, who owned and operated several real estate investment companies under the 5 Star name, was responsible for soliciting funds from investors, primarily in the Amish community, with promises that their money would be used exclusively for real estate ventures. After becoming sole owner in 2014, Miller diverted substantial investor funds for personal use, unauthorized business ventures, and payments to friends’ companies, all in violation of the investment agreements. He also misled investors about the nature and use of their funds, including issuing false statements about new business activities. The scheme continued even as the business faltered, and Miller ultimately filed for bankruptcy.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Indiana indicted Miller on multiple counts, including wire fraud and securities fraud. At trial, the government presented evidence, including testimony from an FBI forensic accountant, showing that Miller misappropriated approximately $4.5 million. The jury convicted Miller on one count of securities fraud and five counts of wire fraud, acquitting him on one wire fraud count and a bankruptcy-related charge. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana sentenced Miller to 97 months’ imprisonment, applying an 18-level sentencing enhancement based on a $4.5 million intended loss, and ordered $2.3 million in restitution to victims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Miller’s appeal, in which he challenged the district court’s loss and restitution calculations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court reasonably estimated the intended loss at $4.5 million, as this amount reflected the funds Miller placed at risk through his fraudulent scheme, regardless of when the investments were made. The court also upheld the restitution award, finding it properly included all victims harmed by the overall scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Miller" on Justia Law

Three individuals who worked as precious metals futures traders at major financial institutions were prosecuted for engaging in a market manipulation scheme known as spoofing. This practice involved placing large orders on commodities exchanges with the intent to cancel them before execution, thereby creating a false impression of market supply or demand to benefit their genuine trades. The traders’ conduct was in violation of both exchange rules and their employers’ policies, and the government charged them with various offenses, including wire fraud, commodities fraud, attempted price manipulation, and violating the anti-spoofing provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over separate trials for the defendants. In the first trial, two defendants were convicted by a jury on all substantive counts except conspiracy, after the court denied their motions for acquittal and a new trial. The third defendant, tried separately, admitted to spoofing but argued he lacked the requisite criminal intent; he was convicted of wire fraud, and his post-trial motions were also denied. The district court made several evidentiary rulings, including admitting lay and investigator testimony, and excluded certain defense exhibits and instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions and the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that spoofing constitutes a scheme to defraud under the federal wire and commodities fraud statutes, and that the anti-spoofing statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court found sufficient evidence supported all convictions, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary or jury instruction decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and the district court’s denial of post-trial motions for all three defendants. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Fifteen individuals who purchased new motorcycles from a major American manufacturer received a limited warranty with their purchases. The warranty provided for free repair or replacement of defective parts for up to 24 months but excluded coverage for defects or damage caused by non-approved or non-manufacturer parts. The plaintiffs, concerned that using non-manufacturer parts would void their warranties, opted to buy higher-priced parts from the manufacturer. They later alleged that the company’s warranty practices unlawfully conditioned warranty coverage on the exclusive use of its own parts, in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and various state antitrust laws.The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the plaintiffs’ lawsuits and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint for failure to state a claim. It found that the limited warranty did not condition benefits on exclusive use of manufacturer parts and that the risk of losing warranty coverage was insufficient to establish an anticompetitive tying arrangement or economic coercion under state antitrust law. The court also dismissed related state law claims premised on the same conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Seventh Circuit held that the warranty’s terms did not create an express or implied tie prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, nor did the complaint plausibly allege violations of the Act’s disclosure or pre-sale availability requirements. The court further held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege sufficient market power or anticompetitive effects to support their state antitrust claims, and that the warranty’s terms were available to consumers at the time of purchase, precluding a Kodak-style lock-in theory. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims. View "Heymer v. Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas in Wisconsin alleged that several gas companies participated in a conspiracy to fix natural gas prices between 2000 and 2002. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in practices such as wash trading, churning, and false reporting to manipulate published price indices, which in turn affected the prices paid by purchasers in Wisconsin. The plaintiffs sought remedies under Wisconsin antitrust law, including both a “full consideration” refund of payments made under contracts tainted by the conspiracy and treble damages.The litigation was initially consolidated with similar cases from other states in multidistrict proceedings in the District of Nevada, where class certification was denied. After the Ninth Circuit vacated that denial and remanded, the Wisconsin case was returned to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. There, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), relying on expert testimony to show that the alleged price-fixing had a common impact on all class members. The defendants countered with their own experts, arguing that the natural gas market’s complexity and variations in contract terms precluded common proof of impact. The district court certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, but did not fully resolve the disputes between the parties’ experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court was required to engage in a more rigorous analysis of the conflicting expert evidence regarding antitrust impact and the existence of a national market. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class certification and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to make factual findings on these expert disputes before deciding whether class certification is appropriate. View "Arandell Corporation v. Xcel Energy Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, the Village of Schaumburg enacted an ordinance requiring commercial and multifamily properties to route fire alarm signals directly to a regional emergency-dispatch center. This ordinance aimed to reduce fire department response times and had financial benefits for the Village. Several alarm companies, which previously used a different model for transmitting alarm signals, claimed that the ordinance caused them to lose business and led to more expensive and lower-quality alarm services for customers.The alarm companies sued the Village, alleging that the ordinance violated the Contracts Clause and tortiously interfered with their contracts and prospective economic advantage. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially dismissed the federal claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed in part, allowing the Contracts Clause claim to proceed. However, on remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the Village, finding that the alarm companies failed to provide evidence that the ordinance caused customers to breach existing contracts or that the Village intended to interfere with their business relationships.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the alarm companies did not present sufficient evidence to show that the ordinance caused customers to breach contracts or that the Village acted with the intent to harm the alarm companies' businesses. The court also found that the alarm companies' claims of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage failed because the Village's actions were motivated by public safety and financial considerations, not a desire to harm the alarm companies. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg" on Justia Law