Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Illinois, voters can cast their ballots by mail, and election officials can receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after Election Day, provided they are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs, including Illinois voters and political candidates, challenged this procedure, arguing it unlawfully extends the voting period and dilutes their votes. They also claimed it forced them to spend additional resources on their campaigns beyond Election Day. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and also rejected the claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. The court found that Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury in fact, as their claims of vote dilution and additional campaign expenditures were deemed too speculative and generalized. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete and particularized injury. The court found that any potential vote dilution would affect all Illinois voters equally, making it a generalized grievance. Additionally, the court determined that the claimed campaign expenditures were speculative and not directly traceable to the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Indiana's ballot access laws by the Indiana Green Party, the Libertarian Party of Indiana, and associated individuals. They argue that the requirements for candidates to collect signatures amounting to 2% of the votes cast in the last Secretary of State election, the process for submitting petitions, and the early deadline for submission are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They also challenge the law's indexing of party-level access to the results of the most recent Secretary of State election.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Indiana’s Secretary of State. The district court concluded that the 2% signature requirement and the June 30 deadline for submitting petitions were constitutionally permissible, relying on precedent from the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. The court did not address the burdens created by the county-level submission requirement or the challenge to the indexing of the full slate access option.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Indiana's ballot access requirements do not impose severe burdens on the plaintiffs' rights. The 2% signature requirement, the June 30 deadline, and the county-level submission process were deemed reasonable and justified by the state's interests in preventing voter confusion and ensuring orderly elections. The court also found that the requirement for parties to garner 2% of the vote in the Secretary of State election to maintain full slate access was reasonable, given the alternative petitioning route available to candidates. The court concluded that the state's regulatory interests were sufficient to justify the challenged restrictions. View "Indiana Green Party v. Morales" on Justia Law

Indiana law allows 13 categories of voters, including “elderly” voters—those 65 or older--to vote by mail. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order for the November general election. Indiana voters who were allowed to vote absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for absentee voting, unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting, citing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Weeks before the 2020 general election, the Seventh Circuit (Tully I) affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that the right to vote does not include a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.Returning to the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court concluded that Tully I constituted controlling authority. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Given the circumstances under which Tully I was issued, that decision does not constitute the law of the case and is not binding. Considering the merits anew, the court held that Indiana’s granting the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not abridge the right to vote of those under 65 and does not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. View "Tully v. Okeson" on Justia Law

Federal law establishes “[t]he Tuesday after the 1st Monday in November[] in every even-numbered year” as “the day for the election,” 2 U.S.C. 7. Illinois law allows mail-in ballots postmarked on or by Election Day to be counted if received up to two weeks after Election Day. The plaintiffs, State Congressman Bost, and two voters and former presidential electors, argued that this extended ballot counting violates federal law and filed suit against the State Board of Elections to enjoin the practice.Within a month, the Democratic Party of Illinois (DPI) filed a motion to intervene as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in defense of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of DPI’s motion. DPI failed to point to any reason that the state’s representation of its interests “may be” inadequate, and the district court’s focus on public time and resources over DPI’s individual interests was not an abuse of its discretion. The court allowed DPI to proceed as amicus curiae if it decided to do so. View "Bost v. Democratic Party of Illinois" on Justia Law

In 2020, Reardon unsuccessfully ran for Coles County State’s Attorney against the incumbent, Danley. Reardon brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against public officials (including Danley), the City of Mattoon, and Coles County, alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.In 2019, Danley and the Mattoon Police Department (MPD) subpoenaed Reardon’s Facebook account information during an investigation into his potential involvement in a perjury/bribery case. A judge denied Reardon’s motion to quash but declined to release the documents until after a probable cause hearing. The Seventh Circuit noted that section 1983 curtails the availability of injunctive relief against judicial officers.Coles County Board Member Metzger removed a Reardon campaign sign from a resident’s lawn weeks before the election, allegedly mistakenly believing the sign was installed without permission. The Board determined that no further action was needed. Reardon did not sufficiently allege that Metzger was “acting under color of state law,” and Coles County is not liable based on the Board’s alleged ratification of Metzger’s conduct.Two weeks before the election, Mattoon Chief of Police Taylor posted a photo of himself (in uniform) with Danley, inside his office, on the official MPD Facebook page with a caption encouraging people to vote for Danley. Reardon failed to provide any authority to support that Taylor or Danley violated the Constitution. View "Reardon v. Danley" on Justia Law

independent-expenditure political action committees (super PACs) do not give money directly to candidates, party committees, or ballot-initiative movements. They spend money themselves to advocate for or against candidates, parties, or initiatives. The Fund wants to operate as an Indiana independent-expenditure PAC but fears that the state’s Election Code does not allow it to accept unlimited donations from corporations, in violation of the First Amendment. Indiana’s election officials say they do not believe their laws could be enforced that way.Indiana’s campaign finance laws allow corporations to make contributions "to aid in the election or defeat of a candidate or the success or defeat of a political party or a public question.” Section 4 imposes limits on direct corporate contributions to candidates and party committees but imposes no cap on contributions to committees unaffiliated with a political party, such as PACs. Section 5 ensures that corporations cannot use PACs as a loophole to avoid contribution caps by requiring corporations to designate their contributions to PACs “for disbursement to a specific candidate or committee listed under section 4.” Section 5 does not address how or whether a corporation could earmark a contribution for a PAC's independent expenditure for or against a candidate or party.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court Does the Indiana Election Code—in particular, sections 3-9-2-3 to -6—prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to PACs or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures? View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

In 2016, Gill ran as an independent candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. He was 2,000 signatures short of qualifying for the general election ballot. Gill sued members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, claiming that portions of the Illinois Election Code violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to evaluate the ballot access provisions for independent candidates under the fact-intensive balancing test set forth in Supreme Court precedent. The district court did so and again granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot. While the litigation was pending, Illinois adopted a redistricting plan that changed the boundaries of the 13th District so that the suit can no longer offer Gill any effectual relief. Any declaratory or injunctive relief would speak to a congressional district that no longer exists. Gill’s circumstances are not capable of repetition yet evading review. View "Gill v. Linnabary" on Justia Law

The Fund appealed the dismissal of its challenge to Indiana’s prohibition on corporate contributions to political action committees (PACs) for independent expenditures. Following oral argument, the Fund filed a “Motion Requesting Judicial Notice,” explaining that Morales has succeeded Sullivan as Indiana’s Secretary of State and has replaced Sullivan as a party to the case. Under Fed.R.App.P. 43(c)(2) the substitution happens automatically without any motion. The Fund sought judicial notice of the fact that there is no record evidence that Morales has taken any steps to disavow enforcement of Indiana’s Election Code prohibition on corporate contributions to PACs for purposes of independent expenditures.The Seventh Circuit denied the motion as “unnecessary” and “improper.” Nothing about Morales becoming Secretary of State calls jurisdiction into question. Nor does it materially alter anything about the issues. The Fund’s motion seeks one of two things, neither of which would be an appropriate use of judicial notice. It may attempt to define the likelihood that Secretary Morales will enforce the Election Code or it might attempt to highlight what it sees as a gap in the evidentiary record—that Secretary Morales has yet to make a statement regarding state regulation of independent-expenditure PACs. Judicial notice is only permitted for adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action challenging the conduct of the Lake County Election Board, holding that the Election Board did not violate Joseph Hero's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.Hero, a registered republican for forty years, opposed the decision of his town council to exercise its eminent-domain authority to seize the property of predominantly lower-income homeowners. Hero backed two independent candidates for town council running against two incumbent, pro-development candidates. Thereafter, the Indiana Republican Party banned Hero from the Republican Party for ten years. In 2019, Hero attempted to appear as a Republican candidate in the 2019 election, but the Election Board concluded that Hero could not run. Hero subsequently filed a complaint arguing that the Election Board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Hero had standing to sue; and (2) the Election Board did not violate Hero's constitutional rights. View "Hero v. Lake County Election Bd." on Justia Law

Indiana’s Act 442 allowed election officials to remove a voter from the state’s voter rolls automatically (without directly contacting the person) based on information acquired through a third-party database, “Crosscheck,” which provided the voter lists of multiple states. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Act 442 was preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20507(d), which requires hearing directly from that voter or providing notice to the voter that he would be removed from the rolls if he did not respond and failed to vote in the next two federal general elections.Indiana replaced Act 442 with Act 334, ending Indiana’s participation in Crosscheck in favor of the Indiana Data Enhancement Association, which is functionally identical to Crosscheck. The Act makes county officials responsible for deciding whether to remove a name, deleting Act 442’s requirement that county officials automatically remove the voter from the rolls. Act 334 instructs county officials to determine: whether a presumptive match in another state “is the same individual who is a registered voter of the county”; whether the registration in another state occurred after the presumptively matching Indiana registration; and whether the voter “authorized the cancellation of any previous registration” when the voter registered in the second state.The Seventh Circuit held that Act 334 is also preempted; it renders inapplicable the rule that a voter must personally authorize the cancellation of her registration before the county official may take that step. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Sullivan" on Justia Law