Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the early hours of July 19, 2018, Peoria Police Officer Ryan Isonhart fatally shot Luis Cruz, who was fleeing from officers and allegedly pointing a gun at Officer Nicholas Mason. Lyrah Hernandez, Cruz’s sister, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Cruz’s estate, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against Officers Isonhart and Mason, and the City of Peoria. The district court granted summary judgment for Officer Mason, and the case proceeded to trial against the remaining defendants. The jury found in favor of the defendants. Hernandez appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting certain evidence and excluding testimony from two individuals.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois admitted evidence including the crimes underlying the 49 messages, the Department of Child and Family Services investigation, Cruz’s incarceration at the time of his daughters’ birth, and his pending drug charge. The court found these pieces of evidence relevant to the officers’ state of mind and Cruz’s damages. The court also barred testimony from forensic scientist Jennifer MacRitchie, ruling it was expert in nature and not properly disclosed, and excluded a recorded statement from Shaquille Alexander, finding it lacked trustworthiness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions, finding that the admitted evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and that the exclusion of MacRitchie’s testimony and Alexander’s statement was appropriate. The court concluded that any potential error in admitting Cruz’s pending drug charge was harmless given the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hernandez v City of Peoria, Illinois" on Justia Law

Dennis Jones, a 42-year-old part-time grocery store cashier, applied for Social Security disability benefits, claiming that conditions related to his premature birth, including a cerebral hematoma, had worsened and prevented him from working full-time. The Social Security Administration denied his application, and Jones requested an administrative hearing. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Jones had the residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain limitations and concluded that he was not disabled.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois affirmed the ALJ's decision. Jones then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate a statement from Dr. James Runke, a consultative examiner, which Jones contended was a medical opinion.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Jones that Dr. Runke's statement, which indicated that Jones's pain and joint strain limited him to working 20 hours per week, constituted a medical opinion under the 2017 revised regulations. However, the court held that the ALJ was not required to evaluate the persuasiveness of this medical opinion because it addressed an issue reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security—whether Jones was capable of performing regular or continuing work. Consequently, the ALJ had no obligation to provide an analysis of Dr. Runke's statement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding the denial of benefits. View "Jones v Dudek" on Justia Law

Reyna Cruz slipped and fell in a Costco food court, injuring her neck, back, knee, and wrist, which led to back surgery. The incident was recorded by Costco’s surveillance cameras. The video showed no evidence of a smoothie spill or any customer purchasing a smoothie in the 28 minutes before Cruz’s fall. However, a woman with a child in a shopping cart was seen in the area shortly before the fall, and Cruz testified that she saw a pink substance on the floor, her shoe, and her pant leg after the fall. Costco employees who arrived at the scene did not recall seeing anything on the floor but cleaned the area and placed a “wet floor” sign. The manager’s incident report noted “smoothie drops” on the floor.Cruz filed a lawsuit in state court, which Costco removed to federal court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Costco, concluding that Cruz had not provided evidence that the smoothie spill was on the floor long enough for Costco to have constructive notice of its presence. The court also found that Cruz did not present evidence that Costco maintained a policy leading to dangerous conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Cruz presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding the presence and duration of the smoothie spill. The court noted that the surveillance video, viewed in the light most favorable to Cruz, could allow a reasonable jury to infer that the spill had been on the floor for at least 28 minutes, which could establish constructive notice. The court also found that Cruz did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Costco maintained a pattern of dangerous conditions.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v Costco Wholesale Corporation" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Jacobs was found guilty by a jury of several drug and gun possession offenses, as well as witness tampering. The case began when Jacobs appeared at a hospital with a gunshot wound and admitted to police that he had accidentally shot himself with a firearm he was not legally allowed to possess. A search of his home revealed firearms, ammunition, and drug-related evidence, including methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Jacobs was indicted on multiple counts, including illegal possession of firearms, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and witness tampering.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana handled the initial proceedings. During pretrial, the court granted a government motion to exclude evidence of Jacobs’s girlfriend’s pending criminal charges, which Jacobs wanted to use to suggest her potential bias. The jury trial proceeded, and Jacobs was convicted on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Jacobs raised two issues on appeal: a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights due to the district court's restriction on cross-examining his ex-girlfriend about her potential bias, and a Fourth Amendment challenge regarding the admission of drug evidence found in his home. The appellate court found that any potential Sixth Amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence against Jacobs. Additionally, the court determined that Jacobs had not shown good cause for failing to file a suppression motion regarding the drug evidence and that the search of the tobacco cans was within the scope of the warrant.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Jacobs’s convictions. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Matthew Cargo, a federal prisoner, attempted to file a notice of appeal after being sentenced on July 20, 2020. He had until August 3, 2020, to file the notice, with a possible extension to September 2, 2020. Cargo, while temporarily held in an Oklahoma jail, prepared the notice on July 22, 2020, and handed it to a correctional officer. However, he incorrectly addressed the envelope, leading to its return by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable. Cargo did not learn of the error until November 2024, after which he promptly resent the notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois received the notice in November 2024, four years after the deadline. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, and Cargo argued that he had complied with the prison-mailbox rule, which deems a notice of appeal filed when handed to prison officials for mailing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Cargo's addressing error precluded him from benefiting from the prison-mailbox rule. The rule requires that the notice be properly addressed to ensure it reaches the district court. Since Cargo's notice was returned as undeliverable, it did not meet the requirements of the rule. Consequently, the court dismissed Cargo's appeal as untimely, emphasizing that proper addressing is crucial for the prison-mailbox rule to apply. The court also noted that Cargo could have avoided this outcome by instructing his counsel to file the notice of appeal. View "USA v Cargo" on Justia Law

Efrain Leonides-Seguria, a Mexican citizen without legal status in the United States, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on June 15, 2021, for illegal reentry. Six days later, ICE referred him for criminal prosecution. On June 23, federal prosecutors filed a criminal complaint, and a magistrate judge issued an arrest warrant. Leonides-Seguria remained in immigration custody until June 28, when he was arrested on the criminal complaint. He later waived prosecution by indictment, consenting to the filing of a criminal information on July 27.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Leonides-Seguria’s motions to dismiss the federal charge, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconstitutional. He pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal these denials. The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Leonides-Seguria argued that the Speedy Trial Act was violated because the criminal information was filed more than 30 days after his apprehension. He urged the court to recognize a "ruse exception," where civil detention by immigration authorities is used to delay criminal prosecution. The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the legal question of the ruse exception, finding that the facts did not support its application. The court found no evidence of collusion between ICE and federal prosecutors to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, consistent with precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Leonides-Seguria" on Justia Law

Mark Sorensen, owner of SyMed Inc., a Medicare-registered distributor of durable medical equipment, was involved in a business arrangement with PakMed LLC, Byte Success Marketing, and Dynamic Medical Management. They advertised orthopedic braces, obtained signed prescriptions from patients' doctors, distributed the braces, and collected Medicare reimbursements. Byte and KPN, another marketing firm, advertised the braces, and interested patients provided their information, which was forwarded to call centers. Sales agents then contacted patients, generated prescription forms, and faxed them to physicians for approval. Physicians retained discretion to sign and return the forms, with many choosing not to.A federal grand jury indicted Sorensen on four counts: one count of conspiracy and three counts of offering and paying kickbacks for Medicare referrals. The jury found Sorensen guilty on all counts. Sorensen moved for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence and lack of awareness of the scheme's illegality. The district court denied his motions, finding the evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude Sorensen knew the fee structure and purchase of doctors' orders were illegal. Sorensen was sentenced to 42 months in prison but was released on bond pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment due to insufficient evidence. The court found that Sorensen's payments to PakMed, KPN, and Byte were for advertising, manufacturing, and shipping services, not for patient referrals. The court emphasized that the Anti-Kickback Statute targets payments to individuals with influence over healthcare decisions, which was not the case here. The court concluded that Sorensen's actions did not violate the statute, as there was no evidence of improper influence over physicians' independent medical judgment. View "USA v Sorensen" on Justia Law

Overhead Door Company of Indianapolis contracted with Blue Giant Equipment Corporation, a Canadian company, for the purchase of multiple dock levelers. After installation, Overhead experienced issues with the levelers and sued Blue Giant in federal court under diversity jurisdiction for breach of contract and warranty. Blue Giant moved to dismiss, citing a provision in its standard terms requiring arbitration in Ontario, Canada. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the standard terms were not incorporated into the parties' contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the case and denied Blue Giant's motion to dismiss. The court found that the mere reference to standard terms on a website was insufficient to incorporate those terms into the contract between Overhead and Blue Giant. Blue Giant appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Blue Giant's reference to its Terms and Conditions on its website was sufficient to incorporate those terms into the contract. The court noted that the reference was conspicuous and provided Overhead with reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms. The court concluded that the parties were obligated to resolve their dispute through arbitration in Ontario, Canada, as specified in the incorporated terms. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Garage Door Systems, LLC v Blue Giant Equipment Corp." on Justia Law

Griffith Foods International and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over a 35-year period. In 2018, a report revealed high cancer rates in Willowbrook, allegedly due to these emissions. Griffith and Sterigenics faced over 800 lawsuits from residents claiming bodily injuries, including cancer, caused by the emissions. Griffith had obtained permits from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) for the plant's operation, which included EtO emissions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case. Griffith and Sterigenics sought declarations that National Union Fire Insurance Company had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by IEPA permits. The court relied on the Illinois appellate decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp., which found ambiguity in the pollution exclusion when emissions were permitted by regulatory authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged the importance of the pollution exclusion in CGL policies and the precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms. The Seventh Circuit noted the conflicting interpretations between Koloms and Imperial Marble regarding the scope of the pollution exclusion. Given the significant implications for Illinois law and the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine the relevance of regulatory permits in applying the pollution exclusion in CGL policies. View "Griffith Foods International Inc. v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Griffith Foods International Inc. and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over 35 years. In 2018, a report linked these emissions to high cancer rates in the area, leading to over 800 lawsuits against the companies. The plaintiffs alleged that the companies knowingly emitted dangerous levels of EtO, causing various illnesses, including cancer.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois handled the insurance dispute between Griffith, Sterigenics, and National Union Fire Insurance Company. Griffith and Sterigenics sought a declaration that National Union had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by a permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on whether the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies applied to the emissions of EtO. The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms interpreted the pollution exclusion to apply to traditional environmental pollution. However, an Illinois appellate court decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp. suggested that emissions authorized by a regulatory permit might not constitute traditional environmental pollution.Given the conflicting interpretations and the significant implications for the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court sought clarification on the relevance of a permit or regulation authorizing emissions in assessing the application of a pollution exclusion within a standard-form CGL policy. View "Sterigenics U.S., LLC v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law