Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
USA v Daoud
An individual became the subject of an FBI investigation after law enforcement discovered his online activities promoting violent jihadist materials and expressing a desire to attack the United States. Undercover FBI agents corresponded with him, leading him to plan a terrorist attack on a Chicago restaurant, though the bomb provided was inert due to the FBI’s involvement. After his arrest, while in custody, he solicited the murder of an undercover FBI agent and later attacked a fellow inmate with improvised weapons over a religious dispute.Following these events, he was found incompetent to stand trial due to mental health issues but was later deemed competent after treatment. As his cases proceeded in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, he entered an Alford plea to all charges. The district court initially sentenced him to 16 years, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that sentence substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. During post-remand proceedings, he changed attorneys multiple times, ultimately choosing to represent himself at sentencing, a decision the district court permitted after a thorough inquiry. The district court then imposed a 27-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea, the validity of his waiver of counsel at sentencing, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, found his waiver of counsel to be knowing and voluntary, and determined that the 27-year sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v Daoud" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Tower Crossing Condominium Ass’n v Affiliated FM Insurance Co.
A condominium association managed a residential complex in Glenview, Illinois, that was insured under an all-risk policy by an insurance company from May 1, 2018, to May 1, 2020. After a storm allegedly damaged the roof on July 2, 2019, the association notified the insurer of the loss in August 2019, which initiated negotiations and an investigation. The insurance policy required the insured to file a “signed and sworn” proof of loss within 90 days, unless extended, and set a two-year limitations period to file any lawsuit, which could be tolled only if a valid proof of loss was under consideration or by written agreement. As the extended limitations period approached, the association’s president signed and had notarized a proof of loss for $2.95 million but did not submit it. The following day, a different proof of loss for $4.34 million was submitted, but it reused the notarized signature page from the unsubmitted version.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The court found that the submitted proof of loss was not “sworn” as required by the policy because the notarized signature did not attest to the actual contents of the submitted document. As a result, the limitations period was not tolled and the lawsuit, filed on November 19, 2021, was untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the insurance policy’s requirement of a “sworn” proof of loss meant that the insured must attest under oath to the specific statement submitted, and that substantial compliance was insufficient to toll the limitations period under Illinois law. Because the association did not submit a sworn proof of loss as required, its suit was time-barred. View "Tower Crossing Condominium Ass'n v Affiliated FM Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Insurance Law
United States of America v State of Illinois
Illinois enacted a law requiring certain nonprofit organizations that make substantial grants to publicly post aggregated demographic information about their directors and officers, including categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation. The American Alliance for Equal Rights, representing two member organizations, filed a pre-enforcement challenge, claiming that the statute compelled speech and encouraged discrimination, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States also intervened, pressing the Fourteenth Amendment claim under specific statutory authority. Both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to prevent enforcement of the law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed all motions together. It dismissed the Alliance’s claims related to the posting requirement for lack of standing and dismissed the United States’ complaint entirely on the same ground, also denying both preliminary injunction requests. The district court reasoned that the Alliance lacked standing because its members declared they would not provide demographic information, meaning there would be nothing to post. It also found the United States had not shown an injury in fact, as required for standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court found that the United States had standing to enforce federal constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause, even if a private plaintiff might not. The court also determined that the Alliance had standing because it was likely that at least one member’s officer or director would respond to the demographic survey, triggering the posting requirement. The court further held that using pseudonyms for member organizations did not defeat standing at this stage.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissals, vacated the denial of preliminary injunctions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States of America v State of Illinois" on Justia Law
Antrim v Hoy
Wisconsin law requires certain sex offenders, including those convicted of two or more sex offenses, to wear a GPS tracking device for life, even after completing probation or supervised release. The GPS device transmits real-time location data to law enforcement, which is regularly reviewed to ensure offenders avoid designated exclusion zones, such as schools and victims’ residences. While the monitoring is lifelong, offenders can petition to end the requirement after 20 years or if they become permanently incapacitated. Alton Antrim, who has multiple convictions for child sexual assault, challenged this law, alleging it violated the Fourth Amendment by subjecting repeat sex offenders to a lifelong, unreasonable search without regard for individual risk.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially denied Antrim’s request for a preliminary injunction, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent which upheld the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s GPS monitoring program for sex offenders. The district court later certified a class of similarly situated offenders and granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Corrections, reasoning that Antrim’s arguments amounted to criticisms of established circuit precedent and that the statute’s breadth did not render it unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Wisconsin’s lifetime GPS monitoring program is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, balancing the state’s strong public safety interest in monitoring repeat sex offenders and their diminished privacy expectations. The court rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment requires individualized risk assessments for monitoring, emphasizing that categorical policies are permissible when the government’s interest outweighs privacy concerns. The court’s decision was grounded in its prior rulings and relevant Supreme Court precedent. View "Antrim v Hoy" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Panton v Blanche
Robert Panton arrived in the United States in 1970 as a lawful permanent resident. In the late 1980s, he became involved in a major drug conspiracy and was convicted in 1992, receiving a life sentence. After serving over 25 years, he was released on compassionate grounds in 2020. Upon release, immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings to Jamaica. Panton claimed protection under the Convention Against Torture, but an Immigration Judge rejected this claim and ordered his removal. Panton later sought a U visa, arguing he was a victim of crime and assisted law enforcement, but his U visa application was still pending during these proceedings. He also needed a waiver of inadmissibility due to his conviction and removal order.Following the Immigration Judge’s removal order, Panton appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but was unsuccessful. He then obtained certification from the New York Police Department confirming he was a crime victim and had assisted in the investigation, but this evidence was received too late for the Immigration Judge. Panton filed a motion to reopen his case with the BIA, citing delays in obtaining the certification. The BIA denied the motion, stating that reopening was only possible sua sponte given the elapsed 90-day deadline and incorrectly dismissed the possibility of equitable tolling. The BIA also conflated the issuance of a U visa with the waiver of inadmissibility and failed to address Panton’s request for discretionary closure pending the Department of Homeland Security’s visa decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted Panton’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA. The court held that the BIA erred by failing to address equitable tolling and conflating visa issuance with waiver authority, and it must properly consider Panton’s arguments and the agency’s responses on remand. View "Panton v Blanche" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Immigration Law
Cherry v USA
Federal agents arrested a man after a sting operation involving a confidential informant. The informant identified the defendant as someone involved in drug transactions and arranged a meeting where agents observed the defendant accepting sham cocaine. Upon arrest, agents found heroin, crack cocaine, and cash in the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant admitted to prior drug dealings with the informant. He was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and went to trial, where a jury convicted him.Before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant’s sentencing included two enhancements: one under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) for a prior felony drug conviction and another under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for being a career offender. Defense counsel did not challenge these enhancements. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison and 8 years of supervised release. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the sentencing enhancements and to certain testimony at trial. The district court denied relief, finding the enhancements valid and counsel’s performance reasonable.On collateral review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that counsel’s failure to challenge the § 841(b)(1)(B) statutory enhancement was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as it affected both the advisory Guidelines range and mandatory minimums. However, the court rejected claims regarding the career-offender enhancement and admission of the agent’s testimony, finding no prejudice or legal error. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, while affirming the conviction. View "Cherry v USA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Anderson Federation of Teachers v. Rokita
In this case, Indiana enacted legislation in 2021 that imposed new requirements on public school teachers who wished to have union dues automatically deducted from their paychecks. These requirements included submitting a written authorization containing a specific statement regarding their First Amendment rights, annual renewal of the authorization, confirmation via official work email, and annual notice of their right to resign from the union. These procedures applied only to teachers and not to other public employees in Indiana.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the case after teachers’ unions and individual members challenged the law, arguing it violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The district court initially found that the mandated statement on the authorization form constituted compelled speech and issued a preliminary injunction. After Indiana amended the statute in response, the district court concluded that the revised law no longer violated the Free Speech Clause, but still found that the additional requirements on teachers constituted viewpoint discrimination against their freedom of association. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the provisions and the State appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the authorization form’s required statement was government speech, not compelled private speech, and did not violate the Free Speech Clause. However, the court agreed with the district court that the additional requirements imposed only on teachers and their unions amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment’s Freedom of Association protections. The court applied strict scrutiny and found Indiana’s justifications insufficient. As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment permanently enjoining enforcement of the challenged provisions. View "Anderson Federation of Teachers v. Rokita" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law
Indeck Power Equipment Co. v Ashley Energy LLC
Ashley Energy, an energy company in Missouri, experienced flooding at its plant and leased a boiler and water treatment trailer from Indeck Power Equipment to maintain operations. The lease required Indeck to provide a “like-new” boiler and new trailer, and Ashley to operate and maintain the equipment according to industry standards, specifically ABMA guidelines, and pay for repairs beyond ordinary wear and tear. After the boiler was returned, Indeck discovered scale and debris, attempted to clean it, and ultimately sued Ashley, alleging breach of contract and seeking over $3 million in damages. Ashley had previously sued Indeck in Missouri state court, but that case was dismissed due to a forum selection clause.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois conducted a jury trial. The jury found that Indeck had performed its contractual obligations and that Ashley had breached the contract. However, the jury concluded that Indeck failed to prove it had sustained damages as a result of Ashley’s breach, finding insufficient evidence that Ashley’s actions directly caused damage beyond normal wear and tear. Indeck’s post-trial motions for a new trial and for attorneys’ and experts’ fees were denied, with the district court explaining that the verdict could be rationally explained by evidence that Indeck’s own actions or equipment contributed to any damage or that no damage beyond ordinary wear and tear occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the jury’s verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent and was supported by plausible explanations from the record, and that Indeck was not entitled to attorneys’ fees as a non-prevailing party under the lease’s provisions. View "Indeck Power Equipment Co. v Ashley Energy LLC" on Justia Law
Center for Gestalt Development, Inc. v Bowman
The case concerned the rights to publish an unpublished article, “Psychopathology of Awareness,” written by Dr. Frederick Perls. Dr. Perls’s widow, Laura Perls, inherited the copyright to this article. In 1991, her estate entered an agreement with the Center for Gestalt Development, granting the Center exclusive rights to publish a collection of Dr. Perls’s unpublished manuscripts, which included the article. However, the Center did not publish the collection until 2021. In the mid-2010s, Charles Bowman acquired a copy of the article and, together with Jean-Marie Robine, decided to publish it with additional commentary. Before publishing, Bowman and Robine sought and received permission from Dr. Perls’s children, who had inherited the copyright to the article itself, to include it in their book.After learning of Bowman and Robine’s plans, the Center contacted them to assert its own purported rights, but the Center refused their offers of collaboration. Bowman and Robine then obtained an oral license from the Perls siblings, communicated through Leslie Gold, authorizing them to use the article. In 2021, following litigation, the Perls siblings assigned their rights in the article to the Center until the conclusion of this lawsuit.The Center sued Bowman and Robine for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The district court found that the Center’s 1991 agreement conveyed rights only in the collection as a whole, not in the article individually. It further determined that Bowman and Robine had an irrevocable oral license to use the article before the Center acquired the copyright.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Bowman and Robine. The main holding was that ownership of a compilation copyright does not confer rights in the individual components, and the oral license granted to Bowman and Robine precluded infringement claims by the Center. View "Center for Gestalt Development, Inc. v Bowman" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Copyright, Intellectual Property
Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC v City of Blue Island
Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC and its principal, Ashley McCoy, applied for a business license to operate a bakery in Blue Island, Illinois. After initially positive interactions with city officials, the license was denied based on the City’s finding that the applicants had hosted unapproved, paid events involving “infused” treats and entertainment, which the City deemed inconsistent with the intended bakery business. The City also cited evasive conduct by McCoy during inspections. The denial was sustained after an administrative hearing, and the applicants did not pursue further administrative review before the City Council as required by municipal code.Instead of completing the administrative review, the plaintiffs sought judicial review in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for untimely filing. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiffs filed a federal suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, raising constitutional and state-law claims stemming from the license denial.The district court dismissed the federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, concluding that the plaintiffs were seeking review of a state-court judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from the City’s administrative action, not the state-court judgment. The appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, noting that claim preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, might bar the suit, but left that issue for the district court if raised by defendants. View "Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC v City of Blue Island" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law