Contreras pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking offenses in three separately charged criminal cases assigned to three different district judges. When calculating the guidelines range at sentencing, each judge applied an upward adjustment of two offense levels after finding that Contreras maintained a premises—his home— “for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his concurrent 87-month sentences, rejecting an argument that each judge erred by not comparing the frequency of legal activity to the frequency of illegal activity that occurred at his residence. The eight drug transactions that Contreras conducted at his home support a finding that drug trafficking was a primary use of the residence, not an incidental or collateral one. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sherman died from gunshot wounds. When police arrived, Sherman lay on the ground with 50-60 people gathered around. Long was tried for first-degree murder. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime. The state presented four witnesses; two recanted at trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor made improper statements, resulting in a new trial. At Long’s second trial, the state again presented the four eyewitnesses. One maintained her identification of Long. Two, having previously recanted, continued to deny having seen Long shoot Sherman, despite their prior videotaped statements. The prosecutor failed to correct Irby when she claimed that she had not previously stated that her identification was coerced; defense counsel impeached that testimony. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made comments that no evidence was presented that another individual committed the crime and referenced the contents of a letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury found Long guilty. His state court appeals and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Long’s federal habeas petition, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims procedurally defaulted and that Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument prejudiced the outcome; and that Long’s ineffective assistance claim was without merit. “[W]hat occurred [Irby's testimony] may well have helped the defense rather than the prosecutor.” View "Long v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Convicted of multiple counts of sex trafficking, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and attempted sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and 1594(c), Sawyer was sentenced to 50 years' incarceration. After unsuccessful appeals, Sawyer sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, stating that “the Government offered the Petitioner a plea offer, which included a term of imprisonment of 15 years” and that counsel advised him to reject it because “the Government’s case against him was weak.” Sawyer attached affidavits from his mother and grandmother, in which they attest to discussing the plea offer with Sawyer. The government argued that Sawyer’s petition failed to provide sufficient evidence that the government made him an offer. The district court denied Sawyer’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, noting that Sawyer did not attach a proposed plea agreement or an affidavit from trial counsel regarding any agreement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. If he is able to prove on remand that the government did offer a plea deal, Sawyer will have to establish that his attorney’s advice was objectively unreasonable and that, with competent advice, he would have accepted the plea deal, but at this point in the proceedings, Sawyer has sufficiently alleged both of those required elements. View "Sawyer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Saxon was convicted in Illinois state court of the 1995 first-degree murder of a 12-year-old girl, arson, and concealment of homicide. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. After his state appeals were exhausted, Saxon sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state’s case included testimony from 15 witnesses, numerous stipulations and exhibits. The victim’s mother testifed that Saxon was at her house almost every day, and was there the night the girl disappeared. Saxon’s aunt testified that she had lived at the residence with the garage in which the victim’s burned body was found before the fire and that Saxon frequently visited. By the time police obtained a search warrant for a sample of Saxon’s blood in 2000, Saxon was serving a 10-year prison sentence following a conviction for the sexual assault of his nephew. Saxon’s blood sample showed that his DNA matched the DNA profile found on the sperm fraction found on the victim’s body. Eventually, Saxon admitted that he had sex with the victim. The evidence was sufficient to find Saxon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged was not objectively unreasonable. View "Saxon v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

Madden, suffering from morbid obesity, respiratory acidosis, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity hypoventilation syndrome, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia, was admitted to the V.A. Hospital several times before his last admission on December 28, 2007. The Hospital placed Madden in respiratory isolation. On the same day, Madden’s wife described him as “not being himself,” and unsuccessfully requested the presence of a staff member in the room with Madden at all times. The Hospital allowed Madden to sit in a wheelchair because of his difficulty with lying in bed. Madden consistently reported that he was feeling fine, with a few comments about shortness of breath. On January 1, 2008, Madden was found unresponsive in his wheelchair. It took the Hospital 25 minutes to resuscitate him; Madden had suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest. On January 25, Madden was transferred to a long‐term care facility. He never regained consciousness and died on January 8, 2010. Madden’s estate filed a wrongful death suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of the government, agreeing that the government’s expert’s opinions were supported by medical records, relevant literature, data, studies, and medical explanations; while the government successfully impeached the family’s expert, a family friend, for lack of consultation of relevant medical literature and even Madden’s medical records. View "Madden v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Asentic, a Bosnian Serb who is now 65, was granted refugee status and brought his family to the U.S. from the former Yugoslavia more than 15 years ago. He has been a permanent resident for nearly that long, but the Board of Immigration Appeals authorized the government to remove Asentic because, in applying for refugee status, he failed to disclose his participation as a combatant in the Bosnian conflict during the 1990s. The Board could have granted Asentic a discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H) but declined to do so. The Seventh Circuit rejected Asentic’s appeal. “Although he presents a sympathetic case,” he is removable based on fraud, and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary decision to deny the waiver. View "Asentic v. Sessions" on Justia Law

From 1986-2015, Forgue was a Chicago Police Department (CPD) officer. Forgue alleges that, from 2012-2015, he was harassed by fellow police officers for adhering to CPD policy and procedure and for filing numerous internal complaints. Forgue filed suit against the city and individual officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, civil conspiracy, and procedural due process, and related state law claims. He claimed, among other things, that he was denied a Retirement Card when he retired. Without one, Forgue cannot carry a concealed firearm, procure benefits such as health insurance, or find other employment in law enforcement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Forgue’s complaints were made pursuant to his job responsibilities; he spoke as a public employee, not a private citizen, so Forgue’s speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection. The district court properly rejected Forgue’s equal protection class-of-one claim and his conspiracy claims. Reversing the dismissal of a procedural due process claim, the court stated that Forgue sufficiently alleged that he has a legitimate entitlement and cognizable property interest in receiving a Retirement Card. View "Forgue v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After participating in a scheme that involved “retirement investment seminars,” Oliver pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for defrauding investors. Because Oliver used their money for personal expenses or invested it in high-risk schemes, investors lost a total of $983,654. The district court sentenced Oliver to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by failing to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities, relying on inaccurate information, not calculating the Guidelines range for supervision, and imposing a two‐level leadership enhancement. The sentence fell within the recommended Guidelines range and Oliver failed to object at the time of sentencing. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Sanders has been in solitary confinement for eight years, and the prison plans to keep him there for another ten. He has been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and other conditions that make him dangerous to others. Sanders alleged in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that the isolation, heat, and restricted airflow in solitary confinement harm aggravate his psychological problems and his asthma. The filing fee in federal court is $400. Sanders asked for permission to litigate in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b), which is unavailable if the prisoner has, on three or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Sanders conceded that at least three of his prior suits or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of his suit, citing “the exception to the exception.” Sanders argued that his mental condition disposes him to self-harm, that he has twice tried to commit suicide, and has engaged in self-mutilation. Sanders’s history, coupled with the prison’s diagnosis of his condition, make his allegations plausible. The court stated that a court cannot simply disregard such an allegation as self-serving. View "Sanders v. Melvin" on Justia Law

In 1998 Haynes was convicted of 12 federal crimes and sentenced to life plus 105 years in prison. His direct appeal and a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 failed. After the Supreme Court retroactively held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C.924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague in labelling as a violent felony a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” the Seventh Circuit authorized Haynes to pursue another collateral attack. The district court concluded that Johnson implies the invalidity of the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii), under which Haynes’s life sentences were imposed and concluded that Haynes must be resentenced. The court did not invalidate any of his convictions. Haynes argued that three of his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions for use of a firearm in committing a crime of violence depended on a conclusion that interstate travel in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(2), is a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The length of Haynes’ new sentences for Hobbs Act robbery may affect the appropriate length of his section 924(c) sentences. When a judge in a section 2255 proceeding orders a resentencing, that proceeding is not over, and the decision is not appealable until that resentencing has occurred. View "Haynes v. United States" on Justia Law