Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William Hudson was convicted in Wisconsin state court of conspiracy to commit first-degree intentional homicide and conspiracy to commit arson. The convictions stemmed from an agreement Hudson made with another inmate, Scott Seal, to kill Seal’s ex-girlfriend and commit arson in exchange for payment. Seal, however, was an informant. After Hudson was released, he met with an undercover officer posing as Seal’s defense attorney, accepted an envelope with $6,000 and the targets' addresses, and was arrested. Hudson claimed he never intended to commit the crimes but was trying to scam Seal to support himself and his sister, Dana Hudson.Hudson filed a direct appeal alleging outrageous governmental conduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not arguing the government’s conduct. The Wisconsin circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review. Hudson then filed a postconviction motion under Section 974.06, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling Dana as a witness and not investigating her testimony. The Wisconsin circuit court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Hudson filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and postconviction counsel. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state court had not misapplied Strickland v. Washington and that trial counsel’s performance satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Hudson failed to demonstrate that the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of the case. View "Hudson v DeHaan" on Justia Law

Bellin Memorial Hospital hired Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc. to upgrade its computer software. Kinsey failed to implement the agreed-upon software, leading Bellin to sue Kinsey in Wisconsin state court for breach of contract and other claims. Bellin also sued Kinsey’s president and a senior product consultant. Kinsey’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, provided a defense under a professional liability insurance policy. During the trial, Bellin and Philadelphia Indemnity entered into a partial settlement, resolving some claims and specifying the conditions under which Bellin could collect damages from Kinsey. Bellin prevailed at trial and was awarded damages.The Wisconsin circuit court ruled that the limited liability provision in the Agreement did not apply due to Kinsey’s material breach. The court granted a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim against Kinsey, leaving the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded Bellin $1.39 million, later reduced to $750,000 plus costs. The jury found Kinsey and its president not liable for intentional misrepresentation and misleading representation.Philadelphia Indemnity filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that the state court’s judgment was covered by the insurance policy and that the $1 million settlement offset the $750,000 judgment. The district court ruled for Bellin, concluding that the state court judgment was not covered by the insurance policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, and the state court’s judgment was based on a breach of contract, not negligence. Therefore, the $1 million set-off provision did not apply, and Bellin could recover the full amount of the judgment. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v Kinsey & Kinsey, Inc." on Justia Law

Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions. View "USA v Sheffler" on Justia Law

Attorney Stephen Eberhardt filed a 102-page, 19-count complaint against 11 defendants, including the Village of Tinley Park, its officials, attorneys, and residents, alleging a scheme to prevent him from making public comments at Village board meetings and on Village-related Facebook pages, violating his constitutional rights. He also brought claims against the Village’s outside counsel, Patrick Walsh, under the Illinois Open Meetings Act. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for being too lengthy and jumbled. Eberhardt then filed an amended complaint, which was also dismissed, and the court entered final judgment.Following the judgment, Walsh’s attorney filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Eberhardt’s claims were frivolous and filed in bad faith to harass Walsh. The district court granted the motion, ordering Eberhardt to pay $26,951.22 in attorneys’ fees, finding that his claims were frivolous and brought with inadequate investigation into the relevant law and facts. The court noted Eberhardt’s history of filing numerous lawsuits and motions, which indicated bad faith.Eberhardt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the district court’s decision to sanction him and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. The court affirmed the sanctions order, agreeing that Eberhardt’s claims were frivolous and brought in bad faith, and that a hearing was not necessary as the record was adequate to determine the need for sanctions. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to reconsider, finding no manifest errors of law or fact. View "Eberhardt v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Clarence Bonds, serving a 71-month sentence for transporting a firearm in interstate commerce as a felon, sought a reduced sentence based on Amendment 821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This amendment, which applies retroactively, reduced Bonds's criminal history category from IV to III, thereby lowering his advisory Guidelines range from 57–71 months to 46–57 months. Bonds requested the district court to reduce his sentence accordingly. The district court acknowledged the amendment's impact but declined to reduce his sentence, citing the need for deterrence, incapacitation, public protection, and Bonds's extensive criminal history, which included numerous violent crimes with firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The court recognized the amendment's effect on Bonds's criminal history category and advisory range but exercised its discretion to maintain the original sentence. The court emphasized Bonds's long criminal history and the serious nature of his offenses as reasons for not reducing the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Bonds's motion for a sentence reduction. The appellate court agreed that the district court had adequately considered the relevant factors under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and provided a sufficient explanation for its decision. Additionally, the appellate court addressed whether the Criminal Justice Act authorized the appointment of appellate counsel for Bonds in his effort to challenge the district court's ruling. The panel was divided on this issue, with each judge providing a separate opinion. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Bonds's motion on the merits. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

A family of six Mexican citizens entered the United States without authorization and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. They hired an attorney to help them apply for asylum. Despite having nearly fifteen months to prepare, the attorney requested a continuance only eight days before the hearing, citing the government shutdown as a reason for her lack of preparation. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the continuance and, due to the attorney's unpreparedness, deemed the asylum applications abandoned, ordering the family's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The family appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the cases of two family members due to lack of jurisdiction, as their removal proceedings had been terminated after they received special immigrant status. The remaining four family members argued that the IJ erred in denying the continuance and that their attorney was ineffective. The court found that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance, as the attorney had ample time to prepare and failed to do so. The court also noted that the attorney's unpreparedness did not violate the family's due process rights.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged the attorney's failure to prepare but noted that the family did not present this claim to the BIA, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the court could not consider the ineffective assistance claim. The court suggested that the family could seek to reopen the proceedings through a motion to reopen or by requesting equitable tolling of the deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petitions of two family members and denied the petitions for review of the remaining four family members. View "Bustos-Millan v. Garland" on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

In 2015, two plaintiffs sued the Chicago Board of Education and various officials, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights and state law. During a deposition in 2017, a confrontation occurred between plaintiffs' attorney Caryn Shaw and opposing counsel Lisa Dreishmire. Shaw allegedly assaulted Dreishmire, leading to police involvement and a complaint to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Shaw misled the court about the incident, prolonging the litigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sanctioned Shaw by removing her from the case and ordering "Plaintiffs' counsel" to reimburse the defendants for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Shaw and her co-counsel, Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, appealed the sanctions. The district court's sanctions were based on findings that Shaw intentionally pushed Dreishmire and misrepresented the incident to the court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the sanctions against Caryn Shaw, finding that she had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the potential sanctions. However, the court vacated the sanctions against Anne Shaw and Donald Villar, concluding that they did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to respond. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the fee award against Caryn Shaw. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Vega v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law

Anthony D. Lee, Sr. was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault in 1996 and sentenced to 100 years in prison. Lee's defense was that the victim had voluntarily entered his car and that any sexual activity was consensual. He later sought postconviction relief, arguing that his attorney, Richard Friedman, had failed to interview several potential witnesses who could have corroborated his testimony. Lee supported his motion with six affidavits from these potential witnesses. The trial court denied Lee's ineffective-assistance claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision.Lee then sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The appellate court found that the state court had based its prejudice analysis on the flawed assumption that each witness would have merely repeated their affidavits and refused to say another word if called to testify. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Lee's claim.After a three-day hearing, the district court again denied Lee's § 2254 petition. The court concluded that Lee failed to establish that Friedman's performance fell below an objective standard of professional competence. Alternatively, the court concluded that any errors Friedman might have committed did not meaningfully compromise Lee's defense given the strength of the state's case. Lee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Lee failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the result of his trial would have been different had Friedman not committed professional errors. The court noted that none of the affidavits provided an explanation for the severity of the victim's injuries, and that the additional testimony from the witnesses may have ultimately weakened Lee's defense by contradicting his testimony or their own affidavits. View "Lee v. Galloway" on Justia Law