Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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Reyna Cruz slipped and fell in a Costco food court, injuring her neck, back, knee, and wrist, which led to back surgery. The incident was recorded by Costco’s surveillance cameras. The video showed no evidence of a smoothie spill or any customer purchasing a smoothie in the 28 minutes before Cruz’s fall. However, a woman with a child in a shopping cart was seen in the area shortly before the fall, and Cruz testified that she saw a pink substance on the floor, her shoe, and her pant leg after the fall. Costco employees who arrived at the scene did not recall seeing anything on the floor but cleaned the area and placed a “wet floor” sign. The manager’s incident report noted “smoothie drops” on the floor.Cruz filed a lawsuit in state court, which Costco removed to federal court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Costco, concluding that Cruz had not provided evidence that the smoothie spill was on the floor long enough for Costco to have constructive notice of its presence. The court also found that Cruz did not present evidence that Costco maintained a policy leading to dangerous conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Cruz presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding the presence and duration of the smoothie spill. The court noted that the surveillance video, viewed in the light most favorable to Cruz, could allow a reasonable jury to infer that the spill had been on the floor for at least 28 minutes, which could establish constructive notice. The court also found that Cruz did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Costco maintained a pattern of dangerous conditions.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cruz v Costco Wholesale Corporation" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law

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Vonzell Scott was shot while waiting in his car at a Wendy’s drive-thru in Chicago around 3:00 am on December 31, 2018. Scott had a brief altercation with another driver, but it ended peacefully. Shortly after, two armed individuals approached Scott’s car and opened fire, injuring him. Scott sued Wendy’s, alleging negligence for not providing overnight security guards, which he claimed could have prevented the shooting.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Wendy’s. The court found that while Wendy’s owed a duty to protect Scott from intentional third-party assaults, the specific shooting incident was so aberrant that Wendy’s failure to provide security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court concluded that the shooting was unforeseeable and that additional security would not have prevented it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the extreme, isolated, and unprovoked nature of the shooting made it unforeseeable as a matter of law. The court noted that while there was evidence of prior crimes in the area, none were similar to the shooting Scott experienced. The court concluded that Wendy’s could not have reasonably foreseen the attack, and therefore, the lack of security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court emphasized that the foreseeability of an injury is context-dependent and that the specific type of violence Scott endured was not reasonably foreseeable based on the prior incidents. View "Scott v Wendy's Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

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Felix Franco, a commercial truck driver, was asleep in his parked semi-trailer truck when it was hit by another truck driven by an employee of Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC. Franco claimed that the accident caused a back injury that necessitated surgery, while Richland acknowledged the accident but disputed the cause of Franco's injury. Franco had a history of degenerative back problems and had experienced back pain before the accident. The case went to trial, and a jury found in favor of Richland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial trial. Franco sought to admit medical illustrations as evidence, but the court only allowed two as demonstrative exhibits. The court provided jury instructions and a special verdict form, focusing on whether the accident caused Franco's injury. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Richland, and Franco's post-trial motions were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, including the denial of Franco's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the accident did not cause Franco's injury. The court also upheld the jury instructions and special verdict form, stating they accurately reflected Wisconsin law. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude two of Franco's medical illustrations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Franco v Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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Clarence Lewis, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, sued various medical staff members, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his health issues, violating the Eighth Amendment. Lewis claimed misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diabetes, COPD, irritable bowel syndrome, and Hepatitis C. He also contended that his grievance about a delay in diabetes medication was not properly addressed.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Lewis's motions for recruited counsel, stating he could represent himself and obtain relevant documents. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, concluding no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. The court also granted summary judgment for Dr. Paul, citing claim splitting due to a similar prior lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, finding no reasonable likelihood that recruited counsel would have changed the outcome. The court noted that Lewis's disagreement with his diagnoses and treatments did not constitute deliberate indifference. As for Administrator Lindor, her limited role and the lack of harm from the medication delay further supported the judgment.However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Dr. Paul, agreeing with Lewis that the district court's application of claim splitting was erroneous. Dr. Paul had raised this defense too late, effectively acquiescing to the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Dr. Paul, with the district court advised to reconsider Lewis's request for recruited counsel if the claim proceeds to trial. View "Lewis v Sood" on Justia Law

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In January 2021, Bertrand Nedoss, an 87-year-old resident of an assisted-living facility in Morton Grove, Illinois, wandered out of the facility, developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate filed a negligence and wrongful-death lawsuit against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner, and Frontier Management, its operator. Welltower and Frontier were insured under a "claims made" policy by Church Mutual Insurance Company, effective from July 1, 2020, to July 1, 2021. The estate filed the lawsuit in October 2021, after the policy expired. However, nine days after Bertrand’s death, an attorney for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the facility, claiming an attorney’s lien and demanding evidence preservation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the attorney’s letter qualified as a "claim" under the policy, triggering Church Mutual’s duty to defend. The court entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier and stayed the rest of the federal case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. On the eve of oral argument, Welltower and Frontier settled with the estate, and the state-court case was dismissed. This development mooted the appeal. The stay order was the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction, and the partial summary judgment was not a final order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the dismissal of the state-court case removed the justification for the stay and rendered any appellate ruling on the stay irrelevant. View "Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Frontier Management, LLC" on Justia Law

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On the night of July 18, 2019, in Charlestown, Indiana, bystanders called 911 to report a fight between RJ Slaymaker and his wife, Amylyn Slaymaker. Two police officers responded, separated the couple, and learned from Amylyn that RJ was drunk, had hit her, had guns, and was threatening to kill her and himself. RJ denied the allegations. The officers called an ambulance for RJ to seek mental health help at a hospital but did not place him under a 24-hour mental health hold. RJ left the hospital shortly after arriving, returned home, and killed Amylyn before committing suicide.The administrator of Amylyn’s estate sued Officer Roederer and the estate of Officer Johnson, claiming they created a danger by misleading Amylyn into believing RJ would be held for 24 hours, thus making her believe it was safe to return home. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding Officer Roederer, finding no evidence of his personal involvement in making assurances to Amylyn. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding Officer Johnson, finding that a jury could reasonably infer that he misled Amylyn about RJ’s detention, creating a danger she would not have otherwise faced. The court held that Officer Johnson’s actions could be seen as a violation of clearly established law under the state-created danger doctrine, as established in Monfils v. Taylor. The case against Officer Johnson’s estate was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rakes v. Roederer" on Justia Law

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Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

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Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law