Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Griffith Foods International and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over a 35-year period. In 2018, a report revealed high cancer rates in Willowbrook, allegedly due to these emissions. Griffith and Sterigenics faced over 800 lawsuits from residents claiming bodily injuries, including cancer, caused by the emissions. Griffith had obtained permits from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) for the plant's operation, which included EtO emissions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case. Griffith and Sterigenics sought declarations that National Union Fire Insurance Company had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by IEPA permits. The court relied on the Illinois appellate decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp., which found ambiguity in the pollution exclusion when emissions were permitted by regulatory authorities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged the importance of the pollution exclusion in CGL policies and the precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms. The Seventh Circuit noted the conflicting interpretations between Koloms and Imperial Marble regarding the scope of the pollution exclusion. Given the significant implications for Illinois law and the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine the relevance of regulatory permits in applying the pollution exclusion in CGL policies. View "Griffith Foods International Inc. v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Griffith Foods International Inc. and Sterigenics U.S. operated a medical supply sterilization plant in Willowbrook, Illinois, emitting ethylene oxide (EtO) over 35 years. In 2018, a report linked these emissions to high cancer rates in the area, leading to over 800 lawsuits against the companies. The plaintiffs alleged that the companies knowingly emitted dangerous levels of EtO, causing various illnesses, including cancer.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois handled the insurance dispute between Griffith, Sterigenics, and National Union Fire Insurance Company. Griffith and Sterigenics sought a declaration that National Union had a duty to defend them under their commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The district court ruled in favor of Griffith and Sterigenics, determining that the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies did not apply because the emissions were authorized by a permit from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on whether the pollution exclusion in the CGL policies applied to the emissions of EtO. The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms interpreted the pollution exclusion to apply to traditional environmental pollution. However, an Illinois appellate court decision in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Imperial Marble Corp. suggested that emissions authorized by a regulatory permit might not constitute traditional environmental pollution.Given the conflicting interpretations and the significant implications for the insurance industry, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court sought clarification on the relevance of a permit or regulation authorizing emissions in assessing the application of a pollution exclusion within a standard-form CGL policy. View "Sterigenics U.S., LLC v National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Kevin Shibilski was charged with environmental and wire-fraud crimes and conspiracy to defraud the United States, related to his operation of three Wisconsin-based companies involved in recycling electronic equipment. Shibilski pleaded guilty to a single felony count of willful failure to pay employment taxes, and in exchange, the government dropped the other charges. During the sentencing hearing, Shibilski objected to the presentence report’s recommendations regarding relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly the recommendation to hold him responsible for the total amount of unpaid employment taxes for all three companies. The district judge held a seven-hour sentencing hearing, most of which was consumed by the presentation of documents and testimony, including testimony from Shibilski himself.The district judge found Shibilski responsible for the full amount of unpaid taxes. The judge also declined to award credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), finding that Shibilski had falsely denied responsibility for relevant conduct. After weighing the statutory sentencing factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.Shibilski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the judge violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by unduly curtailing his attorney’s presentation of evidence, that the judge improperly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), and that the judge committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully address the statutory sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Shibilski" on Justia Law

The Middle Mississippi is the 195-mile-long stretch from St. Louis, Missouri, where the Missouri River flows into the Mississippi, to Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi and doubles its flow. The 1910 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct permanent river training structures in the Middle Mississippi and perform supplemental dredging to maintain a channel sufficient for commercial traffic. The Corps has for decades built and maintained structures—dikes, jetties, and chevrons—along the Middle Mississippi to ensure that the channel is at least nine feet deep and 300 feet wide for commercial navigation. In 1976, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the project's ecological impacts. In 2013, the Corps decided to supplement its 1976 EIS, based on newly designated threatened and endangered species, and new information on the effects of river training structures and dredging. In the final supplemental EIS and record of decision, the Corps chose the “Continue Construction Alternative.” Because the exact locations and types of future river training structures are unknown, the supplemental statement studied environmental impacts at a programmatic level and will perform site-specific environmental assessments before actually building additional river training structures.In a challenge brought by environmental groups, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, rejecting arguments that the supplemental EIS did not comply with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 1041, or the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. View "National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Utility companies responsible for a planned electric transmission line asked the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to allow construction across the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge alongside an existing road and railroad. Rural Utilities Service completed an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). FWS adopted the statement and issued a right-of-way permit.While litigation was pending, the utility companies sought to slightly alter the route and asked FWS to consider a land exchange. FWS discovered that it had relied on incorrect easement documents in issuing its original determination. It revoked the determination and permit but promised to consider the proposed land exchange. The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups but declined to enjoin ongoing construction of the project on private land outside the Refuge.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first rejecting a mootness argument. FWS has revoked the compatibility determination but has not promised never to issue a new permit. However, FWS’s current position does not meet the criteria of finality. Whatever hardship the plaintiffs face comes not from FWS’s promise to consider a land exchange but from the Utilities’ decision to build on their own land, so the district court erred in reviewing the merits of the proposed land exchange. Plaintiffs’ request for relief against the Utilities under NEPA likewise is premature. Adopting the environmental impact statement did not “consummate” the decisionmaking process. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural Utilities Service" on Justia Law

The government is investigating Doe for suspected criminal violations of the Clean Water Act. With a search warrant, agents conducted a day-long search of Doe’s premises. An hour into the search, agents ordered Doe to turn off all security cameras. After the search, Doe contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office and accused the agents of violating the Fourth Amendment in executing the search. Doe also filed an emergency motion to unseal the affidavit supporting the warrant, attaching still images from security-camera video footage of the search, showing agents pointing guns at employees.. Doe refused the government’s request to view the original video. The government served Doe with a grand-jury subpoena for the video.Doe argued that the video was irrelevant to the potential Clean Water Act violations and that the subpoena was for the improper purpose of conducting pre-trial discovery before Doe’s criminal trial or for potential civil litigation over the alleged constitutional violation. The government argued that “the grand jury is entitled to consider potential evidence of law enforcement misconduct in evaluating whether to indict” and that the video could be directly relevant, because it could provide details on what evidence was collected during the search, which employees had access to evidence, and whether anyone tampered with potential evidence. The district court quashed the subpoena. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The grand jury is entitled to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the collection of evidence relevant to its investigation. View "United States v. Doe Corp." on Justia Law

Sandstone operated large-scale swine farms in Scott County. Its owner also owned Red Oak. In 2007-2008, Westfield insured Sandstone. After 2008, Indemnity insured Sandstone. Star provided insurance to Red Oak. Sandstone was named as an additional insured under Star’s policy in 2009. In 2010, neighbors brought private nuisance claims against Sandstone in Illinois state court (“Marsh action”). Sandstone notified the three insurance companies. Each agreed to defend Sandstone, subject to a reservation of rights. Indemnity, citing a coverage exclusion for claims involving ”pollutants,” sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend. Sandstone withdrew its tender of defense to Indemnity, which dismissed its suit without prejudice. Star and Westfield split the defense of the Marsh action. An Illinois appellate court held that odor claims involving a hog facility are not “traditional environmental pollution” and are not excluded under insurance policy pollution exclusions, which foreclosed Indemnity’s earlier argument. Sandstone notified Indemnity, which filed another federal declaratory judgment action. In the Marsh action, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Sandstone. Westfield and then sought reimbursement of their defense costs.Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of Indemnity. Its insurance is "excess" and Star had a duty to defend, so Indemnity’s “other insurance” provision relieves it of any duty to defend Sandstone. Indemnity is not estopped from asserting that defense because it promptly responded to Sandstone’s tender of defense. View "Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Westfield Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The environmental harm at the Indianapolis property developed over at least 50 years. Four adjacent properties have changed hands several times and have been used for manufacturing and industrial businesses that used degreasers and various chemical products. The solvents have degraded over time and have seeped into the groundwater and soil in the surrounding residential area. Investigations showed that vapors emitting from the underground contamination have intruded into homes and a local park. Major acquired the property in 2007 and has not released any hazardous materials.Von Duprin. whose predecessor once owned property in the area, undertook cleanup efforts and sought to recover some of those costs and future remediation costs. Von Duprin sued former and current owners and operators of the properties under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. Current owners or operators of a site where hazardous materials were released may be held liable under CERCLA without having caused a release.The district court found that Von Duprin and two other former or current owners and operators in the area bore responsibility for portions of the environmental harm, then assigned liability among and between all three parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part but vacated the court’s threshold determination under section 107(a) of CERCLA that liability for remediating the environmental harm is divisible—capable of being apportioned on the basis of principles of causation—among and between the parties to this litigation. View "Von Duprin LLC v. Major Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1937-2006, Johnson operated a Goshen, Indiana manufacturing plant that used chlorinated volatile organic compounds in a degreasing process. Some of the chemicals reached the groundwater. TCE, a carcinogen, is part of the breakdown process. Johnson, under the supervision of Indiana’s Department of Environmental Management, began cleanup while the plant was still operating, ensuring that houses using wells were connected to the city’s water mains, pumping and treating groundwater, and determining that the municipal water supply did not come from the contaminated plume. TCE did appear in the air above the plume, so houses were treated to prevent the gas from entering.Plaintiffs sued under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a), The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Johnson, finding that Johnson was not in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, prohibition, or order. The risk from the TCE is currently neither imminent nor substantial. View "Schmucker v. Johnson Controls, Inc." on Justia Law