Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a noncitizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 and, after surviving a car accident and being detained, was served with a notice to appear at a Chicago immigration hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of the hearing; a later notice with that information was sent to an Indiana address provided by the petitioner during her detention. The petitioner claims she never lived at that address, having moved to Ohio after the accident. She failed to appear at the hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. No action was taken on the removal order for sixteen years.Years later, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which clarified notice requirements for removal hearings. She argued these decisions should allow equitable tolling of the deadline to reopen her case and render her eligible for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge denied her motion, finding no basis for equitable tolling and declining to reopen sua sponte. While her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was pending, she filed a second motion to reopen, arguing for the first time that she had not received proper notice of the hearing. The Board found this second motion was numerically barred and rejected her lack-of-notice claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Niz-Chavez does not equitably toll the statutory deadline to reopen a final order of removal when the claimed defect could have been raised earlier with diligence. It also held that the petitioner’s second motion was properly denied as numerically barred. The court further dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the claim that the Board erred by declining to reopen the case sua sponte, as no constitutional or legal error was identified. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Coatl-Chiquito v Blanche" on Justia Law

A native of Ivory Coast and citizen of Mali entered the United States as a student in 2000. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2010 for failing to maintain his student status. He admitted the allegations and conceded removability. While his removal case was pending, he was a victim of domestic violence by his U.S. citizen spouse, leading to her criminal conviction and their eventual divorce. He applied for a U visa and for cancellation of removal as a victim of domestic violence. His attorney withdrew from representation in June 2019. Before his scheduled October 2019 immigration hearing in Chicago, the petitioner was robbed, losing his savings and becoming destitute. He was unable to secure transportation to the hearing after his friend failed to provide a ride and he lacked funds for a bus ticket. He did not contact the Immigration Court to explain his absence. The Immigration Judge ordered him removed in absentia.After the Immigration Judge denied his motion to reopen and rescind the removal order—finding he failed to show "exceptional circumstances" for missing the hearing—the petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board agreed, reasoning that his financial hardship and failed transportation arrangements did not amount to exceptional circumstances because he had not demonstrated that these events prevented him from notifying the court in advance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Seventh Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. The court found that, although the petitioner faced significant hardships, his failure to notify the court of his predicament undermined his claim of exceptional circumstances. The petition for review was denied. View "Nimaga v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A stateless individual born in Germany entered the United States illegally as a child and lived in the country for decades, marrying a U.S. citizen and raising three children who are also U.S. citizens. After his application for asylum was denied, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings based on his lack of legal entry. He conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal, asserting that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, including his wife, children, and father, all U.S. citizens. During removal proceedings, he and his wife testified primarily about their financial dependence on him, their close-knit family, and concerns about discrimination against gypsies in Europe.An Immigration Judge denied his application, finding insufficient evidence to meet the hardship standard. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, largely adopting the Immigration Judge’s reasoning. Later, the petitioner moved to reopen the proceedings, presenting new evidence about his wife’s mental health diagnoses, a past miscarriage, family members’ medical conditions, and reports of discrimination and poor economic conditions in Germany. The Board denied this motion, concluding that much of the new evidence could have been previously presented and that, even considered collectively, the evidence did not establish prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed both the denial of cancellation of removal and the denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was supported under either clear error or substantial evidence review. The court further held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. The petitions for review were accordingly denied. View "Petrov v Blanche" on Justia Law

An individual entered the United States without authorization prior to 2018. After she was convicted in Illinois state court for possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, federal immigration authorities issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) against her under expedited procedures, and she was removed to Mexico in August 2018. Subsequently, she reentered the United States without authorization. She later obtained an amendment of her state conviction to simple possession, arguing the original charge overstated her conduct. Relying on this development, she requested that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reopen and cancel her prior removal order. A Deportation Officer in the Chicago Field Office responded by email, stating the office would not revisit the 2018 order.After the Deportation Officer declined to act, the individual petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review the decision under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a). She characterized the email as a reviewable final order of removal. Meanwhile, DHS had not reinstated the 2018 removal order but had instead initiated new removal proceedings by issuing a Notice to Appear, beginning a new immigration process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition because the email from the field office was not a “final order of removal” as defined by statute or relevant precedent. The court explained that the 2018 removal order was already executed and had not been reinstated, and that the petitioner was now subject to new removal proceedings. Because there was no reviewable order before it, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Velazquez-Olais v Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen originally from Yemen filed family-based visa petitions (Form I-130) in 2002 on behalf of several relatives, including his stepdaughter. The immigration authorities sent a notice of intent to deny these petitions and a subsequent denial letter to the address provided on the petition. The petitioner did not respond, and the petitions were denied. Twenty years later, the petitioner sued, asserting that he never received the notices because the agency had mistakenly sent them to an address where he did not live, and that this lack of notice violated the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. He attached a redacted version of his petition to his complaint, omitting the address at issue.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, initially denied the government’s motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint plausibly supported the application of the discovery rule or equitable tolling and otherwise stated a claim. However, when the government moved for judgment on the pleadings and submitted an unredacted copy of the I-130 petition showing that the petitioner himself had listed the very address to which the notices were sent, the court found this document dispositive. The petitioner did not meaningfully contest the authenticity or content of the unredacted petition, failed to appear at the hearing, and did not object to the government’s supporting affidavit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the unredacted I-130 petition conclusively refuted the petitioner’s factual claims. The court held that when a plaintiff’s own incorporated documents contradict the complaint’s allegations, those documents control. The court affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment for the government, finding that the due process and APA claims failed as a matter of law. View "Muthana v Mullin" on Justia Law

A Polish citizen was approved for an immigrant visa in 2009 based on a petition filed by her U.S. citizen sister. While awaiting visa availability, she remained in the United States unlawfully for over a year, making her inadmissible and subject to a ten-year bar from reentering the country. In 2020, her mother, a lawful permanent resident, died. She then applied for a waiver of her inadmissibility, citing her mother’s death as the qualifying hardship, and sought relief under a statutory provision that allows certain applications to proceed despite the death of a qualifying relative.The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her waiver application, explaining that the relevant policy only applies if the deceased relative had been the qualifying petitioner for the underlying visa, which in her case was her sister, not her mother. Attempts to reopen or reconsider the decision were also denied. She then sought relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, requesting a declaratory judgment on her eligibility and challenging the agency’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed her case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the relevant immigration statutes precluded judicial review of the agency’s waiver decisions.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the statute unequivocally bars judicial review of all agency decisions regarding waivers of inadmissibility, including eligibility determinations, and that such decisions are committed to agency discretion. The presumption of reviewability under the APA was rebutted by the statute's clear jurisdiction-stripping language. The court also publicly admonished the plaintiff’s attorney for including fictitious citations in the appellate brief but imposed no further sanctions. View "Dec v Mullin" on Justia Law

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Kentucky to attempting to receive stolen property, in violation of state law. Several years later, federal immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his state conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, specifically for receipt of stolen property. Hassan challenged this, arguing that the Kentucky statute criminalizes some conduct that would not be considered an aggravated felony under federal law, which requires proof that the defendant had a subjective knowledge or belief that the property was stolen.The immigration judge agreed with Hassan, determining that the Kentucky statute was broader than the federal definition and granting his motion to terminate the removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the Kentucky conviction did count as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Hassan then sought review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that it was not clear whether Kentucky law requires subjective knowledge or belief, or whether a conviction could be based merely on what a reasonable person would have known (“constructive knowledge”). Because Kentucky case law was ambiguous on this point, the court declined to decide the issue itself. Instead, the Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court, specifically asking whether Section 514.110 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes requires subjective knowledge or belief that property is stolen, or if a conviction could be based solely on an objective standard. The Seventh Circuit held the case in abeyance pending guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court. View "Hassan v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, alleging that the agencies were arresting noncitizens without a warrant in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). After years of litigation, the parties entered into a Consent Decree in 2021, approved by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 2022. The Decree required the agencies to issue a policy statement, train officers, and document compliance with § 1357(a)(2). It also outlined procedures for enforcement and modification if violations were alleged.Prior to the Decree’s scheduled expiration in May 2025, Plaintiffs moved to enforce its terms and to extend its duration, asserting substantial noncompliance by Defendants. While these motions were pending, a DHS official declared the Decree terminated. On October 7, 2025, the district court found Defendants had violated the Decree, extended its term by 118 days, and ordered compliance-related relief. Later, Plaintiffs sought release or alternative detention for hundreds of individuals allegedly arrested in violation of the Decree. On November 13, 2025, the district court ordered the release of 13 individuals whom both parties agreed were arrested unlawfully, and additionally ordered release or alternatives for approximately 442 “potential class members,” pending determinations of violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Defendants’ emergency motion to stay the district court’s October 7 and November 13 orders. The Seventh Circuit denied the request to stay the extension of the Consent Decree, holding that Defendants were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their argument that the extension violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). However, the court granted the stay as to the November 13 release order for those arrested pursuant to I-200 warrants and for “potential class members” pending individualized determinations under the Decree. The ruling sets forth the standards for stays and clarifies the limitations of § 1252(f)(1) in the context of class-wide injunctive relief and consent decree enforcement. View "Castanon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Five Indian citizens entered the United States on F-1 student visas, completed their studies, and enrolled in “optional practical training” (OPT) programs. They allege that the organizations providing their OPT programs failed to deliver any actual training or work, and ultimately ceased communication. After returning to India for brief visits, each attempted to reenter the United States. At the airports, immigration officials revoked their visas. Four were subjected to expedited removal, while the fifth was permitted to withdraw his application for entry. All five returned to India and subsequently filed suit from abroad.The plaintiffs brought their case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the administrative findings that they had misused the OPT program. They claimed they never received notice of any administrative proceedings or an opportunity to respond. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A)(i), which generally bars judicial review of individual determinations or claims arising from expedited removal orders under §1225(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge the underlying findings, rather than the removal orders themselves, did not avoid the jurisdictional bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that §1252(a)(2)(A)(i) precludes judicial review not only of expedited removal orders but also of the underlying justifications for those orders. The court further concluded that the administrative findings regarding the OPT programs were not “final” agency actions reviewable under the APA, as they were merely steps leading to the removal orders. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Dubey v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A woman and her son fled Honduras in 2016, fearing violence from the former leader of their land cooperative, who had been ousted after allegations of embezzlement and violence against dissenters. The woman had publicly opposed this leader and received threats from his associates, including intimidation outside her home. After arriving in the United States, she learned that other cooperative leaders had been murdered, which she attributed to the same individual. Although her immediate family remained in Honduras without incident, she believed her public opposition made her a unique target if she returned.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her and her son. She conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing threats and violence linked to the former cooperative leader. An immigration judge found her testimony credible but denied all relief, concluding she had not suffered past persecution and did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The judge found that Honduran authorities were able and willing to protect her and that she could reasonably relocate within Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, relying on the findings regarding government protection and internal relocation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusions that Honduran authorities were both willing and able to protect the petitioner and that she could reasonably relocate within Honduras. Because either ground was sufficient to deny relief, the court denied the petition for review. View "Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi" on Justia Law