Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law

Eulalia Mateo-Mateo and her two minor children, all Guatemalan citizens, sought asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Mateo claimed that the mother of her children's father had physically and verbally abused her and would continue to do so if she returned to Guatemala. Mateo and her children were apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol upon arrival, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. They conceded removability, and Mateo applied for asylum and related relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found Mateo credible but denied her applications. The IJ concluded that Mateo did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. The IJ also found that Mateo did not establish that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her. Mateo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's findings and deeming Mateo's claim for CAT relief waived due to lack of meaningful identification of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and the Board's opinions. The court found that Mateo's claims for asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal failed for two independent reasons: she did not challenge the finding that the Guatemalan government was not unable or unwilling to protect her, and substantial evidence supported the finding that she did not experience persecution on account of a protected ground. The court also concluded that Mateo's CAT claim failed on exhaustion grounds, as she did not challenge the Board's finding of waiver. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Mateo-Mateo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Andre Bowyer, a Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to re-entering the United States without permission after being previously removed. During his sentencing, Bowyer attempted to highlight his ties to a family he had formed in the U.S. The district judge interrupted him frequently, characterizing Bowyer's account as lacking insight and unconvincing. Bowyer received a below-guidelines sentence.Bowyer appealed, arguing that his right to make his own statement at sentencing was violated. He conceded that he did not object during the district court proceedings, so the review was limited to the plain-error standard. Bowyer did not specify what additional arguments he would have made if given more time. The district court had read a letter from Bowyer detailing his background and his relationship with the family, but the judge found this information irrelevant to the sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that while the district judge's interruptions were frequent, they did not completely prevent Bowyer from speaking. The judge also solicited further comments from Bowyer at the end of the allocution. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not plain because there was no unambiguous case law against such interruptions. Additionally, Bowyer's arguments were already considered by the judge, and there was no indication that further allocution would have led to a different sentence.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Bowyer did not meet the plain-error test for reversal and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Bowyer" on Justia Law

David Bernardo-De La Cruz, a Mexican national, has lived in the U.S. without legal authorization for nineteen years. He was pulled over for speeding in 2014, which led to his immigration status being questioned. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, citing his long-term residence, good moral character, and the potential hardship his removal would cause his U.S. citizen daughters. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, finding that his removal would not cause an "exceptionally high level of hardship" for his daughters. However, the IJ granted him voluntary departure. Bernardo-De La Cruz appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge (TAIJ) Gabriel Gonzalez upheld the IJ's findings, including the determination that Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters would remain in the U.S. after his removal. The TAIJ acknowledged evidence suggesting that one daughter required special educational services but did not find it sufficient to warrant a different outcome. Bernardo-De La Cruz then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency exceeded its authority in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), the appointment of the TAIJ was unconstitutional, and the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), which limits voluntary departure for noncitizens contesting a removal order, was within the agency's statutory authority. The court also found that TAIJ Gonzalez was lawfully appointed by the Acting Attorney General, not the EOIR Director, thus complying with the Appointments Clause. Finally, the court determined that the IJ and BIA had adequately considered the evidence regarding the hardship to Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters. The petition for review was denied. View "Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, Alfredo Viveros-Chavez, was found in the United States without lawful immigration status after previously being removed. He was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits noncitizens from reentering the U.S. without authorization. Viveros-Chavez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee due to its discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of racial animus behind the statute’s enactment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the discriminatory-intent framework from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., rather than rational basis review. The court acknowledged that the predecessor to § 1326, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was motivated by racial animus but found little evidence that such animus influenced the enactment of § 1326 in 1952. The court also found the statistical evidence presented by Viveros-Chavez unpersuasive, noting the lack of evidence that the government disproportionately targeted Mexican and Latino individuals for illegal reentry prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 1952 Congress was not motivated by racial animus when enacting § 1326. The court also noted that the statistical evidence provided by Viveros-Chavez was insufficient to demonstrate a disparate impact on Mexican and Latino individuals. View "USA v. Viveros-Chavez" on Justia Law

A family of six Mexican citizens entered the United States without authorization and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings. They hired an attorney to help them apply for asylum. Despite having nearly fifteen months to prepare, the attorney requested a continuance only eight days before the hearing, citing the government shutdown as a reason for her lack of preparation. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the continuance and, due to the attorney's unpreparedness, deemed the asylum applications abandoned, ordering the family's removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The family appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court dismissed the cases of two family members due to lack of jurisdiction, as their removal proceedings had been terminated after they received special immigrant status. The remaining four family members argued that the IJ erred in denying the continuance and that their attorney was ineffective. The court found that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance, as the attorney had ample time to prepare and failed to do so. The court also noted that the attorney's unpreparedness did not violate the family's due process rights.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged the attorney's failure to prepare but noted that the family did not present this claim to the BIA, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the court could not consider the ineffective assistance claim. The court suggested that the family could seek to reopen the proceedings through a motion to reopen or by requesting equitable tolling of the deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petitions of two family members and denied the petitions for review of the remaining four family members. View "Bustos-Millan v. Garland" on Justia Law

A former immigration attorney was convicted of conspiring with clients, interpreters, and employees to defraud the U.S. by submitting fabricated asylum applications. The attorney would create false stories for clients, often including fabricated details of persecution, and submit these to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Interpreters assisted by coaching clients to memorize false information and providing fraudulent translations during asylum interviews. Nine former clients testified against the attorney, and the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to defraud the U.S.The attorney's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming undisclosed benefits were provided to witnesses. The district court authorized broad discovery, held a weeklong hearing, and denied the motion. The court found that undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that post-trial benefits did not violate the attorney's rights as they were not promised to witnesses and would not have affected the trial's outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the undisclosed pre-trial benefits were immaterial and that the post-trial assistance provided to witnesses did not constitute a Brady violation. The court found no evidence of pre-trial promises regarding immigration status and concluded that the undisclosed availability of an "insider" for post-trial assistance was not material to the trial's outcome. The attorney's § 2255 motion was denied. View "Dekelaita v. USA" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security served Pilar Sandoval Reynoso with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for unlawfully residing in the United States. Sandoval applied for cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, concluding that he did not establish ten years of continuous physical presence, did not show that his qualifying relative children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial, including the discretionary finding.The IJ found that Sandoval had not established ten years of continuous physical presence and had not shown that his children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also determined that Sandoval did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion due to his history of criminal and civil infractions, including multiple illegal entries into the U.S. and a DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Sandoval did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The court also lacked jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s review of the IJ’s decision. Consequently, the court dismissed Sandoval’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder of his petition. View "Sandoval Reynoso v. Garland" on Justia Law

Juan Santiago Lopez, a Mexican citizen, sought to overturn an immigration judge's denial of his request for cancellation of removal. Lopez had been in the United States for nearly 20 years, working for the same company and raising four children with his wife. However, he had also accumulated three convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him after his third conviction. Lopez conceded his removability but applied for cancellation of removal relief, arguing that his family circumstances, particularly the burden his removal would place on his wife, warranted cancellation.The immigration judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation of removal but granted his request for voluntary departure. The judge acknowledged Lopez's positive equities, such as his long-term residence, employment, and family ties in the U.S., but found that his history of drunk driving and disregard for U.S. laws outweighed these factors. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lopez challenged the immigration judge's discretionary decision and argued that the missing date and time information in his Notice to Appear required termination of removal proceedings. The court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, which clarified that courts lack jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to an immigration judge's discretionary decision denying cancellation of removal. The court also rejected Lopez's argument about the Notice to Appear, noting that objections to such violations can be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner. View "Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Maria Elvia Smith, a Mexican citizen, was denied legal status in the U.S. by immigration authorities. Smith had been married to a U.S. citizen, Arlo Henry Smith, Sr., who filed a Form I-130 petition to classify her as his immediate-relative spouse. However, Arlo died while the petition was pending, and it automatically converted to an I-360, Widow(er) Petition. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Smith's I-360 petition, concluding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her marriage to Arlo was bona fide for immigration purposes. This conclusion was based on evidence of Smith's continued relationship with her ex-husband and her inconsistent statements to immigration officials.Smith sued the United States Attorney General, USCIS, and the Board, alleging that they improperly denied her I-360 petition and violated her Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed her complaint, finding that she did not plausibly allege that USCIS and the Board acted improperly in denying her petition, acted without observance of the procedure required by law, or substantively violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agencies had considered the evidence, applied the proper standards and burden of proof, and validly elected not to credit Smith’s statements in light of her past untruthfulness. The court also found that the agencies had complied with the procedures required by law and that Smith had received all the process due to her. Finally, the court rejected Smith's claim that the agencies violated her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. View "Smith v. Garland" on Justia Law