Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Kipp, an Illinois resident, purchased a chairlift ticket at Devil’s Head Ski Resort in Merrimac, Wisconsin. He claims that as a result of the “unreasonably fast speed” of the lift in the boarding area, he was injured (broken collarbone) as he was attempting to board it. After allowing Kipp to conduct limited discovery, the Illinois district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that the defendant’s only offices are in Wisconsin. The company does not engage in print or broadcast advertising in Illinois, but it does attend a trade show that takes place in Chicago every year. At the show, Ski Enterprise representatives speak with potential customers and obtain their email addresses. The company later sends out “email E blasts” to those contacts. There is also a website, through which customers can reserve rooms at the resort; they cannot purchase lift tickets on the site. The resort offers a vacation package called the “Chicagoland Express,” but the package is not limited to Illinois residents. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of the resort’s clients are from Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, describing defendant’s contacts with Illinois as insubstantial and episodic. View "Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp." on Justia Law

Doe, a minor female, was drinking in a group at an apartment complex in Arlington Heights and Mount Prospect. A site manager called 911. Three males began moving Doe to a secluded area. She was so intoxicated that they had to hold her up. Arlington Heights Officer Del Boccio arrived, talked to the males, allowed them to leave with Doe without asking for identification, and left the scene. One of the three, Balodimas, was on probation for armed robbery; Doe and the other males were minors. Del Boccio reported that the subjects were gone on arrival. The three males then carried Doe into a laundry room. When the site manager observed this, he again called 911. Mount Prospect police responded and caught Balodimas sexually assaulting Doe. Doe sued Del Boccio and Arlington Heights, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state claims. The district court dismissed and denied Doe’s motion to amend her complaint to allege that Del Boccio was a racist who wanted harm to come to her because she was a white girl socializing with African-Americans. Doe referred to an incident when Del Boccio, operating an unmarked police car, ran over and killed an eight-year-old African-American boy and lied to cover it up. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Del Boccio did not create the danger, nor did he do anything to make the danger to Doe worse. View "Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights" on Justia Law

Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific freight train carrying steel injection molds to Plano Molding in Illinois derailed in Oklahoma; the molds broke through the floor of their shipping container, causing that train car and many behind it to derail. The molds had been manufactured in China and shipped to the U.S. before being transferred to the train. Three companies that were involved in the shipment and that sustained losses sued Plano, claiming that a company Plano hired packed the molds improperly, causing the floor of the container to break and ultimately causing the derailment, so that Plano was liable for breach of a warranty found in the “World Bill of Lading,” which provided shipping terms. Plano argued that the molds were properly packed and that they fell through the floor of the container because the container was defective. The district court found in favor of Plano, finding that the derailment was caused by deficiencies in the container. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plano had no obligation to explain why the accident occurred. Once the court found that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that Plano had breached the warranty, the actual cause of the accident became legally irrelevant. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

Reed claims that during a 2012 stay at the hospital, its staff ignored her requests, treated her poorly, refused to consult with her regarding her care, and physically injured her when she was forcibly discharged. An amended complaint alleged an unelaborated claim of “retaliation,” a violation of the ADA, and state-law claims. The judge dismissed, without prejudice, after considering whether any of her claims asserted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 or the retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12203. Reed filed a second case, asserting that she suffers from tardive dyskinesia plus post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and acute anxiety; she uses a computer to communicate. The complaint alleged specific instances of mistreatment and various constitutional violations 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, finding that her claims were precluded by the dismissal of her earlier suit and that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act could offer her any remedy. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the complaint stated viable claims. View "Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp." on Justia Law

Matichak was injured at work in 2009 and filed a workers’ compensation claim. Matichak filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2010, disclosing the claim, valued at $7,500. About a year after the discharge, Matichak filed a tort suit against firms that, he maintained, had contributed to his injury, seeking substantial damages. Defendants sought summary judgment, because Matichak had not listed any tort claim in his bankruptcy assets. Matichak then notified the Trustee, who reopened the bankruptcy and moved to replace Matichak as the plaintiff in the tort suit. The district court allowed the substitution but held that recovery could not exceed the value of debts that had not been paid in 2010. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The judge did not find that Matichak deliberately hid the tort claim; he claims that he thought that the workers’ compensation claim was his only potential source of compensation. Allowing the tort suit to proceed without a damages cap will allow the Trustee to hire counsel to take the suit on a contingent fee. If Matichak was trying to deceive his creditors, the bankruptcy judge may decide to give the creditors a bonus, or to return any excess to the tort defendants. View "Metrou v. M.A. Mortenson Co." on Justia Law

Michael's brother, Kevin, purchased a lakefront lot. Michael was to cover expenses and ultimately purchase the lot. A dispute arose and Kevin put the lot up for sale. Kevin offered to reimburse Michael $54,049.10 and directed Michael to stop tampering with “For Sale” signs. Michael recorded a lien. Although Michael had about a 5% interest in the lot, the lien stated that Kevin “acquired title for convenience only.” Kevin sought a declaration of quiet title, and alleged slander of title, partition, and breach of contract. The jury was instructed, based on Wis. Stat. 706.13(1), which defines slander of title as submitting, entering, or recording, claim of lien, lis pendens, writ of attachment, financing statement or other instrument relating to a security interest in or the title to property, if the submitter “knows or should have known” that any part of the instrument was false, a sham, or frivolous. An interlocutory judgment of $281,000 was entered for Kevin. Michael filed a bankruptcy petition. Kevin asserted that their judgment was precluded from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) as a “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court concluded that the issue was preclusively decided and entered judgment for Kevin. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state court jury’s slander of title findings did not preclusively established that Michael acted “willfully.” The verdict could have been based on negligence. View "Gerard v. Gerard" on Justia Law

Nearly two years after he stopped using CIBA contact lenses, Kallal sued the company, claiming that a defect had hurt his eyes. CIBA itself had spotted a problem of poor permeability with some of its lenses and had issued a major recall. CIBA claimed that Kallal never used the recalled lenses. Noting that Kallal’s proof of defect relied entirely on the recall, and that the evidence showed that Kallal himself never purchased any of the recalled lenses, the district court granted judgment for CIBA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once CIBA demonstrated that the lenses that it manufactured and Kallal used were not subject to the recall, the company was entitled to summary judgment View "Kallal v. CIBA Vision Corp." on Justia Law

Lodholtz was injured in the Pulliam factory and sued, seeking compensation. Pulliam filed a claim with its insurer, Granite State, which retained a claims adjuster, York. Pulliam assumed, erroneously, that Granite would provide a defense and defaulted on the state court claim. Neither Granite nor York ever had communicated to Pulliam whether they believed Granite had a duty to defend Pulliam under the terms of the policy. Pulliam subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with Lodholtz, assigning to Lodholtz any claims it had against Granite or its agents for failing to undertake a defense. The agreement also provided that Lodholtz would not seek to recover its damages from Pulliam. Granite sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify Pulliam. Lodholtz later filed a complaint against Granite, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and negligence, and against York for negligence. The district court consolidated the cases. After the district court entered a final judgment in favor of York, Lodholtz appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Indiana has held that an insurance adjuster owes no legal duty to the insured, and Lodholtz failed to establish that the Indiana Supreme Court would disagree with that decision. View "Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law