Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2021, the Cook County Health and Hospitals System implemented a policy requiring all personnel to be fully vaccinated against infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Exemptions were allowed for disability, medical conditions, or sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, who are healthcare employees or contractors, requested religious exemptions, which were granted. However, the accommodation provided was a transfer to unpaid status pending termination, with a limited time to find a non-existent remote position. Plaintiffs argued this was religious discrimination violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois previously denied plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions against the vaccine mandates, including Cook County’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the mandate. On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint but were denied permission to add a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act until after the court ruled on the County’s motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the second amended complaint, considering it a facial challenge, which had already been ruled upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs waived their as-applied challenge by not raising it in the district court or their opening brief on appeal. The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded they no longer sought injunctive relief and did not pursue a facial challenge. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claim. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint to include the Illinois RFRA claim. The court criticized the plaintiffs' counsel for poor advocacy and procedural errors. View "Lukaszczyk v Cook County" on Justia Law

Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

On December 15, 2015, police officers responded to a hostage situation at Eagle Nation Cycles in Neenah, Wisconsin. Initial reports indicated a lone gunman had fired a shot and was threatening to kill hostages. When officers attempted to enter the shop, they were met with gunfire and heavy smoke, leading them to suspect an ambush. Several hostages escaped, and the officers detained and questioned them, transporting two to the police station. Three of these hostages later sued the City of Neenah and multiple officers, claiming their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures were violated.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found the plaintiffs' detention reasonable and ruled that no constitutional violation occurred. Additionally, the court held that qualified immunity shielded the officers from liability. The court also dismissed Sergeant Angela Eichmann from the suit due to her lack of involvement in the alleged misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances of a violent hostage situation. The court found that the officers were justified in temporarily detaining the plaintiffs to ascertain their identities and ensure safety. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Sergeant Eichmann, as there was no evidence of her direct involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. The court did not address the issue of qualified immunity, as it concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. View "Moderson v. City of Neenah" on Justia Law

A former inmate at the Illinois River Correctional Center (IRCC) filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several prison officials, including Wardens Walter Nicholson and Gregory Gossett. The plaintiff alleged that the IRCC's failure to treat his chronic kidney disease, which progressed to acute renal failure, constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed that the wardens were aware of the deficient medical practices that led to his injury.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted Warden Nicholson's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred and that he failed to state a claim. The court also granted Warden Gossett's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Gossett was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Additionally, the court excluded the plaintiff's expert witnesses, determining that their testimony would not assist the jury and might cause confusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim against Warden Nicholson, agreeing that the plaintiff's complaint contained only general allegations and did not provide specific deficiencies in the IRCC's health care system. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of Warden Gossett, concluding that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to show that Gossett was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony, as the experts lacked relevant expertise and their opinions would not assist the jury. View "Ollison v Gossett" on Justia Law

An executive at a litigation funding company, Signal, resigned to start a competing business and sought legal advice from Signal’s outside counsel, Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger LLP. Signal sued the law firm and several of its attorneys, alleging legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims. Signal appealed these rulings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Signal’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and part of its fraud claim, allowing the legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims to proceed. The court also struck Signal’s request for punitive damages. During discovery, the court denied Signal’s motion to compel production of a memorandum prepared by one of the defendants. The district court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court agreed that Signal failed to establish proximate cause and damages for its legal malpractice and breach of contract claims. The court also found that Signal waived its challenge to the summary judgment ruling on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim by not adequately addressing it on appeal. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to deny Signal’s motion to compel production of the memorandum, as Signal did not demonstrate that the document influenced the witness’s testimony. The appellate court concluded that the district court’s dismissal of the fraudulent concealment theory was harmless error and denied Signal’s motion to certify a question to the Illinois Supreme Court as moot. View "Signal Funding, LLC v Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger LLP" on Justia Law

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Republic Technologies (NA), LLC and Republic Tobacco, L.P. manufacture and market OCB brand organic hemp rolling papers, while defendant BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP (HBI) markets RAW brand rolling papers. Republic sued HBI in 2016 for a declaration that OCB’s trade dress did not infringe RAW’s trade dress and later added false advertising claims. HBI counterclaimed, alleging that OCB’s trade dress infringed RAW’s trade dress. A jury trial in 2021 resulted in a mixed verdict, and the district court issued a permanent injunction against some of HBI’s advertising practices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found HBI liable under Illinois law for false advertising but not under the federal Lanham Act. The jury also found that OCB’s trade dress for its 99-cent promotional pack infringed RAW’s trade dress, but not the full-priced pack. Republic’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s question about the definition of “consumer” and in denying Republic’s motion for a new trial. The court also upheld the jury’s finding of trade dress infringement, noting that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, rejecting HBI’s arguments that the injunction was vague, overbroad, and improperly applied nationwide. The court concluded that the injunction was appropriately tailored to provide complete relief to Republic. View "Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP" on Justia Law

Matthew Cargo, a federal prisoner, attempted to file a notice of appeal after being sentenced on July 20, 2020. He had until August 3, 2020, to file the notice, with a possible extension to September 2, 2020. Cargo, while temporarily held in an Oklahoma jail, prepared the notice on July 22, 2020, and handed it to a correctional officer. However, he incorrectly addressed the envelope, leading to its return by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable. Cargo did not learn of the error until November 2024, after which he promptly resent the notice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois received the notice in November 2024, four years after the deadline. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, and Cargo argued that he had complied with the prison-mailbox rule, which deems a notice of appeal filed when handed to prison officials for mailing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Cargo's addressing error precluded him from benefiting from the prison-mailbox rule. The rule requires that the notice be properly addressed to ensure it reaches the district court. Since Cargo's notice was returned as undeliverable, it did not meet the requirements of the rule. Consequently, the court dismissed Cargo's appeal as untimely, emphasizing that proper addressing is crucial for the prison-mailbox rule to apply. The court also noted that Cargo could have avoided this outcome by instructing his counsel to file the notice of appeal. View "USA v Cargo" on Justia Law

Jacques Rivera, after being released from over 20 years in prison for a wrongful murder conviction, sued the City of Chicago and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for civil rights violations. A jury awarded him over $17 million, and his attorneys sought more than $6 million in fees and costs. The case was settled for $18.75 million, including at least $3.75 million for attorneys' fees and costs. Chicago, which had an insurance policy with Starstone Insurance SE covering liabilities between $15 and $20 million, sought indemnity for the $3.75 million. Starstone refused, claiming their policy only covered damages, not attorneys' fees and costs, and filed for a declaratory judgment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of Chicago, determining that the insurance policy covered the entire $18.75 million settlement as an "ultimate net loss" that Chicago was legally obligated to pay. Starstone appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Starstone, a Societas Europaea (SE) based in Liechtenstein, qualified as a "corporation" under 28 U.S.C. §1332 for diversity jurisdiction purposes and concluded that it did. On the merits, the court found that the insurance policy's language covered the entire settlement amount, including attorneys' fees and costs, as part of the "ultimate net loss" Chicago was legally obligated to pay. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the policy's terms included indemnity for attorneys' fees and costs awarded under statutory provisions. View "Starstone Insurance SE v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

John Nawara, a former correctional officer at Cook County Jail, had several altercations with other county employees. As a result, the Cook County Sheriff's Office required him to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination and sign medical information release forms. Nawara initially resisted but eventually complied. Before doing so, he sued Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart, alleging that the examination requirement and inquiry into his mental health violated § 12112(d)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in favor of Nawara, but the jury awarded him zero damages. Nawara filed a post-trial motion requesting back pay, lost pension benefits, and restoration of his seniority. The court granted the restoration of seniority but denied the request for back pay, concluding that the violation of § 12112(d)(4) could not support an award of back pay. Nawara appealed the denial of back pay, and the Sheriff cross-appealed the restoration of seniority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to restore Nawara's seniority, finding that it could still benefit him in his current role as a police officer within the Sheriff's Office. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of back pay. The Seventh Circuit held that a violation of § 12112(d)(4) of the ADA constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability, thus entitling Nawara to request back pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nawara v Cook County Municipality" on Justia Law