Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In early 2018, law enforcement in Quincy, Illinois, investigated reports from multiple confidential sources that Ryan Douglas was selling methamphetamine and cocaine. Police conducted several controlled buys, including one in April 2018 where Douglas, driving a black BMW, sold methamphetamine to a confidential source after visiting a residence at 1726 N. 16th Street. Based on these events, police obtained a warrant to search the house, where they found cash (including buy money), drug paraphernalia, and other items. Douglas was arrested after a traffic stop, and police later obtained a second warrant to search his iPhone, which revealed incriminating text messages.A federal grand jury indicted Douglas for distribution of methamphetamine. He moved to suppress evidence from both the house and phone searches, arguing that the warrants lacked probable cause—specifically, that there was insufficient connection between the house and his alleged drug activity, and that no fair probability was shown that evidence would be found on his phone. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding probable cause, and, alternatively, that the officers had acted in good faith. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois adopted this recommendation and denied the motion. Douglas entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 84 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether suppression was warranted. The court declined to decide whether the warrants were supported by probable cause, holding instead that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court concluded that the officers reasonably relied on the warrants issued by neutral judges, and Douglas failed to show that reliance was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Lester Crowder, a former building inspector for the City of Harvey, Illinois, was approached in 2018 by Dennis DeZutter, an FBI informant posing as a strip club manager interested in opening a new club. Crowder met with DeZutter several times, accepting $13,000 in payments while promising to “streamline” the permitting process and suggesting the money would be distributed to city officials. These meetings were arranged via phone and text, which were recorded by the government as part of its investigation.A grand jury indicted Crowder on five counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), for using a cell phone to promote or facilitate bribery in violation of Illinois law. Each count corresponded to an interstate communication arranging a meeting where Crowder accepted or agreed to accept money. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury was instructed on the elements of a Travel Act violation and the definition of bribery under Illinois law. The instructions did not include the statutory requirement that the defendant be “not authorized by law” to accept the property, which both parties agreed was a legal question for the court, not a factual one for the jury. The jury found Crowder guilty on all counts, and the district court denied his motions for acquittal and sentenced him to 14 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Crowder guilty, that Crowder waived any objection to the jury instructions regarding the omitted element, and that the Illinois bribery statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Crowder" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who robbed a bank in Wilmette, Illinois, taking about $7,900 and subsequently purchasing a car with the stolen money. Days later, police approached him while he was in the car with his three-year-old daughter. Upon learning he had an outstanding warrant, the defendant fled, leading police on a high-speed chase. He lost control of the car in snowy conditions, abandoned both the vehicle and his unrestrained daughter in freezing temperatures, and was apprehended soon after.A grand jury indicted the defendant for bank robbery under federal law. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. At sentencing, the presentence report recommended enhancements for reckless endangerment and career offender status, based on his conduct during the flight from police and four prior bank robbery convictions. The defendant challenged these enhancements, arguing his actions did not constitute recklessness and that his prior offenses were not crimes of violence. He also argued that his drug addiction and personal circumstances were mitigating factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that federal bank robbery, including robbery by intimidation, is categorically a crime of violence under the guidelines. It also affirmed the reckless endangerment enhancement, citing the substantial risk created to others, especially the defendant’s young daughter. The court rejected arguments for resentencing under retroactive guideline amendments, finding they did not affect the defendant’s sentence. Additionally, it found no error in the district court’s consideration of prior presentence reports and affirmed the reliability of the information considered. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Gaines" on Justia Law

A police officer in Peoria, Illinois, encountered a parked vehicle in a closed, dark parking lot at around 2:45 a.m. Inside the vehicle were Dazmine Erving and a female companion. The officer observed Erving make a sudden movement that appeared to be an attempt to hide something, smelled burnt cannabis, and noticed the woman provided false identification information. The officer determined that Erving was on federal supervised release for a weapons offense, only twelve days into his release. After allowing both individuals to retrieve their belongings, the officer conducted a limited search under the driver’s seat, where he discovered a handgun. Erving admitted ownership of the firearm.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed Erving’s motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible and held that, considering the totality of circumstances—furtive movement, odor of cannabis, Erving’s criminal history, and his companion’s false statements—a protective search was warranted. Erving’s motion to suppress was denied. He then pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon and admitted to violating supervised release; the court sentenced him to the upper range of the advisory Guidelines and imposed a consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court found the protective search justified under the Fourth Amendment, as the officer had reasonable suspicion that Erving was dangerous and could gain immediate access to a weapon. The appellate court also rejected Erving’s arguments regarding procedural and constitutional errors at sentencing, concluding the district court did not rely on impermissible factors or speculation in imposing sentence. The denial of the suppression motion and the sentencing decision were affirmed. View "United States v. Erving" on Justia Law

Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Grusd" on Justia Law

Farhan Sheikh, a college student and active iFunny user, posted a series of public messages threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago abortion clinic, naming the clinic and specifying a date. He repeatedly emphasized in follow-up posts and private messages that his threats were genuine and not satirical, even stating his intent to carry out the actions. After his posts were reported to the FBI, the clinic was warned, canceled appointments, increased security, and an employee took time off in response to the threat. Sheikh was arrested and indicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sheikh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional and the grand jury had not been properly instructed on the law's requirements regarding true threats and criminal intent. The district court denied his motion and proceeded to trial, where evidence included employee testimony and images of security changes at the clinic. Sheikh testified that he did not intend to carry out the threats, but the jury convicted him. His motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Sheikh’s constitutional challenge to § 875(c), his grand jury process objections, and his evidentiary complaints. The Seventh Circuit held that § 875(c) is constitutional when interpreted to criminalize only true threats made with at least reckless intent, consistent with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court found no reversible error in the grand jury process or the admission of evidence at trial, concluding that any evidentiary mistakes were harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sheikh" on Justia Law

Police in Milwaukee searched Michael Yumang’s car and home in 2019 and 2022, finding distribution quantities of methamphetamine, a handgun, and ammunition. Before the 2022 search, a postal inspector intercepted a package containing a quarter pound of meth addressed to Yumang’s residence from California. Yumang admitted to regularly obtaining meth from California and reselling it in Wisconsin. He was charged with three drug-trafficking offenses related to each meth seizure and the intercepted shipment, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime.After an indictment and pretrial proceedings, Yumang waived his right to a jury trial and had a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The government called multiple witnesses, including three forensic chemists who analyzed the seized meth, confirming its purity and quantity. Prior to trial, the government disclosed—subject to a protective order—that the DEA chemist who tested the 2019 meth had been placed on a performance improvement plan in 2023. At trial, Yumang’s attorney sought to cross-examine the chemist about the plan, but the judge ruled the information irrelevant since the performance issues arose years after the chemist’s work on the case. The judge found Yumang guilty on all counts and imposed a sentence of 180 months.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Yumang argued that briefly closing the courtroom to make a record of the sidebar discussion about the chemist’s performance plan violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, and that the exclusion of the proposed cross-examination was both evidentiary error and a Confrontation Clause violation. The Seventh Circuit held that the five-minute courtroom closure was too trivial to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation and that excluding the cross-examination was neither an evidentiary nor constitutional error. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v Yumang" on Justia Law

Charles Cui was charged with bribery and related offenses after he attempted to secure the assistance of Edward Burke, a powerful Chicago alderman, in reversing a permit denial by the Chicago Department of Buildings (CDOB) regarding a pole sign at his commercial property. Cui’s financial interests were jeopardized by the permit denial, which threatened both a lucrative lease with Binny’s Beverage Depot and tax increment financing from the City. To influence Burke, Cui offered to retain Burke’s law firm for property tax appeal work, explicitly seeking Burke’s intervention in the CDOB matter.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over a six-week trial in which a jury convicted Cui on all counts: bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), violations of the Travel Act, and making false statements to the government. The district court admitted evidence over Cui’s objections, including a photoshopped photograph sent to the CDOB, and denied Cui’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. The court sentenced Cui to 32 months’ imprisonment and applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement for failing to produce key emails in response to a grand jury subpoena.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cui’s challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and sentencing. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the law’s requirements—including the quid pro quo element and the definition of “corruptly”—and that the admission of the photoshopped photograph was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the sentencing enhancement and the disparity between Cui’s and Burke’s sentences were justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Cui" on Justia Law

Federal agents arrested a defendant after he engaged in explicit online communications with an undercover agent posing as the father of an eight-year-old girl. Over several months, the defendant requested sexually explicit images of the fictitious child, instructed the agent on how to sedate her to facilitate the abuse, and provided detailed suggestions about the nature of the photographs. The defendant attempted to access links purported to contain the requested images, which were in fact fake and used to record his attempts.A grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts: attempted enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, attempted sexual exploitation of a child for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, and attempted receipt of child pornography. At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the government presented evidence through two FBI agents. After the government rested, the court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on the enticement charge but denied it on the other two; the defendant was convicted by a jury on attempted sexual exploitation and attempted receipt of child pornography and was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for the exploitation charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the conviction for attempted sexual exploitation. The court held that the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge was preserved and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, found sufficient evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the jury was properly instructed that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not require direct communication with a minor, and that the statute covers conduct involving an intermediary. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Carpenter" on Justia Law

Julius Robinson was convicted of murders committed during drug offenses and sentenced to death in the Northern District of Texas. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Robinson then filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. §2255, which was denied by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, and the Fifth Circuit denied him a certificate of appealability. Subsequent efforts to reopen his case were treated as requests to file second or successive §2255 petitions, which were also denied.After these unsuccessful attempts, Robinson sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2241 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, where he was incarcerated. He raised five issues, including claims about the jurisdiction of the trial court, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and violations of his rights under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The district court dismissed Robinson’s §2241 petition, holding that §2255(e) barred review because Robinson had not shown that the remedy under §2255 was inadequate or ineffective, referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under Jones and its own recent decision in Agofsky v. Baysore, §2255(e) does not permit a federal prisoner to seek relief under §2241 merely because he cannot satisfy the requirements for filing a second or successive §2255 motion, unless the sentencing court is unavailable. The Seventh Circuit further clarified that prior circuit decisions allowing such claims under §2241 are no longer authoritative. The court also rejected Robinson’s Suspension Clause argument and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. View "Robinson v. Lammer" on Justia Law