Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement in southern Illinois identified multiple Snapchat accounts linked to the same person, who used these accounts to impersonate a female and solicit nude images from minor boys. The investigation revealed that the defendant, Adam Power, knew some victims through his work as a choir director, substitute teacher, and day camp employee. He was arrested after police searched his devices and social media accounts, uncovering evidence of extensive child exploitation.A federal grand jury indicted Power on thirty-four counts related to child pornography and sexual exploitation of minors. He pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois ensured that Power’s pleas were knowing and voluntary, and asked him to confirm the factual basis for each count. At sentencing, the court considered the presentence report and the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, ultimately imposing a 60-year prison sentence, significantly less than the calculated Guidelines range of 740 years. The court highlighted the seriousness of the offenses and the lack of meaningful mitigating circumstances.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Power sought to vacate his guilty pleas to eight counts, arguing the district court lacked an adequate factual basis for those pleas. Alternatively, he challenged his sentence as substantively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the guilty plea issue for plain error and found that Power failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for any alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. The court also upheld the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, rejecting Power’s arguments regarding de facto life imprisonment and sentencing disparities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Power" on Justia Law

Steven Bradford was initially convicted in federal court for his involvement in a heroin-trafficking conspiracy that resulted in a teenager’s death. After serving a lengthy prison sentence, he began a five-year term of supervised release. Within a year and a half, Bradford was arrested twice: first for possessing a firearm as a felon and having an open alcohol container, and later for drag racing while intoxicated, which led to a fatal multi-vehicle crash. These incidents constituted serious violations of the terms of his supervised release, including prohibitions against criminal activity, firearm possession, alcohol use, and frequenting bars.Following these events, Bradford’s federal probation officer sought revocation of his supervised release in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court initially paused revocation proceedings to allow state charges to proceed but later held a hearing after the second arrest. Bradford admitted to some violations, and the district judge found that he committed others based on testimony and evidence. The probation officer recommended a reimprisonment term at the upper end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range (14 months), while the government sought the statutory maximum (36 months). The judge imposed the maximum, emphasizing the severity of Bradford’s violations and his criminal history.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Bradford’s challenge to the length of his reimprisonment. The court held that district judges have broad discretion in supervised release revocation proceedings and are not bound by the Guidelines or probation officer recommendations. The Seventh Circuit found that the district judge adequately explained the sentence and properly weighed permissible factors, including the seriousness of the violations. The court concluded that the 36-month sentence was not plainly unreasonable and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement began investigating a Chicago address linked to the defendant after intercepting suspicious parcels sent from Arizona, one of which contained fentanyl. Agents arranged a controlled delivery of lookalike pills to the address, obtained an anticipatory search warrant, and described the property as a single-family home, when it was actually a two-unit building. The description error arose because all the agents’ pre-search checks—postal records, databases, resident information, and visual inspection—suggested the property was a single-family residence. During the delivery, agents noticed two doorbells but did not immediately conclude the building contained multiple units.After the parcel was opened inside the property, officers entered the building, swept the first-floor unit, and quickly encountered the defendant in a common stairwell with purple-stained hands, evidence he had handled the booby-trapped parcel. The defendant fled into the second-floor unit, where agents found further incriminating evidence. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the warrant valid and the execution reasonable, even if the initial investigation was not exhaustive.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the warrant, though technically overbroad, was valid because the agent neither knew nor should have known the building had multiple units based on information available at the time. The court further found the warrant was executed reasonably, as agents, upon realizing there were multiple units, limited their search to the correct premises. Finally, the court determined that, even if the warrant had been invalid, the exigent circumstances and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement justified the search and seizure. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA v Suggs" on Justia Law

An Indiana prisoner, while serving a 65-year sentence for murder, attacked a correctional officer at the Miami Correctional Facility in 2022. The attack caused serious injuries requiring outside medical treatment. Following an administrative hearing, the prisoner was found guilty of battering staff and was sanctioned by losing nearly 19 years of accumulated good time credits. The hearing officer based the sanction on the severity of the attack and the resulting injury and checked factors including the seriousness of the offense and the disruption to facility security.The prisoner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, raising due process and Eighth Amendment claims. He alleged procedural errors, hearing officer bias, and that there was no evidence of serious injury. He also argued that the sanction was grossly disproportionate. After counsel was appointed, he submitted a brief that referenced, but did not fully restate, these claims. The district court denied relief, holding that the due process claims lacked merit and that the Eighth Amendment claim was waived due to insufficient argument in the brief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the relevant constitutional claims were not waived, as the amended filing preserved the original petition’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the hearing officer’s finding of serious bodily injury was supported by sufficient evidence under the “some evidence” standard. The court also concluded that the loss of good time credits was not grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment, given the circumstances of the offense, the petitioner’s disciplinary record, and the nature of his underlying conviction. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Hawkins v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Kentucky to attempting to receive stolen property, in violation of state law. Several years later, federal immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his state conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, specifically for receipt of stolen property. Hassan challenged this, arguing that the Kentucky statute criminalizes some conduct that would not be considered an aggravated felony under federal law, which requires proof that the defendant had a subjective knowledge or belief that the property was stolen.The immigration judge agreed with Hassan, determining that the Kentucky statute was broader than the federal definition and granting his motion to terminate the removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the Kentucky conviction did count as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Hassan then sought review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that it was not clear whether Kentucky law requires subjective knowledge or belief, or whether a conviction could be based merely on what a reasonable person would have known (“constructive knowledge”). Because Kentucky case law was ambiguous on this point, the court declined to decide the issue itself. Instead, the Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court, specifically asking whether Section 514.110 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes requires subjective knowledge or belief that property is stolen, or if a conviction could be based solely on an objective standard. The Seventh Circuit held the case in abeyance pending guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court. View "Hassan v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Police in Chicago responded to a report of shots fired on the city’s west side and discovered a two-car crash, with one vehicle, a minivan, bearing bullet damage. The minivan’s driver, Derrick Davis, exited and was observed approaching a nearby parked car. An eyewitness alerted officers that Davis had a gun. When officers detained him, they found a loaded handgun under the parked car, which Davis had tossed there. Davis had a significant felony record and was on state parole at the time. After his arrest, he made a jail phone call in which he discussed details of the incident and his actions, suggesting he had intentionally driven to the scene.Initially, Davis faced charges in state court, but these were dismissed when federal authorities indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The presentence report did not recommend a sentencing enhancement for Davis’s involvement in another felony (the shoot-out) due to insufficient evidence. The district judge, however, imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 84 months, relying in part on Davis’s jail call. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated that sentence, citing a procedural error: the judge had adopted the presentence report’s findings but also credited the government’s argument that Davis participated in the shoot-out, which was inconsistent.On remand, the district judge clarified that he did not find Davis had fired his gun, but based the above-Guidelines sentence on Davis’s criminal history and his jail call, which showed reckless disregard for the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this was procedurally and substantively reasonable, and affirmed the 84-month sentence. View "USA v Davis" on Justia Law

Jerron Williams was involved in an altercation with a United States Postal Service letter carrier in Gary, Indiana. After a brief dispute, Williams fired several shots into the carrier's vehicle as she attempted to leave, causing her physical injuries. A grand jury indicted Williams on three counts: assaulting a federal employee with a deadly weapon causing bodily injury, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Williams entered into a plea agreement, admitting guilt to the first two counts and waiving his right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, held a change of plea hearing where the magistrate judge explained the charges and their elements. Williams, with his attorney’s agreement, confirmed his understanding and acceptance of the facts and the charges. Prior to sentencing, Williams changed attorneys and sought to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced Williams to 153 months in prison.On appeal, Williams argued for the first time that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid because the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) was not a “crime of violence.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case for plain error and determined that Williams had waived this argument multiple times: by pleading guilty, by waiving his right to appeal, and by not raising the argument in his motion to withdraw the plea. The court also found that the magistrate judge properly explained the charges and ensured Williams’s understanding. As a result, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "USA v JWilliams" on Justia Law

Police officers in Rock Island, Illinois, attempted to stop an unregistered minivan driven by Atoris Slater in July 2020. Slater fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase that ended when they discontinued pursuit after he nearly caused a collision. Slater abandoned the minivan and tried to hide in a dumpster but was found shortly after. Police searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cannabis edibles. Upon his arrest and transport to jail, Slater attempted to discard a bag containing crack cocaine. He was indicted for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Slater pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement, and the presentence report (PSR) initially calculated his sentencing range using a 1:1 drug-conversion ratio for marijuana and cannabis edibles. The government did not object to the PSR within the standard 14-day period. On the eve of sentencing, the prosecutor learned that the edibles contained THC, which required a higher 1:167 conversion ratio, and raised a late objection. The judge granted a continuance, allowed for lab testing, and ultimately adopted the new calculations, resulting in a higher sentencing range. Slater did not renew his objection to the revised PSR and was sentenced below the revised Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district judge properly allowed the government’s untimely objection to the PSR and whether the higher THC conversion ratio applied. The Seventh Circuit held that the district judge did not abuse her discretion by permitting the late objection for good cause. The court also found that Slater had waived any challenge to the THC ratio by affirmatively accepting the revised PSR at sentencing. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Slater" on Justia Law

Michael Connor was convicted in 2013 after a bench trial in Livingston County, Illinois, of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The offenses involved his daughter and stepdaughter, occurring when they were between five and seven years old. The statutory penalty was six to sixty years per count, to be served consecutively, but if convicted of assaulting multiple victims, the law required a mandatory life sentence. After his conviction, Connor received the mandatory life term.After his direct appeal was unsuccessful, Connor pursued postconviction relief in Illinois state court, arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during plea negotiations by failing to inform him that he faced a mandatory life sentence. He claimed this omission led him to reject an 18-year plea offer. At an evidentiary hearing, Connor testified that he would have accepted the plea had he known about the life sentence. The trial judge, however, found this testimony not credible, noting that Connor had repeatedly asserted his innocence and had unequivocally stated at sentencing that he would not have pleaded guilty even if aware of the outcome. The trial court denied postconviction relief, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, finding no reasonable probability that Connor would have accepted the plea but for counsel’s alleged errors.Connor then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, which was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial. The Seventh Circuit held that federal habeas relief was not warranted because Connor failed to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the state court's credibility finding that he would not have accepted the plea. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Connor v. Greene" on Justia Law

David Venkus sought to collect a $13,776,518 criminal restitution judgment against Thomas Lindstrom, his former employee, who had caused the collapse of Venkus’s trading firm through fraudulent activities. Lindstrom later worked for Ryan Building Group, Inc. (RBG), where he earned salary and accumulated stock options but also incurred significant debt to RBG. After Lindstrom was terminated by RBG for embezzlement, RBG paid him $73,090, labeling it a severance payment. This sum was allegedly calculated based on the value of Lindstrom’s expired stock options, offset by his debt to RBG. Venkus, having previously served RBG with a citation to discover assets pursuant to Illinois law, claimed the payment and the handling of the options violated the citation’s asset-transfer prohibitions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Venkus’s motion, finding that because Lindstrom’s options had expired and thus had no value, RBG’s severance payment was hypothetical and not a violation of the citation. The district court also held that the severance was subject to Illinois’s 15% wage garnishment cap and that RBG was not liable for attorney’s fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that material questions of fact existed regarding the true nature of the severance payment and whether RBG’s actions “frustrated” Venkus’s rights under the citation. The court held that the district court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve these questions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the lower court hold an evidentiary hearing and, if necessary, address whether attorney’s fees should be awarded if a citation violation is found. View "USA v Lindstrom" on Justia Law