Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Shannon Agofsky robbed a bank in southwest Missouri and kidnapped the bank president at gunpoint, ultimately drowning him in Oklahoma. A federal jury in the Western District of Missouri convicted Agofsky of bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, resulting in a life sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, and subsequent motions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were denied. In 2001, while serving his sentence in a Texas federal prison, Agofsky murdered a fellow inmate and received a death sentence in the Eastern District of Texas, partly based on his prior firearm conviction.Agofsky later sought to challenge his Missouri firearm conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, arguing—based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)—that bank robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). His claim did not meet the conditions for a successive § 2255 motion. Previously, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport allowed such statutory claims to proceed via § 2241, but the Supreme Court overruled that approach in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Accordingly, the district court dismissed Agofsky’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether § 2255(e) is a jurisdictional bar or merely a venue provision. After reviewing precedent and circuit splits, the court held that § 2255(e) constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the court’s power to entertain habeas petitions outside the strict confines of § 2255. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Agofsky’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Agofsky v. Baysore" on Justia Law

Donald Felton was investigated after a confidential source informed law enforcement that Felton made trips from Taylorville, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine for resale. The source described Felton’s routine, including his use of a white Mazda SUV registered to his girlfriend and referenced a prior traffic stop involving Felton. Inspector Brown corroborated some details by reviewing police records and speaking with another officer about the earlier stop, but found no drugs during that encounter. Relying on this information and Felton’s criminal history, Inspector Brown prepared an affidavit seeking a warrant to install a tracking device on the SUV.The affidavit, submitted to the Circuit Court of Christian County, supported the issuance of the warrant. However, it omitted substantial information about the confidential source’s credibility, such as payments to the source, the source’s cooperation in exchange for consideration in legal matters, and the source’s own criminal history and pending charges. Based on the warrant, the tracking device was installed, and later, Felton was stopped and methamphetamine was found in the vehicle. Felton was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and requesting a Franks hearing regarding omissions in the affidavit. The district court denied both requests, concluding the affidavit was sufficiently corroborated and that Felton failed to show material omissions affecting probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause because it relied almost exclusively on the confidential source and omitted material information regarding the source’s credibility. The court further concluded that Felton made a substantial preliminary showing warranting a Franks hearing. The appellate court reversed the denial of Felton’s suppression motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Felton" on Justia Law

James Cohen accepted monthly payments from an individual who was required to register as a sex offender, in exchange for falsely representing to authorities that this individual lived at his address. Cohen knew that the person had been convicted of a sex offense and was required by law to register his place of residence. When United States marshals investigated the individual's compliance with registration requirements, Cohen knowingly lied to a marshal, claiming the individual resided with him, despite knowing this was untrue.Cohen was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, with making a materially false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He entered a plea agreement, admitting to an offense with a maximum sentence of eight years, and agreed to a sentencing guidelines calculation that included a four-level enhancement for matters relating to a sex offense under chapter 109B. At sentencing, Cohen objected to the application of this guideline, arguing that his offense did not constitute a sex offense under federal law, but withdrew his other objections. The district court overruled his remaining objection, applied the guideline, and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cohen’s arguments that the sentencing guideline was improperly applied. The court held that guideline § 2J1.2 properly applied because Cohen’s false statement related to failure to register under chapter 109B, which falls within the guideline’s scope. The court found no merit in Cohen’s remaining arguments, determined that certain claims had been waived or forfeited, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted in Wisconsin state court for first-degree reckless homicide after selling heroin that resulted in a fatal overdose. The defendant, along with another individual, sold heroin to the victim, who was then injected with the drug and became unconscious. Instead of seeking immediate medical help, the two men drove around with the unconscious victim, later returned to the defendant’s house, and only after several hours did the other individual take the victim to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. The defendant was arrested about a month later and charged with multiple offenses, but only the homicide conviction is relevant here.After his conviction and sentencing, the defendant sought post-conviction relief in the Wisconsin trial court and then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His appellate counsel filed a “no-merit” report, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no deficiency in trial counsel’s performance. The defendant then attempted to petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, but his petition was filed after the deadline. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the petition as untimely and denied reconsideration.Subsequently, the defendant filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, again raising ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the defendant had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to timely exhaust state remedies and had not shown cause to excuse the default. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendant’s reliance on a prison law librarian’s miscalculation of the filing deadline did not constitute cause to excuse procedural default, and that the defendant had not preserved any alternative argument regarding lack of law library access. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jannke v Gierach" on Justia Law

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law

Andrew Johnston was convicted by a jury of attempted bank robbery and sentenced to 168 months in prison. While awaiting transfer to federal prison, Johnston reported to authorities that a fellow inmate, a Sinaloa Cartel leader, had ordered a hit on another inmate. Johnston assisted law enforcement by recording a conversation with the cartel leader and later testified at the cartel leader’s sentencing hearing. Although the judge in that case did not credit Johnston’s testimony, the recorded conversation was considered in sentencing the cartel leader. In recognition of Johnston’s assistance, the government moved for a 25% reduction in his sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the motion was filed more than two years after Johnston’s sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, addressed the government’s untimely Rule 35(b) motion, accepting the government’s waiver of the one-year time limit. The judge found Johnston’s cooperation useful but determined that his repeated frivolous postconviction litigation undermined any inference of genuine acceptance of responsibility. As a result, the court granted only a 10% reduction, lowering Johnston’s sentence to 151 months, rather than the 25% requested.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first considered whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the untimely Rule 35(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit held that the one-year time limit in Rule 35(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, which may be waived, overruling its prior decision in United States v. McDowell. The court further held that no legal rule barred the district judge from considering Johnston’s postconviction litigation conduct in evaluating his acceptance of responsibility. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant only a 10% sentence reduction. View "USA v Johnston" on Justia Law

Kenneth Courtright operated Today’s Growth Consultant (TGC), also known as The Income Store, which promised investors guaranteed, perpetual monthly payments based on website advertising revenue. Investors, called “site partners,” paid upfront fees under Consulting Performance Agreements (CPAs), which stated that these fees would be used exclusively for website-related expenses and that TGC was in satisfactory financial condition. In reality, TGC’s advertising revenue and business loans were insufficient to meet its payment obligations, and Courtright used new investors’ upfront fees to pay existing investors, misrepresenting the company’s financial health and the use of funds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over Courtright’s criminal trial for seven counts of wire fraud. The government presented evidence of TGC’s financial shortfall and improper use of upfront fees, including testimony from employees and financial experts. The jury convicted Courtright on all counts. At sentencing, the parties debated the loss calculation, with the court ultimately adopting a $69.3 million loss figure and granting certain deductions, resulting in a final loss amount of $52.5 million. Courtright was sentenced to 90 months in prison and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Courtright’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the loss calculation. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Courtright guilty of wire fraud, as he made material false statements about the use of upfront fees and TGC’s financial condition, and acted with intent to defraud. The court also found that Courtright waived his causation argument regarding loss calculation and that the district court did not clearly err in denying deductions for operating expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v Courtright" on Justia Law

Police responded to a 911 call in Marshfield, Wisconsin, reporting that Jaison Coleman had threatened to kill his wife, Lisa Coleman, and was still inside their home. Officer Jamie Kizer arrived and spoke with Lisa on the porch, asking about the safety of her children and the location of her husband. Lisa hesitated to answer questions about her children’s safety and initially declined to allow the officer inside. After a brief pause, Lisa returned to the doorway, and following further discussion, she agreed to let Officer Kizer and his colleagues enter the home. Once inside, Lisa directed the officers to the children’s location and indicated where Coleman might be. The officers found Coleman, conducted a protective pat down, and learned from the children that Coleman had threatened Lisa with a gun.Based on information obtained during their entry, the officers secured a warrant to search the home, which led to the discovery of several firearms. Coleman was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearms, arguing that Lisa had not consented to the officers’ entry. A magistrate judge found that Lisa had consented and recommended denial of the motion. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and denied the suppression motion, also concluding that the officers did not exceed the scope of Lisa’s consent. Coleman pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error. The appellate court held that Lisa’s consent was voluntary and that the officers acted within the scope of her consent. The court affirmed Coleman’s conviction, finding no error in the district court’s rulings. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Devin Seats was convicted in Illinois state court in 2012 of three felonies related to a shooting, including aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. His pre-sentence investigation report listed six prior felonies, three of which were for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The sentencing judge referenced Seats’s “considerable criminal background” but did not specifically mention the vacated convictions. Seats was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.After his conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review, Illinois law changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that certain subsections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute were unconstitutional, which affected two of Seats’s prior convictions. Seats sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information due to the inclusion of these now-invalid convictions. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated his armed habitual criminal conviction but declined to order resentencing, finding that the vacated convictions did not result in a greater sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Seats then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information and that the statute of limitations should run from the date his prior convictions were vacated. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, calculating the limitations period from the date his conviction became final. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Seats forfeited his argument for a later limitations period by not raising it in the district court and that the circumstances did not warrant plain error review. The court also found that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably determined the sentencing judge did not rely on the vacated convictions. View "Seats v Nurse" on Justia Law

Otis Elion pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court in 2017. His sentence was enhanced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a “career offender” based on three prior convictions, including two Illinois state convictions for delivery of a look-alike substance. The enhancement depended on whether those state convictions qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, which required a categorical approach comparing the elements of the state statutes to the federal definition.After sentencing, Elion filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the career offender enhancement. The district court initially denied relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (in Elion I) found Elion was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington.On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Elion’s attorney had identified the correct legal issues, researched the relevant law, and reasonably applied the categorical approach, even though she ultimately reached an incorrect legal conclusion. The district court concluded her performance was not deficient.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that an attorney’s reasonable but mistaken legal conclusion does not automatically constitute deficient performance under Strickland. The court found that, at the time of sentencing, existing caselaw did not sufficiently foreshadow the argument that ultimately succeeded, and that counsel’s overall performance met prevailing professional norms. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Elion v USA" on Justia Law