Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three individuals carried out an armed robbery targeting customers at a Chicago convenience store, J&J Food and Grocery. The incident involved robbing a person just outside the store’s vestibule and several customers inside, all at gunpoint. The store, which operates around the clock but limits access to a vestibule in the evenings, temporarily shut down after the robbery for police investigation, resulting in lost business for approximately thirty to sixty minutes. The robbers did not attempt to steal from the store itself or make demands of its employees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial and ultimately convicted the defendants of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c)(1)(A). The defendants moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that their actions did not affect interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act, since they robbed customers rather than the store. The district court denied this motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions de novo and affirmed. The court held that the temporary closure of J&J due to the robbery constituted at least a “realistic probability” of affecting interstate commerce, satisfying the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement. The court also rejected the defendants’ claim that the jury could have convicted them solely based on robbing the customer outside the store, finding that the jury was not presented with separate legal theories for inside and outside robberies. As the Hobbs Act convictions were upheld, the related firearm convictions were affirmed as well. View "United States v. Demus" on Justia Law

The defendant traveled multiple times to the Philippines, where, according to the government, he solicited minors between the ages of eleven and seventeen to perform sex acts in exchange for money, gifts, and food. He was indicted on seven counts of traveling in foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity with minors and seven counts of sex trafficking of a minor. During his change-of-plea hearing, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sex trafficking of a minor, confirming that he understood the plea agreement, was satisfied with his counsel, and entered the plea voluntarily. Afterward, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he felt pressured to sign the agreement the morning of the hearing and that taking the anxiety medication Clonazepam had impaired his cognition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw. The district court found that neither the plea colloquy nor the evidence supported the defendant’s claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary; it relied on his in-court statements, his demeanor, and written admissions in the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion to withdraw his plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion. It found the defendant’s own statements and conduct during the plea hearing, as well as the signed plea agreement, adequately demonstrated that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also determined that the defendant’s evidence regarding the effects of his medication was insufficient to justify withdrawal. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Stenson" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after being indicted on multiple charges related to mail fraud, theft from an employee benefit plan, and filing false tax returns, repeatedly chose to represent herself rather than accept legal counsel. The charges stemmed from her actions following her grandmother’s death: she continued to receive and conceal pension payments that should have stopped, and she prepared fraudulent tax filings for herself and others, keeping a portion of the illicit refunds.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial. Throughout the proceedings, the district court made extensive efforts to inform the defendant of her constitutional right to counsel, the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, and the complexity of the charges. The court appointed standby counsel, but the defendant persisted in her wish to proceed without representation and consistently rejected the assistance of counsel, including private and standby counsel. Despite her refusal to participate actively in her trial—declining to make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence—the jury convicted her on all counts.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court should have forced her to accept counsel and that her waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing or voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the record as a whole and determined that, despite the absence of a formal Faretta hearing, the totality of circumstances demonstrated that the defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court carefully examined whether she understood her options and the consequences of self-representation. Concluding that the district court had not erred, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. The holding is that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid if the record as a whole shows the waiver was knowing and voluntary, even without a formal hearing. View "USA v Salley" on Justia Law

Antonio Carrazco-Martinez was investigated by federal authorities for his alleged involvement in a drug trafficking operation with ties to Chicago and Mexico. Law enforcement, after obtaining judicial warrants, used a cell-site simulator to locate his new phone and a closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera to monitor activity in the garage of a stash house. The investigation led to his indictment for conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. Carrazco-Martinez sought to suppress evidence obtained from both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera, arguing that their use was unlawful, but these motions were denied.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carrazco-Martinez’s motions to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for both the cell-site simulator and the CCTV camera warrants. The court found that the government’s warrant applications were not misleading and that the warrants were neither so lacking in probable cause nor so deficient in scope as to invalidate reliance on them. At trial, the court also overruled Carrazco-Martinez’s objection to a jury instruction (Instruction 28), which stated that the government did not have to prove the specific quantity of drugs alleged, only a measurable quantity, to establish guilt. The jury convicted him on both counts, and his post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that Carrazco-Martinez failed to rebut the presumption of good faith regarding both warrants. It further held that the challenged jury instruction, when read with the accompanying instruction, correctly stated the law, as drug quantity is a sentencing factor rather than an element of the charged offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Carrazco-Martinez" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in South Bend, Indiana, in February 2021, police discovered that Jose Reyna was in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine intended for distribution, and a loaded handgun with its serial number obliterated. Reyna admitted to dealing drugs and to having intentionally removed the serial number from the firearm. A grand jury indicted him for possessing a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), to which he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Shortly before sentencing, Reyna moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(k) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found good cause to consider Reyna's otherwise untimely motion but denied it on the merits. The district judge ruled that the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number was not covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore rejected the constitutional challenge at the first step of the Bruen framework. The judge did not address whether the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(k) de novo. While the appellate court was not persuaded that the challenge could be resolved solely on the text of the Second Amendment, it proceeded to Bruen’s second step, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi. The court concluded that although modern serialization lacks a direct historical analogue, historical practices of marking, inventorying, and inspecting firearms for militia purposes provide a relevant tradition. The Seventh Circuit held that § 922(k) is consistent with the principles underlying this tradition and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Reyna" on Justia Law

In early 2018, law enforcement in Quincy, Illinois, investigated reports from multiple confidential sources that Ryan Douglas was selling methamphetamine and cocaine. Police conducted several controlled buys, including one in April 2018 where Douglas, driving a black BMW, sold methamphetamine to a confidential source after visiting a residence at 1726 N. 16th Street. Based on these events, police obtained a warrant to search the house, where they found cash (including buy money), drug paraphernalia, and other items. Douglas was arrested after a traffic stop, and police later obtained a second warrant to search his iPhone, which revealed incriminating text messages.A federal grand jury indicted Douglas for distribution of methamphetamine. He moved to suppress evidence from both the house and phone searches, arguing that the warrants lacked probable cause—specifically, that there was insufficient connection between the house and his alleged drug activity, and that no fair probability was shown that evidence would be found on his phone. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding probable cause, and, alternatively, that the officers had acted in good faith. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois adopted this recommendation and denied the motion. Douglas entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 84 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether suppression was warranted. The court declined to decide whether the warrants were supported by probable cause, holding instead that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court concluded that the officers reasonably relied on the warrants issued by neutral judges, and Douglas failed to show that reliance was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Lester Crowder, a former building inspector for the City of Harvey, Illinois, was approached in 2018 by Dennis DeZutter, an FBI informant posing as a strip club manager interested in opening a new club. Crowder met with DeZutter several times, accepting $13,000 in payments while promising to “streamline” the permitting process and suggesting the money would be distributed to city officials. These meetings were arranged via phone and text, which were recorded by the government as part of its investigation.A grand jury indicted Crowder on five counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), for using a cell phone to promote or facilitate bribery in violation of Illinois law. Each count corresponded to an interstate communication arranging a meeting where Crowder accepted or agreed to accept money. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury was instructed on the elements of a Travel Act violation and the definition of bribery under Illinois law. The instructions did not include the statutory requirement that the defendant be “not authorized by law” to accept the property, which both parties agreed was a legal question for the court, not a factual one for the jury. The jury found Crowder guilty on all counts, and the district court denied his motions for acquittal and sentenced him to 14 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Crowder guilty, that Crowder waived any objection to the jury instructions regarding the omitted element, and that the Illinois bribery statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Crowder" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who robbed a bank in Wilmette, Illinois, taking about $7,900 and subsequently purchasing a car with the stolen money. Days later, police approached him while he was in the car with his three-year-old daughter. Upon learning he had an outstanding warrant, the defendant fled, leading police on a high-speed chase. He lost control of the car in snowy conditions, abandoned both the vehicle and his unrestrained daughter in freezing temperatures, and was apprehended soon after.A grand jury indicted the defendant for bank robbery under federal law. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. At sentencing, the presentence report recommended enhancements for reckless endangerment and career offender status, based on his conduct during the flight from police and four prior bank robbery convictions. The defendant challenged these enhancements, arguing his actions did not constitute recklessness and that his prior offenses were not crimes of violence. He also argued that his drug addiction and personal circumstances were mitigating factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that federal bank robbery, including robbery by intimidation, is categorically a crime of violence under the guidelines. It also affirmed the reckless endangerment enhancement, citing the substantial risk created to others, especially the defendant’s young daughter. The court rejected arguments for resentencing under retroactive guideline amendments, finding they did not affect the defendant’s sentence. Additionally, it found no error in the district court’s consideration of prior presentence reports and affirmed the reliability of the information considered. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Gaines" on Justia Law

A police officer in Peoria, Illinois, encountered a parked vehicle in a closed, dark parking lot at around 2:45 a.m. Inside the vehicle were Dazmine Erving and a female companion. The officer observed Erving make a sudden movement that appeared to be an attempt to hide something, smelled burnt cannabis, and noticed the woman provided false identification information. The officer determined that Erving was on federal supervised release for a weapons offense, only twelve days into his release. After allowing both individuals to retrieve their belongings, the officer conducted a limited search under the driver’s seat, where he discovered a handgun. Erving admitted ownership of the firearm.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed Erving’s motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible and held that, considering the totality of circumstances—furtive movement, odor of cannabis, Erving’s criminal history, and his companion’s false statements—a protective search was warranted. Erving’s motion to suppress was denied. He then pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon and admitted to violating supervised release; the court sentenced him to the upper range of the advisory Guidelines and imposed a consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court found the protective search justified under the Fourth Amendment, as the officer had reasonable suspicion that Erving was dangerous and could gain immediate access to a weapon. The appellate court also rejected Erving’s arguments regarding procedural and constitutional errors at sentencing, concluding the district court did not rely on impermissible factors or speculation in imposing sentence. The denial of the suppression motion and the sentencing decision were affirmed. View "United States v. Erving" on Justia Law

Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Grusd" on Justia Law