Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Donna Christensen, a twenty-year-old inmate at Vilas County Jail, died by suicide after twenty-five days in confinement. She had a history of substance abuse and mental illness and had previously reported suicidal thoughts and hallucinations. During her incarceration, she exhibited withdrawal symptoms and had an altercation with jail staff, leading to her placement on suicide watch. Despite her initial suicidal ideations, she was removed from suicide watch after a brief assessment by a social worker. She was later placed in solitary confinement, where she remained until her death.The Christensens, Donna's parents, sued Vilas County, the jail's medical service provider, and various employees, alleging that Donna's death resulted from inadequate medical treatment, excessive force, and due process violations. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling against the Christensens. The court also denied the Christensens' requests to amend their complaint and extend deadlines for additional discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Christensens failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Donna's serious medical condition under the Eighth Amendment. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the defendants' conduct and concluded that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the Christensens. The court also upheld the district court's denial of the Christensens' motions for additional discovery and to amend their complaint, finding no abuse of discretion in the lower court's case management decisions. View "Christensen v Weiss" on Justia Law

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Edward Snukis was stopped by Officers Matthew Taylor and Trevor Koontz after a report of an impaired man refusing to leave a parking lot. The encounter escalated when Snukis resisted commands and struck Officer Koontz. Officer Taylor tased Snukis twice, and both officers pinned him to the ground, with Taylor striking Snukis in the head six times. After securing Snukis in handcuffs, the officers noticed he had lost consciousness and provided emergency assistance, but Snukis died later that evening. Snukis’s children, as co-administrators of his estate, sued the officers and the City of Evansville under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed the decision, focusing on claims against the officers for excessive force, failure to intervene, and failure to render medical aid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers' use of force was reasonable given Snukis’s resistance and the threat he posed. The court found that Officer Taylor’s use of the taser and subsequent strikes were justified due to Snukis’s active resistance. The court also determined that the officers provided prompt and appropriate medical care once Snukis lost consciousness. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Snukis v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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The Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging (NIAAA) filed lawsuits against Paula Basta, the former Director of the Illinois Department on Aging (IDA), alleging that Basta unlawfully refused to hold hearings on three administrative petitions filed by NIAAA. These petitions concerned grievances about withheld funding and rejected service provider designations. NIAAA claimed that these actions violated their rights under the Older Americans Act (OAA) and Illinois state law.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Basta, determining that NIAAA did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the funding or service provider designations. Subsequently, the federal district court dismissed NIAAA’s suit, finding it time-barred and failing to state a claim. NIAAA then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that NIAAA’s claims related to the denials of the Initial Petition and APS Petition were barred by the statute of limitations, as they accrued by September 2019 and were not tolled by NIAAA’s state court litigation. The court also agreed with the district court that NIAAA failed to plausibly allege a due process violation, as the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that NIAAA did not have a property interest in the funding or service provider designations.Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that the OAA provisions at issue did not create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court concluded that the OAA’s language and context did not unambiguously confer individual rights upon NIAAA, and thus, NIAAA could not enforce these provisions through § 1983. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Basta. View "Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta" on Justia Law

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Ayla Royan, a student in Chicago State University's (CSU) Doctor of Pharmacy program, was dismissed after failing two clinical rotations. Royan, who has clinical depression and an eating disorder, claimed her dismissal was due to her disabilities. CSU had accommodated her conditions by granting exam and assignment extensions and a yearlong medical leave. Despite these accommodations, Royan failed her first clinical rotation under Dr. Patel and her second under Dr. Kerner, leading to her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of CSU, finding that Royan failed to present sufficient evidence that her dismissal was solely based on her disability. The court held that CSU had accommodated her disabilities and applied its academic standards without discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Royan was not "otherwise qualified" for the program as she failed to meet the academic requirements, specifically passing the clinical rotations. The court also found no evidence of pretext in CSU's stated reasons for her dismissal. Additionally, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that CSU dismissed Royan solely because of her disabilities, as required under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court emphasized that academic institutions have broad discretion in setting and enforcing academic standards, and CSU's actions were consistent with its policies and procedures. View "Royan v. Chicago State University" on Justia Law

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Richard Walker was arrested at his girlfriend Ramona Paulette's residence, where he was staying overnight. Officers conducted a protective sweep of the residence and found a loaded firearm under the mattress in Walker Jr.'s bedroom. Later, with consent from Paulette's mother, Laverne Shipp, officers conducted a second search and found drugs in Paulette's bedroom. Walker was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Walker's motion to suppress, finding the protective sweep and subsequent search justified. Walker entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Walker argued that the firearm and drugs were discovered through an unconstitutional search. The court found that Walker had standing to challenge the search and that the protective sweep was unlawful in scope when officers lifted the mattress in Walker Jr.'s bedroom. The court also determined that the district court erred in applying the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule and did not address the inevitable discovery exception.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Walker's suppression motion and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the inevitable discovery exception applied and to reassess whether Shipp's consent justified the second search. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

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Eugene Westmoreland, an Illinois inmate who uses a wheelchair, filed a class action lawsuit seeking prospective relief to make the showers at the Northern Reception and Classification Center (NRC) accessible. He claimed the showers were inaccessible to individuals using mobility aids. Westmoreland filed the suit without first using the prison's internal grievance process as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Six weeks after filing, he was transferred to a different facility with accessible showers, which led to questions about the mootness of his claim.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Westmoreland's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding his claim moot due to his transfer. The court also determined that no exception to mootness applied, as Westmoreland had not exhausted the internal grievance process, making him an inadequate class representative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Westmoreland's transfer rendered his claim moot and that he did not qualify for any exceptions to mootness. The court also found that Westmoreland's failure to exhaust the grievance process as required by the PLRA made him an inadequate class representative, preventing the class action from proceeding. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. View "Westmoreland v. Hughes" on Justia Law

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Jordan Watkins, while in federal custody, underwent hernia repair surgery and subsequently experienced severe pain and swelling in his groin. Medical staff at the correctional facility dismissed his symptoms as routine side effects and refused to schedule a follow-up appointment before his transfer to another facility. Watkins filed Bivens claims against the medical and correctional staff for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States for negligent medical treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed all of Watkins' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Supreme Court's framework for evaluating Bivens claims barred Watkins' claims and that his FTCA claim was filed too late.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watkins' Bivens claims could proceed under the precedent set by Carlson v. Green, which allows federal prisoners to sue for damages resulting from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The court found that Watkins' claims fit within the context recognized by Carlson and were not meaningfully different. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of Watkins' FTCA claim was premature. Watkins may be able to establish the requirements for equitable tolling due to extraordinary circumstances, such as disruptions caused by COVID-19, which prevented him from filing his suit on time. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mohan" on Justia Law

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A Wisconsin prisoner, Armin Wand III, developed appendicitis in February 2018. He was seen by Nurse Beckey Kramer on February 13, 2018, but she did not diagnose appendicitis at that time. The next day, February 14, she recognized the symptoms and sent him to the hospital for emergency surgery. Wand sued Kramer and other officials, claiming inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and state law negligence for not recognizing his need for emergency care on February 13.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied summary judgment for Kramer and another defendant, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The court recruited an experienced lawyer for Wand, but only for settlement purposes. After settlement efforts failed, the lawyer withdrew, and Wand's subsequent motion for recruitment of another lawyer was denied. The court noted Wand's legal blindness and severe stutter but believed he could represent himself with the court's assistance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Wand's trial testimony contradicted his earlier claims, stating he did not report lower right quadrant pain to Kramer on February 13, which was crucial for diagnosing appendicitis. The court concluded that Wand's case was substantively weak and that he had not shown prejudice from the lack of recruited counsel. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Kramer, holding that Wand did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. View "Wand v. Kramer" on Justia Law

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Malcolm Wilson, an inmate at Indiana State Prison, was involved in an altercation where he grabbed another inmate's cane to defend himself, causing the other inmate to fall and require medical attention. Wilson was charged with battery and, after a disciplinary hearing conducted by Lieutenant Angelita Castaneda, was found guilty. Castaneda imposed a sentence that included 90 days in restrictive housing, a demotion in credit class, and up to $100,000 in restitution for medical costs.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed Wilson's pro se complaint at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the restitution order. Wilson's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Wilson appealed the dismissal, arguing that the restitution amount was not supported by any evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo, accepting the factual allegations in Wilson's complaint as true. The court found that the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing, including Wilson's statements, video footage, and staff conduct reports, constituted "some evidence" to support the restitution order. The court held that the procedural requirements of due process were met, as Wilson received notice of the charges, an opportunity to defend himself, and a written statement of the evidence and reasons for the disciplinary action. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Wilson received the process he was due. View "Wilson v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

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A female student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Isabelle Arana, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by two football players, Quintez Cephus and Danny Davis III. Following an investigation, the university expelled Cephus for sexual assault and harassment. However, after Cephus was acquitted in a state court trial on a related charge, he petitioned for readmission, citing new evidence. The university's Chancellor readmitted Cephus without consulting Arana or reviewing the full trial transcript, allegedly under pressure from influential donors and the football program.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the university, dismissing Arana's Title IX claim. The court acknowledged that a jury could find the university acted with deliberate indifference if it readmitted Cephus due to public pressure. However, it concluded that Arana could not show the harassment deprived her of educational opportunities, citing her continued academic success.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment Arana experienced was severe and whether the university's response was clearly unreasonable, potentially having a detrimental effect on her education. The court noted that Arana's fear of encountering Cephus led her to avoid certain campus areas, skip classes, and delay her graduation, which could be seen as a deprivation of educational opportunities. The court also highlighted the suspicious timing of Cephus's readmission and the university's failure to involve Arana in the process. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Arana v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin" on Justia Law