Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Anthony Sullers, Sr., an African American elevator mechanic, filed a lawsuit against his union, the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2 (IUEC), alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his claim of racial discrimination by his employer, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation (TKE). Sullers and another employee were laid off, and while Sullers was without work, TKE hired a white mechanic. Sullers informed the union of his layoff and his belief that it was racially motivated. The union filed a grievance on his behalf but did not include allegations of racial discrimination. Sullers followed the union's advice to file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of IUEC. The court found that the union had fulfilled its duty of fair representation by obtaining the maximum remedy available for Sullers, including his reinstatement and backpay. The court also noted that Sullers had not requested the union to file a racial discrimination grievance and that the union's actions were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the union's decision to pursue the grievance as it did, rather than filing a racial discrimination grievance, was within its discretion and not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The court also found that Sullers did not suffer harm attributable to the union's actions, as he was reinstated and received backpay. The court concluded that the union had properly represented Sullers and that he had not shown how he would have achieved a better outcome through arbitration. View "Sullers v. International Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2" on Justia Law

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Santoasha Harris endured five years of sexual harassment at her job with the City of Milwaukee. When she reported the harassment in 2017, the City separated her from the harasser, conducted an investigation, compelled the harasser’s resignation, and restored Harris to her position within a month. Harris sued the City, alleging it knew about the harassment for years, failed to act, and retaliated against her for reporting it. Due to Harris’s bankruptcy filing, her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that Harris’s Estate had not shown the City unreasonably failed to prevent the harassment or that she suffered a tangible employment action as a consequence of reporting it. The court found no evidence supporting the Title VII and Section 1983 claims against the City.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not support the claims of quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII. The court found that Harris did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City acted promptly and reasonably once the harassment was reported. Additionally, the court found no basis for employer liability under Section 1983, as there was no evidence of intentional discrimination by the City. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find for the Estate on its claims against the City. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Harris v City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

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Jesus Zambrano was convicted of first-degree murder in Illinois state court in 2013. The Illinois Appellate Court later found that the trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction on accomplice liability, leading to a retrial where Zambrano was acquitted. Zambrano then filed a federal lawsuit against Detective Patrick Schumacher and sought indemnification from the City of Joliet, alleging that Schumacher fabricated evidence, violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.The case involved the murder of Robert Gooch, who was shot at his girlfriend's apartment in May 2009. Key evidence included testimonies and surveillance videos placing Zambrano at the scene. Detective Schumacher's police report stated that Zambrano identified his friends and the location of his girlfriend's apartment, which Zambrano claimed was false.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Zambrano failed to provide sufficient evidence that Schumacher deliberately falsified evidence in bad faith or that the alleged fabrication was material to his conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Zambrano did not present enough evidence to show that Schumacher knowingly falsified the police report or acted in bad faith. Additionally, the court found that the alleged fabricated evidence was not material to the outcome of the trial, as it did not affect the jury's judgment. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was upheld. View "Zambrano v City of Joliet" on Justia Law

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Eric Holmes, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a lawsuit against the Marion County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes sought to proceed in forma pauperis, but the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts this ability for prisoners who have had three prior civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Holmes had incurred three strikes under the PLRA. The court determined that a previous case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey counted as Holmes’s third strike. Holmes did not contest the validity of his first two strikes. He filed a notice of appeal and moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but a motions panel of the Seventh Circuit denied his motion, identifying a different case dismissed due to judicial immunity as his third strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether dismissals based on affirmative defenses, such as those barred by Heck or due to judicial immunity, count as strikes under the PLRA. The court held that a case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck counts as a strike if the Heck bar is clear from the face of the complaint. Similarly, a case dismissed on judicial immunity grounds incurs a strike if the immunity defense is clear from the face of the complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Holmes’s current suit, concluding that both the Heck dismissal and the judicial immunity dismissal counted as strikes. View "Holmes v Marion County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

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Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

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A transgender girl, D.P., and her mother challenged a new policy by the Mukwonago Area School District that required D.P. to use the boys’ bathroom or a gender-neutral alternative. They argued that the policy violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. They filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the policy's enforcement during litigation, citing the precedent set by Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the temporary restraining order and, shortly after, converted it to a preliminary injunction without holding a hearing. The judge found that the case was controlled by the Whitaker precedent and concluded that D.P. was likely to succeed on the merits of her claims. The school district appealed, arguing that the judge erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and urging the court to overrule Whitaker and a related case, A.C. v. Metropolitan School District of Martinsville.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that an evidentiary hearing is not always required before issuing a preliminary injunction, especially when the opponent does not request one or identify material factual disputes. The court also declined to revisit or overrule Whitaker and Martinsville, reaffirming that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the preliminary injunction based on binding circuit precedent. The court concluded that the slight differences in D.P.'s case did not warrant a different outcome. View "Doe v Mukwonago Area School District" on Justia Law

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Joe Feazell, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, sued his doctor, Andrew Tilden, and the prison’s healthcare contractor, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., alleging deliberate indifference to his hemorrhoid condition and significant gastrointestinal bleeding, violating the Eighth Amendment. Feazell claimed that Dr. Tilden failed to respond promptly to his abnormal lab results and adequately treat his hemorrhoids, while Wexford's treatment protocol was ineffective and deliberately indifferent.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, who later granted summary judgment for Wexford and partial summary judgment for Dr. Tilden. Feazell went to trial on his remaining claim against Dr. Tilden but was barred from testifying about his medical diagnoses or their causes. The jury returned a verdict for the defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's summary judgment decision, finding no evidence that Wexford's Collegial Review policy caused Feazell to receive deficient care or that Dr. Tilden was aware of Feazell's hemorrhoids before the colonoscopy. The court also upheld the magistrate judge's evidentiary rulings, barring Feazell from testifying about medical diagnoses or causation, as he was not qualified to provide such testimony.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Feazell failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Wexford's policy causing a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and that Dr. Tilden was not deliberately indifferent to Feazell's medical needs. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Feazell v Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

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Mark Petersen sued Deputy Stefanie Pedersen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest for drunk driving and an unlawful blood draw. On December 27, 2018, Deputy Pedersen responded to a car crash in rural Wisconsin. She found Petersen, who was intoxicated, attempting to change a tire on a car registered to him. Witnesses confirmed he was the only person near the car. Petersen had a history of uncooperative behavior with law enforcement and prior OWI charges. Based on the scene, his behavior, and his intoxication, Pedersen arrested him for OWI and obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, which confirmed his high BAC.In the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Petersen was charged with OWI – 4th Offense. He moved to suppress the BAC evidence, arguing lack of probable cause for his arrest. The state court granted his motion, leading to the dismissal of the charges. Petersen then filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was reduced to claims against Deputy Pedersen for false arrest and unreasonable search. The district court granted summary judgment for Pedersen, finding probable cause for the arrest and a valid search warrant for the blood draw, and also granted her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that probable cause supported Petersen’s arrest based on the totality of the circumstances, including his intoxication, the scene of the crash, and witness statements. The court also found the blood draw was lawful as it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Additionally, the court held that Deputy Pedersen was entitled to qualified immunity for both the arrest and the blood draw. View "Petersen v Pedersen" on Justia Law

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Lazerek Austin, a state prisoner, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three medical providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Austin, representing himself, requested the court to recruit counsel due to his severe mental illness and lack of access to legal resources. The district court initially granted his motion for recruited counsel but was unable to find a volunteer attorney despite extensive efforts. Consequently, Austin continued to litigate his case pro se, participating in discovery and responding to motions.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that a reasonable jury could not find that they violated Austin’s constitutional rights. Austin appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not continuing to search for counsel after initially granting his motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court noted that federal courts cannot compel attorneys to provide free services to civil litigants and that the district court made reasonable efforts to recruit counsel. The court emphasized that the district court was not required to search indefinitely for a volunteer attorney and that it reasonably concluded Austin was capable of litigating his case pro se. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of Austin's motion for recruited counsel and its determination that Austin could proceed without counsel. View "Austin v. Hansen" on Justia Law