Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Village of Schaumburg owns a hotel and convention center that it alleges has defective exterior walls. In February 2022, it initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against several parties for fraud, breach of warranty, and products liability. In November 2022, the Village added Permasteelisa North America, a subcontractor, as a defendant. About eight months later, the Village sought to compel arbitration of its dispute with Permasteelisa, even though it had not previously requested arbitration in its complaint or before filing suit, and the arbitration clause was contained in a contract between Permasteelisa and the general contractor, not the Village directly.The District Court concluded that by filing a lawsuit and then delaying its request for arbitration, the Village presumptively waived any right to arbitrate it might have had. The Village argued that the lawsuit was filed to avoid the statute of limitations expiring, but the District Court responded that the Village should have requested arbitration at the outset or, at the latest, soon after Permasteelisa’s motion to dismiss was filed. The court found that the combination of filing suit and substantial delay amounted to waiver of any right to arbitrate and denied the Village’s motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the Village waived any right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right through both initiating litigation and delaying the arbitration request. The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument that a contractual anti-waiver clause could override federal procedural rules governing litigation conduct. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Village of Schaumburg v Permasteelisa North America" on Justia Law

Paul Johnson sustained severe injuries while using a drain-cleaning machine manufactured by Ridge Tool Manufacturing Company, Inc. The machine, designed to minimize user risks, included a warning label, an instruction manual, and specially designed gloves. Johnson did not read the manual or use the provided gloves, instead choosing an oversized pair from his employer. While operating the machine, his glove became entangled in the rotating cable, resulting in significant injury. Johnson brought suit against Ridge Tool, alleging strict liability, negligence, and failure to warn. He relied on two expert witnesses: Chad Jones, who opined that a safer alternative design was feasible, and Cynthia Rando, who criticized the manual and glove warnings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois excluded both expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, finding Jones’s alternative design opinion unreliable due to lack of testing, analysis, and supporting industry data, and Rando’s report deficient for not proposing an alternative warning and for focusing on the manual Johnson never read. The district court then granted summary judgment to Ridge Tool, concluding that Johnson’s claims lacked evidentiary support after the exclusion of his experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions for abuse of discretion regarding the exclusion of expert testimony and de novo for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed both rulings, holding that the district court properly excluded Johnson’s experts for unreliable methodologies and unsupported conclusions, and that, absent those expert opinions, Johnson’s legal theories could not survive summary judgment. The court emphasized the necessity of reliable expert evidence and alternative warnings to establish causation in failure-to-warn claims under Illinois law. The judgment was affirmed. View "Johnson v Ridge Tool Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

Several parents whose premature infants developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow’s milk-based formula at Pennsylvania Hospital sued the manufacturers of the formula, as well as the hospital, in Pennsylvania state court. The parents alleged that the manufacturers’ products caused NEC and that the hospital failed to warn of the risks and implement policies to protect patients. Some plaintiffs were Pennsylvania citizens and others from New Jersey. The hospital and its related entities were named as defendants, and the claims against them were based on state law.After the lawsuits were filed, the manufacturers removed the cases to federal court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the cases to a multidistrict litigation proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs’ initial motion to remand was granted after the district court found that the claims against the hospital were potentially viable, defeating removal on diversity grounds. The cases returned to Pennsylvania state court, where discovery proceeded and the hospital was later dismissed with prejudice after the state court sustained preliminary objections. The plaintiffs did not immediately appeal. The manufacturers then removed the cases a second time, arguing that the hospital had been fraudulently joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, this time concluding that the plaintiffs’ lack of active pursuit of claims against the hospital showed “no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action,” amounting to fraudulent joinder.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that fraudulent joinder exists only where a plaintiff makes false jurisdictional allegations or has no chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff’s favor. The court held that the plaintiffs’ litigation conduct and subjective intent are not proper bases for finding fraudulent joinder. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdullah v Mead Johnson & Company LLC" on Justia Law

A premature infant was born in West Virginia in 2014 and, after initially being fed her mother’s milk, was switched to a cow’s-milk-based infant formula manufactured by Abbott Laboratories when her mother could no longer produce usable breast milk and no donor milk was available. The hospital, following policy, did not allow sharing of untested breast milk. Shortly after being fed the formula, the infant was diagnosed with necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) and died the next day. The infant’s mother alleged that Abbott failed to adequately warn about the risks of NEC associated with its formula.The mother brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, as part of a multidistrict litigation. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Abbott. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown a feasible alternative design for the formula and, on the failure-to-warn claim, concluded there was insufficient evidence that a different warning would have prevented the infant’s death. The court also denied a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, as the plaintiff’s new witnesses were available during discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence that an alternative warning would have changed the outcome, given that the hospital had no donor milk and enforced a policy against sharing untested milk. The court also affirmed the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, finding no abuse of discretion because the proposed new evidence was not newly discovered. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mar v Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

American Airlines contracted with a uniform manufacturer to provide new apparel for its employees. After distribution, many employees reported health issues, including skin and respiratory symptoms, allegedly connected to wearing or being near the uniforms. The airline allowed employees to stop wearing the uniforms, ultimately replacing them. Laboratory and government testing found low levels of chemicals in the uniforms but concluded these were unlikely to cause the reported symptoms. Multiple alternative causes were identified, and the scientific evidence did not support the employees' claims.A group of employees sued American Airlines, the manufacturer, and others in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially seeking class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After several amended complaints and significant discovery disputes, the plaintiffs dropped their request for class certification, briefly raising questions about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. They later re-pled their class allegations in a fourth amended complaint, and the district court determined it retained jurisdiction. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing these experts were essential to prove defect and causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly retained jurisdiction under CAFA after plaintiffs reasserted class claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ experts due to unreliable methodologies. It further held that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish a defect or causation under strict or negligent products liability. The court also held that neither the Tweedy doctrine nor res ipsa loquitur provided an evidentiary shortcut under the case facts, since the alleged injuries did not inherently indicate a product defect or negligence. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc." on Justia Law

A police sergeant was injured during a training exercise when his department-issued semi-automatic pistol discharged while holstered, resulting in a gunshot wound to his leg. He could not explain what caused the trigger to be actuated but maintained that his hand was not on the weapon at the moment it discharged. He and his wife sued the firearm manufacturer, alleging strict products liability and negligence, and asserting that the pistol’s design was defective—particularly, that it lacked an external safety mechanism, making it more susceptible to unintentional discharge.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiffs sought to introduce expert testimony to establish that the design defect, specifically the lack of an external safety, caused the injury. The district court excluded the experts’ causation opinions, finding them unreliable because the experts did not adequately address the specifics of the incident or test their theories under similar circumstances. The court then granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, holding that under New York law, expert testimony as to proximate causation was necessary due to the complexity of the issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude the experts’ causation opinions, finding the exclusion within the court’s discretion. However, the appellate court held that New York law does not require expert testimony on proximate causation in all product liability cases, especially where jurors can use their own judgment, aided by other evidence, to assess causation. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could decide, based on the design-defect evidence and the circumstances of the accident, whether an external safety would have prevented the injury. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hayes v Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

A woman suffered a below-the-knee amputation of her left leg after an accident involving a zero-radius-turn riding lawnmower manufactured by The Toro Company. The incident occurred when the mower, which could be disengaged from its hydrostatic braking system using "bypass pins," began rolling uncontrolled down a slope after the pins were not reset following an attempt to free the mower from a flower bed. The mower lacked an independent mechanical brake, a rollover protection system, and an ignition safety interlock that would have prevented operation with the bypass engaged. The injured woman, her spouse, and their minor child pursued damages for her injuries, claiming design defects and failure to warn.The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. During pretrial proceedings, the district court excluded all of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony as unreliable or irrelevant and granted summary judgment to Toro on all remaining theories. The court found that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish their strict products liability or negligent design claims. It also dismissed the failure-to-warn claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed most of the district court’s evidentiary rulings but found that the district court did not address one expert’s opinions regarding the need for an independent brake. The appellate court held those opinions to be reliable and relevant, thus presenting genuine disputes of material fact regarding the absence of an independent brake. Consequently, it reversed the summary judgment for Toro on the strict products liability and negligent design claims related to the independent brake theory, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for trial. View "Hillman v. Toro Company" on Justia Law

Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

Jessica Gehner was implanted with a Cook Medical inferior vena cava (IVC) filter in Ohio. She later experienced abdominal pain, and a CT scan in March 2013 revealed that the filter had perforated her IVC. Her doctors recommended the filter's removal, which occurred in April 2013, but a fragment was left behind due to the filter fracturing. Gehner filed a lawsuit in May 2016 against Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical LLC, and William Cook Europe APS, alleging products liability and implied warranty claims. The defendants argued that her claims were time-barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a summary judgment motion. The court concluded that Gehner's claims were time-barred, as she was informed by her doctors in March 2013 that the IVC filter caused her injury, starting the statute of limitations clock. Gehner contended that she was unaware of the defect until 2016 when her mother saw a television commercial about defective IVC filters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under Ohio law, the statute of limitations for product liability claims begins when the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority of an injury related to the product or when the plaintiff should have known of the injury through reasonable diligence. The court found that Gehner was aware of her injury and its relation to the IVC filter by April 2013 at the latest. The court rejected Gehner's argument that the statute of limitations should start when she learned of the defect, noting that awareness of the injury itself was sufficient to start the clock. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Gehner's claims were indeed time-barred. View "Gehner v. Cook Medical, LLC" on Justia Law