Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tawuo was born in Cameroon in 1986. He entered the U.S. in 2009 with a nonimmigrant student visa to attend school in New York. He registered, but did not attend for long. Tawuo moved to Illinois, and in 2010 applied for asylum and withholding of removal, stating that he feared harm or mistreatment if he were to return. Tawuo’s affidavit described being “arrested, detained and tortured due to my activities with the Association for the Defense of the Rights of University Students in Cameroon (ADDEC).” CIS deemed Tawuo’s application not credible, citing material inconsistencies between his affidavit and other evidence as well as “material implausibility.” At a hearing before an IJ, he submitted an affidavit that was significantly more detailed than his first submission. Tawuo testified extensively about his life in Cameroon, his participation in ADDEC, and his subsequent persecution by police. The judge concluded that Tawuo was not credible and had not produced any other evidence sufficient to corroborate his account. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for reviw. The judge’s finding that Tawuo’s testimony and affidavits were not credible was based upon a detailed analysis of the record. View "Tawuo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying a .22 caliber cartridge and did not have documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United States, which made his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that section 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower court’s rationale swept too far, but that the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by section 922(g)(5). View "United States v. Meza-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Giri, a citizen of Nepal, was living in the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Tammy, until USCIS terminated his conditional resident status after finding that his marriage was entered into for the purpose of remaining in the U.S. On the day of his merits removal hearing, after the court granted his request to advance the date of that hearing, he sought a continuance on grounds that he had not been fingerprinted, as required, and was not able to timely submit documentation to support the validity of his marriage. The IJ denied the request finding that Giri had ample time to get fingerprinted and submit his petition for relief and evidence supporting the bona fides of his marriage, but he was not diligent in completing these tasks, and ordered him removed to Nepal. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the ruling. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that the immigration courts provided a reasoned explanation for the IJ’s decision not to grant a continuance that did not depart from established policies or rest on an impermissible basis and that the record indicated that Giri conceded removability and was removable to Nepal. View "Giri v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Joseph, a Nigerian citizen, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1991 and was placed in removal proceedings after convictions for theft and bank fraud. He argued his marriage to a U.S. citizen as a basis for adjusting his status and sought a waiver of inadmissibility, arguing that removal would cause his family “extreme hardship,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B). An IJ concluded that any hardship to his sons would be no worse than confronted by any child whose parent is deported. The BIA agreed. Joseph’s current motion to reopen is his eighth, but his third premised on the Violence Against Women Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv), which extends to one year the deadline for a motion to reopen asserting that the alien facing removal is a victim of domestic violence. That longer deadline can be waived if the battered alien “demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” The first of Joseph’s VAWA motions missed the deadline by four years. Joseph claimed that he was a victim of spousal abuse and should be granted a waiver based on hardship to his children. The BIA denied the motion, noting failure to corroborate his claim of spousal abuse and to submit evidence of unusual hardship. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that its jurisdiction is limited to legal or constitutional questions. Joseph presented neither. View "Joseph v. Lynch" on Justia Law

DeBartolo, 48 years old, immigrated to the U.S. at the age of one, but never applied for U.S. citizenship. He is married to a citizen and his children are citizens. He has no family in Italy and does not speak Italian. In 1996 he was sentenced in an Indiana court to eight years in prison for dealing in cocaine. In 2011 he was indicted in federal court for possessing with intent to distribute more than 100 marijuana plants and manufacturing more than 100 plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). DeBartolo powered the lighting used to grow the plants with electricity that he stole from the electric company. . Because he helped the government to apprehend other drug dealers and pled guilty to manufacturing, the government moved for, and the court imposed, a below-minimum sentence of 25 months. There was no mention of deportation, but his conviction made him deportable and precluded cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i), 1229b(a)(3). After he completed his sentence he was removed to Italy. While his removal was pending he sought habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case, because his lawyer had failed to warn him that if he were convicted he could be deported. The judge denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the government should consider whether having served the recommended prison sentence, having then languished in INS custody, and being deported, DeBartolo has been punished sufficiently. View "Debartolo v. United States" on Justia Law

Lara, a citizen of Mexico, married a U.S. citizen in 1988. He gained conditional permanent residency based on that marriage but never completed the process necessary to obtain unconditional permanent residency, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c). In 2008—10 years after divorcing his wife—he sought permanent residency through a discretionary waiver of the joint-petition requirements available to petitioners who can show that they had entered a failed marriage in good faith. He testified at the removal hearing that he had entered his marriage in good faith and the government offered no evidence to the contrary. Without making a credibility finding, the immigration judge determined that Hernandez’s marriage was not bona fide and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals evaluated Hernandez’s appeal on the assumption that everything he said about his marriage was credible, but concluded that he had not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his marriage was bona fide. The Seventh Circuit granted relief. Given Lara’s testimony that he had married for love, not immigration benefits—and the government’s lack of evidence— the Board’s conclusion implies that it demanded from Hernandez more proof than necessary to satisfy a preponderance standard. View "Lara v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Liu a Chinese citizen in her mid-twenties, came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2011. She did not attend the school designated on her visa, instead taking free English classes in Chicago. Ten months after her arrival, she unsuccessfully sought asylum. At her removal hearing, Liu testified about her conversion to Christianity while in college in China and that the police raided her house church and asked the congregants why they were gathered. Learning that they were discussing Christianity, the police arrested all seven attendees. Liu was detained for four days in a room apart from her fellow churchgoers. She testified that she was mistreated and was released from detention after her parents paid 800 dollars. Liu was told to cease her church activity and report to the police every week. She was unable to eat and was diagnosed with a concussion. There were several inconsistencies in her testimony. Liu presented testimony from a family friend with whom she lived and attended church in Chicago and some documentation. The IJ denied Liu relief, finding that Liu did not submit adequate, reliable evidence to overcome her “incredible testimony.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Liu v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In the1980s, Habib married a woman in Pakistan and had three children with her there. It is unclear when or how Habib came to the U.S. In 1996, he married Bualice, a U.S. citizen, and three years later adjusted his status to that of lawful permanent resident based on that marriage. Habib did not disclose any children or prior marriages in his application to adjust status or during his interview. He applied for naturalization in 2004 and again neglected to list any children or prior marriages. When interviewed by USCIS, he stated that Bualice was his first wife. USCIS denied Habib’s application in 2010 on the ground that he had obtained lawful permanent residency by fraud and was ineligible for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and because he lacked a valid entry document. At a hearing, Habib’s attorney stated that he had not seen the Notice to Appear but, when given a copy of the document, proceeded to admit and deny the allegations without consulting Habib, who was present. After Habib was ordered removed, the BIA denied a motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review, finding that the Board abused its discretion when it determined that Habib was not prejudiced by his lawyer’s mistakes. View "Habib v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Martinez is a native of Guatemala. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to knowingly transfer a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(f). In 2013, the government commenced removal proceedings for having committed a crime of moral turpitude within five years after admission, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Martinez admitted the allegations, but requested a continuance because he had filed a motion to set aside and vacate his conviction. He also argued that he was eligible for a stand-alone waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ ordered that Martinez be removed because he had not demonstrated good cause for a continuance and was ineligible for a waiver. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Pending collateral attack is not good cause because its tentative nature does not affect the finality of the conviction for immigration purposes. Martinez admitted that he waived any claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, that he understood his guilty plea could affect his immigration status, and that his attorney advised him of this. View "Palma-Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In November 2011, defendant was arrested. While in state custody, he was told by a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent that ICE had placed “a hold” on him. If he posted bail, he would be seized by ICE and taken into immigration detention. He was in pretrial detention on state charges until October 2012, when he was convicted on a state obstruction of justice charge. He was detained by the state for 17 months, then taken into custody by ICE and detained while his immigration case was adjudicated. On September 19, 2013, the immigration judge ordered his removal. Defendant withdrew his appeal. On October 17, 2013, defendant was indicted for illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) and taken into federal criminal custody. He pled guilty to that charge, arguing that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate, noting that he would not receive credit for the time served in immigration custody. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 57 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The court should have addressed defendant’s argument that the court should have reduced his sentence because the delay in charging him effectively denied him the ability to receive credit toward his federal criminal sentence for the months he spent in state custody and in immigration custody. View "United States v. Estrada-Mederos" on Justia Law