Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Courtney was sentenced to three years in state prison followed by one year of supervised release for violating an earlier term of parole by failing to register as a sex offender. Courtney’s supervised release was revoked before he left prison. The stated reason was not that he had acted wrongly but that he had no arrangements for a place to live that state officials deemed suitable. Courtney spent his year of supervised release in prison.Courtney brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants failed to investigate his proposed living arrangements and ignored his grievances and that his release was revoked without evidence that he violated any terms of release and without adequate procedural protections. The district court dismissed Courtney’s claims as barred by the Supreme Court’s 1994 “Heck” decision, which forecloses civil litigation that would call into question the validity of a state criminal conviction or sentence that has not been set aside or that would call into question the validity of parole revocation, at least when the revocation is based on the parolee’s wrongdoing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part but remanded the claims based on the defendants’ failure to do their jobs. Courtney’s claims that the defendants, after his parole revocation, ignored his grievances and communications regarding possible host sites, if substantiated, would not necessarily imply that the Prison Review Board’s decision to revoke his parole was invalid. Courtney’s claims concerning the defendants’ inaction before that date are similar to seeking a writ of mandamus, not like seeking habeas corpus relief, and would not “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” View "Courtney v. Butler" on Justia Law

The 2005 Medicare amendment, launching prescription drug coverage, raised concerns that patient assistance plans could violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b, and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, by effectively rewarding doctors and patients for choosing particular drugs. Astellas subsequently launched Xtandi, used to treat metastatic prostate cancer. Priced at $7,800 per month, Xtandi prescriptions were covered by Medicare up to about $6,000 per month. Astellas made contributions to two patient assistance plans. An Astellas marketing executive encouraged both plans to create special funds to provide co-pay assistance for only androgen receptor inhibitors like Xtandi and a few other medications. Astellas donated to the new funds but stopped after contributing about $27 million. Astellas continued contributing to broader prostate cancer funds.The Department of Justice began investigating; the Astellas marketing executive acknowledged that he had “hoped” and “expected” that the contributions would produce financial benefits for Astellas but that Astellas had made no efforts to calculate “a return on investment.” Astellas settled with the government for $100 million--$50 million for “restitution” to the government. Astellas sought indemnification from liability insurers, including Federal, which denied coverage.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Astellas. Under Illinois law, a party may not obtain liability insurance for genuine restitution it owes the victim of its intentional wrongdoing, but a party may obtain insurance for compensatory damages. In cases of ambiguity, Illinois favors settlements and freedom of contract. Federal wrote its insurance policy to try to extend coverage to the limit of what Illinois law would allow. Federal did not carry its burden of showing that the portion of the settlement payment for which Astellas seeks coverage is uninsurable restitution. View "Astellas US Holding, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2001, Sylvester Wince, who is Black, began work as a Hospital maintenance mechanic. In 2010 the Hospital contracted with CBRE. Wince kept his job under the title of Stationary Engineer. Wince is a licensed Stationary Engineer, has a bachelor’s degree, and holds certificates in electricity, air quality, and refrigeration. Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) governed Wince’s employment. Wince alleges that CBRE denied him a promotion because of his race. Wince’s application for the job was outside CBRE’s usual hierarchy for promotions; the job went to a white man with similar credentials who had gone through that hierarchy. Wince claimed he was the subject of racist slurs and a discriminatory nickname, “Sly.” After Wince told his coworkers he disliked the nickname, they stopped using it. Wince claimed CBRE’s management made comments that revealed racial bias. Wince also alleged that he filed grievances accusing CBRE of denying him holidays, overtime, promotions, and paid time off and that CBRE failed to address them. In 2018 Wince filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which was dismissed. In 2019, Wince quit CBRE for a position at another hospital.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII; breach of the CBA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act; and constructive discharge. View "Wince v. CBRE, Inc." on Justia Law

Thirteen’s building suffered fire damages covered by Foremost’s policy. Thirteen retained Paramount as its public adjuster and general contractor for repairs. Paramount was “to be [Thirteen’s] agent and representative to assist in the preparation, presentation, negotiation, adjustment, and settlement” of the fire loss. Thirteen also “direct[ed] any insurance companies to include Paramount … on all payments on” the fire loss claim. Paramount negotiated the fire loss. Foremost delivered settlement checks to Paramount. The checks named Thirteen, its mortgagee, and Paramount as co-payees. Paramount endorsed the names of all co-payees, cashed the checks, and kept the proceeds. Paramount performed some repair work on the building before Thirteen sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer had breached its policy by not paying the claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Foremost. Paramount received and cashed the checks, discharging the insurer’s performance obligation under the policy. The court rejected Thirteen’s arguments that Foremost waived payment as an affirmative defense by failing to plead it in its answer; that, under controlling Illinois law, Foremost’s policy obligation was not discharged when it delivered the checks to Paramount, which cashed the checks; and that Foremost agreed to make claim payments to Thirteen in installments after Foremost had inspected repair work performed. View "Thirteen Investment Co., Inc. v. Foremost Insurance Co. Grand Rapids Michigan" on Justia Law

Curtis was convicted in 2000 for his part in a crack-cocaine distribution enterprise, including related shootings. The indictment included drug conspiracy counts, firearm counts, and an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) count for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Curtis’s PSR grouped the drug counts and grouped the firearms counts (for causing the death of another with a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy) separately, with terms of imprisonment to run consecutively. Section 924(c) convictions feature a five-year mandatory consecutive minimum sentence and are always grouped separately. Curtis did not object to the groupings. Curtis was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a concurrent term of 480 months on the drug counts; two consecutive life sentences on the firearms counts; and another consecutive 60 months on the 924(c) count.Under the 2018 First Step Act, the district court reduced Curtis's term of imprisonment for the drug conspiracy counts to 293 months but concluded that resentencing was not authorized for the other counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court was incorrect to rely rigidly on the grouping rules and that Curtis’s whole sentence should be treated as “a single sentencing package.” While a court does have discretion under the Act to reduce an aggregate sentence, even if part of that sentence rests on offenses that are neither covered by the Act nor grouped with a covered offense, Curtis’s consecutive sentences for the firearms convictions were not part of a package. They were not “covered offenses” and “could not be grouped” with a covered offense. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Bridges and Cunningham filed a putative class action, alleging that Blackstone (the owner of Ancestry.com) violated Section 30 of Illinois’s 1998 Genetic Information Privacy Act, which provides that no person or company “may disclose or be compelled to disclose the identity of any person upon whom a genetic test is performed or the results of a genetic test in a manner that permits identification of the subject of the test,” 410 ILCS 513/30(a). Both plaintiffs had purchased DNA testing products from Ancestry and submitted saliva samples for genetic sequencing years earlier. Blackstone subsequently purchased Ancestry in a “control acquisition”— an all-stock transaction. Because Ancestry had allegedly paired the plaintiffs’ genetic tests with personally identifiable information—including names, emails, and home addresses—Bridges and Cunningham maintained that Blackstone, as part of acquiring Ancestry, had compelled the disclosure of their genetic identities in violation of Section 30.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim. The complaint focusing exclusively on Blackstone’s acquisition of Ancestry did not adequately allege any compulsory disclosure. View "Bridges v. Blackstone, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998, Evans was charged with murder. While awaiting trial, Evans asked his cellmate to kill two witnesses. The cellmate secretly recorded those conversations for the authorities. State charges followed for soliciting murder. In 1999 two separate juries convicted Evans of both murder and solicitation. After Illinois courts affirmed both convictions on direct appeal, Evans filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court in 2003. His petition is still pending. In 2019, frustrated with the delay, Evans invoked 28 U.S.C. 2254 and turned to federal court for relief. He claimed that Illinois’s postconviction relief process had proven “ineffective,” allowing him to seek federal habeas relief without waiting further for relief in the Illinois courts.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Evans and vacated the denial of relief. “The delay Evans has experienced of twenty years and counting is beyond the pale and indefensible.” The exhaustion requirement is neither ironclad nor unyielding. A state-law remedy can become ineffective or unavailable by virtue of delay if the delay is both inordinate and attributable to the state. In this case, the “extraordinary delay has stemmed in no small part from the state’s own conduct, both in its capacity as a respondent to the litigation and as the state trial court itself.” View "Evans v. Wills" on Justia Law

Jelena filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Trustee sued her mother, Jorgovanka, in a “turnover” proceeding, 11 U.S.C. 542, to recover a stake in a company registered in Jorgovanka’s name. The Trustee successfully argued before the bankruptcy court that Jorgovanka served as Jelena’s nominee—a party who holds title for another’s benefit. The court ruled that equitable ownership of the stake in the company belonged to Jelena, and was subject to turnover to the bankruptcy estate.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jorgovanka’s argument that the bankruptcy court incorrectly applied a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, rather than clear and convincing evidence. A preponderance standard applies unless particularly important individual interests are involved or the estate’s theory for property turnover imposes a higher standard of proof. Neither situation exists here. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that the Trustee had met his burden of establishing Jelena’s equitable ownership. The court properly considered the close personal relationship, the consideration given for the property, the anticipation of collection activity, the failure to record the conveyance, and the transferor’s continued control over the property. Because Jorgovanka presented a colorable legal argument, the court declined to award sanctions. View "Dordevic v. Paloian" on Justia Law

Caldera-Torres, a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. without permission, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). To be eligible for that relief an alien must show that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Caldera-Torres has a Wisconsin conviction for battery, arising from an attack on the mother of his daughter. An IJ and the BIA concluded that this conviction makes Caldera-Torres ineligible.The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Caldera-Torres’s argument that, although Wis. Stat. 940.19(1) qualifies as a federal “crime of violence,” it is not a crime of domestic violence, because the victim’s identity is not an element of the offense. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) does not say or imply that the “protected person” aspect of the definition must be an element of the crime. It is enough that the victim’s status as a “protected person” be established. A “crime of domestic violence” is a generic “crime of violence” plus the victim’s status as a “protected person.” All other circuits that have addressed section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) recently have held that the victim’s status as a “protected person” need not be an element of the crime of conviction. It is irrelevant how Wisconsin classified Caldera-Torres’s conviction for its own purposes. View "Caldera-Torres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Jam produces and hosts live events at Chicago-area venues. Over six years ago, Jam’s employees voted to certify the Union as their bargaining representative. Jam filed an objection to the election results, which the National Labor Relations Board overruled. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit instructed the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing on the objection. The Board did so, overruled Jam’s objection again, and again sought enforcement of its order compelling Jam to bargain.The Seventh Circuit granted the application for enforcement, upholding the Board’s approach to analyzing objectionable pre-election benefits. The Board carefully examined the statistical evidence and witness testimony and could reasonably require Jam to show something more than voters receiving a critical period hiring-hall benefit before inferring coercion. The Board properly held that Jam “failed to prove the union provided referrals to the [] voters to which they were not otherwise entitled” and, as a consequence, found it unnecessary to draw an inference of coercion and determined that “even if the increase in job referrals during the critical period were construed as a grant of benefits,” the union’s explanation for the referrals rebutted “any inference of coercive, election-related timing or purpose.” View "National Labor Relations Board v. Jam Productions, Ltd." on Justia Law