Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Sherrod and Johnson were fiduciaries of a retirement plan that Sherrod had set up for herself and other employees of her medical practice. The Secretary of Labor brought this civil enforcement action alleging that both had breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court granted the Secretary summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction removing the defendants as fiduciaries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence under ERISA. Hundreds of thousands of dollars of plan assets were used for Sherrod’s personal benefit but were accounted for as plan expenses or losses rather than as distributions of retirement benefits. The permanent injunction was within the scope of reasonable responses to the breaches. Even giving Sherrod the benefit of her assertions of good faith, since the district court imposed the injunction based on a summary judgment decision, good faith is not a defense for one breach of fiduciary duty, let alone repeated breaches. Many of Sherrod’s payments to herself from plan assets from 2012-2017 were also prohibited as self-dealing. “Given the gravity and frequency of defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, they are fortunate that the relief against them has thus far been relatively modest.” View "Su v. Sherrod" on Justia Law

Howard was charged as a felon in possession of a weapon. Before his trial, the government struck the only three Black jurors on the 39-person venire panel. The judge had admonished the jurors that they could not use the internet for any purpose related to or surrounding the case and asked the jurors to “[r]aise your number if you don’t use the internet.” Jurors 9, 13, and 24 each raised their numbers. Jurors 9 and 24 were two of the three Blacks. The prosecutor struck each of them, explaining: “I do not believe people when they say they don’t use the Internet.” In response to the defendant’s subsequent Batson challenge, the court applied the three steps of the Batson inquiry. At the third step—that the defendant established purposeful discrimination by the government—the court summarized Howard’s counsel’s argument, stating: “Your sole justification and your persuasiveness is that the government attorney, who does happen to be African-American, has struck every single African-American on the panel.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed Howard’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by injecting the prosecutor’s race into the Batson inquiry, improperly evaluating the peremptory strike, and failing to make required demeanor findings. The prosecutor’s theory was not so “implausible or fantastic” as to require a conclusion that the justification was “pretext[] for purposeful discrimination.” View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2013, Kinsella, working for Baker, suffered work-related knee injuries that left him unable to work for three years. He received disability benefits. In 2016, his physician deemed him fit to work in sedentary jobs. Martinez, in human resources, helped him look for appropriate jobs at the company. Kinsella submitted an ADA Reassignment Request. Martinez indicated that Baker had 30 days to look for jobs and that failure to timely find alternative work would result in termination. After that period expired, Martinez suggested Kinsella apply for a dispatcher job. Kinsella failed to apply on time, despite an extension. He applied the next day but did not follow up. A non-disabled employee was hired.Kinsella received a termination letter, citing failure to apply for a position. Kinsella responded, attaching a receipt confirming his application. After investigation, Baker began the process of reinstating Kinsella'a status. Eventually, negotiations broke down.In 2018, Kinsella filed a claim that the EEOC dismissed as untimely. Kinsella sued, alleging failure-to-accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. An arbitrator granted Baker summary judgment. Kinsella asked the district court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by requiring illegitimate elements of proof. The court reinstated and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kinsella misconstrues the arbitrator’s statements concerning a lack of evidence showing discriminatory intent. They were part of attributing fault on both sides for a breakdown in the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. View "Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Northrop laid off workers in 2012 and did not provide them all with severance benefits. Its Severance Plan provides that a laid-off employee regularly scheduled to work at least 20 hours a week will receive severance benefits if that employee “received a cover memo, signed by a Vice President of Human Resources.” The plaintiffs, who did not receive this “HR Memo,” filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001– 1461.The parties agreed to have a magistrate resolve the case, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). After the suit was certified as a class action, the district judge resumed control at Northrop's request, finding that the increased stakes constituted “good cause” for withdrawing the reference. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that the Plan gives the HR Department discretion to choose who gets severance pay.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first finding no abuse of discretion in the withdrawal of the reference order. The Plan makes the receipt of severance benefits contingent on the receipt of an HR Memo, which the class members did not get. Welfare-benefit plans under ERISA—unlike retirement plans—need not provide for vesting, and the terms of welfare-benefit plans are entirely in the control of the entities that establish them. When making design decisions, employers may act in their own interests and may include a discretionary component. Rights under ERISA are not subject to estoppel. The plan itself—not past practice—always controls. View "Carlson v. Northrop Grumman Severance Plan" on Justia Law

Sunny sold seasonal merchandise to Walgreens, with Envision as an intermediary. From 2007-2012 Sunny shipped goods directly to Walgreens but routed documents through Envision. Every year Sunny sent documents calling for it to be named the beneficiary of letters of credit to cover the price. Envision passed these to Walgreens, which arranged for the letters of credit. In 2013 Sunny sent the usual documents but Envision substituted its own name for Sunny’s as the beneficiary of the letters of credit. Walgreens sent the letters of credit to Envision, which drew more than $3 million.A jury found that Envision breached its contract with Sunny by not paying it the money drawn on the letters of credit and that Envision had committed fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Envision’s argument that it cannot be liable for fraud because it was not Sunny’s agent or fiduciary and therefore did not have any duty to alert Sunny that it had changed the instructions about who would control the letters of credit. The cooperative business relations between Sunny and Envision from 2007-2012 created a “special relationship” that required Envision to notify Sunny about any deviation in their dealings. View "Sunny Handicraft (H.K.) Ltd. v. Envision This!, LLC" on Justia Law

Ingram contends that, while confined in the Terre Haute Penitentiary, he was attacked and beaten by guards, after which the medical staff denied him necessary care. A magistrate concluded that Ingram failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C.1997e(a), and granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Ingram filed three substantive grievances. Two he did not pursue to a conclusion; one. asserting that members of the staff failed to protect him from harm, was rejected because it lacked required attachments and Ingram did not resubmit a grievance or appeal. A second grievance asserted that staff retaliated against him by withholding necessary medical care. The prison rejected this grievance because Ingram had not attempted an informal resolution. An inmate cannot short-circuit the grievance process by filing in court while that process is ongoing.The court remanded in part. Ingram alleged that he never got a written decision on his remaining substantive grievance, complaining about the attack itself. If an appeal was blocked by the need to attach a document that the prisoner did not have, then that appeal is not “available” to the prisoner, and the statute allows the prisoner to turn to court. The district court should have held a hearing and taken testimony on subjects such as whether the Warden refused to provide the statement to Ingram or whether there was just a bureaucratic delay in handing it over. View "Ingram v. Watson" on Justia Law

Kitterman is a frequent litigator in Illinois federal and state courts, in response to Illinois authorities' insistence that he is required to register as a sex offender. Kitterman believes that this obligation has expired. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against defendants from the Belleville Police Department, the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department, and the Illinois State Police, alleging that the authorities’ continued enforcement of registration duties violated his constitutional rights.The district court dismissed Kitterman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nothing in federal law calls into question Kitterman’s obligation to register as a sex offender under Illinois law. Even accepting as true that Kitterman’s 1996 conviction was subject to a former Illinois registration law, Kitterman’s current registration duties were triggered in 2011 when he committed additional crimes. The court expressed doubt that a state prosecutor has the power to make the promises that Kitterman described concerning his registration obligations. Kitterman has been under a lawful duty to register ever since his 1996 guilty plea. Kitterman’s federal lawsuit failed because federal constitutional violations cannot be established by showing only that the state officials misapplied state law. View "Kitterman v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law

After a high school student died from a fentanyl overdose, Kenosha police investigated the source of the fatal drugs. That investigation led them to Uzorma Ihediwa, who had sold Percocet pills to the student’s neighbor. Police soon discovered that Ihediwa’s pills were not authentic Percocet but were counterfeits that contained a mixture of drugs, including fentanyl. Ihediwa pleaded guilty to one count of distributing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The only contested issue at sentencing was whether Ihediwa knew that the pills contained fentanyl. If so, then his Sentencing Guidelines offense level would be raised by four levels. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(13) applies “[i]f the defendant knowingly misrepresented or knowingly marketed as another substance a mixture or substance containing fentanyl.” Ihediwa urged that he did not manufacture the pills, did not know that they were counterfeit, and did not know that they contained fentanyl. The district court applied the enhancement.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ihediwa’s 40-month sentence. Because the district court emphasized that its ultimate sentencing decision was not affected by the Guidelines dispute, any error in its interpretation of the Guidelines was harmless. This sentence was below the Guidelines range, whether with the enhancement (78–97 months) or without it (51–63 months). View "United States v. Ihediwa" on Justia Law