Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC was sued in two putative class actions for violating Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), its business liability insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America, filed an action seeking a declaration that it has no obligation under the terms of the insurance contract to indemnify Wynndalco for the BIPA violations or to supply Wynndalco with a defense. Citizens’ theory is that alleged violations of BIPA are expressly excluded from the policy coverage. Wynndalco counterclaimed, seeking a declaration to the contrary that Citizens is obligated to provide it with defense in both actions. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings for Wynndalco.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the narrowing construction that Citizens proposes to resolve that ambiguity is not supported by the language of the provision and does not resolve the ambiguity. Given what the district court described as the “intractable ambiguity” of the provision, the court held Citizens must defend Wynndalco in the two class actions. This duty extends to the common law claims asserted against Wynndalco in the other litigation, which, as Citizens itself argued, arise out of the same acts or omissions as the BIPA claim asserted in that suit. View "Citizens Insurance Company of America v. Wynndalco Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the parties and the district court agreed that the appropriate guideline range based on Defendant's prior criminal history was 37 to 46 months.Citing the fact that he accepted responsibility for the crime and his traumatic upbringing, Defendant sought a 37-month sentence. Defendant also claimed he carried the weapon for protection, given his gang history. The government, citing Defendant's lengthy criminal history and multiple firearms convictions, sought a high-end 46-month sentence. The court sentenced Defendant to 78 months in prison. Defendant appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.In front of the Seventh Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court improperly relied on its own personal fears in fashioning an above-the-guidelines sentence. While "[t]he district court trod on dangerous ground" in personally expressing its own fears, its remarks did not rise to the level of “extraneous and inflammatory.” The Seventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's challenge that the district court disregarded the applicable guideline range.Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Defendant's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable as it "failed to address his offense conduct, juvenile history, and the general lack of evidence surrounding deterrence." The court noted that the district court adequately considered Defendant's upbringing within the context of the offense, and that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) specifically permits judges to consider general deterrence when sentencing. View "USA v. Elvin Saldana-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Carrington Mortgage Services on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. Calderon is a former employee of Carrington. She alleged that Carrington made false representations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the course of certifying residential mortgage loans for insurance coverage from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Carrington moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet her evidentiary burden on two elements of False Claims Act liability. The district court sided with Carrington on both elements and granted summary judgment, disposing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff does have sufficient proof of materiality. However, the court agreed that she has not met her burden of proof on the element of causation. The court explained that on the present record, it is not clear how a factfinder would even spot the alleged false statement in each loan file, let alone evaluate its seriousness and scope. And though Plaintiff asserted that the misrepresentations, in this case, are of the type identified in Spicer, the court did not see much in the record to support that point other than Plaintiff’s assertions. Without more evidence from which a jury could conclude that Carrington’s alleged misrepresentations in each loan caused the subsequent defaults, the nature of those misrepresentations is not enough to get past summary judgment. View "Michelle Calderon v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the legal representatives and family members of two individuals killed using guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms marketplace. Plaintiffs each sued Armslist LLC and its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law claims. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants designed the website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state law regulating firearms. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under Wisconsin law. The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both cases, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims were also dismissed, and Gibbon was dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision in Webber that personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Further, the court wrote that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it affirmed the dismissal in each case. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not alleged an act or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or service activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute. Moreover, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. View "Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and Illinois resident of Indian origin, opened a non-resident account with the State Bank of India through one of its India-based branches. When the State Bank of India retroactively changed the terms of the account, Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied to Bhattacharya’s claim and immunized the Bank from suit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court was correct to conclude that these activities are insufficient to establish a direct effect in the United States. Plaintiff’s non-resident account is maintained in India, and the relevant transactions were with the Bank’s India-based branches. The court explained that Plaintiff did not allege that his suit related to any account held with a U.S.-based branch of the Bank or was otherwise related to any actions the Bank had taken here. Nor did he point to any agreement with the State Bank of India that established the United States as the site of performance. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s contract agreement established his account with the Indian branches of the Bank. View "Arun Bhattacharya v. State Bank of India" on Justia Law

Granger, King, and Walker were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and firearms offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the court should have struck Juror 70 for cause after the defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges. Juror 70 had raised his hand when the judge asked whether any potential jurors thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 was a retired police officer with 30 years of service, and said “I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt” but that he would have an open mind and respect the presumption of innocence. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. Juror 70 recited the correct standard and the judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his promises.The court vacated Walker’s sentence. In holding him accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during Walker’s time as a participant, the judge did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Mack used a US Bank credit card to make household purchases. After she allegedly defaulted, LVNV purchased and Resurgent serviced the debt. Frontline was engaged to collect on the debt. In a letter, Frontline informed Mack that her account had been placed for collection and that she owed $7,179.87. Mack was uncertain about the amount and her obligations to LVNV, an entity she did not know. Within 30 days, Mack went to her library to type and print a validation request, then went to the post office where she paid $10 to send the letter. Mack did not receive a validation but received a letter from Resurgent, identifying LVNV as the “Current Owner,” and listing the balance of $7,179.87. Mack was "confused and alarmed" about who owned the debt. She returned to the library to type another validation request and mail it. Trips to the library and post office took her away from the family members who needed her assistance. Mack never received validation of the debt.Mack filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that Mack failed to demonstrate that she had suffered an injury in fact sufficient to support her standing to bring suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Mack adequately alleged an injury in fact and supported her allegations with evidence that violations of the statute caused her to suffer monetary damages, albeit of modest size. View "Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P." on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an ad on Craigslist that hinted at an opportunity to engage in sexual activity with a minor. Baird responded to Wainscott, who posed as the father of a 10-year-old girl with whom Baird could have sex. Graphic emails and texts followed, indicating Baird's desire to have sex with the girl. In discussing where and when to meet, Wainscott suggested that Baird bring gummy bears as a gift for the child. Baird agreed to buy the candy, then drove to the address that Wainscott gave him. Agents arrested Baird and found three packages of gummy bears in his car.Baird was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court concluded Baird had attempted to “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor, because he “inquired into what this child liked sexually, indicated what he liked and what he would do sexually to this child, requested photographs of the child, and continued to engage the father in conversations about the child.” The messages—although conveyed to Wainscott posing as the girl’s father—still fell within the scope of section 2422(b) and the intended gift was significant evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considered as a whole, the evidence established that Baird took a substantial step toward the completion of the offense and intended to influence the minor to submit to sexual activity. View "United States v. Baird" on Justia Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law