Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Milhem applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging that several conditions limited her ability to work. Milihem, age 38, had completed three years of college and had previously worked as a canvasser, receptionist, portrait photographer, and graphic designer. A vocational expert concluded that the evidence supported limiting Milhem’s work to that which can be learned in 30 days or less, that Milhem could stand or walk for at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, and that Milhem “could make judgments commensurate with functions of simple, repetitive tasks”; such an individual could not perform Milhem’s past work, but could work as a router, price marker, and cafeteria attendant, of which there were approximately 53,000, 307,000, and 63,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively. Changing the exertion level to sedentary, the expert testified, would include the work of an addresser, table worker, or document preparer, of which there were approximately 19,000, 23,000, and 47,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively.Based on this testimony, and “considering [Milhem’s] age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs that Milhem could perform, so Milhem was not under a qualifying disability. The district court upheld that determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonable person would accept 89,000 jobs in the national economy, a figure supported by substantial evidence, as a significant number. Other circuits have accepted similar numbers as significant. View "Milhem v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Atkins pleaded guilty to drug crimes in 2014. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction, he sued, claiming that the district and magistrate judges committed errors, the prosecutor did not identify herself when talking to Atkins during the case and did not respond to his compassionate release motion, the court reporter “invaded” his transcripts, and his court-appointed attorneys were ineffective. Atkins also sued the United States but did not state any allegations against it. The district judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, stating that he would alternatively dismiss all claims under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision because Atkins’s criminal conviction is intact.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All the acts that Atkins attributes to the judges and prosecutor occurred in the criminal case, within their roles as judge or prosecutor, so they are absolutely immune from suit. The Supreme Court has not implied a Bivens-style constitutional claim against federal officials for transcription errors and an alternate remedy to cure transcript inaccuracies is available. The federal defense attorneys cannot be defendants in a Bivens suit because they did not act under color of law. The United States is not subject to suit in a Bivens action. The court affirmed that Atkins incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) for filing a frivolous suit and another “strike” for filing this frivolous appeal. View "Atkins v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

As early as 2009, Dickey recruited followers for her church, “DTM,” grooming vulnerable victims and forcing them to disavow their families, live in the church, and work multiple full-time jobs. The victims gave Dickey all their wages, which she kept for herself. She required multiple victims to find employment at Hyatt hotels, where Dickey forced them to falsify reservation bookings, thereby fraudulently misdirecting kickbacks to Dickey’s own travel company. If someone disobeyed, Dickey threatened them with violence and required them to be homeless until she considered them redeemed. Her scheme netted $1.5 million, most of which came from DTM members. She spent over $1 million on personal expenses, such as travel, rental and vacation properties, and luxury hotels.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dickey’s convictions for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589, upholding the district court’s denial of her fourth motion to continue her trial, rejection of a proposed jury instruction regarding religious liberty, and the imposition of restitution ordering her to pay for future mental health treatment for her victims. Dickey’s proposed instruction would have excused her criminal conduct based on her religious assertions and was not an accurate statement of the law. View "United States v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Springfield’s publicly-owned utility hires water meter readers, subject to a 12-month probationary period. Mayor Langfelder hired Dunlevy and Murray as meter readers. They received the same pay and reported to the same supervisor. There were five levels of supervision between them and the mayor. Near the end of their probationary periods, both men were investigated. Dunlevy had inaccurately recorded meters at seven different homes, which is a fireable offense even for protected employees. Murray had been starting work late, leaving early, and walking off the job for up to three hours. Murray also failed to disclose a seven-year-old burglary conviction on his application. All of the supervisors unanimously recommended that both men be fired. Langfelder fired Dunlevy, who is white, but not Murray, who is Black.Dunlevy brought an equal protection claim (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Langfelder and an Illinois Human Rights Act claim and a Title VII claim (42 U.S.C. 2000e) against the city for disparate punishment based on race. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the case. The district court drew too narrow a comparison: The two men are sufficiently similarly situated for Dunlevy to bring his claims to trial. Dunlevy’s meter curbing undermined the core function of the utility; Murray’s tardiness and absences undermined a basic tenet of any employment: be present. View "Dunlevy v. Langfelder" on Justia Law

Roldan was convicted of criminal sexual assault. Roldan, then 21, allegedly had sex with an intoxicated 16-year-old noncitizen. The Illinois Appellate Court later reversed the conviction, concluding that the state did not prove that Roldan knew the victim was too intoxicated to consent.Drawing upon information he learned after trial, Roldan sued Cicero, Illinois police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers failed to disclose an agreement to help the victim apply for an immigration benefit—a U visa—in exchange for her testimony. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on grounds that the Supreme Court’s 1972 “Giglio” decision and related cases clearly established the officers’ duty to disclose the agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that immunity is inappropriate at this early stage but for a different reason. Qualified immunity hinges on a fact that Roldan did not flesh out in his complaint: whether the police officers informed the prosecution about the U-visa agreement with the victim. If the police did, they cannot be liable, for the ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested with the prosecutors. View "Roldan v. Stroud" on Justia Law

Page sued Alliant Credit Union under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693–1693r, and state law on behalf of herself and other similarly situated customers, alleging that Alliant charged fees in violation of its contract. Alliant charges a nonsufficient fund (NSF) fee when it rejects an attempted debit because an account lacks sufficient funds to cover the transaction. Page argued that the contract requires Alliant to assess NSF fees using the “ledger-balance method” and only allowed one NSF fee per transaction, while Alliant claimed that the contract permits it to use the “available-balance method.”The district court dismissed Page’s claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Analyzing the contract under Illinois principles of construction, it is not ambiguous and it does not prohibit Alliant from using the available-balance method to charge NSF fees. Alliant does not promise not to charge multiple fees when a transaction is presented to it multiple times. View "Page v. Alliant Credit Union" on Justia Law

Shaw’s pro se complaint alleged that three times in 2018 he needed to use the handicapped bathroom but was unable to because nondisabled prisoners occupied it. Shaw is confined to a wheelchair and incontinent. Each instance ended with Shaw defecating on himself. Shaw alerted prison staff, who asserted that they could not control what toilets other inmates used or reserve the handicapped stall solely for his use. Shaw’s complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and constitutional rights.Before allowing the defendants to be served and fulfilling the screening obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), the district court addressed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and concluded that Shaw, while unquestionably a qualified person with a disability, failed to allege a denial of access to any prison service and instead complained only about an “inconvenience” of prison life. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Shaw’s allegations suffice to state claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act; he will still need to prove his claim and show deliberate indifference. View "Shaw v. Kemper" on Justia Law

Tate has worked for the Sheriff of Cook County since 2007. In his third year as a correctional officer, Tate suffered a back injury. He returned to work under medical restrictions that required him to “avoid situations in which there is a significant chance of violence or conflict.” After Tate was promoted to sergeant, the Sheriff’s Office accommodated this medical restriction by allowing him to work in the Classification Unit, where the possibility of violence or physical conflict was relatively remote. When Tate sought a promotion to lieutenant, he was told that the Sheriff could not accommodate him in that position. Correctional lieutenants had to be “able to manage and [defuse] regular, violent situations involving inmates.” Tate’s doctor declined to modify his medical restrictions,Tate sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s Office. In concluding that Tate could not perform the “essential functions,” the court considered the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, the collective bargaining agreement, and the work experience of incumbents in the job. View "Tate v. Dart" on Justia Law

Jane held a minority stake in Du-Kane and Crush-Crete, companies owned by her husband, Paul, and other family members. The couple divorced in 2009. Jane died in 2017. Paul died months later. In 2017 Jane’s estate sued, alleging that Jane’s ownership interest was wrongfully diluted after the divorce. The complaint named only Du-Kane as the defendant, though the allegations concerned the actions of the couple's four sons as officers, directors, and shareholders. An amended complaint filed in 2018 added Crush-Crete and the Dunteman brothers as codefendants. The codefendants were insured under “claims made” liability policies issued in 2017 and 2018 by Hanover. With “claims made” insurance, the insured must notify the insurer of a “claim” in the policy period in which it is first “made.” If a claim goes unreported in the relevant policy period, the insurer owes no duty to defend or indemnify. The defendants notified Hanover and sought coverage under the 2018 policy. Hanover denied the request because the claim was first made in 2017 and had not been timely reported during that policy period.Hanover sought a declaration that it owed no defense or indemnity. The insureds counter-claimed breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment for Hanover. The original complaint triggered a reportable claim during the 2017 policy period. Subsequent amendments to that complaint did not commence a new, distinct claim first made in 2018. View "Hanover Insurance Co. v. R.W. Dunteman Co." on Justia Law

Riegel, seeking to build a condominium development in Isla Mujeres, formed ISLA and borrowed millions of dollars from the Hovdes. The project failed. More than 10 years later, the Hovdes sued ISLA and Riegel.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the claim based on the Mortgage Note, citing the 10-year limitations period, and later holding that the limitations defense could be asserted against Riegel as the guarantor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An acceleration clause provided that if a Default occurred, the outstanding unpaid principal and interest would automatically become immediately due, triggering the 10-year limitations period. One such “Default” was an “Act of Bankruptcy,” defined to include admitting in writing the inability to pay debts as they mature. Two emails sent by Riegel to the Hovdes constituted an admission in writing of inability to pay debts: an August 7, 2008 email, asking for an advance to pay a tax bill, and a subsequent email indicating that all construction workers had been suspended. The language does not require actual insolvency; it merely requires an admission of an inability to pay the debts, whether or not true. The terms “continuing, absolute, and unconditional” are terms of art when used in guarantees and do not waive the limitations defense. View "Hovde v. ISLA Development LLC" on Justia Law