Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police found Miller lying on the sidewalk, bleeding from an apparent gunshot wound. An officer rendering aid removed a vehicle key fob from Miller’s hand, dropping it on the ground. A car, parked 15-20 feet from Miller, had bullet holes in the rear driver’s side door. Officers checked whether there was anyone in the car. One officer shined his flashlight through the windshield and saw what he thought was blood on the front passenger seat. An officer picked up the key fob and clicked a button. The car’s horn honked. Minutes later, an officer stated that he could see the barrel of a gun sticking out from under a hat on the front passenger seat. The car was towed to the police station. At the hospital, Miller said that he was using his girlfriend’s car. A database check showed that the impounded car was registered to Miller. The police obtained a warrant to search the car without mentioning the key fob. Police recovered the gun. DNA on the gun matched Miller’s. He was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Miller’s motion to suppress. Miller argued that clicking the key fob qualified as a search. The district judge reasoned that the fob was used only to identify the car, not to gain entry, and that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his car. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence was also admissible under the independent source doctrine. The car would have been searched regardless of the identity of its owner. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2007, Njos pleaded guilty to six federal crimes arising from robberies, and for attempted escape and assault of an FBI agent after his arrest. During his term of supervised release, he tested positive for illegal substances and failed to report. Njos then pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to eight new robberies. The state courts sentenced him to 25 years.The federal government petitioned to revoke Njos’s federal supervised release. Njos, proceeding pro se, repeatedly asked to be returned to the Illinois Department of Corrections and requested a 24-month sentence, concurrent with his state sentences. He argued that his underlying federal convictions were class C and D felonies and cited his history of mental illness. Noting Njos's wish to expedite the proceedings, the court said: “You don’t need to be in court for this,” proposing to enter a written order imposing his sentence. Njos thanked the judge, Neither Njos nor the government objected. The court later imposed a total of 82 months in prison for the six revocations.The only issue that appointed counsel deemed strong enough to raise on appeal was the imposition of a sentence in a written order rather than with the defendant present in person. When counsel decline to raise other issues that Njos wished to argue, Njos moved to dismiss counsel, submitting a brief of his preferred arguments. The Seventh Circuit denied Njos’s motion to dismiss counsel but allowed him to file the supplemental brief. On reconsideration, the court dismissed counsel and rejected Njos’s arguments about the calculation and reasonable of his sentence. View "United States v. Njos" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs asserted that CWT violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by calling class members using prerecorded messages. Plaintiffs moved to certify a nationwide class of people who had received VVT’s calls. The district court certified a class of Illinois residents, believing that Supreme Court precedent required a finding of no personal jurisdiction over CWT for purposes of the claims of the proposed nonresident class members. Plaintiffs used third-party service providers to identify and send notices to the 28,239 Illinois class members.The district court granted the class summary judgment on the TCPA claim, finding that CWT’s TCPA violations were committed willfully or knowingly. A subsequent Seventh Circuit decision undercut the reason behind limiting the class to Illinois. The court re-opened that question, certified a nationwide class. and granted that class summary judgment, holding that the new class members were entitled to notice and an opportunity to opt-out. The district court ordered CWT to bear the costs of providing notice to the nationwide class, reasoning that CWT’s liability already had been established. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it would be unfair to shift costs to a defendant based solely on “[a] bare allegation of wrongdoing,” in these unusual circumstances, the court had the authority to assign costs to CWT. View "Bakov v. Consolidated World Travel, Inc." on Justia Law

Beechler and Turner, both serving home confinement through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC), reported separate residences. An FBI Task Force was conducting a wiretap investigation involving individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. They discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence. Watching the house, agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in drug trafficking. An MCCC employee, with Indianapolis officers, went to Turner’s address to check compliance with the home detention contract. They encountered Turner and Beechler and discovered methamphetamine in the bedroom. Officers then obtained a search warrant and seized five firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, heroin, and $1,508 in cash. After receiving his Miranda rights, Beechler acknowledged the drugs and guns, admitting that they were there to protect the drugs.Beechler unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that although police labeled the search as a community corrections compliance check, they actually conducted the search for law enforcement purposes so that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Convicted of multiple counts, Beechler was sentenced to 360 months in prison—below the bottom of the 420-month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s expectation of privacy was minimal; the government’s legitimate needs were significant. The search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Beechler" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Sherrod and Johnson were fiduciaries of a retirement plan that Sherrod had set up for herself and other employees of her medical practice. The Secretary of Labor brought this civil enforcement action alleging that both had breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court granted the Secretary summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction removing the defendants as fiduciaries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence under ERISA. Hundreds of thousands of dollars of plan assets were used for Sherrod’s personal benefit but were accounted for as plan expenses or losses rather than as distributions of retirement benefits. The permanent injunction was within the scope of reasonable responses to the breaches. Even giving Sherrod the benefit of her assertions of good faith, since the district court imposed the injunction based on a summary judgment decision, good faith is not a defense for one breach of fiduciary duty, let alone repeated breaches. Many of Sherrod’s payments to herself from plan assets from 2012-2017 were also prohibited as self-dealing. “Given the gravity and frequency of defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties, they are fortunate that the relief against them has thus far been relatively modest.” View "Su v. Sherrod" on Justia Law

Howard was charged as a felon in possession of a weapon. Before his trial, the government struck the only three Black jurors on the 39-person venire panel. The judge had admonished the jurors that they could not use the internet for any purpose related to or surrounding the case and asked the jurors to “[r]aise your number if you don’t use the internet.” Jurors 9, 13, and 24 each raised their numbers. Jurors 9 and 24 were two of the three Blacks. The prosecutor struck each of them, explaining: “I do not believe people when they say they don’t use the Internet.” In response to the defendant’s subsequent Batson challenge, the court applied the three steps of the Batson inquiry. At the third step—that the defendant established purposeful discrimination by the government—the court summarized Howard’s counsel’s argument, stating: “Your sole justification and your persuasiveness is that the government attorney, who does happen to be African-American, has struck every single African-American on the panel.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed Howard’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by injecting the prosecutor’s race into the Batson inquiry, improperly evaluating the peremptory strike, and failing to make required demeanor findings. The prosecutor’s theory was not so “implausible or fantastic” as to require a conclusion that the justification was “pretext[] for purposeful discrimination.” View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2013, Kinsella, working for Baker, suffered work-related knee injuries that left him unable to work for three years. He received disability benefits. In 2016, his physician deemed him fit to work in sedentary jobs. Martinez, in human resources, helped him look for appropriate jobs at the company. Kinsella submitted an ADA Reassignment Request. Martinez indicated that Baker had 30 days to look for jobs and that failure to timely find alternative work would result in termination. After that period expired, Martinez suggested Kinsella apply for a dispatcher job. Kinsella failed to apply on time, despite an extension. He applied the next day but did not follow up. A non-disabled employee was hired.Kinsella received a termination letter, citing failure to apply for a position. Kinsella responded, attaching a receipt confirming his application. After investigation, Baker began the process of reinstating Kinsella'a status. Eventually, negotiations broke down.In 2018, Kinsella filed a claim that the EEOC dismissed as untimely. Kinsella sued, alleging failure-to-accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. An arbitrator granted Baker summary judgment. Kinsella asked the district court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by requiring illegitimate elements of proof. The court reinstated and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kinsella misconstrues the arbitrator’s statements concerning a lack of evidence showing discriminatory intent. They were part of attributing fault on both sides for a breakdown in the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. View "Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Northrop laid off workers in 2012 and did not provide them all with severance benefits. Its Severance Plan provides that a laid-off employee regularly scheduled to work at least 20 hours a week will receive severance benefits if that employee “received a cover memo, signed by a Vice President of Human Resources.” The plaintiffs, who did not receive this “HR Memo,” filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001– 1461.The parties agreed to have a magistrate resolve the case, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). After the suit was certified as a class action, the district judge resumed control at Northrop's request, finding that the increased stakes constituted “good cause” for withdrawing the reference. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that the Plan gives the HR Department discretion to choose who gets severance pay.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first finding no abuse of discretion in the withdrawal of the reference order. The Plan makes the receipt of severance benefits contingent on the receipt of an HR Memo, which the class members did not get. Welfare-benefit plans under ERISA—unlike retirement plans—need not provide for vesting, and the terms of welfare-benefit plans are entirely in the control of the entities that establish them. When making design decisions, employers may act in their own interests and may include a discretionary component. Rights under ERISA are not subject to estoppel. The plan itself—not past practice—always controls. View "Carlson v. Northrop Grumman Severance Plan" on Justia Law

Sunny sold seasonal merchandise to Walgreens, with Envision as an intermediary. From 2007-2012 Sunny shipped goods directly to Walgreens but routed documents through Envision. Every year Sunny sent documents calling for it to be named the beneficiary of letters of credit to cover the price. Envision passed these to Walgreens, which arranged for the letters of credit. In 2013 Sunny sent the usual documents but Envision substituted its own name for Sunny’s as the beneficiary of the letters of credit. Walgreens sent the letters of credit to Envision, which drew more than $3 million.A jury found that Envision breached its contract with Sunny by not paying it the money drawn on the letters of credit and that Envision had committed fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Envision’s argument that it cannot be liable for fraud because it was not Sunny’s agent or fiduciary and therefore did not have any duty to alert Sunny that it had changed the instructions about who would control the letters of credit. The cooperative business relations between Sunny and Envision from 2007-2012 created a “special relationship” that required Envision to notify Sunny about any deviation in their dealings. View "Sunny Handicraft (H.K.) Ltd. v. Envision This!, LLC" on Justia Law