Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Oak Park hired Barwin as its village manager in 2006, as an at-will employee. He had previously worked as a city manager in Michigan. Barwin resigned under threat of termination 30 months before his pension rights vested. Barwin alleged that Oak Park breached its contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing by forcing him out of his job to prevent his pension from vesting and by refusing to honor its practice of allowing senior employees to purchase out-of-state pension credits to meet the vesting threshold.The district court rejected Barwin’s claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Barwin has no plausible contract claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing based on an expectation that the Village would not fire him or force him to resign to prevent him from reaching retirement eligibility. As an at-will employee, Barwin had no enforceable expectation that he would remain employed long enough to meet the vesting threshold. The district court erred in entering summary judgment on the claim that Oak Park breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not allowing Barwin to purchase out-of-state pension credits as it had historically done with other employees. His employment contract entitled him to the same benefits that other senior employees enjoyed “by practice.” A finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the Village had a practice of allowing such employees to purchase out-of-state pension credits. View "Barwin v. Village of Oak Park" on Justia Law

Huston, a Good Housekeeping magazine subscriber, filed a putative class action alleging that media conglomerate, Hearst, offered to sell and sold mailing lists containing her, and 9.1 million other subscribers’, identifying information. Huston sought statutory damages under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) and an injunction requiring Hearst to obtain prior written consent before selling its subscribers’ information.The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To establish an IRPA violation, the plaintiff must allege an appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity, without the plaintiff’s written consent, and for the defendant’s commercial purpose. IRPA prohibits the use or holding out of a person’s identifying information to offer to sell or sell a product, piece of merchandise, good, or service; it contemplates a use or holding out of an individual’s identity with the aim of effectuating a sale. Any use or holding out must either accompany an offer to sell or precede the sale, but it cannot follow the sale. Huston failed to allege that Hearst used or held out her identity to effectuate the sale of the mailing lists or her Good Housekeeping subscription. View "Huston v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Based on a child’s report that West molested him and paid him for a nude photograph, police searched West’s home and business and found a laptop computer and flash drives that contained roughly 1000 photographs and videos of child pornography. West was charged with possessing child pornography, sexual exploitation of a minor, receiving child pornography, and commission of an offense by a registered sex offender. West stipulated that certain images found on his devices were part of known child pornography series identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, produced outside Illinois, and distributed on the internet. The court admitted those exhibits. At trial, the government briefly showed several images from West’s devices to the jury. An FBI agent testified that six images found on West’s devices were from a child pornography series he had investigated; the government briefly published exhibits as the agent identified each child, without objection. As the prosecutor asked about Exhibit 5E, West unsuccessfully objected.The Seventh Circuit affirmed West’s conviction, rejecting his argument that the admission and publication of the exhibits violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the theory that the content of the images was not in dispute, so their admission was needlessly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. He also argued, unsuccessfully, that because he had stipulated that child pornography was found on the devices recovered from his home and business, their admission violated Supreme Court precedent. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

In 2017 Durham, age 46, applied for Social Security disability benefits, she had been diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension. She had also seen medical professionals about neck pain and heart palpitations. She had been experiencing shortness of breath and lightheadedness and was referred to a cardiologist, who counseled her to reduce her caffeine intake and to adopt a healthy lifestyle. Durham continued to have intermittent symptoms and, in 2019, was admitted to a hospital due to “exertional shortness of breath and palpitations.” Testing disclosed that Durham had no cardiac instability, “no acute problems, [and] no functional limitations.”An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Durham’s diabetes, hypertension, and tachycardia were limiting, but not disabling, conditions. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of benefits as supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected arguments that the ALJ relied on outdated evidence and overstepped his authority by interpreting, without supporting medical opinions, the results of medical tests. The record reveals that the ALJ carefully considered Durham’s entire medical history and relied on the opinions of her treating physicians in reaching his conclusions about her physical limitations. View "Durham v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Mercado, age 41, used an Internet application to meet “Alexis,” a profile operated by an FBI agent conducting an undercover investigation of adults with sexual interests in children. After just minutes of texting, “Alexis” told Mercado she was 15 years old. For the next five days, they texted, exchanged photos, and spoke by phone. Mercado raised sexual topics, describing sexual acts he wanted to engage in with “Alexis.” Mercado sent “Alexis” sexually graphic and suggestive messages and emojis and asked her to smoke marijuana and drink alcoholic beverages with him. They arranged to meet at a house that was actually an FBI operations center. When Mercado arrived, he was arrested. Mercado exhibited health problems. He was taken to a hospital and administered medication. Later, he was interviewed at the hospital, waived his Miranda rights, and made inculpatory admissions.Mercado was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and use of interstate facilities to attempt to transmit information about a minor, section 2425. He unsuccessfully opposed a government motion to preclude an entrapment defense. That court denied Mercado’s motion to suppress his statements and evidence obtained in his hospital interview. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding those rulings and rejecting an argument that his statements were involuntary as he was under the influence of drugs when he talked to agents, who coerced his statements. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Illinois State Police Officer Myers supervised 10 controlled drug purchases by a confidential source (CS) at a Cairo residence. Each purchase was recorded on video. The CS initially said that “Cornelius Dean” was selling crack cocaine at the house. Eventually, the CS found out the dealer’s name was Ed. Ed later told the CS that his surname was “Johnson.” Myers searched for an image of an “Ed or Edward Johnson” in the Illinois Secretary of State database but found no match. Alexander County Sheriff Brown suggested Ed’s last name might be Osborne. Myers again checked the state database and discovered that “Phillip Edward Osborne” resided in Cairo. Myers obtained Osborne’s driver’s license photo and concluded that it matched the dealer in the drug buy videos. Myers reported that the CS, upon seeing the photo, unequivocally, identified Osborne. Myers obtained an arrest warrant. Osborne was arrested and remained incarcerated for seven days before being released on bond. The state eventually dismissed the charges.Osborne sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the claims against the county and granted Myers summary judgment on the false arrest claim, finding no evidence to undermine probable cause to arrest Osborne and that Myers was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the warrant and the underlying information, with little more than bare allegations that Myers lied in his warrant application. View "Johnson v. Myers" on Justia Law

Bennett contends that Division 10 of Cook County Jail does not satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act because it lacks grab bars and other fixtures that disabled inmates need in order to use showers and toilets safely. Bennett cited a regulation providing that as of 1988, "construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)(1). UFAS requires accessible toilets with grab bars nearby and accessible showers with mounted seats, Division 10 was constructed in 1992.In 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, stating that Bennett “proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply (and were violated, to detainees’ detriment).” On remand, the district court certified a class. More than two years later, the judge decertified the class, reasoning that some class members, although using aids such as wheelchairs, may not be disabled under the statutes.The Seventh Circuit again reversed. The 2020 decision identified an issue relevant to every Division 10 detainee. Class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) resolves the issue, not the whole case. Class members could receive the benefit of a declaratory judgment on the issue but would need to proceed in individual suits to seek damages; if the class loses, every detainee would be bound by issue preclusion. The application of UFAS can be determined class-wide while leaving to the future any particular inmate’s claim to relief. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Confidential informants participated in controlled purchases from Ramirez that tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Officers executed a traffic stop; inside a vehicle operated by Ramirez, they discovered 184.79 grams of a substance that tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B).The court sentenced him as a career offender (Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1) because he had prior Wisconsin felony convictions for possessing with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinol and for manufacturing or delivering cocaine. The court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. Ramirez asked the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its 2020 “Ruth” holding that an offense need not involve a substance controlled by the Controlled Substances Act to qualify as a predicate “controlled substance offense” under the career offender enhancement, and argued that the district court failed to consider adequately his primary mitigating sentencing argument.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to overrule Ruth. Until the conflicting circuit positions are reconciled, it is arguable "that undercounting career offenders works a substantial injury by failing to protect the public from recidivist drug criminals.” The district court addressed, explicitly and extensively, Ramirez’s arguments about his upbringing, including in reference to the factors and goals of sentencing. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Zaragoza, a citizen of Mexico and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, pleaded guilty to the Indiana offense of criminal neglect of a dependent after locking her six-year-old son in a closet for six hours. She was sentenced to one year in jail, suspended to time served plus 30 days. After completing her sentence, she traveled abroad. When she returned, DHS found Zaragoza inadmissible based on the neglect conviction, which the agency classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). An immigration judge entered a removal order. In the meantime, Zaragoza petitioned the state court to modify her sentence, to bring herself within the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, which is available to first-time offenders sentenced to six months or less. The state court reduced her sentence to 179 days.The BIA rejected Zaragoza’s arguments, finding that the Indiana offense was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that the sentence modification order was not effective to establish Zaragoza’s eligibility for the petty-offense exception. The Board relied on a 2019 Attorney General decision declaring that state-court sentence modification orders are effective for immigration purposes only if based on a legal defect in the underlying criminal proceeding (Thomas). The Seventh Circuit remanded. Applying Thomas in Zaragoza’s case is an impermissibly retroactive application of a new rule. View "Zaragoza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Moore was sentenced to 120 months in federal prison for drug offenses. One factual foundation for the sentence was the district court’s finding that 55.6 grams of methamphetamine found in Moore’s home were 100% pure. Moore argued that a chemist’s affidavit that he submitted was “some evidence” sufficient to call the purity finding into question and that the government failed to support the finding on purity. Moore claimed that the district court erred by placing a burden on him to perform independent testing and by assuming, without supporting evidence, that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s methods for testing purity are reliable and were applied correctly in Moore’s case.The Seventh Circuit remanded for re-sentencing. Moore has a due process right to be sentenced based on reliable information. The district court’s assumption about the general reliability of DEA testing protocols was not supported by any evidence in the record. The “some evidence” standard is not a demanding one. The chemist’s affidavit here did not purport to resolve conclusively the accuracy of the DEA test results, but it raised a fair question about them. View "United St v. Mooatesre" on Justia Law