Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At a barbecue at Brown's home. K.M. and Brown became inebriated and had a physical altercation. K.M.’s wife, Rebecca, got K.M. to his car, in front of Brown’s house. According to Rebecca, K.M. was standing in the street when Brown approached and swung a knife at K.M.. K.M. swung back with a piece of wood that Brown had thrown at K.M. earlier. Brown claims K.M. came up the driveway toward him holding pieces of wood and raised his hands as if to strike Brown, so Brown picked up a knife from the grill and swung it. He did not realize he had stabbed K.M. until K.M. collapsed in the street. Brown did not call 911 but made statements such as “that will teach him.” In recorded telephone calls from the jail, Brown made statements attributing the stabbing to anger rather than fear. K.M.’was struck three times; the knife’s blade penetrated his skull and passed through the brain. K.M. survived but has cognitive and physical impairments and will require care for the remainder of his life.Brown was convicted of first-degree reckless injury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Brown’s habeas petition. Even if he was deprived of due process when the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the “castle doctrine” as part of his self-defense theory, any error was harmless. It is unlikely that a properly instructed jury would have accepted Brown’s factual account. View "Brown v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Armbruster, a CPA with experience working at a Big Four accounting firm, began serving as the controller for Roadrunner's predecessor in 1990 and became Roadrunner’s CFO. Roadrunner grew rapidly, acquiring transportation companies and going public in 2010. In 2014, Roadrunner’s then‐controller recognized shortcomings in a subsidiary's (Morgan) accounting and began investigating. In 2016, many deficiencies in Morgan’s accounting remained unresolved. The departing controller found that Morgan had inflated its balance sheet by at least $2 million and perhaps as much as $4–5 million. Armbruster filed Roadrunner's 2016 third quarter SEC Form 10‐Q with no adjustments of the carrying values of Morgan balance sheet items and including other misstatements. Roadrunner’s CEO learned of the misstatements and informed Roadrunner’s Board of Directors. Roadrunner informed its independent auditor. Roadrunner’s share price dropped significantly. Roadrunner filed restated financial statements, reporting a decrease of approximately $66.5 million in net income over the misstated periods.Criminal charges were brought against Armbruster and two former departmental controllers. A mixed verdict acquitted the departmental controllers on all counts but convicted Armbruster on four of 11 charges for knowingly falsifying Roadrunner‘s accounting records by materially misstating the carrying values of Morgan's receivable and prepaid taxes account, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2), (5), i78ff(a), 18 U.S.C. 2, fraudulently influencing Roadrunner’s external auditor, and filing fraudulent SEC financial statements, 18 U.S.C.1348. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the case against Armbruster may not have been open‐and‐shut, a rational jury could have concluded that the government presented enough evidence to support the guilty verdicts. View "United States v. Armbruster" on Justia Law

Sheehan emigrated from Ireland decades ago and currently lives in Winfield, Illinois. Sheehan obtained loans from an Irish bank to buy interests in an Irish medical company (Blackrock), and to purchase property located in Ballyheigue, Sheehan defaulted on both loans. Breccia, an Irish entity, acquired the loans and took steps to foreclose on the underlying collateral. Sheehan sued but an Irish court authorized Breccia to enforce its security interest in the Blackrock Shares and the Ballyheigue property. Breccia registered the Blackrock Shares in its name and appointed a receiver, Murran, to take possession of the Ballyheigue property. Sheehan filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362 (a)(3). Sheehan notified the Irish receiver, Murran, and Breccia of the automatic stay. Breccia continued, through Murran, to take the necessary steps toward selling the collateral, entering into a contract with IADC (another Irish company) to sell the Blackrock Shares.The bankruptcy court dismissed Sheehan's subsequent adversary complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Irish defendants, as none of them conducted any activity related to the adversary claims in the U.S.; the only link between the defendants and the forum was the fact that Sheehan lived in Illinois. The email notice Sheehan provided the defendants was not sufficient process under the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the defendants had minimum contacts with the United States. View "Sheehan v. Breccia Unlimited Co." on Justia Law

In 2011 Sanders drove a truck into his sister and her boyfriend. He was charged with two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his medication. Sanders was initially found to lack the capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was “malingering.” Sanders entered into a plea agreement, stating he had read and understood the criminal complaint and understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Sanders’s cognitive abilities and educational level were considered, as was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.The day after receiving a seven-year sentence, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected that attorney’s no-merit report but dismissed the appeal, reasoning that Sanders relied on facts outside the record. On remand, Sanders moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he did not understand the offenses to which he pleaded and that his attorney was ineffective. The court denied both motions, making extensive findings that Sanders’s trial counsel was credible and Sanders was generally not credible but was intelligent and understood the proceedings and issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sanders’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is procedurally defaulted. It plainly appears from Sanders’s petition and attached exhibits that he is not entitled to relief on his claim that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. View "Sanders v. Radtke" on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an advertisement on Craigslist: “Bored No School looking to make $ for favors,” intending to identify adults interested in having sexual contact with a minor. York, a 51-year-old correctional officer, responded. Agent Wainscott became “Brionica,” a 15-year-old girl. York responded: “I can’t do anything but look at you [sic] sexy picks with clothes on.” The two continued to converse. York eventually discussed the sexual acts he wanted to perform with “Brionica.” York told “Brionica” that he would travel to meet her but would not do anything sexual during their first meeting because she was “very young,” and he did not want to go to jail. On the day of the meeting, York drove around for 18–20 minutes looking for “Brionica.” Agents arrested him near the planned meeting location. During a post-arrest interview, York stated that he was looking for “Brionica” because he is “a curious person.”York was charged with attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and attempted use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2425. The court submitted the case to the jury, with an entrapment defense instruction. The jury convicted York on both counts. The court sentenced York to the mandatory 120 months’ imprisonment for Attempted Enticement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. York" on Justia Law

Greenbank purchased “Thomas” for $500,000, for use as a competitive showhorse. Greenbank obtained insurance from GA that included coverage for Thomas’s “death” or “authorized humane destruction.” In February 2018, Thomas became sick. Over the next few months, Thomas lost 50 pounds and developed cellulitis in all four legs and uveitis in his eye. In April 2018, Greenbank reported Thomas’s pneumonia to GA. Greenbank's veterinarian informed GA that Thomas “probably” needed to be euthanized. GA retained its own veterinarians. Thomas was transported to its facility, where Dr. MacGillivray advised that it would not be unreasonable to make a euthanasia recommendation but she wanted to try treatment. Greenbank objected, arguing that treatment would destroy Thomas’s future athleticism. After his surgery, Thomas made a "remarkable" recovery. Thomas is still doing well.GA denied coverage for certain treatments and rejected Greenbank’s renewal payment of $14,725.000, citing her failure to provide immediate notice of Thomas’s illness in February 2018. Greenbank argued that GA acted in bad faith by unreasonably withholding consent for authorized humane destruction and that GA’s continued care and control over Thomas after the policy terminated constituted conversion and theft.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Thomas saw three veterinarians in five months; no veterinarian certified that Thomas needed to be euthanized. Nothing in the contract requires GA to protect Thomas’s use as a show horse. Greenbank never made an unqualified demand for Thomas’s return nor did she establish that any demand would have been futile. View "Greenbank v. Great American Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Turnipseed pled guilty to conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for actions he took while participating in the Four Corner Hustlers street gang. The district court sentenced Turnipseed to 120 months’ imprisonment—above the advisory sentencing guideline range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by applying the attempted murder guideline, U.S.S.G. 2A2.1, instead of the aggravated assault guideline, in calculating the guidelines for his RICO offense; that Turnipseed was a minor participant in the conspiracy and therefore entitled to a two-level reduction in his guidelines calculation; and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Based on both Turnipseed’s admitted conduct and the record, the district court permissibly concluded that Turnipseed acted with the requisite intent to justify the application of the attempted murder guideline. Turnipseed did not satisfy his burden of showing that he was “substantially less culpable than the average participant” in his conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 comment. 3(A). When fashioning a sentence, a judge may consider relevant uncharged conduct. The district court gave adequate justification for imposing an above-guideline sentence. View "United States v. Turnipseed" on Justia Law

Illinois, Cook County Health and Hospitals System, Chicago, and Naperville each issued an order, policy, or directive requiring certain employees to vaccinate or regularly test for COVID-19. Employees who failed to comply would be subject to disciplinary action, including possible termination. Three district judges denied motions for preliminary injunctions against those vaccine mandates.Consolidating the appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting a claim that the regulations violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to substantive due process by interfering with their rights to bodily autonomy and privacy, the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to provide facts sufficient to show that the challenged mandates abridge a fundamental right and did not provide a textual or historical argument for their constitutional interpretation. The district judge properly applied the rational basis standard. The plaintiffs established the efficacy of natural immunity and pointed out some uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 vaccines but did not establish that the governments lack a “reasonably conceivable state of facts” to support their policies. Without specifying the process that was due, how it was withheld, and evidence for the alleged protected interest, the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims fail. The court also rejected free exercise claims and claims under the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act. View "Troogstad v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Albert claimed that his former employer, a subsidiary of Oshkosh, violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1132(a)(2), by mismanaging its retirement plan. Albert alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by authorizing the Plan to pay unreasonably high fees for recordkeeping and administration, failing to adequately review the Plan’s investment portfolio to ensure that each investment option was prudent, and unreasonably maintaining investment advisors and consultants for the Plan despite the availability of similar service providers with lower costs or better performance histories.The district court dismissed the complaint. While Albert’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Hughes v. Northwestern University (2022), vacating Seventh Circuit precedent (Divane) and remanding. The district court had cited Divane repeatedly in its opinion, albeit not for the proposition that the Supreme Court rejected in Hughes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims for failure to state a claim. The complaint is devoid of allegations as to the quality or type of services the comparator plans provided; the cheapest investment option is not necessarily the one a prudent fiduciary would select. Plaintiffs “must do more than recast allegations of purported breaches of fiduciary duty as disloyal acts.” View "Albert v. Oshkosh Corp." on Justia Law

In 2008, DHS removed Casas, a Mexican citizen, from the United States pursuant to a valid removal order. Four years later, DHS learned she had returned and sought to reinstate the removal order, using Form I-871. The form has a large section providing notice to the noncitizen of DHS’s intent to reinstate a removal order, a section for the noncitizen to acknowledge receipt of the notice, and a final section for DHS’s ultimate decision. According to the dates on the Form I-871 Casas received, DHS made its decision to reinstate Casas’s removal order first, and gave Casas notice later—an inversion of the procedure ordinarily requiring notice to a noncitizen before a final decision is rendered, The large notice section is dated a day after the decision to reinstate but the middle section shows that Casas acknowledged receipt of the notice six months after that decision. For seven years, Casas remained on supervision in the United States. In 2020, when Casas appeared for a routine check-in, DHS detained her. Casas requested a reasonable-fear interview, during which she discussed a purported kidnapping and possible “reprisal[s].” Casas’s mother and sister still live in Mexico.The asylum officer determined that Casas had not shown a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Casas cannot show that she suffered any prejudice as a result of DHS’s procedural errors. The IJ’s reasonable-fear finding is supported by substantial evidence. View "Casas v. Garland" on Justia Law