Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Utility companies responsible for a planned electric transmission line asked the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to allow construction across the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge alongside an existing road and railroad. Rural Utilities Service completed an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). FWS adopted the statement and issued a right-of-way permit.While litigation was pending, the utility companies sought to slightly alter the route and asked FWS to consider a land exchange. FWS discovered that it had relied on incorrect easement documents in issuing its original determination. It revoked the determination and permit but promised to consider the proposed land exchange. The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups but declined to enjoin ongoing construction of the project on private land outside the Refuge.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first rejecting a mootness argument. FWS has revoked the compatibility determination but has not promised never to issue a new permit. However, FWS’s current position does not meet the criteria of finality. Whatever hardship the plaintiffs face comes not from FWS’s promise to consider a land exchange but from the Utilities’ decision to build on their own land, so the district court erred in reviewing the merits of the proposed land exchange. Plaintiffs’ request for relief against the Utilities under NEPA likewise is premature. Adopting the environmental impact statement did not “consummate” the decisionmaking process. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural Utilities Service" on Justia Law

On O’Sucha’s death, the property, in a land trust, was to be divided equally among her four children, including Lesko. In 2009, Lesko caused her mother to make her the sole beneficiary upon O’Sucha’s 2010 death and to grant her sole power of direction over the trust. Her siblings sued Lesko in state court for undue influence. While an appeal was pending, Lesko sought a loan from Howard Bank, using the property as collateral. Because of Lesko’s poor credit and the state court decision, Howard approved a loan only when Lesko transferred ownership of the property to her daughter, Amorous. Amorous later conveyed a mortgage to Howard, securing a $130,000 loan, which Howard recorded.On remand, the Illinois court entered a money judgment against Lesko and declared a constructive trust; it later conveyed all interests of Amorous and Lesko to the plaintiffs, who unsuccessfully demanded that Howard release the mortgage.Plaintiffs sued Howard in federal court, then sold the property for $700,000, and paid the mortgage balance. Howard unsuccessfully sought to dismiss the case. In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted slander of title and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Howard held a valid mortgage and did not publish a falsity by recording it. Howard was not required to release the mortgage and did not continue to publish a falsity, nor did it unjustly retain a benefit by not releasing the mortgage. View "Guerrero v. Bank" on Justia Law

Mata fired shots, killing two men and injuring another. Chicago police arrested Mata that evening. The following day, after receiving his Miranda rights and saying that he understood them, Mata gave a videotaped statement: Mata explained that he heard Mares calling his name. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares while other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Mata fired five more shots toward the group, then ran toward his car. The men were walking with their backs to him when he fired; he never saw any of them with a weapon. An officer read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and wanted to make the statement; the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without threats or promises by the police.Defense counsel moved to suppress Mata’s statements, claiming that Mata was subjected to abuse by the police for two days before being given any Miranda warnings. No hearing was held on the motion. Convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, Mata sought habeas relief, arguing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing on the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Mata procedurally defaulted his claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. View "Mata v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gilbert and his son Michael were charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gilbert pleaded guilty and sought “safety-valve relief” from the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence. While Gilbert was awaiting sentencing, Michael pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate including by providing information about Gilbert’s criminal conduct. The plea agreement itself was not entered into the court’s docket. The government never disclosed the agreement to Gilbert or his lawyer. At Gilbert’s sentencing hearing, Michael testified against his father. The prosecutor elicited false testimony that Michael had pleaded “open”—without the benefit of a written plea agreement. The court subsequently located the written plea agreement and informed the parties. Gilbert’s lawyer did not move to recall Michael for further cross-examination nor did he probe Michael’s motivations for testifying. The court denied Gilbert’s request for safety-valve relief and sentenced Gilbert to 156 months.The Seventh Circuit “reluctantly” affirmed. To obtain relief for a “Brady” violation, a defendant must show that undisclosed information was “material either to guilt or to punishment.” While Gilbert was completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing. The court described the prosecution’s conduct as “unsettling.” View "United States v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

On the night of May 6, 2020, Lisby, eight months pregnant, and Lewis walked along the shoulder of State Road 37 in Indianapolis to get back to their motel. Indianapolis Officer Henderson was driving to work in his police vehicle on the same road, at 78 miles per hour, 33 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. He illegally changed lanes over a solid white line and his vehicle partially crossed the fog line onto the shoulder of the road. Henderson struck Lisby without seeing her while still traveling at 55 miles per hour. Lisby was transported to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Lisby and Lewis’s child was born at the hospital by emergency Cesarian section but died shortly after delivery. Henderson was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a police officer when he killed Lisby.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Henderson. The complaint failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly suggesting that Henderson acted with the criminal recklessness necessary to establish a due process violation. View "Lisby v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Eight drug couriers, under indictment, identified Caraway as the supplier of the cocaine and leader of the operation. The government communicated to Caraway’s attorney that Caraway would soon be indicted. Caraway voluntarily traveled to Illinois for a proffer interview, then returned to Houston. In September 2017, the government learned that Caraway committed a violent robbery in Houston and notified Caraway’s attorney that he would be indicted and was required to surrender by December 15, 2017. Caraway never responded. In January 2018, the government charged Caraway with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.U.S. Marshals began searching for Caraway 11 months later. In July 2021, a Texas state trooper stopped Caraway for speeding. After initially supplying a fake name, Caraway provided his real name and was arrested. Caraway pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for being the leader and organizer of the conspiracy and for obstruction of justice, based on evading arrest for approximately 42 months. Caraway argued that the fact that the government could not find him was not evidence that he was evading arrest. After overruling the enhancement objections, the court calculated Caraway’s sentence range as 292-365 months; without the obstruction enhancement, the range would have been 235-293 months. After discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the judge noted that she would have imposed the same 360-month sentence without the enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly calculated the Guidelines range without the enhancement and tied the imposed sentence to the severity of the crime, Caraway’s role, relevant conduct, possible recidivism, and protecting the public. View "United States v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Ye sought to recover against GlobalTranz, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claimed, under Illinois law, that GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier (Sunrise) that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. Ye obtained a $10 million default judgment against Sunrise.The district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the significant economic effects that would result from imposing state negligence standards on brokers. Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, with a specific carveout for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority." Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a ... service of any ... broker ... with respect to the transportation of property.” Rejecting the "safety exception" claim, the court reasoned that a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles." View "Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The parents work for the School District. Through the District, they contracted for a self-funded health insurance plan. The District, not an outside insurer, bears sole financial responsibility for the payment of plan benefits. The District is also the plan administrator and named fiduciary but contracted with United HealthCare to serve as the third-party claims administrator, with the authority to deny or approve claims. The plan is a governmental plan, so the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not apply, 29 U.S.C. 1003(b)(1). In 2017, daughter Megan—covered under her parents’ policy—suffered a mental health emergency. United approved Megan for 24 days of inpatient treatment and informed the family that it would not approve additional days. Her parents and Megan’s doctors disagreed and appealed internally within United. They elected to continue Megan’s inpatient treatment. They received a final denial of coverage notice, leaving most of Megan’s treatment expenses uncovered.The family sued United for breach of contract, bad faith, punitive damages, and interest under Wisconsin’s prompt pay statute but did not join the District as a defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and United. Wisconsin law does not permit them to sue United for tortious bad faith absent contractual privity. Wisconsin’s prompt pay statute applies only to insurers. View "Daniels v. United Healthcare Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Eligibility for disability payments from the Fund turns on how many credits an ironworker has accumulated (a credit is equal to 1,000 hours of work on union jobs in a given year); those with more than five but fewer than 15 credits are entitled to disability benefits if “totally and permanently disabled as the result of an accident sustained while on the job and employed by a Contributing Employer.” Lane, with nine credits as a union ironworker, applied for disability benefits. Lane was approved for Social Security Disability Insurance. The Fund’s Administrator requested information to connect Lane’s disability to an on-the-job injury. Lane explained that he suffered on-the-job injuries to his shoulder and knee and sent medical records, none of which connected his disability to the cited May 2014 accident. Lane admitted that his SSA award was determined by a combination of factors, not just the 2014 accident. A letter from Lane’s physician referred to several work-related injuries without identifying the work-related events or whether those injuries were the sole basis for the SSA’s disability award.After review by the Medical Review Institute of America concluded that the records did not establish that the SSA disability related to the 2014 accident, the Fund’s Trustees affirmed the denial of Lane’s Claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Fund under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1002, characterizing the denial as “not downright unreasonable.” View "Lane v. Structural Iron Workers Local No. 1 Pension Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Hunter was housed in a general-population wing of “Unit H” at Redgranite Wisconsin state prison. Patterson, Hunter’s cellmate March-December 2017, was regarded as a “lifer” and a “violent individual.” On multiple occasions, Patterson told Hunter that he would beat him while he slept. Hunter communicated Patterson’s threats to Mueske, the Unit H supervisor with authority over housing assignments. Hunter told Officer Walker about Patterson’s threats. At Walker’s suggestion, Hunter filled out an Inmate Complaint form, dated August 9. Walker typically notifies his superiors and drafts an incident report when he learns of threats between inmates, but he did not do so. Wilcox decided to move Patterson out of Unit H on December 6, 2017, but not due to Hunter’s complaints.On the day of Patterson’s move, Hunter approached Patterson, purportedly to say goodbye. Hunter claims that Patterson flew into a rage, accusing Hunter of causing Patterson’s reassignment. Patterson testified that Hunter called him various derogatory terms, including the N-word. Patterson violently battered Hunter and stomped on his head, causing Hunter permanent injuries and triggering his PTSD from his time in the military. The altercation was captured on video. In Hunter’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Mueske and Walker summary judgment. Hunter offered no facts from which a reasonable jury could find that Walker acted with deliberate indifference or that Mueske’s conduct caused his injury. View "Hunter v. Mueske" on Justia Law