Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In early 2015, Daniel Stewart was stopped by Indianapolis police for a traffic violation, leading to the discovery of a handgun, over $9,000 in cash, and more than 800 grams of illegal narcotics in his car. A subsequent search of his home revealed additional drugs, nearly $500,000 in cash, and five more firearms. Stewart was found to be laundering drug proceeds through sham businesses. He was convicted in November 2016 on multiple counts, including drug distribution, firearm possession, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially sentenced Stewart to life imprisonment plus five years. Stewart appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. He then sought postconviction relief, arguing that recent case law invalidated his sentence enhancements. The government conceded, and the district court ordered resentencing. At resentencing, the court imposed a 360-month term of imprisonment, considering Stewart's efforts at rehabilitation but also the severity of his crimes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Stewart's appeal of his resentencing. Stewart argued that the district court miscalculated his sentencing range under the career-offender guideline and misunderstood its discretion regarding his rehabilitation efforts. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court correctly applied the career-offender guideline and did not err in its consideration of Stewart's rehabilitation. The court also held that the district court provided a sufficient explanation for the increased sentences on the money laundering counts, which did not affect the overall sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Stewart's 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

P.A.-V., a Mexican citizen, first entered the U.S. in 1995 but was removed in 1998 and 1999. He re-entered in 1999 and remained until 2020 when he was arrested for DUI, leading to the reinstatement of his removal order by the Department of Homeland Security. He applied for protection under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing violence in Mexico due to cartel activity linked to his parents' land. An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the decision.The immigration judge found P.A.-V.'s testimony credible but concluded that he had not shown past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution or torture. The judge noted that the violence experienced by his family was not directly linked to him and was consistent with general violence in the region. The judge also determined that P.A.-V. could safely relocate within Mexico. The BIA affirmed the judge's decision on the same grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying a highly deferential standard of review. The court found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's and BIA's conclusions. The court held that P.A.-V. failed to establish past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution, as the evidence did not show a direct link between the violence and a threat to him. The court also agreed that P.A.-V. could reasonably relocate within Mexico. Additionally, the court found that P.A.-V. did not meet the higher burden required for CAT relief, as there was no evidence that the Mexican government would consent or acquiesce to any harm he might face. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "P. A.-V. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Eric Skeens was convicted in Indiana of five counts of child molesting, based almost entirely on the detailed testimony of the child victim, K.W. There was no physical evidence presented at trial, but the prosecution relied on K.W.’s account, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, a school counselor, a therapist, and a sexual assault nurse who explained the absence of physical evidence. During closing arguments, Skeens’s attorney made a statement to the jury, “I believe her,” referring to K.W., which Skeens later argued constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After his conviction, Skeens appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and found that the attorney’s statement did not prejudice the outcome, given the strength and detail of K.W.’s testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the case, and Skeens’s subsequent state post-conviction and federal habeas petitions were also denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied relief, concluding that Skeens had not shown the state court’s decision was unreasonable under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Strickland v. Washington. The court held that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply the Strickland standard when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent the attorney’s statement. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Skeens’s habeas petition. View "Skeens v Neal" on Justia Law

Jonathan Cain applied for supplemental security income (SSI) due to severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease, migraine headaches, obesity, depression, and anxiety. Despite his conditions, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Cain could perform certain types of work and denied his disability benefits. Cain challenged this decision in federal court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana affirmed the ALJ's decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion. The court found that the ALJ met the minimal articulation requirements in assessing the medical evidence and did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ adequately evaluated the medical opinions of Cain's treating physician, Dr. Amanda Williams, and the state agency psychologists, Dr. Joelle Larsen and Dr. Ken Lovko. The ALJ also properly relied on the vocational expert, Thomas Dunleavy, who provided a reliable basis for his job number predictions. The court concluded that the ALJ did not commit legal error and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cain v Bisignano" on Justia Law

Madeline Krasno sued the University of Wisconsin–Madison after her comments on the University's social media posts were hidden and her Instagram account was restricted. Krasno alleged that these actions violated her First Amendment rights, as she was advocating against animal abuse in the University's primate testing facilities. The University defended its actions by claiming that it was hiding "off-topic" comments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding that the University's social media comment threads were nonpublic forums and that the University's moderation decisions were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The district court also held that Krasno lacked standing to seek an injunction against the University's use of keyword filters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's findings. The appellate court determined that Krasno had standing to bring her as-applied challenge and concluded that the University's social media comment threads were limited public forums. The court held that the University's off-topic comment rule was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, making it unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the University and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for Krasno. View "Krasno v. Mnookin" on Justia Law

In a suburban shopping center parking lot on July 1, 2016, Michael Cokes, Isaiah Stevenson, and Ronald Arrington waited in a car while Jimmie Malone robbed a restaurant manager. After the robbery, the men drove away with Malone, who later took over as the driver. When Illinois state troopers stopped the car, the men refused to exit, and Malone sped off, leading to a high-speed chase. During the chase, Chicago Police Officer Dean Ewing, driving an unmarked car, collided with the Pontiac, resulting in serious injuries to Cokes, Stevenson, and the officers in Ewing’s car, and the deaths of Malone and Arrington.The plaintiffs, including Arrington’s estate, sued the City of Chicago and Officer Ewing, alleging various torts related to the collision. After a nine-day trial, a jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, challenging the district court’s decisions on affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and the admissibility of evidence. The district court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings. Specifically, the court upheld the district court’s decisions to allow the defendants to plead a joint enterprise theory of contributory negligence, to admit testimony about Arrington’s conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 601 rather than the Illinois Dead Man’s Act, and to exclude the COPA report under Rule 403. The appellate court concluded that any potential errors did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. View "Arrington v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Mitchell Green was charged with trafficking a child and related offenses in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During his trial, Green called his cousin, Jonathan Cousin, as a witness, who testified that he, not Green, had driven the minor to a hotel. The state did not initially object to Cousin's testimony but later argued that Green failed to provide pretrial notice as required for a "Denny witness," leading the judge to declare a mistrial. Green, out on bond, argued that a retrial would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.The trial court denied Green's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the mistrial was erroneous. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sided with the trial judge, finding that he exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. Green then filed a collateral attack, and the district court denied relief, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial was based on a mistaken belief that pretrial notice for Denny evidence was required. The court noted that no such requirement existed in Wisconsin law. The trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion by not considering alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial, and thus, a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue an unconditional writ. View "Green v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Sheldon Morales and Eduardo Santana were surveilled by the DEA after Morales, recently released from prison for drug trafficking, resumed similar activities. Morales coordinated with two incarcerated brokers to arrange drug shipments, which were intercepted by law enforcement. Santana acted as a translator and partner in the operation, discussing plans to expand their drug distribution and defraud suppliers. Morales and Santana were indicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. Morales faced additional charges for attempting to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl.In the Northern District of Illinois, Morales requested new counsel multiple times, causing trial delays. His final request for new counsel was partially granted, but the court denied a subsequent motion to replace Joseph Lopez, citing potential further delays. Morales and Santana were convicted by a jury, with Morales found guilty of all charges and Santana convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Post-trial motions for a new trial and acquittal were denied. Santana's request for a minor role reduction at sentencing was also denied, and he was sentenced to 200 months, while Morales received 235 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Santana's appeal argued insufficient evidence for his conspiracy conviction and error in denying a minor role reduction. The court found ample evidence of Santana's active role in the conspiracy and upheld the district court's sentencing decision. Morales contended the district court erred by not giving a buyer-seller jury instruction and violated his right to counsel of choice. The court found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy with Santana, making the buyer-seller instruction irrelevant, and determined Morales had not properly requested new counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Santana" on Justia Law

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

Jada Padua applied for Social Security benefits, claiming disability due to fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, depression, and anxiety. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her benefits, concluding that she was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. Padua challenged the agency’s denial in federal court, but the district court upheld the ALJ's decision, finding substantial evidence to support it.Padua filed her disability benefits application in November 2010, initially claiming a disability onset date of July 2008, later amended to November 2010. After an initial denial and a remand by a magistrate judge in February 2016, the ALJ held a second hearing in August 2016. The ALJ determined that Padua was not disabled under the Social Security Act, finding that her impairments did not meet a listing for presumptive disability and that she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with additional limitations. The ALJ discounted Padua’s complaints of extreme pain and fatigue, noting inconsistencies with her daily activities and the overall medical record. The ALJ also gave little weight to the opinions of her treating physicians, Drs. Carpenter and Pendolino, finding them inconsistent with the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ALJ’s assessment of Padua’s fibromyalgia and the opinions of Drs. Carpenter and Pendolino were supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the ALJ reasonably considered the objective medical evidence, treatment history, and daily activities in determining Padua’s RFC. The court also concluded that the ALJ provided adequate reasons for discounting the treating physicians’ opinions and that the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Padua v. Bisignano" on Justia Law