Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals who are charged with a crime and found to suffer from a mental disorder "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” The Act requires care and treatment for the committed person, "designed to effect recovery.” Once detainees are deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must discharge them. The Supreme Court held, in 1986, that the Act, on its face, complies with the Due Process Clause, noting the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic possibility of release.Every Big Muddy River Program detainee participates in a weekly core therapy group. Only detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct participate in offense-specific and didactic groups. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy. Therapists evaluate detainees semiannually and provide them with copies of their evaluations and treatment plans. Detainees may discuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group therapy, not one-on-one. The state contracts with Wexford to evaluate detainees for release. The plaintiffs alleged that Big Muddy’s treatment program was run in a constitutionally deficient manner.The district court concluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards amounted to a constitutional violation and issued an injunction, requiring that Big Muddy provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week; reinstate inactive groups; and use independent evaluators for discharge evaluations.The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging concern about whether Illinois is complying with its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. Detainees receive minimal treatment, raising serious questions about whether rehabilitation and release are realistically available. The district court, however, issued too broad an injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which requires the least intrusive means available to correct the constitutional violation. View "Howe v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Evans twice sold heroin to a confidential source (50 grams, 125 grams). Officers stopped Evans 30 minutes later and found cash from the controlled purchase, methamphetamine, two handguns, and ammunition. He was charged with two drug distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841, and two firearm counts, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 922(g)(1). Following conflicts with Evans’s first two lawyers, Sarm was appointed to represent Evans. After Evans withdrew a plea, prosecutors added another 924(c) count.At trial, Sarm only subjected four of 11 witnesses to meaningful cross-examination and rested without presenting any evidence or calling any defense witnesses. Convicted, Evans was sentenced to 788 months; 50 years came from the 924(c) convictions, each of which carried mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 25 years because Evans had a prior qualifying 924(c) conviction. Nineteen days after the trial, Sarm overdosed on heroin. The district court appointed new counsel but, without a hearing, denied a motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Evans made a single choice to possess a firearm over a continuous 30-minute span that included a sale of heroin and the police finding methamphetamine and a gun in his car. The facts support one 924(c) conviction, not two. Evans faced serious charges with serious sentencing consequences; his appointed counsel had never tried a federal criminal case and was using heroin before, during, and after trial. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Elanco Animal Health sent Ambassador Animal Hospital two unsolicited faxes inviting Ambassador’s veterinarians and its owner to RSVP for two free dinner programs: one titled “Canine and Feline Disease Prevention Hot Topics” and the other “Rethinking Management of Osteoarthritis.” The faxes indicated that both programs had been approved for continuing education credits and provided the names of the programs’ presenters. The corners of each invitation included the trademarked “Elanco” logo, and the bottom of each fax contained a notice encouraging recipients to consult their state or federal regulations or ethics laws about restrictions on accepting industry-provided educational and food items.Ambassador filed suit, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 (TCPA), and arguing that the faxes were unsolicited advertisements because the free dinner programs were used to market or sell Elanco’s animal health goods and services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The text of the TCPA creates an objective standard narrowly focused on the content of the faxed document. The faxes do not indicate—directly or indirectly—to a reasonable recipient that Elanco was promoting or selling some good, service, or property as required by the TCPA. The court rejected a “pretext” argument. View "Ambassador Animal Hospital, Ltd. v. Elanco Animal Health Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Reardon unsuccessfully ran for Coles County State’s Attorney against the incumbent, Danley. Reardon brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against public officials (including Danley), the City of Mattoon, and Coles County, alleging violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.In 2019, Danley and the Mattoon Police Department (MPD) subpoenaed Reardon’s Facebook account information during an investigation into his potential involvement in a perjury/bribery case. A judge denied Reardon’s motion to quash but declined to release the documents until after a probable cause hearing. The Seventh Circuit noted that section 1983 curtails the availability of injunctive relief against judicial officers.Coles County Board Member Metzger removed a Reardon campaign sign from a resident’s lawn weeks before the election, allegedly mistakenly believing the sign was installed without permission. The Board determined that no further action was needed. Reardon did not sufficiently allege that Metzger was “acting under color of state law,” and Coles County is not liable based on the Board’s alleged ratification of Metzger’s conduct.Two weeks before the election, Mattoon Chief of Police Taylor posted a photo of himself (in uniform) with Danley, inside his office, on the official MPD Facebook page with a caption encouraging people to vote for Danley. Reardon failed to provide any authority to support that Taylor or Danley violated the Constitution. View "Reardon v. Danley" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted of bank robbery. The court determined that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, 4B1.2, with an advisory range of 210-240 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Brown's 180-month sentence. Defendants are deemed career offenders if they have at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence. The 4B1.2(a)(1) “elements clause” defines a crime of violence as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Brown had a 2010 Illinois conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking; He “t[ook] a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense.The Seventh Circuit previously held that Illinois vehicular hijacking constituted a 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence. That precedent was not overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” decision, construing the term “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause, which is identical to 4B1.2(a)(1). The Court held that, under the categorical approach, an offense does not involve the use of physical force against the person of another if the offense can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. The Illinois statute implied an element of knowing or purposeful use or threat of force. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Consolidated suits claimed that many firms in the broiler-chicken business formed a cartel. Third-party discovery in that ongoing suit turned up evidence that Rabobank, a lender to several broiler-chicken producers, urged at least two of them to cut production. Some plaintiffs added Rabobank as an additional defendant.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, bans combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade and does not reach unilateral action. Here, all the plaintiffs allege is that Rabobank tried to protect its interests through unilateral action. The complaint does not allege that Rabobank served as a conduit for the producers’ agreement, helped them coordinate their production and catch cheaters, or even knew that the producers were coordinating among themselves. A flurry of emails among managers and other employees at Rabobank observing that lower output and higher prices in the broiler-chicken market would improve the bank’s chance of collecting its loans and a pair of emails from the head of Rabobank’s poultry-lending section, to executives at two producers indicated nothing but unilateral action. The intra-Rabobank emails could not have promoted or facilitated cooperation among producers and the two messages only reminded the producers that as long as demand curves slope downward, lower output implies higher prices. Advice differs from agreement. View "Amory Investments LLC v. Utrecht-America Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

When police responded to a shooting outside a casino, the victim was dead. They found Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance video, to track him down and arrest him. They searched Grady’s apartment and discovered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the weapon that was used in the shooting. Grady and his roommate, Bronson, gave different accounts of what happened that night.A state-court jury convicted Grady of first-degree murder. In response to a special verdict form, the jury found that the prosecution had not proved that Grady was the triggerman. Bronson was sentenced to 24 years, Grady to 60 years. Grady’s direct appeal focused on his sentence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of his ineffective assistance post-conviction petition, concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was “overwhelming” and Grady could not demonstrate the necessary prejudice under Strickland.Contending that the special-verdict finding negated the prosecution’s sole theory of guilt, Grady sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s rejection of this contention was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. View "Grady v. Truitt" on Justia Law

C.S. has developmental and cognitive disabilities, including autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. C.S., then in sixth grade attempted to use the hallway elevator. A teacher told C.S. to stop. C.S. did not comply. Ultimately, three staff members forced C.S. onto the floor and pinned her face down while handcuffing her hands behind her back, and later bound her legs before returning her to her wheelchair. C.S. was handcuffed and bound for 34 minutes until her mother, Thomas, took her home. Thomas also alleged that days later, C.S. may have scratched or grabbed another student and was required to eat her lunch in the school office. While there, C.S. became dysregulated, prompting staff to respond “with similar aggressive force,” including calling the police. The District sought a juvenile delinquency prosecution of C.S. Charges were dropped when C.S. was found not competent to stand trial. A.S. (C.S.’s brother) had previously attended the same school and, after an incident, the school’s then-principal requested charges against A.S. His prosecution was also dropped after a finding that he was incompetent to stand trial.Thomas alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that the District had a “practice or protocol of utilizing excessive punitive and retaliatory force or threats of force to punish students with behavioral disabilities.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thomas’s suit. Thomas failed to plausibly allege a widespread custom or practice of violating disabled students’ Fourth Amendment rights. View "Thomas v. Neenah Joint School District" on Justia Law

At around 4:36 AM, Washington’s cellmate, Simmons, awoke to the sound of Washington, a pretrial detainee, gasping for breath. Simmons tried to shake Washington; he did not respond. At 4:37, Simmons pressed the intercom button, which triggers an audible ping and a flashing light at the control desk. Valentine, the control deck officer, did not answer for over one minute. Valentine claims he had trouble understanding Simmons and thought Simmons was referring to a plumbing issue. Valentine ended the call. For 30 seconds. Simmons tried to wake Washington. He used the intercom again around 4:47. Valentine did not answer for about 90 seconds. Other officers had joined him at the desk. This time, Valentine understood Simmons was reporting an emergency. The other officers ran to Washington’s cell, arriving at 4:50, issued an alert for medical assistance, and began CPR. A nurse with a defibrillator arrived around 4:52 and administered an electrical shock. At 5:00, EMTs arrived and continued CPR. Washington was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy concluded that sleep apnea caused Washington to go into cardiac arrhythmia, which caused Washington’s death.In a suit under 18 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Valentine’s delay in obtaining treatment harmed Washington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Valentine for lack of sufficient evidence to show causation. View "Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Cruz-Rivera was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree assault (stabbing) in 2001, having violently attacked two women who suffered from a mild mental disability. After his 2015 release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20901; he never did so. Cruz-Rivera lived and worked (for a staffing agency, including at a school) in Indiana and was convicted of two felonies—resisting law enforcement and auto theft.Cruz-Rivera was convicted of failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR recommended a condition of supervised release that required him to submit to the search of his person and property based on “reasonable suspicion” of a violation of a condition of supervision or other unlawful conduct. Cruz-Rivera unsuccessfully objected, arguing that his crimes did not provide a justification for the search of electronics and electronic communications. The Probation Office noted that the condition is imposed on all monitored offenders. “Searches are not conducted without probable cause and only after approval from the Deputy Chief and/or Chief Probation Officer.”The court imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release after describing Cruz-Rivera’s criminal history and stating that it had considered his mitigation arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After a conscientious reading of Cruz-Rivera’s PSR, the district court reasonably concluded that the circumstances surrounding his criminal history made the imposition of the contested condition an important ingredient in stopping his antisocial behavior. View "United States v. Cruz-Rivera" on Justia Law