Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005 Newbern pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. District judge Herndon found that Newbern had prior convictions for crimes of violence, including reckless discharge of a firearm, qualifying him as a career offender, and had distributed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. With an advisory range of 262–327 months’ imprisonment, he sentenced Newbern to 300 months, explaining that he would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the career-offender determination.The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that reckless discharge of a firearm is not a crime of violence. Judge Herndon twice denied Newbern relief, reiterating that he would have sentenced Newbern to 25 years regardless of his career-offender status. Newbern later sought resentencing under the First Step Act; he met the criteria for relief: his sentence was based on the pre–Fair Sentencing Act crack-to-powder ratio, he committed his crime before August 2, 2010, his sentence had not been previously reduced under the First Step Act, and a previous motion for a sentence reduction had not been denied on the merits. Newbern reiterated that reckless discharge of a firearm no longer qualifies as a crime of violence and underscored his prison record. Judge Yandle denied Newbern’s motion, noting that Newbern’s guidelines range remained the same and adopting Herndon’s statements.The Seventh Circuit vacated, citing the 2022 Supreme Court holding (“Concepcion”) that “when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.” The district court did not consider Newbern’s good-conduct argument. View "United States v. Newbern" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lomax was convicted of heroin distribution and firearm offenses. Lomax’s prior felony convictions for drug and violent offenses subjected him to increased penalties; the district court sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. On remand in 2017, the district court again sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. In 2019, Lomax moved, pro se, to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging his counsel performed deficiently during his 2017 resentencing by failing to investigate whether Lomax’s prior Indiana cocaine conviction constituted a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court construed Lomax’s motion as arguing that he was actually innocent of the section 841 sentencing enhancement and agreed that he was. Lomax was resentenced in 2021, without application of the section 841 sentencing enhancement, to a term of 300 months of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a section 2255 evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. Lomax’s prior attempted murder conviction constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

Rock Hemp contracted with CBDINC to purchase 6,000 hemp seeds. CBDINC is a fictitious business name used by Dunn, Davies, and Kolodny (Appellees). The contract contains an arbitration clause requiring “[a]ny dispute arising out of this Agreement” be resolved through “binding arbitration” in Denver, Colorado. Disappointed with CBDINC’s hemp seeds, Rock sued the Appellees individually, not CBDINC, in Wisconsin state court. The Appellees removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the arbitration clause. Rock sought remand under 28 U.S.C. 1447.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the Appellees. Based on the date when Rock “specifically disclose[d] the amount of monetary damages sought,” the district court correctly found that removal was timely. The Appellees did not fully litigate the merits of the case in state court. The allegations in the complaint make clear that CBDINC was not a distinct legal entity from the Appellees, and Rock does not allege it was confused or deceived by the use of the d/b/a; the district court correctly concluded that the contract is valid and Appellees have standing to enforce it. View "Rock Hemp Corp. v. Dunn" on Justia Law

In March 2019, Lloyd robbed a Credit Union and led police on a high-speed chase, Lloyd was charged with credit union robbery and transporting stolen money interstate. On July 11, 2019, he pleaded not guilty. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the Speedy Trial Act requires that the trial begins within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or the arraignment, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), with exceptions including for delay resulting from mental competency examinations The court granted Lloyd two continuances. Trial was set for December 30, but on November 19, Lloyd’s attorney sought a competency evaluation. The court entered an order on November 22. Lloyd did not arrive at the site of his examination until February 27, 2020. The pandemic struck. Lloyd’s evaluation was completed on May 8, 2020; the psychologist’s report was finalized on May 26. Lloyd was returned to jail on July 1, 2020. On September 23, the court found Lloyd competent. The government conceded that over 70 non-excludable days elapsed. The court dismissed the case without prejudice.The government promptly brought the same charges again. Lloyd pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion. The facts and circumstances leading to dismissal weighed in favor of dismissal without prejudice. The discussions between counsel and the court at the hearing demonstrate the court’s sufficient consideration and application of all the factors within the Act. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Meyers was one of seven men convicted of the 1989 gang-related murders of Williams and Kaufman in Chicago. In 1995, after Meyers’ conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction, arguing that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective for failing to investigate the scene of the shooting and to establish that a witness, Wilson, would not have been able to see the shooters from his second-floor vantage point. Pointing to Wilson’s post-trial recantation, Meyers added that he was wrongfully convicted based on Wilson’s perjured trial testimony and the prosecution’s subornation to commit perjury. Meyers also argued that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective in failing to interview and present the alibi testimony of Parker. The Illinois appellate court rejected his claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply “Strickland” in rejecting his claim that Nichols was ineffective for failing to interview and present Parker’s alibi testimony. The risk that the defense would have taken by pursuing that alibi, which contradicted statements made by Nichols after his arrest, is obvious. The state court reasonably determined that his conviction was not based on the knowing use of perjured testimony. View "Meyers v. Gomez" on Justia Law

On June 1, 2020, the defendants surrounded an ATM located in a Chicago grocery store parking lot. The ATM included a surveillance video camera that captured video, but not audio. The footage shows Foy (in a neon construction vest) and his co‐defendants surrounding the ATM at approximately 7:10 PM. For eight minutes, the group used various tools, including a hammer, crowbar, and rod, trying to break open the ATM. They damaged its outside cover but ultimately failed to gain access to the cash inside. At 7:18 PM, police arrived on the scene and arrested all three. The vandalized ATM held over $190,000 in cash. Foy was charged under 18 U.S.C. 371, for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, specifically bank theft (18 U.S.C. 2113(b)), “exceeding $1,000 in value.” The bank that owned the ATM was FDIC-insured.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Foy’s conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the government was required to show evidence of intent to steal more than $1,000, rather than just intent to steal; that the government fell short of establishing a conspiracy; and that the district court impermissibly considered the civil unrest in the wake of George Floyd’s death as an aggravating factor in sentencing Foy. The court noted the video evidence of the defendants’ cooperative efforts. View "United States v. Foy" on Justia Law

During a 3:30 am encounter, while South Bend Officer O’Neill was investigating reports that someone was stealing from parked cars, Logan picked up a hunting knife and approached O’Neill. The officer told Logan to stand still and put down the weapon. Logan held the knife up, came within three steps of O’Neill, and threw the knife, hitting O’Neill in the arm. O’Neill fired his gun, hitting Logan in the torso. O’Neill called for an ambulance, but Logan died at a hospital.The district court rejected Logan's estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that one of O’Neill’s multiple descriptions of the events implies that Logan threw the knife a second or so before O’Neill pulled the trigger and that O’Neill was safe (Logan was no longer armed) or that a jury might doubt O’Neill’s version of events because he did not activate his body camera and has been convicted of ghost employment. The physical evidence, such as the bullet track, is consistent with O’Neill’s account. Disbelief of the only witness is not proof that the opposite of the witness’s statements is true. “The fact that many shootings by police eliminate an important source of evidence is troubling, but litigation remains tied to the record," which compels a decision for O’Neill. View "Estate of Eric Jack Logan v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

In 2016, law enforcement agents, with a search warrant, broke open the doors and windows of Rodriguez’s home, threw a flash-bang grenade into the living room where his one-year-old daughter was sleeping, and searched for illegal drugs. Rodriguez was arrested and convicted in state court. Rodriguez sued 14 defendants under “Bivens” and 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they provided false information to the judge who issued the warrant and executed the search in an unreasonable manner. Two defendants were identified by codes that Rodriguez received in his criminal proceeding. The judge dismissed 13 defendants as not properly identified and granted the remaining defendant summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. A plaintiff who uses “placeholders” ordinarily must substitute identified defendants before the statute of limitations expires. A plaintiff may be able to replace or add defendants after the limitations period by using the relation-back doctrine of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C), which applies because “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out … in the original pleading.” Rule 4(m) requires service of the complaint and summons within 90 days after the complaint’s filing unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the delay. Not until the district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A was service possible; by then the 90 days, and the statute of limitations, had expired. Delays required by section 1915A constitute “good cause” under Rule 4(m) for belated service, which increases the time for Rule 15(c) relation back. View "Rodriguez v. McCloughen" on Justia Law

A person arrested in Chicago can take some property into jail but must surrender other property, including cell phones. The detainee has 30 days to reclaim the property in person (if released) or by a designated friend or relative. Property remaining in the city’s hands after 30 days is sold or thrown away. In 2021, the Seventh Circuit (Conyers), rejected several constitutional challenges to that policy. Kelley-Lomax remained in custody for more than 30 days and did not have anyone retrieve his property. The city disposed of a cell phone and a wallet, including a debit card and library card, that the police had seized.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The disposition of the seized property is governed by the Due Process Clause. Chicago provides detainees with notice and an opportunity to reclaim their property. Rejecting a substantive due process argument, the court reasoned that property is a fundamental right but property can be abandoned. Chicago draws the abandonment line at 30 days. Physical items seized from arrested persons make claims on limited space, and for many detainees, the costs of arranging a sale to free up space would exceed the value of the items in inventory. View "Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cope, injured on a Kentucky job site, filed a workers’ compensation claim. The subcontractor who hired him for the project, CMC, is based in Southern Indiana, and had an insurance policy with AFICA. Schultheis Insurance Agency procured the policy for CMC, but failed to inform AFICA that CMC did business in Kentucky. AFICA sought a declaration that its policy does not cover Cope’s claim.The district court granted AFICA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plain text of the policy is unambiguous: because CMC failed to notify AFICA until after Cope’s accident that it was working in Kentucky, AFICA is not liable for Cope’s workers’ compensation claim. The policy states : “If you have work on the effective date of this policy in any state [other than Indiana], coverage will not be afforded for that state unless we are notified within thirty days.” View "Accident Fund Insurance Co. v. Schultheis Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law