Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Middle Mississippi is the 195-mile-long stretch from St. Louis, Missouri, where the Missouri River flows into the Mississippi, to Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi and doubles its flow. The 1910 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct permanent river training structures in the Middle Mississippi and perform supplemental dredging to maintain a channel sufficient for commercial traffic. The Corps has for decades built and maintained structures—dikes, jetties, and chevrons—along the Middle Mississippi to ensure that the channel is at least nine feet deep and 300 feet wide for commercial navigation. In 1976, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the project's ecological impacts. In 2013, the Corps decided to supplement its 1976 EIS, based on newly designated threatened and endangered species, and new information on the effects of river training structures and dredging. In the final supplemental EIS and record of decision, the Corps chose the “Continue Construction Alternative.” Because the exact locations and types of future river training structures are unknown, the supplemental statement studied environmental impacts at a programmatic level and will perform site-specific environmental assessments before actually building additional river training structures.In a challenge brought by environmental groups, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, rejecting arguments that the supplemental EIS did not comply with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 1041, or the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. View "National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Kimmons was diagnosed with early cataracts in the center of his vision that might qualify for surgery. An optometrist recommended that Kimmons avoid driving at night. Kimmons lived in Racine and was working at Charter’s Milwaukee call center, a one-hour drive away. Kimmons’ shift ended at 9:00 PM, so he asked Charter to modify his work schedule. Charter allowed him to start at 10:00 AM and end at 7:00 PM but for only 30 days. Kimmons asked to extend his modified schedule while he tried to move closer to the workplace. Charter’s internal policy permitted work-schedule changes, but Charter summarily denied this request, stating that “assistance with your commute” is “not required under the ADA." Kimmons tried other options for commuting without success.Kimmons filed an EEOC charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted Charter summary judgment, finding that Kimmons did not need any accommodation to perform an essential job function. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that there is no bright-line rule as to when an employee’s disability interferes with essential job attendance or whether particular accommodations are reasonable but, if a qualified individual’s disability substantially interferes with his ability to get to work and attendance at work is an essential function, an employer may sometimes be required to provide a commute-related accommodation, if reasonable under the circumstances. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

After a New Year’s Eve hit-and-run left one person dead and another injured, Jones became a suspect and turned himself in. During a recorded interrogation at 1:18 a.m., an officer read Jones his Miranda rights and fully explained those rights. Jones asked what penalty he was potentially facing. The officer refused to answer, asking multiple times if Jones wanted to proceed with questioning. The officer stated that others had placed him at the scene of the accident, police knew Jones fled because he was scared, Jones did the right thing coming in, and it was important for Jones to get his side of the story on record. After saying he felt horrible, Jones asked, “So y’all can get a public pretender right now?” After some laughter, a detective responded, “You said it right, pretender … they’re called public defenders.” After more chuckling, the detective said: “Obviously due to the time right now, we can’t.” At one point the detective stated that he believed the maximum punishment was 15 years. Jones then told the detectives what happened, implicating himself.The Wisconsin trial court denied his motion to suppress, concluding that Jones's joking reference to a “public pretender” cannot constitute a genuine request. A state appellate court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Jones’s question about a lawyer, whether earnest or in jest, was too ambiguous to invoke his right to counsel under Supreme Court law. View "Jones v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Doe is a transgender male who was born female. He had breast-removal surgery but no other gender-altering procedure. Doe’s partner is A.B., the mother of R.M. and four other children. Starke County Detective Gray, and Purtee, a family case manager with the Indiana Department of Child Services, met with 17-year-old R.M. to investigate allegations that Doe and A.B. had abandoned him. Ultimately, Doe and A.B. were arrested for neglect of a dependent and nonsupport of a dependent child. During subsequent interviews and proceedings, it was divulged that Doe was born female.After the charges were resolved with deferred prosecution agreements, Doe and A.B. sued the detective, the Sheriff’s Department, and Purtee under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of Doe’s right to privacy in sexual preference under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they were arrested without probable cause contrary to the Fourth Amendment. They later sought to amend their complaint to clarify that Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment claim pertained to the disclosure of gender identity not sexual preference. The district court denied the motion to amend and entered summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no clearly established right to privacy in one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or child welfare investigation. The totality of the circumstances provided probable cause for the arrests. View "Doe v. Gray" on Justia Law

Arroyo served in the Illinois House of Representatives from 2006-2019, while also managing a lobbying firm. In 2018-2019, Arroyo’s firm received $32,500 in checks from Weiss’s sweepstakes-gaming company in exchange for his official support for the sweepstakes industry in the General Assembly. Despite never previously expressing a view on sweepstakes gaming, Arroyo began pushing for sweepstakes-friendly legislation and encouraging other legislators and executive-branch officials to support the same. Arroyo concealed his financial arrangement with Weiss.When the government uncovered the bribery scheme, Arroyo pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). The court sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment and ordered that he forfeit $32,500 in bribe money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Arroyo’s contention that the judge erred by finding his 57-month sentence necessary to deter public corruption. District judges need not marshal empirical data on deterrent effects before considering whether a sentence adequately deters criminal conduct. The judge presumed that public officials are rational actors who pay attention when one of their own is sentenced. That presumption that sentences influence behavior at the margins was reasonable. The court also rejected arguments that the judge erred by deeming several of his allocution statements aggravating and ordering him to forfeit too much money. View "United States v. Arroyo" on Justia Law

PayPal users can transfer money to businesses and people; they can donate to charities through the Giving Fund, its 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Kass created a PayPal account and accepted PayPal’s 2004 User Agreement, including a non-mandatory arbitration clause and allowing PayPal to amend the Agreement at any time by posting the amended terms on its website. In 2012 PayPal amended the Agreement, adding a mandatory arbitration provision. Users could opt out until December 2012. In 2016, PayPal sent emails to Kass encouraging her to make year-end donations. Kass donated $3,250 to 13 charities through the Giving Fund website. Kass alleges she later learned that only three of those charities actually received her gifts; none knew that Kass had made the donations. Kass claims that, although Giving Fund created profile pages for these charities, it would transfer donated funds only to charities that created a PayPal “business” account; otherwise PayPal would “redistribute” the funds to similar charities.Kass and a charity to which she had donated filed a purported class action. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, then affirmed the arbitrator’s decision in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated. In concluding that Kass had consented to the amended Agreement, the district court erred by deciding a disputed issue of fact that must be decided by a trier of fact: whether Kass received notice of the amended Agreement and implicitly agreed to the new arbitration clause. View "Kass v. PayPal Inc." on Justia Law

Federal law establishes “[t]he Tuesday after the 1st Monday in November[] in every even-numbered year” as “the day for the election,” 2 U.S.C. 7. Illinois law allows mail-in ballots postmarked on or by Election Day to be counted if received up to two weeks after Election Day. The plaintiffs, State Congressman Bost, and two voters and former presidential electors, argued that this extended ballot counting violates federal law and filed suit against the State Board of Elections to enjoin the practice.Within a month, the Democratic Party of Illinois (DPI) filed a motion to intervene as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in defense of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of DPI’s motion. DPI failed to point to any reason that the state’s representation of its interests “may be” inadequate, and the district court’s focus on public time and resources over DPI’s individual interests was not an abuse of its discretion. The court allowed DPI to proceed as amicus curiae if it decided to do so. View "Bost v. Democratic Party of Illinois" on Justia Law

Inmate Arce got a sharp knee in the thigh while he was playing soccer at Illinois’s Pinckneyville Correctional Center in June 2017. Since then, he has suffered from severe leg pain, which the prison’s medical providers (Wexford) ultimately concluded was attributable to a blood clot. Arce’s blood clot was successfully treated but his pain persisted. Arce sued Wexford and two of its employees, claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arce claimed that he suffered from compartment syndrome and that failure to diagnose and treat this condition caused his long-term leg injury. But after five years and numerous visits to Wexford and non-Wexford health professionals, Arce has no evidence aside from his lay speculation that he experienced tissue necrosis in his thigh, the primary consequence of untreated compartment syndrome. Nor did Arce proffer any expert testimony or the results of any medical exam opining that his symptoms are consistent with untreated compartment syndrome. An orthopedist thought that he would benefit from further testing for that condition but Arce has not shown deliberate indifference in denying the recommended two-day follow-up appointment or that the denial was “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.” View "Arce v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

After DHS reinstated prior removal orders and initiated another removal proceeding, Mejia sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to Mexico, he would face violence from the criminal gang, Union of Tepito. When Mejia initially refused to transport drugs for Tepito, the gang beat him and mocked his religion; police were nearby and ignored the beating but Mejia could not say whether they saw it. Mejia capitulated but, after a few drug deliveries, he relocated to a different area on the outskirts of Mexico City. The gang found him, hit his head with a gun, and threatened to kill him. Mejia fled to the U.S. He testified that he believed he could not relocate within Mexico because he did not know if other gangs were affiliated with Tepito and feared people would discriminate against his Mexico City accent.The IJ found Mejia credible but denied relief, finding that the gang’s prior attacks did not qualify as persecution or torture; Mejia failed to demonstrate future persecution would be likely, that his persecution was tied to membership in a qualifying social group, or that Mexican officials would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ decided that Mejia could avoid the gang by relocating within Mexico. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Mejia’s counsel had not disputed the relocation finding. View "Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Booker was convicted of first-degree murder and received a 55-year sentence of 55. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, he tried a petition for postconviction relief. At the latter stage, he was represented by Illinois Assistant Appellate Defender Reyna. Booker wanted Reyna to argue that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Reyna declined. Booker filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Booker’s pro se brief because of the state’s rule against hybrid representation.Booker then filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted, reasoning that Illinois courts did not violate any federal rule when they denied his attempt to raise the issue in a pro se supplemental brief. The court also held that Booker’s default could not be excused on actual innocence grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Booker must bear the consequences of his decision. Even if Reyna’s advice was not entirely accurate regarding his chances of success, Booker had proceeded pro se in the past and knew that he could do so again to ensure that his preferred arguments were raised, or he could hope that the court would make an exception to the rule against hybrid representation. View "Booker v. Baker" on Justia Law