Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brownsburg Community School Corporation requires its high school teachers to call all students by the names registered in the school’s official student database. Kluge, a teacher, objected on religious grounds to using the first names of transgender students to the extent that he deemed those names not consistent with their sex recorded at birth. After Brownsburg initially accommodated Kluge’s request to call all students by their last names only, the school withdrew the accommodation when it became apparent that the practice was harming students and negatively impacting the learning environment for transgender students, other students in Kluge’s classes and in the school generally, and the faculty.Kluge brought a Title VII religious discrimination and retaliation suit after he was terminated from his employment. The district court granted the school summary judgment, concluding that the school was unable to accommodate Kluge’s religious beliefs and practices without imposing an undue hardship on the school’s conduct of its business of educating all students and rejected Kluge’s retaliation claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Kluge’s accommodation harmed students and disrupted the learning environment. No reasonable jury could conclude that harm to students and disruption to the learning environment are de minimis harms to a school’s conduct of its business. View "Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Trahanas began working as a technologist in Dr. Schwulst’s laboratory at Northwestern's School of Medicine. Trahanas claims Schwulst made demeaning remarks about her work, mental health, and sexual orientation and that her lab coworkers harassed her. Trahanas did not report the incidents. Trahanas received positive performance reviews from Schwulst, who recommended Trahanas for raises and promotion.Trahanas had been diagnosed with ADHD, depression, and anxiety and decided to take time off. She did not provide advance notice. On February 16, 2015, Trahanas did not report to work. She later emailed Schwulst. Trahanas was granted 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), When her leave expired, Northwestern informed Trahanas that failure to return to work or extend her leave would result in termination. She did not extend leave or return to work. Northwestern terminated her employment.Trahanas sued, asserting a hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Trahanas’s voluntary decision not to return to work or extend leave does not amount to a tangible employment action. The court noted Northwestern’s anti-harassment policy and that Trahanas “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities” to avoid harm. Trahanas cannot show that her leave played a motivating factor in Northwestern’s decision to terminate her employment. The court also rejected state law claims. View "Trahanas v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

During the 2008 recession, Chicago faced a $150 million shortfall in revenue and sought an alternative to raising taxes. The city awarded a 75-year Concession over designated parking spaces to the private firm CPM, which agreed to give Chicago an upfront payment of more than a billion dollars. After CPM took over, the price of parking in areas covered by the Concession more than doubled. Litigation in both state and federal courts followed. A federal class action filed by “two car drivers who live in Chicago,” asserted that CPM has violated the federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the antitrust theories as barred by the state-action immunity doctrine. The Concession represents a use of municipal authority to substitute, during the term of the lease, exclusive private operation for direct city operation of specified areas of Chicago’s on-street parking facilities. It swaps one “monopolist” (Chicago) for another (CPM). Chicago had the authority to enter into the Concession and has reserved meaningful powers to oversee and regulate CPM’s performance. The court also theorized that there might not be a monopoly; Chicago cars can be found in apartment building parking garages, private residential garages, private lots, public lots, unregulated streets, and metered parking. View "Uetricht v. Chicago Parking Meters, LLC" on Justia Law

In July 2013, Koger began serving a 300-day sentence in Cook County Jail. While incarcerated, he received 42 books by mail. Per Jail policy, contained in the Inmate Information Handbook, inmates can keep no more than three books or magazines (excluding religious texts) in their cell at any time. Koger received a copy of the Handbook. Inmates with excess books can mail them out of the Jail using supplies available at the Jail commissary, can have someone outside the Jail pick up personal property, and are free to donate their books to other inmates. The policy was not strictly enforced during Koger’s stay.In October 2013, Jail administrators warned Koger they would soon search cells and take excess books. On October 5, officers searched the cells and took all but three books from Koger’s cell. Koger did not file a grievance. The Jail acknowledges the search but disputes whether any books were taken and what became of them. The Jail has no policy for dealing with confiscated books. The Jail released Koger on October 24, 2013; he died in 2020.Koger’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 has twice previously been before the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s summary judgment rejection of Koger’s claim that the county deprived him of his books without due process. Koger received constitutionally sufficient due process surrounding any property deprivation, and presented insufficient evidence to hold the county liable under “Monell.” View "Orozco v. Dart" on Justia Law

Sullivan registered copyrights for two “illustration collections,” comprising 33 individual illustrations, and sued Flora for infringing those copyrights, 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1). A jury found that Flora willfully infringed Sullivan’s copyrights and awarded statutory damages for each of the individual illustrations infringed ($3,600,000). The Seventh Circuit rejected the court's test for calculating statutory damages, which focused exclusively on how the illustrations were copyrighted. The court adopted the “independent economic value test”: “A protected work has standalone value if the evidence shows that work has distinct and discernable value to the copyright holder.” On remand, the district court denied Flora’s request to reopen discovery; held that Flora had waived arguments challenging the independent economic value of certain illustrations; granted Sullivan summary judgment; and entered the same verdict, finding that the 33 illustrations constitute separate works.The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, in entering summary judgment, the district court violated the remand mandate and improperly weighed the evidence. The case must proceed to trial on the question of damages. The scope of the remand was narrow and limited to determining whether Sullivan’s illustrations “constitute 33 individual works or instead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the two advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustrations).” At trial, Flora is not prohibited from “nitpicking” specific aspects of the 33 illustrations to show that they lack independent economic value. Flora is not permitted to relitigate the issues of infringement or joint authorship. View "Sullivan v. Flora, Inc." on Justia Law

Two California hardware stores (Craftwood) are part of the Do It Best (DIB) hardware industry cooperative and wholesaler. Generac supplies goods to DIB for purchase by hardware retailers in the cooperative. Generac had an agreement with CMI, an independent sales and marketing representative, for assistance with promotion and marketing. CMI sent out faxes to DIB-member hardware stores advertising deals on Generac products, including three sent to Craftwood.The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, forbids using “any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement” except where the recipient gave “prior express invitation or permission.” Generac cited the agreement that Craftwood signed when it joined the DIB cooperative, which refers to the provision of advertising and includes Craftwood’s fax number. Craftwood also opted to purchase advertising materials to send to its customers.The district court granted Generac summary judgment, finding that the contract between Craftwood and DIB evinced an agreement by Craftwood to receive faxes, including from vendors. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding a material dispute of fact as to consent. The court noted the need to enforce the Act as written, although fax machines are now rare, and the common view that these suits are fueled primarily by plaintiffs’ attorneys looking for large fee awards that often come at the expense of small businesses. View "Craftwood II, Inc. v. Generac Power Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, IIT, a nonprofit higher education institution, suspended all in-person instruction, moved all classes online, and restricted access to campus facilities. IIT did not refund tuition or mandatory fees to its students. Before the pandemic, IIT undergraduates were not permitted to register for an online class without special approval and were required to live on campus. Hernandez, a student who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 semester, filed a purported class action, alleging that an express or implied contract was formed under which the university promised to provide in-person instruction, services, and resources, in exchange for tuition and compulsory fees, citing Activity Fees, Student Services Fees, Professional Co-Curricular Fees, and Studio Fees. He also raised an unjust enrichment theory, based on IIT’s retention of students’ full tuition and fees.The district court dismissed, finding that Hernandez failed to identify any specific promise to provide in-person, on-campus instruction to support a breach-of-contract claim and that Hernandez failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment. While his appeal was pending, the Seventh Circuit decided "Gociman," finding that Loyola University students adequately stated claims for breach of an implied contract under Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Hernandez’s case, finding no meaningful distinctions between his case and Gociman. View "Hernandez v. Illinois Institute of Technology" on Justia Law

The primary source of incriminating information against Taylor was “Doe,” a woman with whom Taylor and his wife were intimately involved. Law enforcement presented a warrant application to an Indiana judge, seeking to search Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography and bestiality. The affidavit did not disclose that two officers involved in the investigation had been competing with Taylor for Doe’s affection. The judge signed a typed warrant that authorized the search of Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography; it did not mention bestiality. At a time unknown and under unknown circumstances, the lead detective apparently made handwritten alterations, adding “bestiality” to the warrant’s scope. When officers executed the altered warrant, they found substantial evidence that Taylor was producing and distributing child pornography. They found no evidence relating to bestiality. Taylor's motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing were denied. Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to 324 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated. An evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the judge approved the alterations before the warrant's execution. Questions surrounding those alterations are relevant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so the hearing must encompass false statements and material omissions in the affidavit and law enforcement’s subjective good faith in seeking the warrant. The affidavit did not support probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography but did support probable cause to search for evidence of crimes of bestiality. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Participating employees can contribute a portion of their salary to their Retirement Plan account and Northwestern makes a matching contribution. Employees participating in the Voluntary Savings Plan also contribute a portion of their salary, but Northwestern does not make a matching contribution. Both plans allow participants to choose the investments for their accounts from options assembled by the plans’ fiduciaries. Northwestern is the administrator and designated fiduciary of both plans. The plaintiffs sued Northwestern under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 (ERISA).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit in 2020. The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's reliance on a “categorical rule” that providing some low-cost options eliminates concerns about other investment options being imprudent. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reinstated claims that Northwestern failed to monitor and incurred excessive recordkeeping fees and failed to swap out retail shares for cheaper but otherwise identical institutional shares. The court again affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including a claim that Northwestern retained duplicative funds. View "Divane v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

In 2016, Gill ran as an independent candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. He was 2,000 signatures short of qualifying for the general election ballot. Gill sued members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, claiming that portions of the Illinois Election Code violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to evaluate the ballot access provisions for independent candidates under the fact-intensive balancing test set forth in Supreme Court precedent. The district court did so and again granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot. While the litigation was pending, Illinois adopted a redistricting plan that changed the boundaries of the 13th District so that the suit can no longer offer Gill any effectual relief. Any declaratory or injunctive relief would speak to a congressional district that no longer exists. Gill’s circumstances are not capable of repetition yet evading review. View "Gill v. Linnabary" on Justia Law