Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lumar caused a disturbance at a Chicago clinic. Called to the scene, police discovered that Lumar was wanted on an arrest warrant and took him into custody. About 19 hours later he committed suicide. His estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 argued that Lumar should have been released without a bond hearing, and, had he been released swiftly, Lumar would not have killed himself.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. While the warrant set bond at an amount Lumar could have posted, it had been issued in Lee County, so a local order required a local bond hearing. Even if the order is inconsistent with state law, in denying arrestees the right to waive local bond hearings, a violation of state law does not permit an award under section 1983. Federal law does not prohibit presenting the arrestee to a local judge, within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours. The time Lumar spent in custody, including six hours in a hospital to address breathing problems, and the discovery of 12 rocks of crack cocaine in his cell and ensuing return to the Police Department, was reasonable under the standard set by the Supreme Court. Lumar was screened for suicide risk shortly after his arrest and again at the hospital. Illinois law offers a remedy for suicide during custody only if the jailers do something that makes suicide foreseeable. View "Alcorn v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Venequip, a Venezuelan heavy-equipment supplier, sold and serviced products made by Illinois-based Caterpillar. Venequip’s dealership was governed by sales and service agreements with CAT Sàrl, Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary. In 2019 CAT Sàrl terminated the dealership. The contracts contain clauses that direct all disputes to Swiss courts for resolution under Swiss law. In 2021 Venequip brought contract claims against CAT Sàrl in Geneva, Switzerland. Venequip filed applications across the United States seeking discovery from Caterpillar and its employees, dealers, and customers under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes (but does not require) district courts to order any person who resides or is found in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Venequip’s Northern District of Illinois application sought wide-ranging discovery from Caterpillar.Ruling on Venequip’s application, the district judge addressed four factors identified by the Supreme Court (Intel) that generally concern the applicant’s need for discovery, the intrusiveness of the request, and comity considerations, and added the parties’ contractual choice of forum and law and Caterpillar’s agreement to provide discovery in the Swiss court, then denied the application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeal was not mooted by intervening developments in the Swiss court. The judge appropriately weighed the Intel factors and other permissible considerations. View "Venequip, S.A. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

Willow purchased a house that needed repairs. Bids for the work exceeded $100,000. Renovations began in 2017 but soon halted. After several years passed, with the house remaining empty, the Village proposed its demolition as a nuisance. The Village published notice, posted notices on the house, and mailed notice to Willow, which concedes having actual knowledge of the impending demolition. Willow did not respond until the week scheduled for the demolition when its lawyer proposed a meeting. The parcel was sold at auction to satisfy the Village’s lien for demolition expenses.Willow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming a taking without compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Village. Demolition of a dilapidated structure that constitutes a public nuisance is not problematic under the Due Process Clause and does not require compensation. The protection that the federal Constitution offers to property owners is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Village gave such a notice to Willow, which did not ask for a hearing. Illinois law offers procedures that are constitutionally adequate; someone wanting to stop a demolition need only file suit in state court, which automatically blocks action until the judge decides whether the building meets the statutory criteria for demolition. The district court was not required to decide a state law inverse-condemnation claim. View "Willow Way, LLC v. Village of Lyons, Illinois" on Justia Law

NCR's customer engineers (CEs) service NCR devices in the field, working remotely. NCR instructed CEs to work only during their official shifts, prohibited off-the-clock work, and required CEs to record their time in an electronic system. If a CE worked overtime—contrary to NCR guidance—the CE would be paid for the time only if she recorded it. Meadows worked as a CE from 2008-2019; when he recorded unauthorized overtime, he was paid for that time. When he did not record that time, he was not compensated.Meadows sued NCR under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, seeking compensation for his unrecorded overtime work. The district court held that Meadows’s off-the-clock activities were not part of his core responsibilities but were incidental. Under the FLSA, employers are required to compensate an employee’s performance of all principal activities but not incidental activities unless an exception applies, including if the employer elected to do so by contract or custom. The court stated that NCR could not escape liability by imposing a recording requirement on its custom of paying for incidental activities because NCR had constructive knowledge of those activities.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The FLSA does not mandate overtime pay for the performance of incidental activities—which an employer has chosen to remunerate by custom or practice—if the employee failed to comply with requirements for payment imposed by that custom or practice. View "Meadows v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. View "McMullen v. Dalton" on Justia Law

In 2016, Nerio and her minor daughter sought admission to the U.S. without the required authorization. They applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on Nerio’s fear that her partner’s nephew, Walter, would harm them if they returned. Nerio testified that she and her partner, Yuny, have been together for 10 years. Around a year after they met, Nerio became pregnant. Yuny left Guatemala in 2009, but Nerio continued living with, and later near, Yuny’s family. Walter considered her as his “inferior” based on Nerio’s indigenous heritage, refusing to treat her as family. She further testified that around 2015, Walter began trying to physically harm her. Twice that year, he tried to hit her with his motorcycle. In February 2016, he shot at her with a rifle. Nerio obtained a protective order but did not press criminal charges because of family pressure.The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief, finding that substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s determination that Nerio failed to establish that the Guatemalan government is unable or unwilling to protect her. The IJ reasonably weighed the generalized country conditions report against Nerio’s specific testimony. View "Nerio Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Current and former policyholders filed a class action lawsuit in Illinois against Country Mutual and 46 of its current and former officers and directors. Every member of the proposed class is an Illinois citizen under the Class Action Fairness Act, CAFA, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), as are Country Mutual and 45 of the individuals. The 46th defendant, Bateman, is a citizen of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the firm accumulated and retained excess surplus of over $3.5 billion from premium revenues exceeding the cost of claims and thereby failed to supply those policies at cost. They claimed breach of contract, violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.Based on putative class size, the amount in controversy, and the minimal diversity created by Bateman, Country Mutual removed this case to federal district court, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); 1453(b). The Seventh Circuit remanded to state court. Under CAFA’s internal affairs exception, each claim sounds in allegations of corporate mismanagement that cannot be adjudicated without immersion into the boundaries of the discretion afforded by Illinois law to officers and directors of a mutual insurance company to set capital levels and make related decisions about surplus distributions to policyholder members. The case is also within CAFA’s home-state controversy exception, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4)(B), as Bateman, who creates minimal diversity, is not a “primary defendant.” View "Sudholt v. Country Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Salem received a license to practice law in New York. He applied for but was denied a license to practice in Illinois, where he resides, but maintained an Illinois practice, from 2004-2019, by obtaining permission to appear pro hac vice. The Illinois Attorney Disciplinary and Registration Commission (IARDC) charged him with falsely representing that he was licensed in Illinois and successfully requested that the Illinois Supreme Court prohibit Illinois courts from allowing him to appear pro hac vice for 90 days. Salem filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Salem’s suit and ordered him to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court first rejected Salem’s argument that every Illinois district judge should be disqualified and the case transferred to Michigan. The court then held that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court cannot be collaterally attacked in civil litigation. The court noted that the defendant, the IARDC, did not deprive Salem of liberty or property and that there was a rational basis for the Supreme Court’s decision. The court described the litigation as frivolous and noted Salem’s history of “preposterous” behavior in federal court. View "Salem v. Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipinary Commission" on Justia Law

The 2019 Illinois Cannabis Regulation Act legalized the recreational use of cannabis and established a licensing system for cannabis dispensaries. Applications for the first licenses closed in 2020; by mid-2021 the Department had allocated 185 licenses using a lottery procedure. The issuance of licenses was stayed during state-court litigation. For a second group of licenses in 2022, the Department established a point system that heavily favored longtime Illinois residents. The plaintiffs want to invest in Illinois cannabis dispensaries but neither lived in Illinois.In March 2022, they filed suit raising a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the residency provisions and sought a preliminary injunction halting the completion of the allocated 2021 licenses and enjoining the ongoing process for 2022 licenses. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The denial of a preliminary injunction allowed the Department to issue the 2021 licenses; it did so, largely mooting the appeal. To the extent that unwinding the licenses remains possible, the judge weighed the equities and held that the plaintiffs waited too long to challenge the residency provisions; an injunction would severely harm reliance interests and disrupt the orderly completion of the first-round licensing process. At the time of the ruling, the Department had not finalized the criteria for the second group but a challenge was unripe because the Department might materially modify the criteria. The Department subsequently finalized the 2022 rules and deleted provisions favoring Illinois residents. View "Finch v. Treto" on Justia Law