Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maranto pled guilty to distribution of child pornography. In 2014, after his release from prison, Maranto began serving his lifetime term of supervised release in Wisconsin. Maranto subsequently committed a new crime, possession of child pornography, for which he was convicted in state court. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Wisconsin conviction violated a condition of his federal supervised release, as did possession of an unapproved cell phone and of child pornography. The district court revoked his probation, then sentenced Maranto to 14 months in prison, concurrent with his state court sentence, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Maranto objected to two discretionary conditions of supervised release. Condition 13 requires that Maranto provide “all requested financial information, including copies of state and federal tax returns.” Condition 19 requires that Maranto, “[a]s approved by the supervising U.S. Probation Officer, undergo psychosexual evaluations which may involve use of polygraph examinations.” The judge cited the requirement to report place of employment under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20901, and Maranto’s history.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although there are other ways to monitor Maranto’s employment and SORNA compliance, tax returns are helpful information, and are not difficult to produce. The district court gave thoughtful consideration to the benefits and detriments of polygraph testing and noted its usefulness with sex offenders in general and with Maranto in particular. View "United States v. Maranto" on Justia Law

Erlinger pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was given an enhanced 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his 1991 Illinois conviction for residential burglary, 1991 Indiana conviction for burglary, and two 2003 Indiana convictions for dealing in methamphetamine. The court vacated Erlinger’s sentence after the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois residential burglary is not a violent felony and Indiana methamphetamine convictions are not serious drug offenses under ACCA. The government argued that Erlinger still qualified for an ACCA enhancement, citing other 1991 Indiana burglary convictions. The government supplied the plea and charging documents; each charged a different burglary at a different business, three on different dates within a week. Erlinger argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary is broader than the federal definition and does not trigger ACCA and these burglaries were not committed on separate occasions as ACCA requires, and a jury, not the judge, must make that factual determination.The district court imposed an ACCA-enhanced 15-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana statute does not include language the Supreme Court deems overly broad. Erlinger has not cited any Indiana cases that interpret the statute in this manner. The government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions. View "United States v. Erlinger" on Justia Law

FSSolutions faxed Dr. Thalman several times to ask him to join its network of preferred medical providers and administer various employment screening and testing services to its clients. Thalman declined the invitation and instead invoked the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), to sue FSSolutions for sending him unsolicited advertisements. The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that the faxes were not “unsolicited advertisements” within the meaning of the TCPA because they merely asked to purchase Thalman’s own services rather than inviting him to buy something from FSSolutions.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While a fax must directly or indirectly encourage recipients to buy goods, services, or property to qualify as an unsolicited advertisement, Thalman plausibly alleged that FSSolutions’s faxes did just that by promoting the company’s network of preferred medical providers, a network that would bring Thalman new business in exchange for a portion of the underlying client fees. “[M]indful that many plaintiffs’ attorneys view the TCPA opportunistically, the court cautioned against overreading its opinion, which applies to unsolicited faxes that an objective recipient would construe as urging the purchase of a good, service, or property by emphasizing its availability or desirability. View "Smith v. First Hospital Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Castaneda was arrested for his role in a large-scale heroin conspiracy. Once released on bond, Castaneda fled and lived as a fugitive in Mexico for more than 20 years. He returned to the United States in 2019 and was rearrested for his 1997 offense. Castaneda entered guilty pleas to attempt to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin, and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. Penalties for both charges included a statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Castaneda qualified for the “safety valve”—under which a court is obligated to impose a sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to any statutory minimums, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Safety valve relief is available if five requirements are met.The court sentenced Castaneda to 12 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court applied an incorrect guideline range and failed to provide any explanation for its rejection of Castaneda’s principal mitigation argument. The court appears not to have understood that if the safety valve applied, it was required to sentence Castaneda without regard to the mandatory minimum. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Police responded to a 911 call from a gas station, and discovered Gamez, on probation for a robbery conviction, in possession of a Winchester rifle. Eight days earlier Gamez had removed his GPS-tracking ankle bracelet; a LaPorte County Community Corrections officer had filed charges for escape. Gamez pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought the 15-year minimum sentence mandated by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) for section 922(g)(1) offenders with three previous convictions “for a violent felony.” Gamez had three prior Indiana state convictions—two for robbery (2009, 2016) and one for aiding and abetting arson (2011)—and never disputed that his robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. He argued that Indiana’s arson statute covered too broad a range of conduct to be considered a “violent felony.” The district court imposed the enhancement.The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court the question: whether Indiana arson requires a fire or burning. By its terms, the state’s criminal code does not require fire or burning as an element of arson but there are indications that Indiana state courts have interpreted and applied the arson statute to require proof of burning to sustain an arson conviction. The issue has not been addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court. The state’s choice to charge Gamez as an aider-and-abettor of arson and not a principal does not independently preclude the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Gamez" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Lee carried out a scheme to defraud the Chicago White Sox. With the help of two Sox employees, Lee obtained thousands of discounted and free game tickets and resold them online for a profit. He was eventually convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The indictment expressly sought forfeiture of Lee’s ill-gotten gains and Lee did not object to that request. The parties disagreed on the amount. The court failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture specifying what would be due and what property was subject to forfeiture (Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)) but did everything else necessary for forfeiture, including giving Lee notice and an opportunity to contest the amount the government was seeking and orally imposing forfeiture in the sentence, along with an 18-month prison term, restitution, and the required special assessment. The written judgment, however, omitted forfeiture. After some additional proceedings, the court concluded that it was too late to enter a proper forfeiture order, and refused to amend the written judgment to reflect its oral sentenceThe Seventh Circuit rejected Lee’s challenges to the indictment, the court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, and his sentence but reversed and remanded for the district court to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to include forfeiture in the amount the court found–$455,229.23. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Hoops, which owned an NBA franchise sought a $10.7 million tax deduction for deferred compensation that it owed to two of its players at the close of the 2012 tax year, based on their performance during previous seasons. Under 26 U.S.C. 404(a)(5), an accrual-based taxpayer like Hoops can only deduct deferred compensation expenses in the tax years when it pays its employees or contributes to certain qualified plans, such as a trust or pension fund. Hoops did not do either. In 2012 the firm sold substantially all its assets and liabilities. As part of the transaction, the buyer assumed Hoops’s $10.7 million deferred compensation liability. Hoops viewed this $10.7 million amount as a deemed payment to the buyer to compensate it for assuming the deferred compensation obligation and took a tax deduction, claiming the buyer’s assumption of the $10.7 million liability as an ordinary business expense deductible at the time of sale.The IRS denied the deduction. The Tax Court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 404(a)(5) barred Hoops from claiming a deduction for deferred compensation in the 2012 tax year because the firm did not pay the employees during that year; the statute precluded Hoops from taking the deduction until the players were paid. View "Hoops, LP v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Schmutzler, the owner and president of Jadair, was a pilot with decades of experience. Schmutzler applied to American National for an insurance policy on its Cessna airplane in 2019. The application listed Schmutzler as the Cessna’s only authorized pilot; Schmutzler indicated that he was a licensed pilot with an FAA medical certificate. The application included “Minimum Pilot Requirements,” which stated that “there is no coverage in flight unless the aircraft is being operated by the pilot(s) designated on this document who has/have at least the certificates, ratings, and pilot experience indicated, and who … is/are properly qualified for the flight involved.” Schmutzler initialed this provision. The Cessna crashed in May 2020, killing Schmutzler, who was piloting the plane. The crash was caused by a mechanical failure.American National denied coverage because Schmutzler did not have a current and valid FAA medical certificate at the time of the accident; his previous certificate had expired. The district court granted American National summary and declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The policy unambiguously excludes coverage for any accident involving the Cessna where the pilot lacks a current FAA medical certificate. That requirement is an exclusion of coverage, not a failed condition of coverage. View "Jadair International, Inc. v. American National Property & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Malhotra subleased a room in a fraternity house while attending the University of Illinois in 2021. The University prohibited students from permitting underage drinking in their residences. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the University then restricted the number of people who could attend social gatherings. According to Malhotra, days after he moved in, the other residents threw a party. Malhotra was not involved in planning or hosting the party. During the event, Malhotra was wearing noise-canceling headphones and studying in his room when his roommate alerted him to loud noises. Malhotra discovered a large group of people partying, including a young woman who was visibly intoxicated. The party ended when officers arrived at the house.The University charged Malhotra and the other residents with violating the University’s code of conduct. Malhotra met with the University’s Assistant Dean of Students and subsequently appeared at a hearing before the “Subcommittee on Undergraduate Student Conduct,” which found Malhotra guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Dean Die explained that Malhotra had been held responsible because he was a signatory on the fraternity house’s lease. Malhotra, however, had not signed the lease; he had merely subleased a room. He appealed, attaching the lease as evidence. The suspension was upheld. Malhotra filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Malhotra did not allege a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest as required under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Malhotra v. University of Illinois at Urbana" on Justia Law