Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officers used a confidential source (CS) for two controlled methamphetamine buys from Deeren. The CS met Deeren at a gas station and went to 3243 Brouse Avenue in Dereen's car. The CS handed Deeren cash; Deeren entered the house. Minutes later, Deeren returned and handed the CS meth. The two returned to the gas station, where the CS gave the meth to an undercover officer. Deeren used a different car each time. Officers obtained a warrant to search the residence and any vehicles on its premises. Days later, they arranged another controlled buy and observed Miles using a key to enter the residence. When Deeren and the CS arrived, Deeren approached Miles on the front porch. Officers arrested both men and executed the warrant. After waiving his Miranda rights, Miles admitted to living at the house and owning two vehicles on the premises (not those used during the controlled buys). The officers found 107.3 grams of meth inside a vehicle, 160.5 grams of meth in the house, 124 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, two rifles, and drug distribution paraphernalia.Miles, charged with possession with intent to distribute meth and a mixture containing cocaine and knowing possession of two firearms, argued that the warrant did not establish probable cause and was not sufficiently particular. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress but vacated Miles’s 240-month sentence, remanding for the purpose of vacating one of his firearm sentences and merging his two firearm convictions. View "United States v. Miles" on Justia Law

In 2010, Sweatt pleaded guilty to five counts of armed bank robbery. The district court ordered him to pay $20,038.52 under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A–3664. In the “Payment Schedule,” the court selected “immediately.” Sweatt declined to participate in the Bureau’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, through which the Bureau allocates portions of prisoners’ incomes to their restitution debts. In 2023, the district court authorized the Bureau of Prisons to turn over $600 of $1,100 in Sweatt’s prison trust account to be applied toward his restitution debt. Sweatt then had hip replacement surgery, preventing him from working for about 18 months.Sweatt moved to modify his judgment to halt his restitution payments until he resumes working; 18 U.S.C. 3664(k) provides that once a court receives notification of “any material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay restitution,” the court may “adjust the payment schedule.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of his motion. Sweatt did not ask to alter the fact or amount of restitution or to usurp the Bureau’s exclusive authority to impose a pre-release payment plan. The government assumed that Sweatt was trying to alter his obligations under a Program agreement with the Bureau but no such agreement existed. Generally, district courts lack jurisdiction to modify a sentence, but they can do so when authorized by statute; section 3664(k) permits the court to modify the restitution schedule. View "United States v. Sweatt" on Justia Law

Johnson, a Wisconsin company, merged with Tyco, an Irish company. The combined entity, Johnson International, is domiciled in Ireland. The merger's terms were disclosed in a joint proxy statement/prospectus filed with the SEC, along with the opinions of financial advisors that the merger was overall “fair.” The statement stated that the market price of the shares would fluctuate. Each share of Johnson’s common stock would be, at the election of the shareholder, either converted into an ordinary share of International or cashed out; either would be a taxable transaction. Johnson shareholders were expected to own approximately 56% of International to prevent triggering 26 U.S.C. 7874: when a domestic corporation is acquired by a foreign entity, but its former shareholders retain at least 60% of the stock, the expatriated entity must pay “inversion gain” taxes. The Treasury Department had announced proposed regulations that affected how Johnson’s equity would be calculated, eliminating the tax benefits of the “reverse merger.” The proxy statement warned that if those regulations were finalized, the tax benefits would not be realized. Johnson shareholders voted in favor of the merger.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and wrongfully structured the merger as taxable for Johnson’s former shareholders. “Although plaintiffs allege that they are not challenging the business and financial merits of the merger, their arguments boil down to a demand for a better deal;” they failed to allege any materially misleading statements or omissions. View "Smykla v. Molinaroli" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116 (effective January 2023) and three municipal laws regulate assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Act, which makes it unlawful for any person within Illinois knowingly to “manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase … an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge,” without reaching Second Amendment issues. The Act includes exceptions for “trained professionals” and “grandfathered individuals.”The Seventh Circuit upheld denials of injunctions, concluding that the state and the municipalities have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. There is a long tradition, unchanged from when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution, supporting a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use. The Act respects and relies on that distinction. “From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The fact that many people own assault weapons does not insulate them from regulation. View "Herrera v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Pemberton sold methamphetamine to an undercover informant and pleaded guilty to distributing drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Ordinarily, distributing the quantity of drugs Pemberton admitted to distributing carries a 10-year minimum sentence. The district court ruled that his 2003 conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery under Indiana law was a “serious violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(2)(F), subjecting him to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Although Pemberton had not agreed that his co-participant would carry a weapon, and his co-participant was never convicted, the court reasoned that the facts of his crime included a dangerous weapon that caused serious harm (his coconspirator fired a gun during the robbery, hitting a bystander), and his plea of guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery precluded him from denying his involvement in a conspiracy.On appeal. Pemberton argued that Indiana’s crime of conspiracy is not a categorical match to the federal conspiracy counterpart of section 3559(c)(2)(F) and not a “serious violent felony” meriting the enhanced minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pemberton raised his argument for the first time on appeal and therefore forfeited it. He has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred when it determined his prior conviction was a serious violent felony, View "United States v. Pemberton" on Justia Law

Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to four counts under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); (b)(1)(B), based on his role in a large-scale methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. The government portrayed Williams as a major supplier to other dealers and individual users, asserting that he was responsible for the distribution of more than 48 kilograms (105 pounds) of methamphetamine over the course of the conspiracy. The government’s investigation linked three deaths to methamphetamine supplied by Williams. Laboratory testing of different batches of drugs supplied by Williams and confiscated by law enforcement indicated that the tested drugs were between 96 to 100% pure methamphetamine. Ten people who purchased significant quantities of methamphetamine from Williams testified at his sentencing hearing about the quantities of drugs they bought from him. Several also testified about threats he made to them to induce payment and about his possession and use of firearms. Officers had also orchestrated a controlled buy with audio and visual recording in which Williams’ associate provided the source with approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine.After calculating a U.S.S.G. range of 360 months to life range, the court imposed a 360-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning sentence disparities and the application of the enhancement for credible threats of violence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Shelbyville Post Office is the closest one to Ellison’s home and the largest in that area of Indiana. Ellison keeps a P.O. box at Shelbyville or her non-profit organization, which educates the public about accessibility for people with disabilities. Ellison cannot enter the Shelbyville Post Office because it has only one customer entrance: at the top of its front steps. Ellison can ask for help from the loading dock or from a van-accessible parking space, use the Postal Service’s website, or visit wheelchair-accessible locations in surrounding towns. After multiple complaints about the inconvenience of those options, the City of Shelbyville offered to pay for a ramp at the front entrance. The Postal Service declined, citing a policy of refusing donations for exterior physical improvements.In a suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), the district court entered summary judgment, concluding that Ellison could meaningfully access the program through its website and three wheelchair-accessible locations within a 15-minute drive of her home. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of whether Ellison’s proposed accommodation (a ramp) is reasonable. The Shelbyville Post Office does not provide a significant level of access, and the alternative locations are further away and open for fewer hours than Shelbyville. View "Ellison v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

Vidal-Martinez, a non-citizen, was arrested three times for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. DHS detained him and initiated deportation. Vidal-Martinez filed a habeas petition, arguing that his detention was unconstitutional because it impeded his ability to defend himself against the drunk-driving charges. ICE transferred Vidal-Martinez to county custody “until the completion of [the] criminal matter, then released to his ICE detainer.” Vidal-Martinez was convicted of DUI and sentenced to 236 days in jail. He was then returned to ICE custody. Due to a lack of evidence that he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, the district court granted Vidal-Martinez’s habeas petition and ordered his release.Vidal-Martinez filed a FOIA request, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure from ICE of documents related to his custody transfer. ICE produced 561 pages of responsive documents, some of which contained redactions. Vidal-Martinez challenged ICE’s redactions. ICE submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration from its FOIA officer explaining the legal justification for each redaction, citing attorney-client, work product, deliberative process privileges, and identifying information of government employees. Vidal-Martinez responded that ICE committed criminal conduct by transferring him to Indiana, so the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied. The district court granted ICE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no factual foundation in the record for criminal conduct or misconduct by ICE. The district court had an adequate factual basis to evaluate ICE’s withholdings. View "Vidal-Martinez v. United States Department Of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Pacilio and Bases were senior traders on the precious metals trading desk at Bank of America. While working together in 2010-2011, and at times separately before and after that period, they engaged in “spoofing” to manipulate the prices of precious metals using an electronic trading platform, that allows traders to place buy or sell orders on certain numbers of futures contracts at a set price. It is assumed that every order is bona fide and placed with “intent to transact.” Spoofing consists of placing a (typically) large order, on one side of the market with intent to trade, and placing a spoof order, fully visible but not intended to be traded, on the other side. The spoof order pushes the market price to benefit the other order, allowing the trader to get the desired price. The spoof order is canceled before it can be filled.Pacilio and Bases challenged the constitutionality of their convictions for wire fraud affecting a financial institution and related charges, the sufficiency of the evidence, and evidentiary rulings relating to testimony about the Exchange’s and bank prohibitions on spoofing to support the government’s implied misrepresentation theory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants had sufficient notice that their spoofing scheme was prohibited by law. View "United States v. Bases" on Justia Law