Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indiana law allows 13 categories of voters, including “elderly” voters—those 65 or older--to vote by mail. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order for the November general election. Indiana voters who were allowed to vote absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for absentee voting, unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting, citing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Weeks before the 2020 general election, the Seventh Circuit (Tully I) affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that the right to vote does not include a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.Returning to the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court concluded that Tully I constituted controlling authority. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. Given the circumstances under which Tully I was issued, that decision does not constitute the law of the case and is not binding. Considering the merits anew, the court held that Indiana’s granting the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not abridge the right to vote of those under 65 and does not violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. View "Tully v. Okeson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Coleman was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Coleman was sentenced to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment based on having at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense,” section 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Coleman’s pro se motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserted that his appointed counsel, Vaupel, was ineffective for failing to inform him of the government’s pretrial 21 U.S.C. 851 Notice of Enhancement, indicating its intention to seek life imprisonment based on his prior Illinois cocaine-related convictions. According to Coleman, had Vaupel shown him this notice, he never would have agreed to go to trial. Vaupel responded that he had repeatedly informed Coleman that he faced a mandatory life sentence and that the government was unwilling to waive the enhancement. Coleman moved to amend his petition to argue that Vaupel was ineffective by failing to argue that Coleman’s convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” because Illinois defined “cocaine” more broadly than federal law. The district court denied Coleman’s section 2255 motion, and his motion to amend as not relating back to his initial pleading and untimely.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court must determine whether Vaupel considered a possible categorical challenge to Coleman’s predicate offenses and, if he did consider it, his reasons for not raising it. Coleman has established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s purportedly deficient performance. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

Burns, working as a truck driver for a transportation company, made a delivery to the Bolingbrook, Illinois Sherwin-Williams store. Burns and a store employee used the company’s walkie—a hand-operated electric forklift—to move pallets holding the products from Burns’s truck, up a small ramp, and into the store’s warehouse. When they finished unloading, Burns backed the walkie down the ramp in reverse to return the empty pallets to his truck. He moved in the direction of a dumpster and other pallets that were on the ground beside it. Burns miscalculated how long it would take to stop the walkie as he approached the pallets, trapped his foot, and broke his ankle.Burns sued Sherwin-Williams, alleging that the company failed to exercise ordinary care by leaving the empty pallets in the work area and providing an unsafe walkie. The district court granted Sherwin-Williams summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law, Sherwin-Williams owed no duty to Burns. The discarded pallets were an open and obvious condition. The court declined to apply the doctrine’s deliberate encounter exception: “Where the possessor of land has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because, to a reasonable man in his position, the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.” The court upheld the exclusion of expert testimony that the walkie was unsafe as unreliable under Rule 702. View "Burns v. Sherwin-Williams Co." on Justia Law

Chaitoff sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, alleging that Experian made a mistake when it omitted a fact from his credit report, then failed to correct its error. Chaitoff had signed an agreement with his mortgage lender that allowed him to make lower payments and avoid foreclosure. Rather than report the agreement, Chaitoff’s credit report said that he was delinquent. The district court granted Experian summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the omission of material information is actionable under the FCRA; reporting the existence of the agreement did not involve the application of law to facts. Experian’s initial reporting efforts were reasonable but, concerning Experian’s investigations after Chaitoff alerted it to the discrepancy, a reasonable jury could find that there was a cost-effective step Experian could have taken that would have discovered the agreement’s existence. Experian failed to note Chaitoff’s dispute in later reports, as the FCRA requires. View "Chaitoff v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

ShotSpotter devices alerted to possible gunshots on Chicago’s west side. Police officers began monitoring the area, using remote-controlled cameras, which had been positioned in high-crime locations. They saw a large group congregating on that block and a man handing a gun to Alexander. Alexander held the gun openly for several seconds before concealing it in his waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off went to the scene. When they arrived, Alexander turned away and stepped behind another man, then pushed against a fence that was blocking his way. Soon his arms were grabbed by the officers, who handcuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in Alexander’s waistband and retrieved a loaded gun. Alexander was charged with possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Because it was not obvious at which point Alexander was arrested, the court employed the probable cause standard. Probable cause exists when an objectively reasonable officer—with the same information known by the arresting officer—would believe there is a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. Even if the officers did not know that Alexander had a felony conviction or lacked a concealed-carry license, they had probable cause to believe that he violated the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act. Objectively reasonable officers could infer criminal activity from their knowledge that he possessed a gun and his furtive movements. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Gunter and Grommet participated in a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, including a controlled purchase of actual methamphetamine from Gunter by law enforcement agents. A September 17, 2019 indictment charged Gunter and Grommet of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gunter was arrested on July 2, 2020. The court set an initial trial date of August 31, 2020. Over the next 23 months, the trial was repeatedly rescheduled. Gunter first requested continuances; later continuances were at the request of Grommet, who was evaluated for competency and whose lawyer subsequently died. When Gunter eventually (unsuccessfully) sought severance, he did not cite Speedy Trial Grounds.Days before trial, Gunter unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gunter’s conviction after considering the length of and reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice the defendant suffered. Although Gunter first moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his right to a speedy trial immediately before trial, he opposed motions for continuances and asserted his desire for a speedy trial numerous times. The delays could not be attributed to the government. Gunter made no argument that he experienced any prejudice from the delay, and no strong showing of prejudice is obvious in the record. View "United States v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Hoping to minimize her risk of suffering serious complications from future blood clots, Johnson underwent surgery to implant a retrievable intravascular filter–a medical device that is placed in the inferior vena cava to prevent blood clots that develop in the lower body from flowing into the heart and lungs. Johnson’s doctor selected the Meridian filter, which was supposed to be temporary and easily removable. Johnson’s filter migrated and fractured, leaving shards embedded in the wall of her heart and elsewhere. Her surgeon was unable to remove the device safely and fully. As a result, Johnson faces an ongoing risk of infection, pain, and other complications.Johnson sued the manufacturers of the Meridian filter (Bard), claiming that they defectively designed the Meridian filter and failed to warn medical providers about the device’s risks, in violation of Wisconsin law. A jury rejected most of Johnson’s theories but returned a $3.3 million verdict in her favor on her strict liability failure-to-warn count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that its decision “should not be misinterpreted as our endorsement of some of Johnson’s counsel’s trial tactics.” There was no reversible error in instructing the jury or in permitting certain testimony, in alleged violation of expert witness disclosure requirements. View "Johnson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Unifund purchased Choice's defaulted consumer debt and hired the Kohn Law Firm, which sued Choice in state court on behalf of Unifund, seeking judgment in the amount of the debt plus “statutory attorney fees.” An attached affidavit by Unifund’s agent indicated that the company was not seeking additional amounts after the charge-off date, including attorney’s fees. Choice believed that because the affidavit contradicted the complaint's request for judgment, one of the statements was false; he claimed that no applicable statute permitted the recovery of such attorney’s fees.Choice sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging injury from the receipt of false, misleading, and deceptive communications. Choice alleged “he hired an attorney to help him ascertain the amount of the alleged debt owed, whether attorney fees could be imposed, and in what amount” and paid an appearance fee to a lawyer in the state court action. Despite his allegation that, but for the statements, he would have paid or settled the debt, during discovery Choice denied owing any debt. He later said he lost sleep due to concern over the extent of his liability.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Choice did not establish Article III standing; neither confusion, lost sleep, nor hiring a lawyer are concrete harms. Choice admitted in discovery that he did not suffer any actual damages. View "Choice v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C." on Justia Law

The defendants each licensed computer code from Live Face for $328. Live Face then sued them for copyright infringement, seeking about $483,000 in damages. Live Face has roughly 200 copyright suits pending. After more than five years, with summary judgment pending, Live Face successfully moved to dismiss its suit with prejudice. It argued that a 2021 Supreme Court case (Google) made the defendants’ fair-use defense insurmountable. The defendants sought fees; the district court denied the motion, finding that the defendants did not prevail because of their defenses but rather due to a fortuitous, unforeseen change in the law.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Copyright Act authorizes prevailing parties to recover costs and fees, 17 U.S.C. 505. Four nonexclusive factors are relevant: the frivolousness of the suit; the losing party’s motivation for bringing or defending against a suit; the objective unreasonableness of the claims advanced by the losing party; and the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. The defendants did prevail because of their defenses, including their fair-use defense. No matter which side prevailed in Google, the law would favor one of these parties. It is unclear whether Google changed anything relevant here, without a proper analysis of how Google affected Live Face’s claims. Even if Google did change something fundamental, the defendants raised defenses apart from fair use, which might have defeated Live Face’s claims. View "Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Society of Illinois, Inc." on Justia Law