Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cothron works at an Illinois White Castle restaurant where she must scan her fingerprint to access the computer system. With each scan, her fingerprint is collected and transmitted to a third-party vendor for authentication. Cothron alleges that White Castle did not obtain her written consent before implementing the fingerprint-scanning system, violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, arguing that every unauthorized fingerprint scan amounted to a separate violation of the statute, so a new claim accrued with each scan. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which responded that claims accrue each time a private entity scans a person’s biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, not only upon the first scan and first transmission.The Seventh Circuit then lifted a stay and affirmed the denial of White Castle’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court rejected White Castle’s request to expand the interlocutory appeal to include new questions concerning the scope of a possible damages award and Due Process and Excessive Fines Clause claims. The order before the court concerned only the timeliness of Cothron’s suit. View "Latrina Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc." on Justia Law

FBI agents executing a search warrant at Kamkarian’s home seized computers, containing 12 videos and more than 46,000 images of child pornography. Kamkarian was released on bond and was required to participate in mental health treatment. Kamkarian attended counseling but refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Kamkarian mentioned the possibility of suicide and was admitted to a hospital. During that hospital stay, Kamkarian was transported to court, Kamkarian, under oath, proceeded with a plea colloquy. The court confirmed that Kamkarian could read, write, and understand English; was able to think clearly and understand the proceedings; was fully satisfied with his counsel’s advice; had not been forced to plead guilty; and was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. The court accepted his plea.With new counsel, Kamkarian moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that at the time he pled guilty, he was receiving in-patient treatment for depression. He was granted a psychological evaluation but denied an interpreter. A forensic psychologist interviewed Kamkarian, reviewed his treatment records, and opined that Kamkarian had Major Depressive Disorder that did not render him incompetent to plead guilty and that he had no difficulty communicating in English. The district judge denied his motion, explaining that she recalled Kamkarian’s hearing and that he had not appeared distressed, confused, or under duress. She discredited his testimony and sentenced Kamkarian to 87 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous; the court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kamkarian" on Justia Law

Midvale created an “instant quote” feature on their websites. Anyone who supplied basic identifying information could receive a quote for auto insurance. Each site would auto-fill some information, including the number of the applicant’s driver’s license. Anyone could enter a stranger’s name and home address, which caused the form to disclose the number of the stranger’s driver’s license. Midvale discontinued the autofill feature after observing unusual activity suggesting misuse, and notified people whose information had been disclosed improperly. Three people who received Midvale’s notice filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721–25.The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, having failed to show a concrete injury traceable to the disclosure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that whether the Act applies at all is questionable. Its principal rule is directed to state officials rather than private actors. A driver’s-license number is not potentially embarrassing or an intrusion on seclusion. It is a neutral fact derived from public records, a fact legitimately known to many private actors and freely revealed to banks, insurers, hotels, and others. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Midvale’s disclosure of their numbers caused them any injury, and the disclosure of a number in common use by both public and private actors does not correspond to any tort. View "Baysal v. Midvale Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Long was arrested for domestic battery. Police discovered a stolen firearm in his waistband and cocaine in plain view. Long pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. His guideline range was 33-41 months. The court explained it intended to impose a 51-month sentence, followed by three years of supervised release with conditions of drug testing and treatment. The court noted that Long had four felony convictions and several other convictions and that the guideline calculation understated his criminal history. Long’s history of domestic violence, was “very concerning” and Long had been “afforded the opportunity for rehabilitation by probation, parole, supervision, community corrections, jail sentences, and even a prison sentence.” The court noted that Long admitted he was addicted to drugs and requested treatment, that Long owed approximately $80,000 in child support and had limited employment history, then referred to “a long enough time that the defendant can participate in prison industries, as well as learn some job skills.” Neither party objected.Long argued that the court plainly erred by imposing a sentence in part to rehabilitate him, contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3582(a) as construed in by the Supreme Court in “Tapia” (2011). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rehabilitation is an important consideration in most sentences. Tapia permits a judge to discuss rehabilitation so long as she does not make rehabilitation a primary consideration. This record does not show a plain error under Tapia. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law

Hakim, a DuPage County Sheriff’s Office (DCSO) SWAT officer, was accidentally shot by a colleague during a training exercise, using a Safariland “breaching” shotgun round. Breaching rounds assist in breaking down doors by disabling hinges and other attachments on doorframes. When used as intended, they disintegrate harmlessly on impact with a metal attachment mechanism. Hakim’s fellow officer missed the door hinge he was shooting at. The round struck wood, remained live, and hit Hakim in the spine. Hakim’s 13-month recovery required multiple surgeries. He still experiences severe pain. Hakim sued Safariland under Illinois’s strict product liability law. Hakim claimed that the Safariland round was defective in its manufacture and design and that Safariland failed to provide adequate warning that its rounds do not disintegrate if they strike wood instead of metal.A jury found for Safariland on the manufacturing- and design-defect claims, but awarded Hakim $7.5 million on his failure-to-warn claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The fact that the rounds might be complex in some respects does not mean that expert testimony is required for every product liability claim involving them. The jury reasonably could have found Safariland’s warnings inadequate. Even assuming that DCSO was negligent, Safariland’s own failure to warn could constitute an additional proximate cause of Hakim’s injuries. The jury’s award of $7.5 million, “while perhaps on the high side,” was not unreasonable. View "Hakim v. Safariland, LLC" on Justia Law

Hambrick, a black woman born in 1970, has worked at the Social Security Administration (SSA) for nearly 35 years. In 2016, her supervisor reassigned her. Hambrick remained a manager at the same pay scale and grade. Since her transfer, Hambrick alleges she has endured constant negative treatment from her supervisors and peers, amounting to harassment based on her age and race. Hambrick unsuccessfully applied for other roles. For one position, her supervisor hired a younger, white man, explaining that her collaborative skills needed work and her direct supervisor recommended her “with reservations.” Hambrick also complained of her heavy workload, and the quick rise of younger, non-black SSA employees and that her supervisors did not celebrate her lowering the backlog of cases. Hambrick filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints that were resolved in the SSA’s favor.The district court determined that Hambrick had administratively exhausted the SSA’s failure to promote Hambrick; Hambrick’s lowered performance evaluation; and Hambrick’s non-selection to positions in 2021 as retaliation for her EEO complaints, then concluded that she failed to show unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that the “totality of undisputed facts … consisted of unremarkable workplace disagreements.” Hambrick’s “dissatisfaction with her supervisors, heavy workload, and lack of recognition,” did not create a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the incidents that Hambrick challenged were severe or pervasive, nor does she show how they relate to the protected characteristics of her race or age. View "Hambrick v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The FBI surveilled Jones and Schimenti, members of the same mosque, based on their pro-ISIS, violent social media posts. After several months, the FBI found no evidence of criminal activity but initiated contact between Jones and an undercover agent, “Omar.” Jones, not the agents, pursued subsequent conversations about radical Islam. Omar introduced Jones to “Bilal,” another undercover agent. Omar, Bilal, Jones, and Schimenti met. After Schimenti left, Jones explained that Schimenti worried that Bilal and Omar were federal agents. Jones continued to initiate pro-ISIS messages and built other ISIS connections, including Omar 2, another undercover FBI agent. Jones organized a meeting between himself, Bilal, and Omar 2, after which Omar 2 purportedly traveled to Syria with Bilal’s help. The FBI reestablished contact with Schimenti through a new confidential informant, “Muhamed,” who expressed his desire to join his brother in the ISIS army in Syria. Schimenti offered help. In 2017 Jones and Shimenti gave Muhamed nine phones and drove Muhamed to O’Hare airport. They believed he would be traveling to Syria to use the cell phones as makeshift bombs as an ISIS fighter. The FBI arrested Jones and Schimenti. Based on the provision of cell phones for use as IEDs by ISIS, they were convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of entrapment; its ultimate determination is entitled to meaningful deference. The court upheld the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a revelation regarding a substantial payment the government made to a confidential source shortly after the convictions. It is impossible to conclude that earlier disclosure of a contemplated post-trial payment would have resulted in acquittals. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law

In a suit filed in 2014 under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–19, Cook County claimed that the banks made credit too readily available to some borrowers, who defaulted, and then foreclosed on the loans in a way that injured the County. The County alleged the banks targeted potential minority borrowers for unchecked or improper credit approval decisions, which allowed them to receive loans they could not afford; discretionary application of surcharge of additional points, fees, and other credit and servicing costs above otherwise objective risk-based financing rates; higher cost loan products; and undisclosed inflation of appraisal values to support inflated loan amounts. When many of the borrowers could not repay, the County asserts, it had to deal with vacant properties and lost tax revenue and transfer fees.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Entertaining suits to recover damages for any foreseeable result of an FHA violation would risk “massive and complex damages litigation.” Proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Cook County seeks a remedy for effects far beyond “the first step.” The directly injured parties are the borrowers, who lost both housing and money. The banks are secondary losers. The County is at best a tertiary loser; its injury derives from the injuries to the borrowers and banks. View "County of Cook v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law