Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Nicholas Vichio, a warehouse supervisor at US Foods, Inc. who was terminated after the arrival of a new vice president of operations, Charles Zadlo. Vichio, who had previously received positive performance reviews, was placed on a performance improvement plan by Zadlo and subsequently terminated. Vichio filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of US Foods, concluding that Vichio failed to show that the performance issues cited were a pretext for discrimination.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court concluded that Vichio had presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer discrimination. This evidence included the sudden negative performance reviews upon the arrival of Zadlo, the seemingly predetermined nature of Vichio's termination, the identical language in performance improvement plans for Vichio and another older employee, and the hiring of a younger employee to replace Vichio. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Vichio v. US Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the disorderly conduct convictions of Jamison Krahenbuhl, an Air Force veteran. Krahenbuhl had been convicted following an incident at the Milo C. Huempfner Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Green Bay, Wisconsin. During a respiratory therapy appointment, Krahenbuhl became agitated and engaged in abusive language and disruptive behavior that led to the clinic staff summoning VA police. He was subsequently charged with two counts of disorderly conduct under 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5), (b)(11) and was found guilty on both counts.On appeal, Krahenbuhl argued that his convictions violated his First Amendment rights, and that the government failed to prove all the elements of the crimes. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It determined that the clinic was a nonpublic forum, where greater regulation of speech is permissible. The court found that the regulation under which Krahenbuhl was convicted was viewpoint neutral and reasonable, given the clinic's primary aim of providing medical care to veterans. The court also rejected Krahenbuhl's argument that the government failed to prove that the clinic was under the charge and control of the VA and not under the charge and control of the General Services Administration, finding that this was an invited error. Consequently, Krahenbuhl's convictions were affirmed. View "USA v. Krahenbuhl" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Miguel Navarrete, a felon, was charged with possessing a firearm, which he could not lawfully do. Navarrete was arraigned, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced by video under the CARES Act, which permitted such proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic. He consented to the video proceedings during the arraignment and guilty plea, and all necessary findings were made. He was sentenced to 58 months’ imprisonment, a term below the range calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. Navarrete appealed the sentence, arguing that he should be resentenced because he did not appear personally in court and did not formally consent on the record to the video sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's argument did not meet the requirements for "plain error" reversal. The court reasoned that Navarrete had, in fact, enjoyed the substantial part of the entitlement secured by Rule 43(a), and the absence of a formal consent on the record to a video appearance that was evidently voluntary on the defendant’s part did not call the justice system into disrepute. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that failure to obtain on-the-record consent for video sentencing was a structural error that required automatic reversal. The court held such an error to be a "discrete defect," not affecting the entire conduct of the proceedings or necessarily rendering the outcome unreliable. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's sentencing decision. View "USA v. Navarrete" on Justia Law

Inmate Chadrick Fulks filed a lawsuit against several prison officials at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging constitutionally deficient medical care, the use of excessive force, and a sexual assault. The district court concluded that he had successfully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to only two claims. During the course of the litigation, the court found that Fulks had knowingly submitted a forged document and provided perjured testimony. As a sanction for this misconduct, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that even though dismissal prevented Fulks from litigating his allegation of sexual assault, there were other remedies available to him, such as through the Bureau's Office of Internal Affairs or under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. The court concluded that while the district court's decision was severe, it was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action as a sanction for Fulks's submission of a forged document and perjured testimony. View "Fulks v. Watson" on Justia Law

Kibambe Mwendapeke, a permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of the Congo, was convicted of complicity to robbery in the first degree under Kentucky law. Later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mwendapeke based on his conviction. He appealed, arguing that his conviction should not categorize him as an "aggravated felon," which would render him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction is indeed a categorical match for an "aggravated felony."The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Mwendapeke's crime was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a requirement for classification as an "aggravated felony." The court found that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute, under which Mwendapeke was convicted, meets the level of force and has the required mens rea, or state of mind, for a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The court also concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is not overbroad with respect to generic aiding-and-abetting liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable. The court denied his petition for review. View "Mwendapeke v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

This is a dispute regarding a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act, brought by the plaintiff-appellant, Heather Tutwiler. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that Ms. Tutwiler was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The court found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since the onset date of her condition, and that her impairments significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. However, these impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any impairments listed in the Social Security regulations that lead to automatic findings of disability. The court noted that Ms. Tutwiler had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with some additional restrictions. The court also found that jobs within Ms. Tutwiler’s abilities existed in the economy in such numbers that she was not disabled under the Social Security Act. The court held that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not otherwise contrary to law. View "Tutwiler v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

Fliss, Wojciak, and Barr took out a $200,000 bank loan for their jointly owned companies. Each man personally guaranteed the loan. When the borrowers defaulted, the bank obtained a state court $208,639.95 consent judgment, holding the guarantors jointly and severally liable. Wojciak then entered into an agreement with the bank, through his company, Capital I, to purchase the promissory note and judgment debt for $240,000, then entered into a settlement agreement with the bank, agreeing to pay $240,000. Wojciak's other company, Capital II wired the bank $240,000. The state court substituted Capital I for the bank as the plaintiff. Wojciak moved to enforce the judgment: Capital I commenced a supplemental proceeding and sought property turnovers. Fliss and Barr unsuccessfully argued that the debt was extinguished when the Wojciaks paid $240,000 in exchange for settlement.Fliss filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Wojciak had Capital I file a secured claim, seeking to enforce the judgment–$359,967.69 including post-judgment interest. The bankruptcy court disallowed that claim, finding that Wojciak used Capital I as his alter ego and became both the creditor and debtor, which extinguished the debt. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim objection—the Rooker-Feldman doctrine posed no obstacle. Capital I failed to demonstrate the existence of a final judgment as required by res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Generation Capital I, LLC v. Fliss" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) operates schools for military families. Smithson has worked as a DODEA science teacher since 2004. Smithson’s medical conditions include migraines, intracranial hypertension, affective disorder, vertigo, and ADHD. These conditions, with the required medications, have caused her problems with balance, walking, driving, breathing, vision, speech, and memory. In 2010, Smithson first obtained accommodations–an occasional flexible start time and permission to be seated during part of the teaching day. In 2014-2016, Smithson's requests for additional accommodations were largely granted. Principal Villareal's response to Smithson’s request for a flexible duty reporting time of up to two hours was, “The employee is approved to use sick leave for any absence from school up to two hours, barring any undue hardship to the school schedule.” Later, Smithson indicated that she would be late every day but would arrive before her first instructional section. Smithson then used sick leave as needed. During the pandemic, Smithson began to work from home, full-time, in DODEA’s Virtual School.Smithson sued under the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate when she was required to use a half-day of sick leave whenever she arrived late. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of DODEA. In-person attendance was an essential function of Smithson’s position and her need to miss up to two hours each morning demonstrated that she could not perform this essential function. A frequent two-hour delay at the beginning of the school day is not the same as an infrequent 15-minute delay, as permitted under her original accommodation. View "Smithson v. Austin" on Justia Law

Escorted by an officer who had followed him from the scene of a shooting, Hudson entered the Medical Center seeking emergency treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer stood outside Hudson’s hospital room. Medical staff discovered Hudson was concealing “something plastic” in his mouth and spent nearly 20 minutes admonishing Hudson to spit it out before he finally complied, revealing a device used to convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon. Hudson moved to suppress the device, arguing that the medical staff acted as government agents in conducting a warrantless search.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Knowledge and inaction alone are insufficient to establish an agency relationship. There must be some evidence of government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional. Viewed in context, the officer answered questions but did not direct the medical staff to act in any particular way. The facts supported a finding that medical staff acted with the purpose of providing medical treatment, not assisting law enforcement. The court noted that both the officer and the medical staff apparently assumed that Hudson was concealing drugs, voicing concerns that the suspected drugs could cause him to overdose. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law