Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017 Durham, age 46, applied for Social Security disability benefits, she had been diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension. She had also seen medical professionals about neck pain and heart palpitations. She had been experiencing shortness of breath and lightheadedness and was referred to a cardiologist, who counseled her to reduce her caffeine intake and to adopt a healthy lifestyle. Durham continued to have intermittent symptoms and, in 2019, was admitted to a hospital due to “exertional shortness of breath and palpitations.” Testing disclosed that Durham had no cardiac instability, “no acute problems, [and] no functional limitations.”An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Durham’s diabetes, hypertension, and tachycardia were limiting, but not disabling, conditions. The district court and Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of benefits as supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected arguments that the ALJ relied on outdated evidence and overstepped his authority by interpreting, without supporting medical opinions, the results of medical tests. The record reveals that the ALJ carefully considered Durham’s entire medical history and relied on the opinions of her treating physicians in reaching his conclusions about her physical limitations. View "Durham v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Mercado, age 41, used an Internet application to meet “Alexis,” a profile operated by an FBI agent conducting an undercover investigation of adults with sexual interests in children. After just minutes of texting, “Alexis” told Mercado she was 15 years old. For the next five days, they texted, exchanged photos, and spoke by phone. Mercado raised sexual topics, describing sexual acts he wanted to engage in with “Alexis.” Mercado sent “Alexis” sexually graphic and suggestive messages and emojis and asked her to smoke marijuana and drink alcoholic beverages with him. They arranged to meet at a house that was actually an FBI operations center. When Mercado arrived, he was arrested. Mercado exhibited health problems. He was taken to a hospital and administered medication. Later, he was interviewed at the hospital, waived his Miranda rights, and made inculpatory admissions.Mercado was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and use of interstate facilities to attempt to transmit information about a minor, section 2425. He unsuccessfully opposed a government motion to preclude an entrapment defense. That court denied Mercado’s motion to suppress his statements and evidence obtained in his hospital interview. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding those rulings and rejecting an argument that his statements were involuntary as he was under the influence of drugs when he talked to agents, who coerced his statements. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Illinois State Police Officer Myers supervised 10 controlled drug purchases by a confidential source (CS) at a Cairo residence. Each purchase was recorded on video. The CS initially said that “Cornelius Dean” was selling crack cocaine at the house. Eventually, the CS found out the dealer’s name was Ed. Ed later told the CS that his surname was “Johnson.” Myers searched for an image of an “Ed or Edward Johnson” in the Illinois Secretary of State database but found no match. Alexander County Sheriff Brown suggested Ed’s last name might be Osborne. Myers again checked the state database and discovered that “Phillip Edward Osborne” resided in Cairo. Myers obtained Osborne’s driver’s license photo and concluded that it matched the dealer in the drug buy videos. Myers reported that the CS, upon seeing the photo, unequivocally, identified Osborne. Myers obtained an arrest warrant. Osborne was arrested and remained incarcerated for seven days before being released on bond. The state eventually dismissed the charges.Osborne sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the claims against the county and granted Myers summary judgment on the false arrest claim, finding no evidence to undermine probable cause to arrest Osborne and that Myers was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the warrant and the underlying information, with little more than bare allegations that Myers lied in his warrant application. View "Johnson v. Myers" on Justia Law

Bennett contends that Division 10 of Cook County Jail does not satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act because it lacks grab bars and other fixtures that disabled inmates need in order to use showers and toilets safely. Bennett cited a regulation providing that as of 1988, "construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)(1). UFAS requires accessible toilets with grab bars nearby and accessible showers with mounted seats, Division 10 was constructed in 1992.In 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, stating that Bennett “proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply (and were violated, to detainees’ detriment).” On remand, the district court certified a class. More than two years later, the judge decertified the class, reasoning that some class members, although using aids such as wheelchairs, may not be disabled under the statutes.The Seventh Circuit again reversed. The 2020 decision identified an issue relevant to every Division 10 detainee. Class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) resolves the issue, not the whole case. Class members could receive the benefit of a declaratory judgment on the issue but would need to proceed in individual suits to seek damages; if the class loses, every detainee would be bound by issue preclusion. The application of UFAS can be determined class-wide while leaving to the future any particular inmate’s claim to relief. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Confidential informants participated in controlled purchases from Ramirez that tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Officers executed a traffic stop; inside a vehicle operated by Ramirez, they discovered 184.79 grams of a substance that tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B).The court sentenced him as a career offender (Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1) because he had prior Wisconsin felony convictions for possessing with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinol and for manufacturing or delivering cocaine. The court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. Ramirez asked the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its 2020 “Ruth” holding that an offense need not involve a substance controlled by the Controlled Substances Act to qualify as a predicate “controlled substance offense” under the career offender enhancement, and argued that the district court failed to consider adequately his primary mitigating sentencing argument.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to overrule Ruth. Until the conflicting circuit positions are reconciled, it is arguable "that undercounting career offenders works a substantial injury by failing to protect the public from recidivist drug criminals.” The district court addressed, explicitly and extensively, Ramirez’s arguments about his upbringing, including in reference to the factors and goals of sentencing. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Zaragoza, a citizen of Mexico and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, pleaded guilty to the Indiana offense of criminal neglect of a dependent after locking her six-year-old son in a closet for six hours. She was sentenced to one year in jail, suspended to time served plus 30 days. After completing her sentence, she traveled abroad. When she returned, DHS found Zaragoza inadmissible based on the neglect conviction, which the agency classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). An immigration judge entered a removal order. In the meantime, Zaragoza petitioned the state court to modify her sentence, to bring herself within the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, which is available to first-time offenders sentenced to six months or less. The state court reduced her sentence to 179 days.The BIA rejected Zaragoza’s arguments, finding that the Indiana offense was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that the sentence modification order was not effective to establish Zaragoza’s eligibility for the petty-offense exception. The Board relied on a 2019 Attorney General decision declaring that state-court sentence modification orders are effective for immigration purposes only if based on a legal defect in the underlying criminal proceeding (Thomas). The Seventh Circuit remanded. Applying Thomas in Zaragoza’s case is an impermissibly retroactive application of a new rule. View "Zaragoza v. Garland" on Justia Law

Moore was sentenced to 120 months in federal prison for drug offenses. One factual foundation for the sentence was the district court’s finding that 55.6 grams of methamphetamine found in Moore’s home were 100% pure. Moore argued that a chemist’s affidavit that he submitted was “some evidence” sufficient to call the purity finding into question and that the government failed to support the finding on purity. Moore claimed that the district court erred by placing a burden on him to perform independent testing and by assuming, without supporting evidence, that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s methods for testing purity are reliable and were applied correctly in Moore’s case.The Seventh Circuit remanded for re-sentencing. Moore has a due process right to be sentenced based on reliable information. The district court’s assumption about the general reliability of DEA testing protocols was not supported by any evidence in the record. The “some evidence” standard is not a demanding one. The chemist’s affidavit here did not purport to resolve conclusively the accuracy of the DEA test results, but it raised a fair question about them. View "United St v. Mooatesre" on Justia Law

Milhem applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging that several conditions limited her ability to work. Milihem, age 38, had completed three years of college and had previously worked as a canvasser, receptionist, portrait photographer, and graphic designer. A vocational expert concluded that the evidence supported limiting Milhem’s work to that which can be learned in 30 days or less, that Milhem could stand or walk for at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, and that Milhem “could make judgments commensurate with functions of simple, repetitive tasks”; such an individual could not perform Milhem’s past work, but could work as a router, price marker, and cafeteria attendant, of which there were approximately 53,000, 307,000, and 63,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively. Changing the exertion level to sedentary, the expert testified, would include the work of an addresser, table worker, or document preparer, of which there were approximately 19,000, 23,000, and 47,000 jobs in the national economy, respectively.Based on this testimony, and “considering [Milhem’s] age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs that Milhem could perform, so Milhem was not under a qualifying disability. The district court upheld that determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonable person would accept 89,000 jobs in the national economy, a figure supported by substantial evidence, as a significant number. Other circuits have accepted similar numbers as significant. View "Milhem v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Atkins pleaded guilty to drug crimes in 2014. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction, he sued, claiming that the district and magistrate judges committed errors, the prosecutor did not identify herself when talking to Atkins during the case and did not respond to his compassionate release motion, the court reporter “invaded” his transcripts, and his court-appointed attorneys were ineffective. Atkins also sued the United States but did not state any allegations against it. The district judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, stating that he would alternatively dismiss all claims under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision because Atkins’s criminal conviction is intact.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All the acts that Atkins attributes to the judges and prosecutor occurred in the criminal case, within their roles as judge or prosecutor, so they are absolutely immune from suit. The Supreme Court has not implied a Bivens-style constitutional claim against federal officials for transcription errors and an alternate remedy to cure transcript inaccuracies is available. The federal defense attorneys cannot be defendants in a Bivens suit because they did not act under color of law. The United States is not subject to suit in a Bivens action. The court affirmed that Atkins incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) for filing a frivolous suit and another “strike” for filing this frivolous appeal. View "Atkins v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

As early as 2009, Dickey recruited followers for her church, “DTM,” grooming vulnerable victims and forcing them to disavow their families, live in the church, and work multiple full-time jobs. The victims gave Dickey all their wages, which she kept for herself. She required multiple victims to find employment at Hyatt hotels, where Dickey forced them to falsify reservation bookings, thereby fraudulently misdirecting kickbacks to Dickey’s own travel company. If someone disobeyed, Dickey threatened them with violence and required them to be homeless until she considered them redeemed. Her scheme netted $1.5 million, most of which came from DTM members. She spent over $1 million on personal expenses, such as travel, rental and vacation properties, and luxury hotels.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dickey’s convictions for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589, upholding the district court’s denial of her fourth motion to continue her trial, rejection of a proposed jury instruction regarding religious liberty, and the imposition of restitution ordering her to pay for future mental health treatment for her victims. Dickey’s proposed instruction would have excused her criminal conduct based on her religious assertions and was not an accurate statement of the law. View "United States v. Dickey" on Justia Law