Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An individual purchased a long-term care insurance policy that covered expenses incurred at nursing or assisted living facilities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, at age 94, the insured fractured her hip and, due to concerns about contracting COVID-19 in a communal setting, received post-surgical care at home as prescribed by her physician. When she submitted a claim for these home health care expenses, the insurance company denied coverage, stating that her policy did not include home care benefits. The insured had selected a policy that covered only institutional care, though an alternative plan of care provision allowed for non-institutional benefits if certain conditions were met, including mutual agreement between the insured, her provider, and the insurer.The insured, through her successor trustees, filed a breach of contract action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court found in favor of the insurer, holding that the policy did not provide home health care benefits, and that the denial of coverage under the alternative plan of care provision was not in bad faith because the insured had not met the necessary conditions to trigger that provision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the policy did not provide for home health care benefits, as required for the relevant Illinois insurance regulation to apply. The court also determined that the alternative plan of care provision was discretionary and did not guarantee coverage for home care. Additionally, the insurer did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by enforcing the explicit terms of the policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Hartnett v Jackson National Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Kentucky to attempting to receive stolen property, in violation of state law. Several years later, federal immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his state conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, specifically for receipt of stolen property. Hassan challenged this, arguing that the Kentucky statute criminalizes some conduct that would not be considered an aggravated felony under federal law, which requires proof that the defendant had a subjective knowledge or belief that the property was stolen.The immigration judge agreed with Hassan, determining that the Kentucky statute was broader than the federal definition and granting his motion to terminate the removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the Kentucky conviction did count as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Hassan then sought review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that it was not clear whether Kentucky law requires subjective knowledge or belief, or whether a conviction could be based merely on what a reasonable person would have known (“constructive knowledge”). Because Kentucky case law was ambiguous on this point, the court declined to decide the issue itself. Instead, the Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Kentucky Supreme Court, specifically asking whether Section 514.110 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes requires subjective knowledge or belief that property is stolen, or if a conviction could be based solely on an objective standard. The Seventh Circuit held the case in abeyance pending guidance from the Kentucky Supreme Court. View "Hassan v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Dr. John Peterson, a pain-management physician employed at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility in Illinois, was placed on summary suspension in 2020 due to concerns about his patient care, particularly relating to the management of opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions. He was notified of the suspension, informed of his right to respond, and told a comprehensive review would follow. After several extensions—largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic—a review concluded that Peterson should be removed for failing to provide appropriate medical care and for failing to follow instructions during his suspension. Peterson was given notice of the charges, access to the evidence against him, and the right to respond, but did not submit a timely reply. He was subsequently removed from his position.Peterson appealed his removal to the Veterans Administration Disciplinary Appeals Board, which held a hearing and allowed him multiple postponements to secure an expert witness. Ultimately, Peterson submitted a lengthy rebuttal the night before the hearing, which the Appeals Board excluded as untimely. After questioning Peterson directly, the Appeals Board sustained most charges and upheld his removal. The decision was reviewed and approved by the Deputy to the VA Undersecretary for Health. Peterson then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, challenging the procedures and alleging due process violations. The district court found the procedures adequate, the evidentiary exclusion justified, and the agency’s actions not arbitrary or capricious, granting summary judgment for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and held that the procedures Peterson received were adequate under due process and agency law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no basis to disturb the agency’s decision. View "Peterson v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was arrested after a police officer encountered him near a suspiciously parked car with expired registration in Superior, Wisconsin. Body camera footage documented the arrest, the plaintiff’s argument with officers, and his subsequent booking at the local police station. During the booking process, the plaintiff was agitated and complained of an infection on his wrist, which he said was aggravated by tight handcuffs. After a pat-down search at the booking counter, several officers escorted him to a receiving cell, where an incident occurred as he was moved toward a concrete bunk. The plaintiff alleged that officers used excessive force, causing him to fall face-first onto the bunk, resulting in injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin organized the plaintiff’s claims into three groups: force during the booking (handcuffs and arm twisting), force used while moving him to the receiving cell (“dragging”), and force in the receiving cell (lifting his leg and removing the mattress). The district court allowed only the claims related to handcuff adjustment and arm twisting at the booking area to proceed to a jury. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all other claims, concluding that video evidence contradicted the plaintiff’s account of being dragged or excessive force in the receiving cell. The jury later found for the defendants on the claims that went to trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether summary judgment on the excessive force claim regarding the receiving cell was proper and whether exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the video evidence so clearly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of events that no reasonable jury could find in his favor. The court further determined that the expert testimony issue was moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all matters. View "Raddant v Douglas County" on Justia Law

Police in Chicago responded to a report of shots fired on the city’s west side and discovered a two-car crash, with one vehicle, a minivan, bearing bullet damage. The minivan’s driver, Derrick Davis, exited and was observed approaching a nearby parked car. An eyewitness alerted officers that Davis had a gun. When officers detained him, they found a loaded handgun under the parked car, which Davis had tossed there. Davis had a significant felony record and was on state parole at the time. After his arrest, he made a jail phone call in which he discussed details of the incident and his actions, suggesting he had intentionally driven to the scene.Initially, Davis faced charges in state court, but these were dismissed when federal authorities indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The presentence report did not recommend a sentencing enhancement for Davis’s involvement in another felony (the shoot-out) due to insufficient evidence. The district judge, however, imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 84 months, relying in part on Davis’s jail call. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated that sentence, citing a procedural error: the judge had adopted the presentence report’s findings but also credited the government’s argument that Davis participated in the shoot-out, which was inconsistent.On remand, the district judge clarified that he did not find Davis had fired his gun, but based the above-Guidelines sentence on Davis’s criminal history and his jail call, which showed reckless disregard for the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this was procedurally and substantively reasonable, and affirmed the 84-month sentence. View "USA v Davis" on Justia Law

Police officers in Calumet City, Illinois, responded to a 911 call in May 2015 reporting a man allegedly throwing a knife near a home. Upon arrival, officers spoke with the caller, who identified the suspect entering a residence. The officers knocked on the door, exchanged words with someone inside who told them to leave, and later decided to enter through an unlocked back door without a warrant, citing concerns for the safety of occupants due to a recent domestic violence report involving the address. Inside, officers found a woman who appeared unhurt and ultimately located Elias Villalobos hiding upstairs. The parties dispute whether Villalobos resisted or threatened the officers before he was tased and shot.Villalobos sued four officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging excessive force and unlawful entry under the Fourth Amendment. At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity for most excessive force claims, finding factual disputes for trial. On the unlawful entry claim, however, the court granted partial summary judgment for Villalobos, concluding as a matter of law that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering without a warrant and rejecting the officers’ exigent circumstances argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the denial of qualified immunity on the unlawful entry issue. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order, finding that the lower court did not address whether clearly established law put the officers on notice that their conduct was unlawful, as required for denying qualified immunity. The appellate court also noted unresolved factual disputes relevant to the exigent circumstances analysis. The case was remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to clarify the facts and address both prongs of the qualified immunity test. View "Villalobos v. Picicco" on Justia Law

Jerron Williams was involved in an altercation with a United States Postal Service letter carrier in Gary, Indiana. After a brief dispute, Williams fired several shots into the carrier's vehicle as she attempted to leave, causing her physical injuries. A grand jury indicted Williams on three counts: assaulting a federal employee with a deadly weapon causing bodily injury, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Williams entered into a plea agreement, admitting guilt to the first two counts and waiving his right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, held a change of plea hearing where the magistrate judge explained the charges and their elements. Williams, with his attorney’s agreement, confirmed his understanding and acceptance of the facts and the charges. Prior to sentencing, Williams changed attorneys and sought to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced Williams to 153 months in prison.On appeal, Williams argued for the first time that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid because the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) was not a “crime of violence.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case for plain error and determined that Williams had waived this argument multiple times: by pleading guilty, by waiving his right to appeal, and by not raising the argument in his motion to withdraw the plea. The court also found that the magistrate judge properly explained the charges and ensured Williams’s understanding. As a result, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "USA v JWilliams" on Justia Law

In the fall of 2025, federal immigration authorities increased enforcement activities in Chicago through “Operation Midway Blitz,” prompting protests near an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention center in Broadview, Illinois. Protesters and journalists alleged that federal officers from ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights by deploying tear gas and other chemical agents without justification. The plaintiffs described instances of excessive force and sought injunctive relief to stop such practices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a temporary restraining order and later a broad preliminary injunction that applied districtwide, enjoining all federal law enforcement officers and agencies from using certain crowd control tactics. The court also certified a plaintiff class and required ongoing compliance reporting from DHS officials. The government appealed the preliminary injunction, arguing it was overbroad and infringed on separation of powers principles. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, citing its expansive scope and concerns over standing.Subsequently, as the enforcement operation ended and no further constitutional violations were reported, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice and decertified the class, contrary to the plaintiffs’ request for dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that extraordinary circumstances warranted vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit held that vacatur was appropriate because the case had become moot and to prevent the now-unreviewable injunction from producing adverse legal consequences in future litigation. The court vacated the injunction and dismissed the appeal. View "Chicago Headline Club v. Noem" on Justia Law

Police officers in Rock Island, Illinois, attempted to stop an unregistered minivan driven by Atoris Slater in July 2020. Slater fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase that ended when they discontinued pursuit after he nearly caused a collision. Slater abandoned the minivan and tried to hide in a dumpster but was found shortly after. Police searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cannabis edibles. Upon his arrest and transport to jail, Slater attempted to discard a bag containing crack cocaine. He was indicted for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Slater pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement, and the presentence report (PSR) initially calculated his sentencing range using a 1:1 drug-conversion ratio for marijuana and cannabis edibles. The government did not object to the PSR within the standard 14-day period. On the eve of sentencing, the prosecutor learned that the edibles contained THC, which required a higher 1:167 conversion ratio, and raised a late objection. The judge granted a continuance, allowed for lab testing, and ultimately adopted the new calculations, resulting in a higher sentencing range. Slater did not renew his objection to the revised PSR and was sentenced below the revised Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district judge properly allowed the government’s untimely objection to the PSR and whether the higher THC conversion ratio applied. The Seventh Circuit held that the district judge did not abuse her discretion by permitting the late objection for good cause. The court also found that Slater had waived any challenge to the THC ratio by affirmatively accepting the revised PSR at sentencing. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Slater" on Justia Law

An inmate at a correctional institution in Wisconsin, who practices Islam and prays five times daily at precise times, relied on a prayer schedule printed and distributed by prison chaplains. He discovered the schedule was inaccurate due to the chaplain entering the wrong location into an online tool, resulting in prayer times being off by several minutes. Although the chaplains corrected the schedule for meal deliveries during Ramadan, they declined to distribute revised prayer schedules to inmates, citing a policy prohibiting the use of government funds to purchase religious items for inmates. The inmate eventually received an accurate schedule by donation from a visiting imam, but complained he did not receive one from the prison.After exhausting internal grievance procedures, the inmate sued the corrections staff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. It found the initial error in the prayer schedule was a mistake, not an intentional constitutional violation, and determined neither RLUIPA nor the Free Exercise Clause required prison officials to purchase religious materials for prisoners using government funds. The court also concluded the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law requiring the provision of religious materials as a courtesy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that a de minimis cost for an inmate to purchase his own prayer schedule does not constitute a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA. Additionally, RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates. The court also affirmed that the neutral prison policy did not violate the Free Exercise Clause and that the negligence claim regarding the inaccurate schedule was waived. The judgment was affirmed. View "Childs v Webster" on Justia Law