Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Carrington Mortgage Services on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. Calderon is a former employee of Carrington. She alleged that Carrington made false representations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the course of certifying residential mortgage loans for insurance coverage from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Carrington moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet her evidentiary burden on two elements of False Claims Act liability. The district court sided with Carrington on both elements and granted summary judgment, disposing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff does have sufficient proof of materiality. However, the court agreed that she has not met her burden of proof on the element of causation. The court explained that on the present record, it is not clear how a factfinder would even spot the alleged false statement in each loan file, let alone evaluate its seriousness and scope. And though Plaintiff asserted that the misrepresentations, in this case, are of the type identified in Spicer, the court did not see much in the record to support that point other than Plaintiff’s assertions. Without more evidence from which a jury could conclude that Carrington’s alleged misrepresentations in each loan caused the subsequent defaults, the nature of those misrepresentations is not enough to get past summary judgment. View "Michelle Calderon v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the legal representatives and family members of two individuals killed using guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms marketplace. Plaintiffs each sued Armslist LLC and its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law claims. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants designed the website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state law regulating firearms. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under Wisconsin law. The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both cases, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims were also dismissed, and Gibbon was dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision in Webber that personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Further, the court wrote that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it affirmed the dismissal in each case. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not alleged an act or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or service activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute. Moreover, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. View "Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and Illinois resident of Indian origin, opened a non-resident account with the State Bank of India through one of its India-based branches. When the State Bank of India retroactively changed the terms of the account, Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied to Bhattacharya’s claim and immunized the Bank from suit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court was correct to conclude that these activities are insufficient to establish a direct effect in the United States. Plaintiff’s non-resident account is maintained in India, and the relevant transactions were with the Bank’s India-based branches. The court explained that Plaintiff did not allege that his suit related to any account held with a U.S.-based branch of the Bank or was otherwise related to any actions the Bank had taken here. Nor did he point to any agreement with the State Bank of India that established the United States as the site of performance. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s contract agreement established his account with the Indian branches of the Bank. View "Arun Bhattacharya v. State Bank of India" on Justia Law

Granger, King, and Walker were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and firearms offenses. The judge sentenced Granger and King to 360 months’ imprisonment and Walker to 330 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting an argument that the court should have struck Juror 70 for cause after the defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges. Juror 70 had raised his hand when the judge asked whether any potential jurors thought that a law enforcement officer’s testimony should receive extra weight. Juror 70 was a retired police officer with 30 years of service, and said “I’m inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt” but that he would have an open mind and respect the presumption of innocence. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a district judge may take into account everything a potential juror says when deciding whether that person can be impartial. Juror 70 recited the correct standard and the judge was entitled to find that he possessed enough self-awareness and honesty to carry out his promises.The court vacated Walker’s sentence. In holding him accountable for all drugs that the conspiracy as a whole distributed during Walker’s time as a participant, the judge did not address what conduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to Walker. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Mack used a US Bank credit card to make household purchases. After she allegedly defaulted, LVNV purchased and Resurgent serviced the debt. Frontline was engaged to collect on the debt. In a letter, Frontline informed Mack that her account had been placed for collection and that she owed $7,179.87. Mack was uncertain about the amount and her obligations to LVNV, an entity she did not know. Within 30 days, Mack went to her library to type and print a validation request, then went to the post office where she paid $10 to send the letter. Mack did not receive a validation but received a letter from Resurgent, identifying LVNV as the “Current Owner,” and listing the balance of $7,179.87. Mack was "confused and alarmed" about who owned the debt. She returned to the library to type another validation request and mail it. Trips to the library and post office took her away from the family members who needed her assistance. Mack never received validation of the debt.Mack filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that Mack failed to demonstrate that she had suffered an injury in fact sufficient to support her standing to bring suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Mack adequately alleged an injury in fact and supported her allegations with evidence that violations of the statute caused her to suffer monetary damages, albeit of modest size. View "Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P." on Justia Law

FBI Agent Wainscott posted an ad on Craigslist that hinted at an opportunity to engage in sexual activity with a minor. Baird responded to Wainscott, who posed as the father of a 10-year-old girl with whom Baird could have sex. Graphic emails and texts followed, indicating Baird's desire to have sex with the girl. In discussing where and when to meet, Wainscott suggested that Baird bring gummy bears as a gift for the child. Baird agreed to buy the candy, then drove to the address that Wainscott gave him. Agents arrested Baird and found three packages of gummy bears in his car.Baird was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court concluded Baird had attempted to “knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce” a minor, because he “inquired into what this child liked sexually, indicated what he liked and what he would do sexually to this child, requested photographs of the child, and continued to engage the father in conversations about the child.” The messages—although conveyed to Wainscott posing as the girl’s father—still fell within the scope of section 2422(b) and the intended gift was significant evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considered as a whole, the evidence established that Baird took a substantial step toward the completion of the offense and intended to influence the minor to submit to sexual activity. View "United States v. Baird" on Justia Law

Two sisters accused Bell, a family friend, of sexually assaulting them. There was no physical evidence. Bell did not testify. Bell’s attorney sought to undermine the sisters’ credibility, suggesting that the girls had motives to lie, highlighting the younger sister’s admission that she had been drunk and had lied to police about her inebriation, and noting that the older sister’s account had changed. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that jurors who voted to acquit would “have to believe” that the sisters were lying and that if someone lies, “they’re going to have a reason.” The judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence; and the jury should disregard any arguments suggesting facts not in evidence.The jury convicted Bell. Because of his prior sexual-assault convictions, the court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected Bell’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments shifted the burden of proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Bell’s federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), stating that under de novo review, "the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause,” but under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential standard, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "Bell v. Hepp" on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Salazar, at a Peoria bar, posted a video of himself online, which Peoria police officers saw. Salazar had an active arrest warrant for traffic violations. Officers went to the bar. Security cameras and body-worn cameras captured the subsequent events. Salazar was sitting at the bar with a black jacket on his chair. Draped over an empty chair to his left was another jacket with a Purple Heart insignia. As Salazar stood between the chairs, an officer cuffed his hands behind his back. Salazar claimed that the black jacket was not his but that the Purple Heart jacket was his. Police found a gun and a wallet containing Salazar’s identification in the black jacket on Salazar’s chair.Salazar was charged with possessing a firearm illegally. Salazar unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court ruled that the police had conducted a valid search incident to arrest because Salazar could reach the jacket (and gun) and, in any event, had abandoned the jacket. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The search was a lawful search incident to Salazar’s arrest. The court declined to address whether it matters that an arrestee is secured. View "United States v. Salazar" on Justia Law

In 2014, Stacy was convicted of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 in restitution jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. When Stacy entered federal custody he suffered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated. Stacy filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The government settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. The government expected the Treasury Department to offset the $75,000 settlement for application to Stacy’s restitution debt.The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law authorizes the government to offset Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing. View "Stacy v. United States" on Justia Law