Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

C.S. has developmental and cognitive disabilities, including autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. C.S., then in sixth grade attempted to use the hallway elevator. A teacher told C.S. to stop. C.S. did not comply. Ultimately, three staff members forced C.S. onto the floor and pinned her face down while handcuffing her hands behind her back, and later bound her legs before returning her to her wheelchair. C.S. was handcuffed and bound for 34 minutes until her mother, Thomas, took her home. Thomas also alleged that days later, C.S. may have scratched or grabbed another student and was required to eat her lunch in the school office. While there, C.S. became dysregulated, prompting staff to respond “with similar aggressive force,” including calling the police. The District sought a juvenile delinquency prosecution of C.S. Charges were dropped when C.S. was found not competent to stand trial. A.S. (C.S.’s brother) had previously attended the same school and, after an incident, the school’s then-principal requested charges against A.S. His prosecution was also dropped after a finding that he was incompetent to stand trial.Thomas alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that the District had a “practice or protocol of utilizing excessive punitive and retaliatory force or threats of force to punish students with behavioral disabilities.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thomas’s suit. Thomas failed to plausibly allege a widespread custom or practice of violating disabled students’ Fourth Amendment rights. View "Thomas v. Neenah Joint School District" on Justia Law

At around 4:36 AM, Washington’s cellmate, Simmons, awoke to the sound of Washington, a pretrial detainee, gasping for breath. Simmons tried to shake Washington; he did not respond. At 4:37, Simmons pressed the intercom button, which triggers an audible ping and a flashing light at the control desk. Valentine, the control deck officer, did not answer for over one minute. Valentine claims he had trouble understanding Simmons and thought Simmons was referring to a plumbing issue. Valentine ended the call. For 30 seconds. Simmons tried to wake Washington. He used the intercom again around 4:47. Valentine did not answer for about 90 seconds. Other officers had joined him at the desk. This time, Valentine understood Simmons was reporting an emergency. The other officers ran to Washington’s cell, arriving at 4:50, issued an alert for medical assistance, and began CPR. A nurse with a defibrillator arrived around 4:52 and administered an electrical shock. At 5:00, EMTs arrived and continued CPR. Washington was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy concluded that sleep apnea caused Washington to go into cardiac arrhythmia, which caused Washington’s death.In a suit under 18 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Valentine’s delay in obtaining treatment harmed Washington, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Valentine for lack of sufficient evidence to show causation. View "Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Cruz-Rivera was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree assault (stabbing) in 2001, having violently attacked two women who suffered from a mild mental disability. After his 2015 release from prison, he was required to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20901; he never did so. Cruz-Rivera lived and worked (for a staffing agency, including at a school) in Indiana and was convicted of two felonies—resisting law enforcement and auto theft.Cruz-Rivera was convicted of failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR recommended a condition of supervised release that required him to submit to the search of his person and property based on “reasonable suspicion” of a violation of a condition of supervision or other unlawful conduct. Cruz-Rivera unsuccessfully objected, arguing that his crimes did not provide a justification for the search of electronics and electronic communications. The Probation Office noted that the condition is imposed on all monitored offenders. “Searches are not conducted without probable cause and only after approval from the Deputy Chief and/or Chief Probation Officer.”The court imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release after describing Cruz-Rivera’s criminal history and stating that it had considered his mitigation arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After a conscientious reading of Cruz-Rivera’s PSR, the district court reasonably concluded that the circumstances surrounding his criminal history made the imposition of the contested condition an important ingredient in stopping his antisocial behavior. View "United States v. Cruz-Rivera" on Justia Law

Utility companies responsible for a planned electric transmission line asked the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to allow construction across the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge alongside an existing road and railroad. Rural Utilities Service completed an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). FWS adopted the statement and issued a right-of-way permit.While litigation was pending, the utility companies sought to slightly alter the route and asked FWS to consider a land exchange. FWS discovered that it had relied on incorrect easement documents in issuing its original determination. It revoked the determination and permit but promised to consider the proposed land exchange. The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups but declined to enjoin ongoing construction of the project on private land outside the Refuge.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first rejecting a mootness argument. FWS has revoked the compatibility determination but has not promised never to issue a new permit. However, FWS’s current position does not meet the criteria of finality. Whatever hardship the plaintiffs face comes not from FWS’s promise to consider a land exchange but from the Utilities’ decision to build on their own land, so the district court erred in reviewing the merits of the proposed land exchange. Plaintiffs’ request for relief against the Utilities under NEPA likewise is premature. Adopting the environmental impact statement did not “consummate” the decisionmaking process. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural Utilities Service" on Justia Law

On O’Sucha’s death, the property, in a land trust, was to be divided equally among her four children, including Lesko. In 2009, Lesko caused her mother to make her the sole beneficiary upon O’Sucha’s 2010 death and to grant her sole power of direction over the trust. Her siblings sued Lesko in state court for undue influence. While an appeal was pending, Lesko sought a loan from Howard Bank, using the property as collateral. Because of Lesko’s poor credit and the state court decision, Howard approved a loan only when Lesko transferred ownership of the property to her daughter, Amorous. Amorous later conveyed a mortgage to Howard, securing a $130,000 loan, which Howard recorded.On remand, the Illinois court entered a money judgment against Lesko and declared a constructive trust; it later conveyed all interests of Amorous and Lesko to the plaintiffs, who unsuccessfully demanded that Howard release the mortgage.Plaintiffs sued Howard in federal court, then sold the property for $700,000, and paid the mortgage balance. Howard unsuccessfully sought to dismiss the case. In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted slander of title and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Howard held a valid mortgage and did not publish a falsity by recording it. Howard was not required to release the mortgage and did not continue to publish a falsity, nor did it unjustly retain a benefit by not releasing the mortgage. View "Guerrero v. Bank" on Justia Law

Mata fired shots, killing two men and injuring another. Chicago police arrested Mata that evening. The following day, after receiving his Miranda rights and saying that he understood them, Mata gave a videotaped statement: Mata explained that he heard Mares calling his name. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares while other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Mata fired five more shots toward the group, then ran toward his car. The men were walking with their backs to him when he fired; he never saw any of them with a weapon. An officer read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and wanted to make the statement; the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without threats or promises by the police.Defense counsel moved to suppress Mata’s statements, claiming that Mata was subjected to abuse by the police for two days before being given any Miranda warnings. No hearing was held on the motion. Convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, Mata sought habeas relief, arguing counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing on the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Mata procedurally defaulted his claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. View "Mata v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gilbert and his son Michael were charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gilbert pleaded guilty and sought “safety-valve relief” from the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence. While Gilbert was awaiting sentencing, Michael pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate including by providing information about Gilbert’s criminal conduct. The plea agreement itself was not entered into the court’s docket. The government never disclosed the agreement to Gilbert or his lawyer. At Gilbert’s sentencing hearing, Michael testified against his father. The prosecutor elicited false testimony that Michael had pleaded “open”—without the benefit of a written plea agreement. The court subsequently located the written plea agreement and informed the parties. Gilbert’s lawyer did not move to recall Michael for further cross-examination nor did he probe Michael’s motivations for testifying. The court denied Gilbert’s request for safety-valve relief and sentenced Gilbert to 156 months.The Seventh Circuit “reluctantly” affirmed. To obtain relief for a “Brady” violation, a defendant must show that undisclosed information was “material either to guilt or to punishment.” While Gilbert was completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing. The court described the prosecution’s conduct as “unsettling.” View "United States v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

On the night of May 6, 2020, Lisby, eight months pregnant, and Lewis walked along the shoulder of State Road 37 in Indianapolis to get back to their motel. Indianapolis Officer Henderson was driving to work in his police vehicle on the same road, at 78 miles per hour, 33 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. He illegally changed lanes over a solid white line and his vehicle partially crossed the fog line onto the shoulder of the road. Henderson struck Lisby without seeing her while still traveling at 55 miles per hour. Lisby was transported to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Lisby and Lewis’s child was born at the hospital by emergency Cesarian section but died shortly after delivery. Henderson was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a police officer when he killed Lisby.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Henderson. The complaint failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly suggesting that Henderson acted with the criminal recklessness necessary to establish a due process violation. View "Lisby v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Eight drug couriers, under indictment, identified Caraway as the supplier of the cocaine and leader of the operation. The government communicated to Caraway’s attorney that Caraway would soon be indicted. Caraway voluntarily traveled to Illinois for a proffer interview, then returned to Houston. In September 2017, the government learned that Caraway committed a violent robbery in Houston and notified Caraway’s attorney that he would be indicted and was required to surrender by December 15, 2017. Caraway never responded. In January 2018, the government charged Caraway with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.U.S. Marshals began searching for Caraway 11 months later. In July 2021, a Texas state trooper stopped Caraway for speeding. After initially supplying a fake name, Caraway provided his real name and was arrested. Caraway pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for being the leader and organizer of the conspiracy and for obstruction of justice, based on evading arrest for approximately 42 months. Caraway argued that the fact that the government could not find him was not evidence that he was evading arrest. After overruling the enhancement objections, the court calculated Caraway’s sentence range as 292-365 months; without the obstruction enhancement, the range would have been 235-293 months. After discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the judge noted that she would have imposed the same 360-month sentence without the enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly calculated the Guidelines range without the enhancement and tied the imposed sentence to the severity of the crime, Caraway’s role, relevant conduct, possible recidivism, and protecting the public. View "United States v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Ye sought to recover against GlobalTranz, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claimed, under Illinois law, that GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier (Sunrise) that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. Ye obtained a $10 million default judgment against Sunrise.The district court concluded that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the significant economic effects that would result from imposing state negligence standards on brokers. Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, with a specific carveout for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority." Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a ... service of any ... broker ... with respect to the transportation of property.” Rejecting the "safety exception" claim, the court reasoned that a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles." View "Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law