Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
United States v. Jones
Balentine, who lived in Kokomo, pooled money from co-conspirators to buy illegal drugs from Riley in Georgia. The two arranged for couriers. Balentine stored the drugs in the homes of his associates, then distributed the drugs to O’Bannon, Jones, Myers, Reed, Owens, Jones, and Abbott. After two years of investigation, officers intercepted a courier and seized methamphetamine and cocaine she was transporting. Myers’s girlfriend drove to Georgia to pick up another shipment; she was also intercepted. To protect the operation, Riley and Balentine plotted to kill a suspected confidential informant. Officers stopped O’Bannon as he drove with the hitmen to the target’s home. Officers found several firearms in the hitmen’s hotel room. With a warrant, a DEA agent searched the conspirators’ residences, finding guns and drugs.Fourteen people were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and individual counts related to drugs, firearms, murder for hire, and money. laundering. Nine defendants pleaded guilty. The others were convicted on most charges. Ten defendants appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, only vacating Jones’s sentence–the court erred in applying a firearm enhancement. The wiretap and search warrant affidavits were sufficient. The district court properly rejected a Batson challenge, focusing on the credibility of the government’s explanations for its strikes. The court upheld the admission of a DEA special agent’s “dual-role” testimony; a related jury instruction was “confusing” but did not merit reversal. Sufficient evidence supported all of the convictions. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Zenith Logistics, Inc.
The employers agreed that for the duration of two collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), they would make pension contributions on behalf of covered employees to the Pension Fund. Both CBAs contained “evergreen clauses” that extended them a year at a time until either party provided timely written notice expressing an “intention to terminate.” Both were to expire in January 2019. After the window for timely notice of intention to terminate on that date, the employers and the union signed new CBAs requiring pension contributions to a different fund beginning in February 2019. The employers notified the Fund that they were ceasing contributions, relying on letters the union sent in November 2018.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Fund’s lawsuit. Those letters did not express the union’s intent to terminate the existing CBAs, so as to satisfy the evergreen clause's termination procedure. The letters did not mention termination. They noted the date that the CBAs would expire and expressed a desire to meet to negotiate new agreements; neither of these points communicated an intent to terminate the existing agreements. In the context of an evergreen clause, expiration and termination are distinct concepts. A desire to negotiate a new contract is quite consistent with a desire to leave the existing agreement in place until a new deal is reached. The old agreements renewed under the evergreen clauses; the employers remained obligated to contribute to the Fund for one more year. View "Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Zenith Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
ERISA, Labor & Employment Law
United States v. Turner
Aguas received a tenant complaint about a marijuana odor and suspicious drug activity at Apartment 103. He called the police and stated that, on three occasions, he had smelled marijuana when passing by Apartment 103 and in the empty unit directly above it. When Aguas knocked on the door, Turner, opened the door. Investigator Quinley and Aguas swore to these facts in an affidavit. Warrants were issued. The first authorized a canine sniff outside Apartment 103. The second authorized a search of the apartment conditioned on a positive canine alert. A police dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers entered the apartment and found firearms, marijuana, heroin, and a scale with heroin residue.Turner was charged with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense Turner unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause for the search. Turner stated he did not want to accept the government’s plea agreement. Turner’s counsel confirmed Turner wanted “an open plea.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Turner entered an unconditional plea in open court and waived any objection to the suppression ruling. The court remanded for resentencing, the district court improperly relied on prior state convictions to enhance his statutory maximum sentence. Illinois defines cocaine in a matter “categorically broader than the federal definition.” View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
United States v. Jerry
Jerry robbed a cellphone store at gunpoint, The store determined that Jerry had taken 45 phones and watches, valued at $31,599.86. Jerry pleaded guilty to obstruction of commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act robbery), 18 U.S.C. 1951, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a robbery, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and possession of a firearm by a felon. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Jerry to 264 months as a career offender.The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing based on its 2021 “Bridge” holding that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence.” On remand, the district court resentenced Jerry to 171 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court committed procedural error and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. A court does not commit procedural error simply by listening to purportedly incorrect arguments, nor did the court err in its calculation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines range. The district court’s remarks about the sentencing range were a “personal belief” that cannot reasonably be understood to indicate a personal grudge against Jerry. The court adequately explained that because the Guidelines range did not account for Jerry’s violent conduct and the impact on his victims, a sentence 16-27 percent above that range was appropriate. View "United States v. Jerry" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana
The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Mitek Systems, Inc.
HyreCar is an intermediary between people who own vehicles and people who would like to drive for services such as Uber and GrubHub. Before leasing a car, HyreCar sends an applicant’s information, including a photograph, to Mitek, which provides identity-verification services. Johnson, a HyreCar driver, brought a putative class action, alleging Mitek used that information without the consent required by the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act. Mitek asked the district court to send the case to arbitration, citing an Arbitration Agreement in Johnson’s contract with HyreCar, applicable to drivers, HyreCar, and “any subsidiaries, affiliates, agents, employees, predecessors in interest, successors, and assigns, as well as all authorized or unauthorized users or beneficiaries of services or goods provided under the Agreement.The district court concluded that suppliers such as Mitek were not covered. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Mitek’s claim that it is a “beneficiary of services or goods provided under the Agreement.” The “services or goods provided under the Agreement” are vehicles. Mitek cannot be classified as a “user” of HyreCar’s services or goods. Mitek has its own contract with HyreCar, but does not have a contract with any HyreCar driver. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2 does not change the result. The court noted that claims under the Illinois Act cannot be litigated in federal court unless the plaintiff can show concrete harm. Johnson seeks only statutory damages. Johnson’s claim must be remanded to state court. View "Johnson v. Mitek Systems, Inc." on Justia Law
United States v. Filer
Barsanti was delinquent on $1.1 million of senior secured debt it owed to BMO Harris Bank. Barsanti’s owner, Kelly, hired attorney Filer and Gereg, a financing consultant. After negotiations with BMO failed, Filer introduced Gereg to BMO as a person interested in purchasing Barsanti’s debt. Filer created a new company, BWC, to purchase the loans. BWC purchased the loans from BMO for $575,000, paid primarily with Barsanti’s accounts receivable. Barsanti also owed $370,000 in delinquent benefit payments to the Union Trust Fund. Filer, Kelly, and Gereg used BWC’s senior lien to obtain a state court judgment against Barsanti that allowed them to transfer Barsanti’s assets beyond the reach of the Union Fund, using backdated documents to put confession-of-judgment clauses into the loan documents and incorrectly claiming that Barsanti owed BWC $1.58 million. Filer then obtained a court order transferring Barsanti’s assets to BWC, which then transferred the assets to Millwork, another new entity, which continued Barsanti’s business after the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Barsanti for unpaid taxes. Gereg was Millwork's nominal owner in filings with the Indiana Secretary of State. Barsanti filed for bankruptcy. Filer instructed others not to produce certain documents to the bankruptcy trustee.After a jury convicted Filer of wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343., the district court granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. View "United States v. Filer" on Justia Law
Ramos v. Piech
In 2017, Ramos settled his lawsuits against Cook County Jail correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged a failure to protect Ramos from another inmate and the use of excessive force. The settlement agreements contained an identical 262-word sentence—labeled a general release—that released Cook County and its employees from all claims. Months later, Ramos filed another section 1983 lawsuit against two Cook County police officers based on a 2016 arrest that occurred after the events that lead to the first two lawsuits but prior to the execution of the settlement agreements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. “While the rambling, 262- word sentence is no model of clarity,” it unambiguously released Ramos’s claims arising out of the 2016 arrest. Three phrases signal that Ramos released all foreseeable claims against Cook County “and its agents, employees and former employees,” including those stemming from his 2016 arrest when he signed the settlement agreements in 2017. View "Ramos v. Piech" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Contracts
Ryan v Branko Prpa MD LLC
Ryan sought worker’s compensation and entered into a settlement with his employer, calling for "$150,000 to Rodney Ryan, minus attorney fees and costs listed below; $400,000 to the Trust Account of Fortune & McGillis for disbursement to medical providers and lienholders, it being understood that from any balance remaining Mr. Ryan shall receive 80% and Fortune & McGillis shall receive 20%.” Fortune, Ryan’s law firm, received $30,000 in fees. The employer agreed to fund a Medicare Set Aside for Ryan’s future medical expenses. A state administrative law judge approved the Settlement.Weeks later, before any of the $400,000 was distributed to his doctors, Ryan filed for bankruptcy and attempted to exempt the $400,000 from the estate, citing Wisconsin Statutes 102.27(1), which says no “claim for [worker’s] compensation, or compensation awarded, or paid, [may] be taken for the debts of the party entitled thereto.” Ryan owed more than $800,000 in unpaid medical bills. His medical creditors cited Section 102.26(3)(b)(2), “[a]t the request of the claimant[,] medical expense[s], witness fees[,] and other charges associated with the claim may be ordered paid out of the amount awarded.” The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court holding that Ryan could not exempt the $400,000. The Order created an express trust in favor of the doctors with Fortune as trustee. There were also "grounds to impose a constructive trust because allowing Ryan to keep the $400,000 would have amounted to unjust enrichment.” View "Ryan v Branko Prpa MD LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Bankruptcy
McGee v. Parsano
Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law