Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hess, a 17-year-old student, was required to participate in a ride-along with Hammond Officer Garcia. Her complaint describes a day-long sequence of inappropriate comments and questions punctuated by unwelcome physical sexual contact. Garcia allegedly rubbed his arm against her breast, repeatedly placed his hand on Hess’s thigh, put his hand on her buttocks, stated that Hess wanted to become a prostitute, and, while in a secluded location, asked another officer if he wanted to have sex with Hess. After Hess’s ride along, another female classmate participated in the course-required ride with Garcia. When the classmate told Hess that Garcia had acted inappropriately, the girls reported their experiences.Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Doughty for lack of allegations of the requisite level of involvement in the alleged violations. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim against Garcia. It is well established that sexual assault by a government official acting under the color of law can violate the Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination, the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure in their persons,” and the right to bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause. The court rejected arguments that the alleged conduct was simply “boorish” and not serious enough to implicate the Constitution. Sexual assault is an intentional act that never serves a legitimate governmental purpose. View "Hess v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Jaranowski worked as a conductor for the Railroad for 22 years. While operating a railroad switch in 2020, he seriously injured his neck. He sued the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that he was injured because the railroad failed to maintain the switch properly. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and negligence per se based on alleged violations of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Track Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. 213. The district court concluded that Jaranowski had failed to present evidence that would support a finding that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the switch before he was injured and granted the Railroad summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Actual or constructive notice is required to violate the federal Track Safety Standards, however, Jaranowski presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the railroad at least should have known that the switch was defective before he was injured. A reasonable jury could accept Jaranowski’s account of the facts and the report of his expert, who examined the switch, to conclude that the Railroad’s prior inspection was performed without due care. View "Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Martinez applied for supplemental security income. An ALJ reviewed the record and found that Martinez suffered from severe impairments but could nonetheless “perform the requirements of representative unskilled occupations such as a checker, routing clerk, and mail sorter.” After the Appeals Council denied Martinez’s request to review the decision, Martinez filed suit, then notified the Commissioner that the administrative record (pages within exhibit B15F) included medical records regarding a different claimant. In filing the administrative record with the court, the Commissioner noted that it was the full record. The pages relating to the other claimant were removed and replaced with a placeholder reading: “THIS PAGE WAS REMOVED AS AN EXHIBIT BY THE APPEALS COUNCIL BECAUSE IT DOES NOT REFER TO THE CLAIMANT.” Neither Martinez nor the district court saw the omitted pages. The Commissioner refused to produce the pages. Martinez moved to compel the Commissioner to include the full exhibit in the administrative record. The district court denied that motion, stating that “[t]he ALJ [only] cited the third-party records in exhibit B15F … as additional potential evidence that Mr. Martinez had an impairment.” The district court then affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it relies on medical records belonging to someone other than Martinez; it is impossible to determine whether that error was harmless. View "Martinez v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

FBI agents created a profile for a fictitious individual, “Clay,” on the dating app “Grindr.” Grindr does not allow users under age 18, so the agent represented that Clay was 18. Agent Carter testified that he exchanged messages with Leal, telling him that Clay was 15 years old. Grindr deleted Clay’s profile. Carter created a new profile for “Corey.” Leal initiated contact with Corey. The ensuing discussion concerned a meeting, Corey’s age and the risk of going to jail, and condoms. When Leal arrived for the meeting, an officer pulled up behind the car Leal had described; the car accelerated. Officers stopped the vehicle and found Leal driving. Leal admitted to planning to receive oral sex from Corey—who he believed was under 18–and stated that he deleted the Grindr app as he was being stopped because he knew it was wrong to meet with a 15-year-old.Leal was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). At Leal’s request, the district court charged the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the entrapment defense. The court also provided the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the permissibility of the government’s use of undercover and deceptive investigative techniques. Convicted, Leal was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to prove that Leal was not entrapped. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

The Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians is a federally recognized tribe in northwestern Wisconsin. In 2013 the Tribe’s Community Health Center hired Mestek as the Director of Health Information. In 2017 the Health Center implemented a new electronic health records system. Mestek soon raised questions about how the new system operated, expressing concern to management that the Center was improperly billing Medicare and Medicaid. An eventual external audit of the Center’s billing practices uncovered several problems. After receiving the audit results in 2018, Bae, the head of the Health Center, called Mestek into her office to ask if she was “loyal.” Mestek answered yes, but persisted in her efforts to uncover billing irregularities. A month later, Mestek learned that she was being fired in a meeting with the Medical Director and the HR Director. Mestek sued the Health Center and six individuals (in both their personal and official capacities) under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precluded Mestek from proceeding; the Health Center is an arm of the Tribe. The individual employee defendants also properly invoked the Tribe’s immunity because Mestek sued them in their official capacities. View "Mestek v. Lac Courte Oreilles Community Health Center" on Justia Law

Hohman, age 53, applied for Social Security benefits after she stopped working. She suffers from fibromyalgia, PTSD, depression, and anxiety, and alleged that the combined effects of these conditions left her unable to work as a medical records clerk or patient access representative. A vocational expert testified that someone with Hohman’s limitations could work as a photocopy machine operator, small products assembler, or mail clerk. Relying on that testimony, an ALJ denied the claim for benefits, finding that despite her limitations, Hohman still had the capacity to perform light work with physical and social limitations available in significant numbers in today’s economy. The vocational expert stated that he arrived at his final numbers about jobs available in the economy through a “weighted estimate" based upon professional experience, 25 years of both placement and labor market survey work, and 2,000 labor market surveys, explaining that many of the job titles in the database had been merged or had been eliminated by technology, so he decided that the job titles should not receive equal weight.The Seventh Circuit and the district court affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the denial. The court acknowledged Hohman’s frustration with the equal distribution method and concerns about the method’s reliability but stated that it is not, by itself, reversible error for an ALJ to rely on the equal distribution method to make a job-number determination. View "Hohman v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.” View "Snowden v. Henning" on Justia Law

Leisgang suffers from depression, anxiety, and a personality disorder, among other conditions. He sought supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. The ALJ concluded that Leisgang could undertake only simple, routine, and repetitive work; could not work at a rapid, production-rate pace; could tolerate few changes in routine work settings; and could interact only occasionally with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Those limitations precluded Leisgang from performing his past work. To determine whether Leisgang could perform other available jobs, the ALJ sought assistance from a vocational expert, who testified that someone with Leisgang’s limitations could work as a kitchen helper, sweeper/cleaner, or hospital cleaner. The expert estimated that there were meaningful numbers of each job across the country, identifying job titles using the Department of Labor's 1977 dictionary, not revised since 1991. The primary data came from the Occupational Employment Quarterly, which applies the equal distribution method to estimate the distribution of job numbers within a larger group of occupations. When Leisgang asked if that method was reliable, the expert reported that it was the only method he had available. Leisgang asked no further questions about the methodology.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits. Leisgang forfeited his argument that the ALJ should have done more to ensure the soundness of the vocational expert’s methodology by failing to object at the hearing. Substantial evidence otherwise supports the ALJ’s determination. View "Leisgang v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

In 2006 Ubiquity, a California-based company, contracted with North’s Illinois firm, Associates. North executed the contract in Arizona, where he lived, on behalf of Associates. Ubiquity promised to transfer 1.5% of its outstanding shares to Associates as a “commencement fee.” Ubiquity terminated the agreement two months after signing the contract and never transferred its shares. In 2013, when Ubiquity went public, North demanded specific performance, then sued Ubiquity for breach of contract in Arizona state court. The Arizona court denied Ubiquity’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.North, worried about reversal on appeal, filed an identical breach-of-contract claim in the Northern District of Illinois in 2016. Ubiquity failed to appear. The district court entered a default judgment ($7 million). Ubiquity successfully moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court explained that Ubiquity’s only connection to Illinois was that it had contracted with an Illinois entity and that North, by his own admissions, had negotiated, executed, and promised to perform in Arizona. North filed an appeal but obtained a stay while his Arizona litigation proceeded. That stay remained in effect until 2023; by then North’s contract claim was time-barred in every relevant jurisdiction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court ought to have considered transferring the case to the Central District of California (28 U.S.C. 1631) North’s own representations would have fatally undermined his transfer request. View "North v. Ubiquity, Inc." on Justia Law