Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Humphrey was a Riteway driver. His trips began in Illinois, often ending in another state. In 2013 Humphrey drove a truck to Indiana. After he delivered the freight, Riteway directed him to another site in Fort Wayne. While driving to the pickup site, Humphrey’s truck collided with Wright's car. After cooperating with the police, Humphrey picked up his load and delivered it to Illinois. Wright sued Riteway in Indiana state court and obtained a default judgment. Riteway's Prime Insurance policy contained an endorsement that provides payments to an injured party even when the insurer need not defend or indemnify its client. A federal court determined that Riteway had forfeited the benefit of Prime’s policy but reserved questions about whether Wright could recover under the endorsement. The Indiana judiciary declined to allow Prime to attack the default judgment.Prime sought a declaratory judgment that the endorsement did not apply. The endorsement applies to any judgment “resulting from negligence ... subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.” Those statutes have been repealed but the parties stipulated that 49 U.S.C. 31139(b)(1) applies and provides that all motor freight transportation from a place in one state to a place in another is covered. The district court ordered Prime to pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Humphrey was engaged in interstate freight transportation under the statutory definition regardless of intent, whether a truck was carrying freight, or the “totality” of the circumstances. View "Prime Insurance Co. v. Wright" on Justia Law

Michael has worked for FCA for more than two decades. In 2014 he married Becky, also a veteran FCA employee at the company’s Kokomo, Indiana transmission plant. In 2017 they submitted medical certifications from their healthcare providers to take intermittent leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, for periodic flare-ups of anxiety, depression, and back pain (Michael) and irritable bowel syndrome (Becky). At the end of that year, FCA’s outside FMLA administrator notified the company that they had 21 common days of FMLA absence and an additional 27 days on which their partial-day leave requests overlapped. FCA opened an investigation. Neither Michael nor Becky could explain why they had requested FMLA leave on so many of the same dates and times. FCA suspended both for providing false or misleading information in connection with their FMLA leave requests.In a suit alleging interference with FMLA rights and retaliation, the district judge granted FCA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the suspension was not based on an honest suspicion of FMLA abuse. View "Michael Juday v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Traders set up accounts with Trean, a Chicago Mercantile Exchange introducing broker, managing the customer side of the futures-trading business. Stone handled the trading side. The traders engaged in naked trading—speculating rather than hedging. Stone set a high margin accordingly. Stone was a principal in all trades and, with the clearing house bore, the immediate economic risk; Trean guaranteed Stone’s positions and shared in its commissions. The market did not cooperate. Trean learned that the traders had not met Stone’s margin call and were not cooperating with Stone. Trean told the traders that it would close their accounts but that they were free to deal directly with Stone. Stone thereafter prohibited any trades that would increase the holdings’ net risk. The traders liquidated. Of the $1,020,000 with which they began, they lost $548,000.The traders sued, contending that their contract with Trean did not allow it to cease dealing with them for the reason given and that Trean’s decision led Stone to impose unacceptable conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Trean. Regardless of whether Trean was entitled to end its dealings with the traders, no reasonable jury could find that Trean injured them. Trean’s decision did not affect the value of their futures contracts; they did not have a greater loss than they would have by moving their accounts to a different introducing broker and retaining Stone. View "Daneshrad v. Trean Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Behning, an Illinois prisoner, claims that prison guards violated his constitutional rights while responding to his altercation with a prison guard. After the incident Behning was taken to the emergency room, was charged with assaulting an officer, and was put in solitary confinement at another institution. While he was in solitary confinement, Behning allegedly timely mailed a grievance over the altercation, inadequate medical care, and procedural defects in his disciplinary hearing to the Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board. He sent a copy to his attorney, who also forwarded it to the Board. The Board returned it, asserting that only offenders themselves could submit grievances. Behning mailed another grievance, which the prison rejected as untimely.Behning filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted summary judgment based on Behning’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. Behning, through his attorney, submitted most of his grievances to the appropriate administrative office, on time. Nothing in the regulation prohibits an offender from submitting a grievance through an attorney. Regardless of how Behning’s grievance arrived, it apprised the Board of the nature of his complaints. View "Behning v.Johnson" on Justia Law

Bankruptcy trustees can recover some transfers made to outside parties during the 90 days before the debtor files a petition, 11 U.S.C. 547(b)(4)(A). Warsco, the trustee in the Harris bankruptcy, discovered that about $3,700 had been paid to Creditmax during those 90 days under a garnishment order, which was issued by an Indiana state court more than 90 days before Harris filed his bankruptcy petition. Warsco began an adversary proceeding to recover the $3,700Creditmax argued that the definition of a “transfer” under section 547 depends on state law and that under Indiana law a “transfer” occurs when a garnishment order is entered, not when money is paid. The bankruptcy court denied the Trustee’s application. The Seventh Circuit overruled and remanded the decision, citing a 1992 Supreme Court holding that federal rather than state law defines the meaning of “transfer.” The “transfer” occurs when money changes hands. View "Warsco v. Creditmax Collection Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Baro was an ESL teacher for Waukegan Community School District in 2019 when she signed a union membership form—a contract to join the union that represents teachers in the District. The form authorized the District to deduct union dues from her paychecks for one year. Baro alleged she learned later that she was not required to join the union. She tried to back out of the agreement. The union insisted that her contract was valid. The District continued deducting dues from her paychecks.Baro filed suit, arguing that the dues deduction violated her First Amendment rights under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Janus: decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Baro voluntarily consented to the withdrawal of union dues. The enforcement of a valid private contract does not implicate her First Amendment rights. The “First Amendment protects our right to speak. It does not create an independent right to void obligations when we are unhappy with what we have said.” View "Baro v. Lake County Federation of Teachers Local 504, IFT-AFT" on Justia Law

Baker ran from police officers, took a loaded firearm out of his waistband, and threw it over a fence into a residential backyard. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court added two offense levels under Sentencing Guideline 3C1.2 for Baker’s having “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”The Seventh Circuit upheld Baker’s 72-month sentence. Without the contested enhancement, his guideline range would have been 57-71 Months but the record indicates that the district judge would have imposed the same sentence even if the contested guideline levels had not been added. The judge focused on Baker’s 11 prior convictions, including three for being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, and said, “I noted that you got 72 months before when you [committed this offense] a third time. You need to get at least 72 months this time given your history. I need to deter you from committing this crime again. I need to deter others not to do it again.” Any guideline error would have been harmless. The actual sentence was reasonable under the circumstances. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Porosh, a citizen of Bangladesh, claims he joined a political party, Jamaat in 2012, at age 15, and that an opposing party, Awami, called and threatened to kill Porosh; attacked Porosh and broke his hand; and held him against his will for two days. Porosh did not report the first two incidents to the police because he believes Awami controls the government. After he escaped, Porosh tried to report these three incidents. The police allegedly threatened to kill him if he filed a report. Porosh moved to another city but he claims Awami was still looking for him. In 2015, Porosh moved to Malaysia. In 2020, Awami contacted his father, threatening that if they found Porosh, they would kill him. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Malaysia announced that everyone with a temporary work permit would be returned to their home country. Porosh went to the United States with what he believed to be a valid work permit. When he presented the permit in Chicago, officers identified it as fake.After an interview, officers determined Porosh had a “credible fear of persecution” based on “political opinion” but an IJ rendered an adverse credibility determination and denied Porosh asylum. The BIA dismissed Porosh’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. While some of the IJ’s conclusions lack evidentiary support, on the whole, the decision is supported by findings that have a credible basis in the record. View "Porosh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Adams Outdoor Advertising owns billboards throughout Wisconsin, including 90 in Madison. Madison’s sign-control ordinance comprehensively regulates “advertising signs,” to promote traffic safety and aesthetics. The ordinance defines an “advertising sign” as any sign advertising or directing attention to a business, service, or product offered offsite. In 1989, Madison banned the construction of new advertising signs. Existing billboards were allowed to remain but cannot be modified or reconstructed without a permit and are subject to size, height, setback, and other restrictions. In 2009, Madison prohibited digital displays; in 2017, the definition of “advertising sign” was amended to remove prior references to noncommercial speech. As amended, the term “advertising sign” is limited to off-premises signs bearing commercial messages.Following the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Reed” decision, Adams argued that any ordinance treating off-premises signs less favorably than other signs is a content-based restriction on speech and thus is unconstitutional unless it passes the high bar of strict scrutiny. The judge applied intermediate scrutiny and rejected the First Amendment challenge. The Supreme Court subsequently clarified that nothing in Reed altered its earlier precedents applying intermediate scrutiny to billboard ordinances and upholding on-/off-premises sign distinctions as ordinary content-neutral “time, place, or manner” speech restrictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. View "Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. City of Madison, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

In 2013. Yankey pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846. The court sentenced Yankey to 115 months in prison followed by 48 months of supervised release. His prison term was 36 months below the bottom of the advisory guideline range. In 2020, Yankey began his term of supervised release. The probation office’s summary indicates that Yankey associated with people engaged in criminal activity and had a certain person at his home who his probation officer had specifically and repeatedly warned could not be there. During a 2022 probation visit, drugs and paraphernalia were found in Yankey’s home. Yankey admitted that in March 2022, he had used methamphetamine and cocaine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of Yankey’s supervised release and his sentence of 24 months in prison followed by 24 more months of supervision. The judge’s questions and comments indicate that he considered mitigation arguments about Yankey’s family support, employment history, and efforts toward sobriety. The judge considered the sentencing factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, and the need for treatment. The court’s decision that the prior below-guideline sentence justified a revocation sentence at the top of—but still within—the guideline range was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Yankey" on Justia Law