Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bureau Chief Korza received a complaint regarding Snowden’s handling of a claim. Korza found discrepancies in Snowden’s records. Korza and a division administrator met with Snowden and her union representative and gave Snowden copies of the records. Korza continued his review and found many additional problems. Korza consulted with the Department’s Labor Relations office. Korza lacked the authority to discharge anyone and was advised that discharge was an appropriate penalty for the falsification of records. Korza summarized his findings for the director of the Division and recommended termination. At a later pre-disciplinary meeting, Snowden and her union representative were given a statement of charges. Korza stated that the discipline was undetermined because Snowden had not had an opportunity to respond, but that the charged violations were subject to discipline including discharge. Snowden’s written rebuttal did not contest the factual basis for the charges but noted arguable shortcomings in the investigation. At a final meeting, Korza advised Snowden that she was being placed on suspension pending discharge. Director Hoffman later signed a form terminating Snowden. Snowden pursued a grievance, which resulted in Snowden being allowed to resign without reinstatement rights.Snowden filed suit, asserting due process violations, claiming that Korza had decided to discharge her before the pre-disciplinary meeting and was not the impartial decision-maker. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. Korza was not the decision-maker. Snowden was given notice and the opportunity to respond before that decision was made, plus a post-discharge grievance process. View "Snowden v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The 1996 E-Rate program (Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support program, Telecommunications Act 110 Stat. 56), is intended to keep telecommunications services affordable for schools and libraries in rural and economically disadvantaged areas. The program subsidizes services and requires providers to charge these customers rates less than or equal to the lowest rates they charge to similarly situated customers. Heath brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Wisconsin Bell charged schools and libraries more than was allowed under the program, causing the federal government to pay more than it should have. The district court granted Wisconsin Bell summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Heath’s briefing and evidence focused more on which party bore the burden of proving violations than on identifying specific violations in his voluminous exhibits and lengthy expert report, Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. It is reasonable to infer that government funds were involved and that if the government knew of actual overcharges, it would not approve claims. View "Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

Luster was buying a house on contract and had already paid the owner at least 20 percent of the price of the home. The village contacted Luster to obtain the property to create a municipal park. Luster rebuffed this offer. The village then contacted the seller. Luster claims the village knew of his contract but convinced the seller to convey a warranty deed to the village without notifying Luster. The village then sent a letter to Luster demanding immediate possession of the property. According to Luster, he was unable to insure the house because of the ownership dispute. The house burned down while Luster was attempting to quiet title, destroying his family’s possessions and leaving them homeless. Luster sued the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for his lost property and the village’s “malicious conduct.” He alleged that the village took the home without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the complaint. Luster’s complaint does not allege or permit a reasonable inference that he was deprived of his property by the random, unauthorized acts of any village employee. Absent any obvious reason why the village could not have provided advance notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before it seized Luster’s property interest, the adequacy of a post-deprivation remedy is irrelevant. View "Luster v. Village of Ashmore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, three transgender boys, were denied access to the boys’ bathrooms at school. The boys sued the districts and the school principals, alleging sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The boys requested preliminary injunctions that would order the schools to grant them access to the boys’ bathrooms and, in the case of two boys, access to the boys’ locker rooms when changing for gym class. The district courts granted the preliminary injunctions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that litigation over transgender rights is occurring all over the country and that at some point the Supreme Court will likely step in with more guidance than it has furnished so far. The district courts appropriately followed Circuit precedent in crafting narrowly tailored and fact-bound injunctions. There was no abuse of discretion in the balancing of the equities and the public interest. The records showed only speculative harms, which are not enough to tip the balance. View "A.C. v. Kutruff" on Justia Law

Wilson was traveling at O’Hare airport with $33,783 in cash. The Drug Enforcement Administration seized the money, suspecting that the proceeds were from illegal drug activity. DEA notified Wilson that it would declare the seized cash as government property by administrative forfeiture. Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(1)(A), Wilson had to file a “claim” with DEA by September 25, 2020. She received the required notice that failure to file a timely claim would waive her right to contest the forfeiture. On September 18, 2020, Wilson’s attorney mistakenly filed the wrong form, a “petition for remission,” which seeks to reduce the amount of seized money subject to forfeiture. Wilson’s attorney realized the mistake about five months later and sent a letter. DEA declined to correct the error.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Wilson’s Motion to Recover Seized Property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), which “is properly invoked to request the return of seized property before forfeiture proceedings have been initiated.” CAFRA is “the exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture.” Wilson did not assert any challenge to the notice she received from the DEA; her argument amounted to a request for equitable relief. Apart from challenges based on notice, “Congress has authorized no other means for challenging a declaration of forfeiture” in federal court. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Middle Mississippi is the 195-mile-long stretch from St. Louis, Missouri, where the Missouri River flows into the Mississippi, to Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi and doubles its flow. The 1910 Rivers and Harbors Act authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to construct permanent river training structures in the Middle Mississippi and perform supplemental dredging to maintain a channel sufficient for commercial traffic. The Corps has for decades built and maintained structures—dikes, jetties, and chevrons—along the Middle Mississippi to ensure that the channel is at least nine feet deep and 300 feet wide for commercial navigation. In 1976, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) assessing the project's ecological impacts. In 2013, the Corps decided to supplement its 1976 EIS, based on newly designated threatened and endangered species, and new information on the effects of river training structures and dredging. In the final supplemental EIS and record of decision, the Corps chose the “Continue Construction Alternative.” Because the exact locations and types of future river training structures are unknown, the supplemental statement studied environmental impacts at a programmatic level and will perform site-specific environmental assessments before actually building additional river training structures.In a challenge brought by environmental groups, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, rejecting arguments that the supplemental EIS did not comply with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 1041, or the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. View "National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Kimmons was diagnosed with early cataracts in the center of his vision that might qualify for surgery. An optometrist recommended that Kimmons avoid driving at night. Kimmons lived in Racine and was working at Charter’s Milwaukee call center, a one-hour drive away. Kimmons’ shift ended at 9:00 PM, so he asked Charter to modify his work schedule. Charter allowed him to start at 10:00 AM and end at 7:00 PM but for only 30 days. Kimmons asked to extend his modified schedule while he tried to move closer to the workplace. Charter’s internal policy permitted work-schedule changes, but Charter summarily denied this request, stating that “assistance with your commute” is “not required under the ADA." Kimmons tried other options for commuting without success.Kimmons filed an EEOC charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted Charter summary judgment, finding that Kimmons did not need any accommodation to perform an essential job function. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that there is no bright-line rule as to when an employee’s disability interferes with essential job attendance or whether particular accommodations are reasonable but, if a qualified individual’s disability substantially interferes with his ability to get to work and attendance at work is an essential function, an employer may sometimes be required to provide a commute-related accommodation, if reasonable under the circumstances. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

After a New Year’s Eve hit-and-run left one person dead and another injured, Jones became a suspect and turned himself in. During a recorded interrogation at 1:18 a.m., an officer read Jones his Miranda rights and fully explained those rights. Jones asked what penalty he was potentially facing. The officer refused to answer, asking multiple times if Jones wanted to proceed with questioning. The officer stated that others had placed him at the scene of the accident, police knew Jones fled because he was scared, Jones did the right thing coming in, and it was important for Jones to get his side of the story on record. After saying he felt horrible, Jones asked, “So y’all can get a public pretender right now?” After some laughter, a detective responded, “You said it right, pretender … they’re called public defenders.” After more chuckling, the detective said: “Obviously due to the time right now, we can’t.” At one point the detective stated that he believed the maximum punishment was 15 years. Jones then told the detectives what happened, implicating himself.The Wisconsin trial court denied his motion to suppress, concluding that Jones's joking reference to a “public pretender” cannot constitute a genuine request. A state appellate court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Jones’s question about a lawyer, whether earnest or in jest, was too ambiguous to invoke his right to counsel under Supreme Court law. View "Jones v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Doe is a transgender male who was born female. He had breast-removal surgery but no other gender-altering procedure. Doe’s partner is A.B., the mother of R.M. and four other children. Starke County Detective Gray, and Purtee, a family case manager with the Indiana Department of Child Services, met with 17-year-old R.M. to investigate allegations that Doe and A.B. had abandoned him. Ultimately, Doe and A.B. were arrested for neglect of a dependent and nonsupport of a dependent child. During subsequent interviews and proceedings, it was divulged that Doe was born female.After the charges were resolved with deferred prosecution agreements, Doe and A.B. sued the detective, the Sheriff’s Department, and Purtee under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of Doe’s right to privacy in sexual preference under the Fourteenth Amendment and that they were arrested without probable cause contrary to the Fourth Amendment. They later sought to amend their complaint to clarify that Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment claim pertained to the disclosure of gender identity not sexual preference. The district court denied the motion to amend and entered summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no clearly established right to privacy in one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or child welfare investigation. The totality of the circumstances provided probable cause for the arrests. View "Doe v. Gray" on Justia Law

Arroyo served in the Illinois House of Representatives from 2006-2019, while also managing a lobbying firm. In 2018-2019, Arroyo’s firm received $32,500 in checks from Weiss’s sweepstakes-gaming company in exchange for his official support for the sweepstakes industry in the General Assembly. Despite never previously expressing a view on sweepstakes gaming, Arroyo began pushing for sweepstakes-friendly legislation and encouraging other legislators and executive-branch officials to support the same. Arroyo concealed his financial arrangement with Weiss.When the government uncovered the bribery scheme, Arroyo pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). The court sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment and ordered that he forfeit $32,500 in bribe money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Arroyo’s contention that the judge erred by finding his 57-month sentence necessary to deter public corruption. District judges need not marshal empirical data on deterrent effects before considering whether a sentence adequately deters criminal conduct. The judge presumed that public officials are rational actors who pay attention when one of their own is sentenced. That presumption that sentences influence behavior at the margins was reasonable. The court also rejected arguments that the judge erred by deeming several of his allocution statements aggravating and ordering him to forfeit too much money. View "United States v. Arroyo" on Justia Law