Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smartt had a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old runaway (S.S.) and traveled around the country with her while working as a trucker. He took sexually explicit photos of her. When she got pregnant, he returned her to Alton, Illinois. The FBI investigated when S.S. sought medical care at an Alton hospital. Agents obtained a warrant to search Smartt’s East St. Louis home, where they seized electronic devices containing sexually explicit photos of S.S. DNA tests confirmed that Smartt is the father of her child. Smartt sent letters addressed to S.S. and others trying to influence her testimony. Smartt was convicted of producing child pornography and of witness tampering.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smartt’s claims that the judge erred in referring to S.S. as “the victim” before she testified. During her direct examination, S.S. identified 14 sexually explicit photos Smartt had taken of her. The prosecutor moved to admit only one. The judge asked whether the prosecutor planned to admit the other photos through another witness. The prosecutor said yes. The judge replied: “Just making sure.” The court rejected Smartt’s argument that the comment signaled pro-government bias to the jury. Smartt did not clear the high hurdle of plain-error review; “his arguments are frivolous.” View "United States v. Smartt" on Justia Law

Butler downloaded, distributed, and shared child pornography via internet chat rooms. After tracking him online, investigators obtained a search warrant and seized ten electronic devices from his home, which contained more than 10,000 images and videos of child pornography. Much of this material involved very young children—including babies—and some depicted sadistic and masochistic content. After several years of competency proceedings, Butler pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1).The district judge imposed a prison sentence of 188 months, the bottom of the properly calculated 188-235 month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Butler’s argument that a lower sentence was warranted “in light of his background and mitigating circumstances” as “frivolous on the merits.” The judge considered all of the relevant factors and explained how she weighed those factors. She was aware that Butler suffers from bipolar disorder, personality disorder, and several mood disorders, and was himself the victim of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse as a child. Weighing the need to protect the public, she noted the seriousness of the offense and that Butler has an adult conviction for boarding a school bus while impersonating a police officer and another for child abduction in which he again posed as a police officer and attempted to lure children into his car. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2000, Von Vader pled guilty to distributing methamphetamine in Wisconsin and was sentenced to 270 months’ imprisonment; the court concluded he was a “career offender.” He did not appeal. Von Vader later pled guilty to possessing heroin in prison (in Kansas) and received an additional ten-year sentence. In a 2017 petition (28 U.S.C. 2255) Von Vader argued that intervening Supreme Court precedent indicated that one or more of his previous convictions should not have been counted toward career offender classification. Von Vader’s petition was dismissed as untimely.He then unsuccessfully applied for compassionate release (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)), contending that the 2000 sentencing error was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. The Seventh Circuit first held that the fact that Von Vader’s 2000 sentence has expired did not render the application moot because relief would be possible, The court then rejected his claims on the merits. A challenge to a sentence must be resolved by direct appeal or motion under 2255, not by seeking compassionate release. Judicial decisions, even those announcing new law, cannot alone amount to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, which, under 3582(c)(1), is some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief. Even if the Sentencing Commission’s staff erred in distributing information concerning Van Vader’s right to file a 2255 motion, prisoners do not have a right to legal assistance in initiating collateral relief requests. View "United States v. Von Vader" on Justia Law

Cruz‐Velasco entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. He has remained continuously present, raising his American‐born sons as a single father after the death of his partner. In 2014, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted of reckless driving, endangering safety, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with his nine‐ and 11‐year‐old sons in the car. In subsequent removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). While in removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted again with DUI and sentenced to serve another 10 days in jail. Cruz‐Velasco stopped drinking after his 2016 arrest and completed a court‐ordered substance abuse program.The IJ held that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, having failed to establish that his sons would suffer hardship beyond what is predictable as a result of a parent’s removal and because his DUI convictions demonstrated a lack of good moral character. While his BIA appeal was pending, the Attorney General ruled that two or more DUI convictions in the relevant period raise a presumption that a noncitizen lacks good moral character, which cannot be overcome solely by showing rehabilitation. The BIA affirmed the removal order Amid the 2020 COVID‐19 pandemic, Cruz‐Velasco sought to reopen his application, submitting new evidence that he had been diagnosed with diabetes and that this condition increased his risk of dying from COVID‐19 in Mexico. The BIA denied Cruz‐Velasco’s motion, without specifically addressing arguments concerning his diabetes. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Cruz-Velasco v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1993 the Village of Channahon approved the plat of a residential subdivision lying within the DuPage River Special Flood Hazard Area. The Village subsequently issued permits for the construction of houses in this subdivision, all of which experience flooded basements when the river is at high water. The current owners of these houses contend that the Village violated the Constitution either by granting the permits to build or by failing to construct dykes to keep water away.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit, noting the plaintiffs do not contend that the Village required them to build where they did or dig basements, or took any steps after the houses’ construction that made flooding worse. The Constitution establishes rights to be free of governmental interference but does not compel governmental intervention to assist persons. Even if the Village violated a local ordinance and a federal regulation, 44 C.F.R. §60.3(c)(7), by granting the applications without insisting that the houses be built higher, the Constitution does not entitle private parties to accurate enforcement of local, state, or federal law. The Village did not take anyone’s property, either by physical invasion or by regulation that prevented the land’s use. The river, which did invade their basements, is not a governmental body. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable but the -plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the water in their basements is “government-induced.” View "Billie v. Village of Channahon" on Justia Law

Sanchez filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) against his former employer, DuPage Regional Office of Education. Sanchez claimed that, after he made two protected disclosures concerning expenditures to DuPage, he suffered five reprisals in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, 41 U.S.C. 4712. The OIG investigated and determined his claims to be unsubstantiated. An ALJ determined, contrary to the findings of the OIG, that Sanchez was entitled to relief for all five alleged reprisals and ordered DuPage to pay Sanchez compensatory damages of $210,000.The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Department of Education, “suggesting” assignment to a different ALJ. The court held that DuPage did not establish that it was entitled to sovereign immunity from the Department’s adjudication of Sanchez’s whistleblower complaint. On the merits, the court concluded that the actions described by Sanchez were not retaliatory. View "DuPage Regional Office of Education v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Williams was shot and killed in 2009, and two other men were injured. A Wisconsin jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson was the gunman. After exhausting state remedies, he appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial and postconviction counsel.The Seventh Circuit declined to reach the merits of Wilson’s claims, finding both procedurally defaulted. Wisconsin state courts disposed of Wilson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on adequate and independent state procedural grounds. Wilson failed to present his ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim for one complete round of state court review. If a petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is precluded unless the prisoner demonstrates either “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” or that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” The miscarriage of justice exception ‘applies only in the rare case where the petitioner can prove that he is actually innocent. Wilson does not allege cause and prejudice and did not make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. View "Wilson v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Joy Global and Komatsu agreed to merge. Joy sent its investors disclosures required under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n. Subsequent suits contended that Joy violated the Act by not disclosing some internal projections of Joy’s future growth that could have been used to negotiate a higher price, rendering the proxy statements fraudulent, and that Joy’s directors violated their state law duties by not maximizing the price for the shareholders. The suits settled for $21 million.The district court held that the $21 million loss is not covered by insurance. The policies do not require indemnification for “any amount of any judgment or settlement of any Inadequate Consideration Claim other than Defense Costs.” An “inadequate consideration claim” is that part of any Claim alleging that the price or consideration paid or proposed to be paid for the acquisition or completion of the acquisition of all or substantially all the ownership interest in or assets of an entity is inadequate.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The suits assert the wrongful act of failing to disclose documents that could have been used to seek a higher price and are within the definition of “inadequate consideration claim.” The claims do not identify any false or deficient disclosures about anything other than the price. The only objection to this merger was that Joy should have held out for more money, and that revealing this would have induced the investors to vote “no.” View "Joy Global Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Oregon and his wife divorced; his ex-wife retained custody over their two children. After his divorce, Oregon failed to file and pay taxes for three years. When he ultimately filed his late tax returns, he mistakenly claimed his two children as dependents. Because of this mistake, Oregon owed the IRS approximately $60,000 in back taxes and penalties. Looking for additional work, Oregon met a man who offered to introduce Oregon to a man who needed help laundering his proceeds from illegal drug sales. He told Oregon that he could keep 10 percent of everything he laundered. Oregon agreed, not knowing that the man was an undercover FBI agent. The agent gave him $100,000. After laundering over $85,000, Oregon had a change of heart and refused to launder any more money.Oregon pled guilty to one count of laundering money, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison—six months below the Sentencing Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Oregon’s arguments that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, such as his need to support his family and his payment of restitution, and improperly relied on the need for general deterrence and to avoid sentence disparities. View "United States v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Department of Labor regulations required the administrator of an employee benefit plan to give a claimant, “upon request,” copies of “all documents, records, and other information” that the administrator considered in making an adverse benefit determination. In 2018, the regulations were amended to eliminate “upon request” and require an administrator to provide such information “sufficiently in advance” of an adverse determination “to give the claimant a reasonable opportunity to respond.”Zall, a dentist for 20 years, sought long-term disability benefits in 2013 after pain and numbness forced him to stop working. His insurer, Standard denied the claim. In 2014, after considering additional medical information and consulting an orthopedic surgeon, Standard approved Zall’s claim, including retroactive payments. Less than a year later, Standard began reviewing his case to see if his condition was subject to a 24-month benefit limit applicable to any disability “caused or contributed to by … carpal tunnel or repetitive motion syndrome” or “diseases or disorders of the cervical, thoracic, or lumbosacral back and its surrounding soft tissue.” Standard ultimately terminated Zall’s benefits.Zall filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, arguing that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and that Standard violated ERISA’s procedural requirements by failing to afford him “a full and fair review.” The district court granted Standard summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The plain language shows that the amended regulation applies; Standard failed to comply. View "Zall v. Standard Insurance Co." on Justia Law