Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A kitchen supervisor directed Balle, an Illinois state prisoner, to carry near-boiling water across a wet, damaged floor in a plastic five-gallon bucket. His foot caught in a hole, and he fell down. The water splashed on him and caused severe burns. Balle sued several prison officials, claiming they violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the dangerous kitchen conditions. The district court dismissed some of Balle’s claims at the pleading stage and granted summary judgment on the others.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The record lacks sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the subjective knowledge of two defendants. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Balle, a reasonable jury could conclude that the kitchen conditions represented an objectively serious danger to inmates, but gaps in the record prevent a jury from inferring that the two actually knew about the conditions that made the kitchen seriously dangerous–that inmates had to carry scalding water across the damaged floor. The court reversed in part, reinstating the claim against the kitchen supervisor, who required the inmates to carry the scalding water. The court affirmed the denial of a motion to recruit counsel. View "Balle v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Camarena defaulted on a debt, then married Ross. Ross and Camarena share a phone plan. FAMS, a debt collector, mailed Camarena a letter. Camarena never followed the letter’s instructions but learned FAMS’s employee email address format and sent emails disputing his debt to FAMS’s CEO and Vice President. The CEO had no recollection of seeing Camarena’s email and could not locate it, while the VP found it in his deleted folder but could not recall ever seeing it. Had Camarena properly submitted his dispute, FAMS could have followed its policy of stopping collection activity until the account was validated. FAMS called Ross concerning Camarena’s debt. Ross initially informed FAMS that it had called her personal cell phone, not an appropriate number for Camarena. The FAMS collector failed to follow procedures to prevent her from receiving future calls, despite his training. FAMS continued to call Ross.Ross sued FAMS, alleging that the calls violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 by continuing debt collection activities after Camarena disputed the debt without first providing verification of the debt; calling Ross after Camarena disputed the debt; calling Ross after she notified FAMS that Camarena does not use her phone; and disconnecting calls with Ross. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of FAMS based on the “bona fide error” defense. FAMS had policies and procedures that should have prevented the calls from going out to Ross. View "Ross v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, TEFRA, 26 U.S.C. 6221–6234, a partnership’s tax liabilities were assessed on individual partners in proportion to their ownership interest. Partners reported their share of that income on their individual tax returns; the partnership supplied information on Schedule K-1. Determinations made at the partnership level were binding on all partners. Partners could opt out of partnership-level proceedings and could challenge partnership-level determinations during ongoing proceedings. Partners were entitled to receive a “notice of beginning of administrative proceedings,” NBAP, and a notice of a “final partnership administrative adjustment,” FPAA, by mail.Goldberg was a partner in two firms. The IRS began auditing the partnerships in 2001-2002 and believes it timely sent the required NBAPs and FPAAs to Ronald by certified mail. Goldberg later denied receiving the NBAPs. In 2010, while the Tax Court’s review of the FPAAs was underway, Goldberg challenged his tax liability for both partnership items, arguing that three-year statute of limitations for the assessments had expired. The IRS suggested raising the challenges in the Tax Court proceedings before the adjustments became final. Goldberg took no action. In 2013 the Tax Court entered judgment. The resulting liability determinations became final. The IRS notified Goldberg of the adjustments and initiated proceedings to collect $500,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Goldberg received notice and had an opportunity to contest the partnership tax liabilities independent of any alleged failing on the IRS’s part. View "Goldberg v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald worked for Roncalli Catholic High School as a guidance counselor and Co-Director of Guidance for 14 years and earned years of stellar performance reviews. In 2018, the school declined to renew her one-year employment agreement, explaining that her same-sex marriage was contrary to the Catholic faith. Fitzgerald was placed on administrative leave. Her Co-director of Guidance, Starkey, informed Roncalli that she too was in a same-sex marriage. The school did not renew Starkey’s employment agreement. Fitzgerald and Starkey brought separate lawsuits, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.In both cases, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The school fired Fitzgerald because of her same-sex marriage and Title VII prohibits this kind of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination suits are barred “when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.” Fitzgerald played a crucial role on the Administrative Council, which was responsible for at least some of Roncalli’s daily ministry, education, and operations and “helped develop the criteria used to evaluate guidance counselors, which included religious components like assisting students in faith formation and attending church services.” Fitzgerald held herself out as a minister. View "Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc." on Justia Law

McKendree University, like other Illinois colleges, closed its campus and switched to remote instruction in March 2020 due to the risks of COVID-19. McKendree already ran an online degree program in addition to its on-campus degree program. McKendree did not refund its in-person students for any portion of their tuition or fees. The plaintiffs. enrolled in McKendree’s on-campus program at the time of the shutdown, sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, noting its recent precedent holding that certain evidence—including a university’s course catalogs, class registration system, and pre-pandemic practices—can suffice under Illinois law to allege the existence of an implied contract between a university and its students for in-person instruction and extracurricular activities. The complaint in this case is “enough—if barely—to state a claim at the pleading stage.” Under Illinois law, the relationship between students and universities is contractual and the parties’ obligations under the contract are “inferred from the facts and conduct of the parties, rather than from an oral or written agreement.” View "Delisle v. McKendree University" on Justia Law

Google and the University of Chicago Medical Center collaborated to develop software capable of anticipating patients’ future healthcare needs. The University delivered several years of anonymized patient medical records to Google, to “train” the software’s algorithms. An agreement restricted Google’s use of the records to specific research-related activities and prohibited Google from attempting to identify any patient whose records were disclosed. Dinerstein sued on behalf of himself and a class of other patients whose anonymized records were disclosed, claiming that the University had breached either an express or an implied contract traceable to a privacy notice he received and an authorization he signed upon each admission to the Medical Center. Alternatively, he asserted unjust enrichment. Citing the same notice and authorization, he alleged that the University had breached its promise of patient confidentiality, violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Against Google, he claimed unjust enrichment and tortious interference with his contract with the University. He brought a privacy claim based on intrusion upon seclusion.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (and later prove) that he has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and traceable to the defendant’s conduct. The injuries Dinerstein alleges lack plausibility, concreteness, or imminence (or some combination of the three). View "Dinerstein v. Google, LLC" on Justia Law

Hartleroad responded to an online post soliciting persons interested in participating in sexual conduct with minors. The author (McCarty, an FBI agent) claimed to be engaged in sexual relations with his 14-year-old stepdaughter. Hartleroad agreed to a Skype meeting, during which Hartleroad would view McCarty engaging in sexual conduct with the minor. McCarty suggested that Hartleroad direct the sexual conduct. Hartleroad sent McCarty a photograph of a child on which he had ejaculated, drafted a script of sexual conduct he expected, and sent it to McCarty. McCarty reminded Hartleroad that the fictitious minor was under age. Hartleroad responded, “It’s cool” and joined the Skype call. McCarty then claimed his wife had returned. McCarty later posted similar messages. Hartleroad reinitiated contact, admitting he knew she was a minor but “would still love to do Skype” and “direct.”Hartleroad was charged with attempting to sexually exploit a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251, for “attempting to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, or a live visual depiction.” The jury received a similar instruction but was told Hartleroad must have acted for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct. The court of appeal affirmed Hartleroad’s conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, and that the indictment charged conduct not prohibited under section 2251(a). View "United States v. Hartleroad" on Justia Law

Marvin’s mother called the police to perform a wellness check; she thought Marvin, age 21, was suicidal. St. Joseph County Sheriff’s Deputies arrived at Marvin’s home and found his mother in the driveway with a bleeding lip. She stated that Marvin had hit her with a chair. The officers approached the house to speak with Marvin, who declined to exit the house. During the confrontation, the deputies saw Marvin’s father remove a box cutter from Marvin’s pocket. They pulled him from the doorway and wrestled him to the ground. While he resisted, they tased him twice and struck him several times. Marvin sued the deputies for unlawful entry and excessive force. Marvin admitted that he was uncooperative but claimed he was not threatening or violent and that he suffered a concussion and a broken toe.Marvin brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the deputies for unlawful entry and excessive force, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the unlawful entry claims against Officer Corban, who had not helped pull Marvin from his house, and the excessive force claims against Officer Lawson-Rulli, who was not involved in tasing or hitting Marvin. Corban and Holcomb’s use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. The court also affirmed a defense verdict on Marvin’s unlawful entry claims against Holcomb and Lawson-Rulli. View "Marvin v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Sorensen's friend Berg told Sorensen to drive a Suburu and follow him. Sorensen drove the Subaru but got lost and slept in the Subaru, waking up the next day. Sorensen then picked up Charles and subsequently noticed a handgun in the driver-side door. He and Charles both had felony records. He drove to a Goodwill parking lot, thinking that there was a drop box for disposing of illegal items without police involvement. He exited the car with the gun. In the meantime, police had received a report that the Subaru was stolen, containing a loaded revolver and ammunition. Officers discovered the Subaru and arrested Charles. Sorensen heard Charles talking to the officers, panicked, and hid the gun on a shelf in the Goodwill store. A Goodwill employee notified officers that a man (Sorensen) had been hiding in a maintenance closet and ran out of the store upon being discovered. Officers arrested Sorensen with the Subaru keys on his person. Sorensen showed them the location of the gun. Officers found the loaded firearm; there were many people, including children, in the store.Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Sorenson sought to present an innocent possession defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, noting that circuit precedent does not recognize an innocent possession defense to section 922(g)(1) and that, even under a broad interpretation of that defense, Sorenson would not qualify. He did not take reasonable steps to turn over the firearm to law enforcement directly or through a third party. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

Springfield Officer Weiss obtained a warrant to search Outland’s person and residence for heroin and drug paraphernalia. Another officer conducted a traffic stop and search, discovered drug paraphernalia, read Outland his Miranda rights, and began transporting him to a DEA facility. Outland collapsed; his face and coat were covered in a white substance (heroin). The officer drove Outland to the emergency room. He was unresponsive when triaged at 10:46 a.m. Hospital staff began administering medications. Around 11:30 a.m., Outland passed swallowing tests. Although he continued to appear drowsy and had apneic episodes, he was generally alert and oriented; his “mentation” was “improved significantly.” He was placed on a Narcan drip, awaiting an ICU bed. At regular intervals, staff described Outland as alert, awake, and oriented. Weiss arrived around 1:00 p.m. The officer assigned to Outland stated that Outland had asked to speak with Weiss. Outland stated his name and date of birth. Weiss read him his Miranda rights and confirmed that he understood his rights. Outland made several incriminating statements about trafficking in heroin.Outland was charged with distributing and conspiring to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)–(C), 846. On remand, the district court rejected his arguments that he was so intoxicated as to render his statement involuntary and was unable to voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights because of the medications. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Outland" on Justia Law