Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal law establishes “[t]he Tuesday after the 1st Monday in November[] in every even-numbered year” as “the day for the election,” 2 U.S.C. 7. Illinois law allows mail-in ballots postmarked on or by Election Day to be counted if received up to two weeks after Election Day. The plaintiffs, State Congressman Bost, and two voters and former presidential electors, argued that this extended ballot counting violates federal law and filed suit against the State Board of Elections to enjoin the practice.Within a month, the Democratic Party of Illinois (DPI) filed a motion to intervene as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 in defense of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of DPI’s motion. DPI failed to point to any reason that the state’s representation of its interests “may be” inadequate, and the district court’s focus on public time and resources over DPI’s individual interests was not an abuse of its discretion. The court allowed DPI to proceed as amicus curiae if it decided to do so. View "Bost v. Democratic Party of Illinois" on Justia Law

Inmate Arce got a sharp knee in the thigh while he was playing soccer at Illinois’s Pinckneyville Correctional Center in June 2017. Since then, he has suffered from severe leg pain, which the prison’s medical providers (Wexford) ultimately concluded was attributable to a blood clot. Arce’s blood clot was successfully treated but his pain persisted. Arce sued Wexford and two of its employees, claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arce claimed that he suffered from compartment syndrome and that failure to diagnose and treat this condition caused his long-term leg injury. But after five years and numerous visits to Wexford and non-Wexford health professionals, Arce has no evidence aside from his lay speculation that he experienced tissue necrosis in his thigh, the primary consequence of untreated compartment syndrome. Nor did Arce proffer any expert testimony or the results of any medical exam opining that his symptoms are consistent with untreated compartment syndrome. An orthopedist thought that he would benefit from further testing for that condition but Arce has not shown deliberate indifference in denying the recommended two-day follow-up appointment or that the denial was “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.” View "Arce v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

After DHS reinstated prior removal orders and initiated another removal proceeding, Mejia sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to Mexico, he would face violence from the criminal gang, Union of Tepito. When Mejia initially refused to transport drugs for Tepito, the gang beat him and mocked his religion; police were nearby and ignored the beating but Mejia could not say whether they saw it. Mejia capitulated but, after a few drug deliveries, he relocated to a different area on the outskirts of Mexico City. The gang found him, hit his head with a gun, and threatened to kill him. Mejia fled to the U.S. He testified that he believed he could not relocate within Mexico because he did not know if other gangs were affiliated with Tepito and feared people would discriminate against his Mexico City accent.The IJ found Mejia credible but denied relief, finding that the gang’s prior attacks did not qualify as persecution or torture; Mejia failed to demonstrate future persecution would be likely, that his persecution was tied to membership in a qualifying social group, or that Mexican officials would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ decided that Mejia could avoid the gang by relocating within Mexico. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Mejia’s counsel had not disputed the relocation finding. View "Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Booker was convicted of first-degree murder and received a 55-year sentence of 55. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, he tried a petition for postconviction relief. At the latter stage, he was represented by Illinois Assistant Appellate Defender Reyna. Booker wanted Reyna to argue that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Reyna declined. Booker filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Booker’s pro se brief because of the state’s rule against hybrid representation.Booker then filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted, reasoning that Illinois courts did not violate any federal rule when they denied his attempt to raise the issue in a pro se supplemental brief. The court also held that Booker’s default could not be excused on actual innocence grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Booker must bear the consequences of his decision. Even if Reyna’s advice was not entirely accurate regarding his chances of success, Booker had proceeded pro se in the past and knew that he could do so again to ensure that his preferred arguments were raised, or he could hope that the court would make an exception to the rule against hybrid representation. View "Booker v. Baker" on Justia Law

An Illinois state agency oversees Metra, a railroad with passenger service over lines radiating from Chicago. For three lines, Metra owns the rolling stock, while Union Pacific supplies the track, the workforce, and ticket sales. Ticket revenue goes to Metra, which pays UP for its services. UP notified Metra that it would discontinue its services. Metra replied that UP cannot drop the service unless relieved of its obligations by the Surface Transportation Board. Metra argued that UP is locked into its relationship with Metra because the 1995 ICC Termination Act repealed 49 U.S.C. 10908, 10909, the only statutes giving the Board authority over the discontinuation of passenger service. UP argued that the repeal deregulated passenger rail service so that railroads can end passenger service when business considerations dictate. Federal law requires the Board’s permission to abandon all service over a line of track but UP will continue freight service; the lines will not be abandoned.The district court declined to defer to the Board’s primary jurisdiction because the dispute does not require any findings of fact by an agency. The Board agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of UP. The controlling contract has long expired. Any reduction in service, therefore, depends on “compliance with all applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” To the extent that UP is a common carrier—rather than an independent contractor of Metra—it has unfettered authority to discontinue any service without the Board’s approval if it keeps the rails in place and continues running some trains. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Regional Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

Dixon Correctional Center Officer Brinkmeier informed inmate Walker that prison policy prohibited prisoners from maintaining “unsearchable” hairstyles like dreadlocks. Walker told Brinkmeier that he was a Rastafarian and had taken a vow not to cut his hair. Brinkmeier later returned with another officer and again ordered Walker to cut his dreadlocks. The officers disciplined Walker for his disobedience, placing him in segregated housing for several days. Walker submitted an emergency grievance, which was denied without explanation. Walker was told that if he did not acquiesce, a tactical unit would forcibly remove his dreadlocks. Walker allowed the prison barber to shave his hair. Walker regrew his dreadlocks and kept them for three years. During security checks, officers ran their gloved hands through his dreadlocks. When he was released from Dixon, Walker’s dreadlocks were roughly the same length as they had been when he entered prison.Walker sued for violations of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1. The district court noted that under Circuit precedent, Walker could not seek monetary damages against individual defendants under RLUIPA; “the only relief available under RLUIPA,” injunctive relief, was moot because Walker had been released. The court also granted the defendants summary judgment on Walker’s First Amendment claim, citing qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that Walker abandoned his RLUIPA damages claim. View "Walker v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Fehlman was the Neillsville Police Department’s interim police chief in 2019. In 2020, Mankowski was hired as the permanent chief. Fehlman returned to being a rank-and-file officer. Over the next several months, Fehlman raised concerns about the management of the department, which Mankowski rebuffed. Fehlman and other officers requested a meeting with the Police & Fire Commission (PFC), where Fehlman raised concerns that Mankowski instilled fear in officers; Mankowski lacked professionalism and, while on duty, told a bar owner that he should consider having the owner’s wife dance topless; Mankowski ordered officers to turn off their body cameras in violation of department policy; Mankowski verbally abused suspects; Mankowski changed radio talk procedures in ways that threatened officer safety; Mankowski prioritized speed limit enforcement over responding to an allegation of child abuse at a school.Mankowski subsequently harassed Fehlman, taking away his work credit card and threatening charges of insubordination. Fehlman resigned from the NPD. Mankowski allegedly interfered with Fehlman’s job search by making false, negative comments (Fehlman was hired nonetheless). Fehlman also discovered that his NPD personnel file had been altered and that Mankowski gave information to the unemployment compensation office that led to a delay in benefits.Fehlman sued Mankowski under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Fehlman’s statements to the PFC were made in his capacity as a public employee, not a private citizen. View "Fehlman v. Mankowski" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Hendrix was sentenced to 78 months in prison, significantly more than the U.S.S.G. range of 46-57 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s sentence was well within its discretion. The court discussed and applied multiple 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in detail: it carefully considered Hendrix’s personal “history and characteristics” but found that this factor was mitigating in some respects and aggravating in others because Hendrix had a lengthy criminal history at age 23. The court also discussed the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” finding Hendrix’s conduct to be serious because Hendrix had possessed a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and had a prior firearms conviction. The court recommended that Hendrix be placed in a drug-abuse treatment program and provided a thorough explanation for its sentence. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s discussion of the prevalence of gun violence in Chicago at sentencing. View "United States v. Hendrix" on Justia Law

Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the commitment and indefinite detention of individuals who are charged with a crime and found to suffer from a mental disorder "coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” The Act requires care and treatment for the committed person, "designed to effect recovery.” Once detainees are deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must discharge them. The Supreme Court held, in 1986, that the Act, on its face, complies with the Due Process Clause, noting the lack of punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic possibility of release.Every Big Muddy River Program detainee participates in a weekly core therapy group. Only detainees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct participate in offense-specific and didactic groups. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy. Therapists evaluate detainees semiannually and provide them with copies of their evaluations and treatment plans. Detainees may discuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group therapy, not one-on-one. The state contracts with Wexford to evaluate detainees for release. The plaintiffs alleged that Big Muddy’s treatment program was run in a constitutionally deficient manner.The district court concluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment program and professional standards amounted to a constitutional violation and issued an injunction, requiring that Big Muddy provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week; reinstate inactive groups; and use independent evaluators for discharge evaluations.The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging concern about whether Illinois is complying with its Fourteenth Amendment obligations. Detainees receive minimal treatment, raising serious questions about whether rehabilitation and release are realistically available. The district court, however, issued too broad an injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), which requires the least intrusive means available to correct the constitutional violation. View "Howe v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Evans twice sold heroin to a confidential source (50 grams, 125 grams). Officers stopped Evans 30 minutes later and found cash from the controlled purchase, methamphetamine, two handguns, and ammunition. He was charged with two drug distribution counts, 21 U.S.C. 841, and two firearm counts, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 922(g)(1). Following conflicts with Evans’s first two lawyers, Sarm was appointed to represent Evans. After Evans withdrew a plea, prosecutors added another 924(c) count.At trial, Sarm only subjected four of 11 witnesses to meaningful cross-examination and rested without presenting any evidence or calling any defense witnesses. Convicted, Evans was sentenced to 788 months; 50 years came from the 924(c) convictions, each of which carried mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 25 years because Evans had a prior qualifying 924(c) conviction. Nineteen days after the trial, Sarm overdosed on heroin. The district court appointed new counsel but, without a hearing, denied a motion for a new trial.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Evans made a single choice to possess a firearm over a continuous 30-minute span that included a sale of heroin and the police finding methamphetamine and a gun in his car. The facts support one 924(c) conviction, not two. Evans faced serious charges with serious sentencing consequences; his appointed counsel had never tried a federal criminal case and was using heroin before, during, and after trial. Evans was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law