Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Russell was convicted of distributing heroin and fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Russell challenged one special condition of his supervised release: that he undergo a sex-offender evaluation to determine whether sex-offender treatment is necessary. In imposing the condition, the district court relied on facts from a police report, summarized in the PSR–that Russell had been convicted in 2010 of an offense that involved the sexual assault of a girl who became his stepdaughter. Russell furnished no evidence to call the PSR into question, stressing only that his “sexual assault case” was only a misdemeanor, not a felony. He expressed concern that imposing the condition could cause problems for him in prison. The court found the facts in the PSR quite detailed for the type of offense and age of the victim and credible. The court explained that if treatment were recommended following the assessment and Russell objected, the court would then decide if treatment was necessary.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The condition does not delegate judicial authority to anyone and vests final decision-making with the judge alone. It was narrowly tailored and promoted the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

The National Police Association (NPA), a non-profit organization, describes its purpose as “educat[ing] supporters of law enforcement in how to help police departments accomplish their goals.” In 2018-2019, some police departments around the country took issue with fundraising mailers the NPA sent residents, characterizing the solicitations as deceptive. The Indianapolis Star and the Associated Press reported on the alerts issued by these police departments in articles that questioned whether the money NPA raised went to police departments. Counsel for the NPA sent a letter to the publisher and AP’s general counsel, providing notice under Indiana Code 34-15-4-2 that the NPA considered the articles defamatory and intended to sue. The letter sought a retraction and removal of public access to online copies of the stories. NPA subsequently sued the publishers, alleging libel. The district court dismissed its case, reasoning that NPA never alleged “actual malice”—that the publishers were aware of an inaccuracy or had serious doubts about the accuracy of the material—when the stories were first published.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting “a novel interpretation of the Restatement (Second) Torts 577(2)” that would create a requirement that internet publishers remove previously published libelous information. The court declined to certify questions to the Indiana Supreme Court to confirm that such a duty exists in Indiana. The alleged duty lacks doctrinal support. View "National Police Association, Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Scanlon went on leave from his job as a Systems Administrator at McKesson. He requested accommodations to return to work; McKesson temporarily granted some, but not all, of them. Scanlon did not return to work but sought long-term disability insurance benefits under a McKesson group policy underwritten, insured, and administered by LINA. To meet the definition of “disabled” under the policy, an employee must be unable to perform the “material duties” of the employee’s regular occupation and earn 80% or more of the employee’s indexed earnings from working in the employee’s regular occupation. LINA denied Scanlon’s request and denied two administrative appeals after Scanlon supplied VA examination reports and letters and two residual functional capacity evaluations. LINA's medical examiners concluded that Scanlon was not entitled to benefitsIn a suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132, the district court found that Scanlon, a veteran, suffered from myriad chronic orthopedic and sleep disorders that cause him pain and impact his daily life but found Scanlon ineligible for benefits, concluding Scanlon did not show that he cannot perform the material duties of his job. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court clearly erred when it failed to consider Scanlon’s inability to sit at his desk for eight hours a day as required by his occupation and his inability to perform the cognitive requirements of his job during regular work hours and in its treatment of certain medical records Scanlon provided. View "Scanlon v. Life Insurance Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Brown’s credit-monitoring business used a “negative option feature” on its websites, offering visitors a free credit report but automatically enrolling them in a $29.94 monthly subscription when they applied for that report. Information about the monthly membership was buried . Brown’s contractors created website traffic by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and directing applicants to the websites for a “free” credit score. The FTC sued under Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) section 13(b), which authorizes restraining orders and permanent injunctions to enjoin conduct that violates its prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. On its face, section 13(b) authorizes only injunctive relief but the Commission long interpreted it to permit restitution awards—an interpretation adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others.The district court entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit overruled its precedent and held that section 13(b) does not authorize restitution awards.The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief. On remand, the Commission argued that the Court’s decision had significantly changed the law and successfully requested the reimposition of the restitution award under the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and FTCA section 19. The Seventh Circuit modified the new judgment. Its direction that any funds remaining after providing consumer redress shall be “deposited to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement” exceeds the remedial scope of section 19, which is limited to redressing consumer injuries. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Three sets of plaintiffs alleged price fixing in the broiler chicken market, including a class of end users–persons and entities who indirectly purchased certain types of broilers from the defendants or alleged co-conspirators for personal consumption in certain jurisdictions during the class period. This class settled their claims with a subset of the defendants for $181 million. The district court entered judgment (FRCP 54(b)) as to the settling parties. Class counsel was awarded one-third of the settlement—excluding expenses and incentive awards— $57.4 million. Class member Andren argued the court erred in discounting bids made by class counsel in auctions in other cases; in suggesting the Seventh Circuit has rejected the use of declining fee scale award structures; and in crediting expert reports. In setting the fee award, the district court considered actual agreements between the parties and fee agreements reached in the market for legal services, the risk of nonpayment at the outset of the case and class counsel’s performance, and fee awards in comparable cases.The Seventh Circuit vacated the award. Under Seventh Circuit law, the district court’s task was to award fees in accord with a hypothetical “ex-ante bargain.” In doing so, the court did not consider bids made by class counsel in auctions in other cases as well as out-of-circuit fee awards. View "Andren v. Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation End User Consumer Plaintiff Class" on Justia Law

Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

Until recently, under every McDonald’s franchise agreement, the franchise operator promised not to hire any person employed by a different franchise, or by McDonald’s itself, until six months after the last date that person had worked for McDonald’s or another franchise. A related clause barred one franchisee from soliciting another’s employee (anti-poach clauses). In a suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, the plaintiffs worked for McDonald’s franchises while these clauses were in force and were unable to take higher-paying offers at other franchises. They contend that the anti-poach clause violated the antitrust laws.The district court dismissed, rejecting plaintiffs’ “per se” theory, stating that the anti-poach clause is not a “naked” restraint on trade but is ancillary to each franchise agreement—and, as every new restaurant expands output, the restraint was justified. The court deemed the complaint deficient under the Rule of Reason because it does not allege that McDonald’s and its franchises collectively have power in the market for restaurant workers’ labor.The Seventh Circuit. The complaint alleges a horizontal restraint; market power is not essential to antitrust claims involving naked agreements among competitors. The court noted that there are many potentially complex questions, which cannot be answered by looking at the language of the complaint but require careful economic analysis. View "Turner v. McDonald's USA LLC" on Justia Law

Garcia provided logistical assistance while another man unloaded items from a secret compartment on an empty bus. The items were controlled substances. Based on his involvement in the affair, Garcia was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to do the same. The court rejected his argument that, although he may have known the bus contained unspecified contraband, the government failed to prove that he knew about drugs specifically, and that notes that jurors submitted to the court during trial suggested that jurors were deliberating prematurely and otherwise not following the court’s instructions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was evidence that Garcia knew the bus contained controlled substances. Garcia knew the object of the conspiracy was drugs, as opposed to some general illicit end. The court noted a conversation about needing “more time because he had not been able to remove the drugs” and a second conversation in which Garcia explicitly mentioned drugs. Although the juror notes show something strange was happening with the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion concluding that it did not rise to the level of misconduct. Courts presume the jury followed the instructions not to deliberate prematurely; there is no “overwhelming” evidence to overcome the presumption. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Munoz, a citizen of Honduras, moved to Guatemala but never acquired lawful status there. She entered into a relationship with Mazariegos, with whom she had two daughters. Mazariegos began a relationship with another woman, Oneida. Munoz and her children left Guatemala for the United States. She applied for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), withholding of removal, section 1231(b)(3)(A), and relief under the Convention Against Torture. At her credible fear interview, Munoz stated that she was afraid of Oneida who had insulted and threatened her; she stated that she had not been physically harmed by anyone. She also stated that the police would protect her in Guatemala. She later claimed that she was the victim of domestic violence and asserted that the police would not help a foreigner. She feared the harassment would continue if she went to Honduras. She later changed her story and denied any physical violence but alleged kidnapping of her daughter.The IJ held that Munoz’s testimony was not credible based on the cumulative effect of the inconsistent, vague, and evasive testimony, and thus she did not meet her burden under the REAL ID Act; documentary evidence did not rehabilitate her claim. The BIA affirmed, agreeing that the testimony was inconsistent, implausible, and vague, and ordered removal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denial of relief to be supported by substantial evidence. View "Munoz-Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law