Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Scott Carlberg was convicted by a jury of four counts of wire fraud for fraudulently obtaining disability benefits from the United States Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Carlberg, who had suffered a traumatic brain injury while working at Soo Line Railroad, applied for occupational disability benefits in 2013 and later for enhanced benefits in 2015. The RRB requires applicants to disclose any non-railroad work and earnings, which Carlberg failed to do accurately. Despite purchasing and operating a tanning salon, Carlberg misrepresented his work activities to the RRB, leading to his prosecution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Carlberg’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, which argued that the evidence did not show he intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud or made material misrepresentations. The court found sufficient evidence that Carlberg had concealed his ownership and involvement in the salon, and that his misrepresentations were material to the RRB’s decision to grant him benefits. Carlberg was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $279,655.22 in restitution, representing the full value of the benefits he received.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Carlberg’s appeal, which challenged both the denial of his motion for acquittal and the restitution award. The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, as it showed Carlberg engaged in significant physical and mental duties at the salon, which would have disqualified him from receiving benefits. The court also upheld the restitution award, agreeing that the government had proven the full amount of benefits Carlberg received was ill-gotten. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "United States v. Carlberg" on Justia Law

Dijon Foston pleaded guilty to four charges: conspiracy to engage in racketeering, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug offense. The prosecutor dismissed two other charges. Foston was sentenced to a total of 203 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. The sentence was favorable compared to the Sentencing Guidelines range of 262 months.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois accepted Foston's guilty plea. Foston did not move to withdraw his plea in the district court, so his appeal depended on showing that accepting the plea was plain error. He argued that the district judge did not properly inform him of the nature of the racketeering charge during the plea colloquy, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Foston was aware of the elements of the racketeering charge before pleading guilty, as the prosecutor described them in open court and Foston submitted a written declaration of his activities. The court noted an internal disagreement within the Seventh Circuit regarding whether a RICO conspiracy requires an agreement to assist enterprise leaders, but concluded that any error by the district judge was not "plain" due to this conflict. Additionally, the court found no prejudice to Foston, as his sentence would not change even if he were acquitted of the RICO charge. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Foston" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as charged. RiverStone appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, stating that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusions. The court agreed that RiverStone violated the NLRA by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of the hiring list, removing picket signs, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court also upheld the NLRB’s decision that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member, as the company followed its disciplinary policy. The court denied both RiverStone and Local 150’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. Additionally, the court denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward’s presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ’s finding that RiverStone unlawfully disciplined and discharged the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying the union steward’s presence, requiring the signing of a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the court agreed with the NLRB that RiverStone did not unlawfully discipline and discharge the union member. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB. View "Grove v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security served Pilar Sandoval Reynoso with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for unlawfully residing in the United States. Sandoval applied for cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, concluding that he did not establish ten years of continuous physical presence, did not show that his qualifying relative children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial, including the discretionary finding.The IJ found that Sandoval had not established ten years of continuous physical presence and had not shown that his children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also determined that Sandoval did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion due to his history of criminal and civil infractions, including multiple illegal entries into the U.S. and a DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Sandoval did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decision to deny Sandoval’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The court also lacked jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s review of the IJ’s decision. Consequently, the court dismissed Sandoval’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder of his petition. View "Sandoval Reynoso v. Garland" on Justia Law

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward's presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy and would have disciplined the employee regardless of his union activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB and its counsel, finding that the Board’s waiver argument had a plausible legal and factual basis. View "National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150" on Justia Law

Jonathan Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court. At sentencing, the district court applied two recidivist enhancements based on his 2008 Illinois conviction for aggravated robbery, classifying it as a "crime of violence" and a "serious violent felony." Smith argued that his prior conviction should not qualify as a predicate offense for these enhancements because Illinois law did not require the intentional use of force for an aggravated robbery conviction.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois disagreed with Smith, relying on the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Chagoya-Morales, which held that an Illinois aggravated robbery conviction involves the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." The district court followed this precedent and sentenced Smith to 120 months in prison. Smith appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether the Illinois aggravated robbery statute, under which Smith was convicted, required the use of force directed at another person. The court found that Illinois law necessitated the use of force or the threat of force to deprive someone of property, aligning with the federal definitions of "serious violent felony" and "crime of violence." The court also considered Smith's arguments regarding the applicability of recklessness and the lack of a specific intent requirement but found them unpersuasive. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held that Smith's 2008 conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the sentence enhancements and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law

Gary Hicks, a corrections sergeant, was suspended for 10 days by the Illinois Department of Corrections after an internal investigation into his Facebook posts, which were described as "Islamophobic" and "offensive" by a news article. The investigation concluded that Hicks violated Department policies prohibiting conduct unbecoming of a State employee or that may reflect unfavorably on the Department. Hicks admitted to making the posts, which included derogatory comments about various groups and a prayer for a civil war or government overthrow. He sued the Department and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Department’s policies.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both claims. The court held that Hicks’s suspension did not violate the First Amendment because his posts were not on matters of public concern, and the Department’s interest in maintaining discipline outweighed his interest in speaking. The court also found that the Department’s policies were not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks’s conduct and granted qualified immunity to the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the Department’s interest in managing its affairs outweighed Hicks’s interest in posting the content, thus he could not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Additionally, the court found that the Department’s code of conduct was not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks, as a reasonable officer would understand that his posts were unbecoming and could reflect unfavorably on the Department. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "Hicks v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Alexander Kawleski was convicted of sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend's adolescent daughter and recording the act. He also recorded videos of the girl undressing and showering, which were stored on a flash drive. His new girlfriend, Tracy Brown, discovered the flash drive and turned it over to the police. Kawleski faced state charges and was federally indicted for producing and possessing child pornography. Key evidence included Brown's testimony and the videos found on the flash drive.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin oversaw the trial. The jury found Kawleski guilty on all counts. Kawleski moved for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence from Brown's ex-boyfriend, who questioned her credibility and suggested she might have transferred the videos to the flash drive. The district judge denied the motion, stating the ex-boyfriend's statements were speculative and would only serve as impeachment evidence, which was unlikely to lead to an acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district judge's decision, agreeing that the new evidence was speculative and insufficient to warrant a new trial. The court also found that the forensic examination of the Apple computer, which found no evidence of child pornography, refuted the ex-boyfriend's theory. The court held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "U.S. v. Kawleski" on Justia Law

Phillip Robbin was removing a tree from a residential lot in the City of Berwyn when he was confronted by Sarah Lopez, a city inspector. Lopez berated Robbin using racial slurs, which led Robbin to demand disciplinary action against her. The Mayor of Berwyn denied Robbin's request for Lopez's termination, leading Robbin to sue the City, the Mayor, and Lopez for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Robbin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that he failed to state a federal claim. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to Robbin's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Robbin failed to allege a violation of a fundamental right and that the conduct described did not "shock the conscience," which are necessary elements for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that while Lopez's use of racial slurs was deplorable, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Robbin's complaint. View "Robbin v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law