Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, plaintiff Catherine Erdman, a firefighter from Janesville, Wisconsin, applied for a position with the Madison fire department. Erdman claimed that the Madison fire department's Physical Abilities Test (PAT), which she failed to pass, had a disparate impact on women, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Erdman proposed an alternative test, the Candidate Physical Abilities Test (CPAT), licensed by the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), which she claimed would have less disparate impact on women while still effectively measuring an applicant's physical abilities.The district court found that Erdman had shown the Madison PAT had a prima facie disparate impact on women. However, it also found that the Madison PAT was job-related and served the city’s legitimate needs, and that Erdman had failed to prove that the IAFF test would adequately serve the city’s legitimate needs. Erdman appealed the decision.The appeals court affirmed the district court's ruling. It agreed that the Madison PAT as a whole, not its individual components, should be considered as the "particular employment practice" for the purpose of determining disparate impact. The court found that Erdman had established her prima facie case of disparate impact as the Madison PAT as a whole showed a statistically significant disparate impact on female applicants.However, the appeals court also agreed with the district court's finding that Erdman failed to prove that the IAFF test would serve the Madison fire department's legitimate needs as well as the Madison PAT. This was based on testimony that certain elements of the Madison PAT were specifically designed for Madison, considering the city’s characteristics, the fire department’s equipment, and safety considerations. Also, the court noted that the Madison fire department had a higher-than-average rate of hiring and retaining female firefighters compared to the national average, suggesting the effectiveness of the Madison PAT. View "Erdman v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

The case involves Green Plains Trade Group, LLC, who appealed the district court's dismissal of their claim for tortious interference with contract against Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM). Green Plains alleged that ADM unlawfully manipulated the price of ethanol, causing Green Plains to receive less money for the ethanol it sold to third parties. The district court dismissed the case, saying Green Plains hadn't specified the contracts ADM interfered with or shown a breach of contract. Green Plains argued that under Nebraska law, tortious interference doesn't always require a breach and that ADM's actions made its performance under its contracts "more expensive or burdensome."The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals found that while the district court was correct to require Green Plains to plead more than general allegations about its contracts, it may have required too much specificity. The Court of Appeals also found that the district court erred in not recognizing section 766A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as part of Nebraska's law, which allows a plaintiff to bring a successful tortious interference with contract claim even if the contract was not breached. The Court of Appeals held that the district court must apply the law as it believes the highest court of the state would apply it if the case were now before it, and it should not fear adopting the less restrictive approach if it believes the state's highest court would adopt that approach. View "Green Plains Trade Group, LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal related to a Fourth Amendment issue involving a warrantless search of a vehicle. The defendant, Charles Hays, was stopped by the police while driving, and his passenger was found in possession of methamphetamine. The police officers then searched the vehicle's interior but found no drugs. However, under the hood of the car, inside the air filter, they discovered more methamphetamine.Hays was indicted and later moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search under the hood and in the air filter. The district court denied his motion, and Hays subsequently pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, including all parts of the vehicle where there is a fair probability contraband could be concealed, as long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity. The court found that given the totality of the circumstances, including the passenger's possession of methamphetamine, Hays's previous drug-related arrest, and the presence of a screwdriver in the car - a tool known to be used for hiding drugs in vehicles - officers had a fair probability to believe that methamphetamine could be concealed in the car, including under its hood. View "United States v. Hays" on Justia Law

The case arose from a tipster's information that led to an investigation and subsequent search of David Hueston's apartment in Marion, Indiana. The search, which was conducted under a warrant, produced drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition. Hueston was charged with various drug-related offenses. He sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district court denied Hueston's motion after conducting a Franks hearing, and Hueston appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that though the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained omissions and inaccuracies, it was not clear that the detectives acted with deliberate intent or recklessness to mislead the judge who issued the warrant. The court noted that the detectives' consultation with a prosecutor both before and after drafting the affidavit argued against a finding of intent to mislead. The court also found that the good-faith exception applied, meaning that the police officers acted in good faith reliance upon a facially valid warrant. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Hueston's motion to suppress the evidence. View "United States v. Hueston" on Justia Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, an accident occurred at a construction site which resulted in bodily injuries to Gaylon Cruse and Mark Duckworth. During the installation of roof trusses, a power crane operated by Douglas Forrest was prematurely released, causing a truss to fall and collapse onto other trusses, injuring Cruse and Duckworth. Southern Truss, the owner of the truck to which the crane was attached, had two insurance policies - a commercial auto policy from Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company (Artisan) and a commercial general liability policy from The Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington). Both insurance companies denied a duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit initiated by Cruse and Duckworth.Artisan filed a suit in federal court seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend under its auto policy due to an operations exclusion clause and that Burlington owed a duty to defend. The district court denied both companies' motions for judgment, finding an ambiguity in Artisan's policy that should be construed in favor of the insured and that Burlington had a duty to defend some claims not covered by Artisan's policy. Both Artisan and Burlington appealed.The appeals court, applying Illinois law and conducting a de novo review, found no ambiguity in Artisan's policy. The court concluded that the operations exclusion applied because the injuries arose from the operation of the crane attached to the truck, whose primary purpose was to provide mobility to the crane. As such, Artisan had no duty to defend. Since Artisan had no duty to defend, the court determined that Burlington did have a duty to defend under its policy. Thus, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court. View "Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company v. Burlington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements. View "USA v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Randall Ewing and Yasmany Gomez entered into a contract with 1645 W. Farragut LLC (Farragut) to purchase a house. The house was in need of substantial renovations, but Ewing and Gomez proceeded with the contract based on Farragut's assurance that the house would be renovated and ready by closing time. Unbeknownst to Ewing and Gomez, the house was under a stop work order, which hindered their ability to secure a mortgage. When they requested their earnest money back, Farragut refused. They subsequently sued Farragut for breach of contract, common law fraud, and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found Farragut liable for fraud and breach of contract and awarded Ewing and Gomez $905,000 in damages. Farragut appealed the decision and Ewing and Gomez cross-appealed, seeking to add Farragut's principal, Erik Carrier, to the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions, finding that the record supported the damages awarded and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and the motions to amend. View "Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerns Johnnie Wesley, who was brought in for questioning by Wisconsin police in connection with a murder investigation. Wesley invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interrogation, and the interrogation ceased. However, he was interrogated two more times, during which he made incriminating statements implicating himself in the murder. Wesley was subsequently charged with felony murder. He moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds: (1) the officers did not honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent, and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The motion was denied and Wesley was convicted. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case. The court determined that Wesley's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" after he invoked it during the first interrogation, and that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The court reasoned that Wesley's statements during the third interrogation could reasonably be interpreted as exculpatory, rather than as an invocation of silence. View "Wesley v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court looked at the appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The defendant, Johneak Johnson, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government appealed a pretrial ruling by the District Court, which excluded evidence of a laser sight attached to the firearm. The District Court had ruled that the evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the defendant, outweighing its probative value. The government's proposal to limit the laser sight evidence to reduce any risk of unfair prejudice was also denied by the District Court.The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that the District Court had incorrectly assessed the balance between the probative value of the laser sight evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals held that the laser sight evidence was central to proving a key disputed element of the offense – possession of the firearm. It also found that the laser sight evidence tended to corroborate the testimony of the government's eyewitnesses, which was critical given the defense's intended strategy of attacking their credibility.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's assessment of the risk of unfair prejudice, holding that the government's proposed limits on the laser sight evidence should minimize any risk that it will cause the jury to view the defendant as unduly dangerous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the laser sight evidence under Rule 403 and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This case involves the appeal of a judgment convicting Byron Pierson of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Pierson contested the decision, arguing that the district court erred by not holding a hearing to determine if he had knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights when he entered into a proffer agreement with the government. Furthermore, he argued that the court erred by allowing a witness to testify about the investigation that led to his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.The case began when an Indianapolis Police Officer responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported that Pierson threatened to "come back and shoot the house up." After learning about Pierson's criminal record and obtaining a description of his car, the officer decided to return to the woman's home later that evening. Upon returning, the officer saw the car described by the woman and initiated a traffic stop. Pierson was in the back seat of the car. When asked to step out of the car, Pierson hesitated and then fled on foot when an attempt was made to handcuff him. During the ensuing chase, officers saw a firearm under Pierson's body, which was later retrieved and used as evidence against him.Prior to his trial, Pierson had entered into plea negotiations with the government, signing a Proffer Letter that waived certain rights. After admitting possession of the firearm in two proffer sessions, Pierson withdrew his plea and decided to go to trial. Pierson moved to exclude statements he made during these plea negotiations, arguing that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.The Court of Appeals found that Pierson failed to provide an evidentiary basis for his assertion that he had not knowingly and voluntarily entered into the proffer agreement. Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, the court did not find it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the proffer waiver was deemed valid. The court also noted that the government never sought to introduce any of Pierson's proffer statements at trial, meaning any potential error in refusing to hold a hearing was harmless.Additionally, Pierson contended that the district court erred in allowing the government to present evidence about the investigation that led to his arrest. The court found that Pierson had opened the door to this testimony in his opening statement by referencing a complaint made by his ex-girlfriend. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony, and immediately gave a limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of this evidence.Given the strong evidence of Pierson's guilt, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions. View "USA v. Pierson" on Justia Law