Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Circle City Broadcasting I, LLC, a local television broadcasting network operating in Indianapolis, which owns two local television stations—WISH-TV and WNDY. The company is majority-owned by DuJuan McCoy, a Black man. The dispute arose when DISH and DirecTV Network declined to pay broadcast fees to Circle City for rights to carry the company’s two Indianapolis-based television stations. Circle City alleged that the decisions reflected discrimination against its majority owner, DuJuan McCoy, and thus discrimination against the company itself.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered summary judgment for DISH and DirecTV, concluding that Circle City failed to identify evidence permitting a jury to find that the decisions not to pay the broadcast fees reflected anything other than lawful business choices responsive to dynamics of the television broadcast market.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Circle City failed to produce evidence that would allow a jury to find that DISH or DirecTV's conduct during the contractual negotiations reflected racial discrimination. The court concluded that DISH and DirecTV declined to pay fees for rights to broadcast WISH and WNDY because Circle City—unlike Nexstar—as the new owner of both stations lacked the market power to demand the fees. The court also found that Circle City fell short of demonstrating any pretext in DISH and DirecTV’s explanations for choosing not to pay retransmission fees. View "Circle City Broadcasting I, LLC v. DISH Network L.L.C." on Justia Law

Bryant D. Aron was indicted by a grand jury for possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Initially, Aron agreed to plead guilty under a binding plea agreement, which recommended a sentence of 96 months' imprisonment. However, the district court refused to accept this sentencing recommendation. As the plea agreement was binding, Aron was given the option to withdraw his guilty plea, which he did. Instead of negotiating a different plea agreement, Aron chose to proceed to trial. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months' imprisonment.The district court's refusal to accept the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement led to Aron's decision to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. After his conviction and sentencing, Aron appealed, raising several challenges to the indictment and the plea and sentencing process. He argued that the indictment failed to include a known and necessary element, that he had good cause for not raising this objection in the district court, and that the deficiency in the indictment was either structural error or met the plain error standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Aron's arguments. The court found that the indictment was not defective and that Aron had failed to raise his objection in a timely manner. The court also found that Aron had not demonstrated good cause for his failure to raise the objection pretrial. Therefore, the court did not conduct a plain error review of his claim.Aron also challenged the district court's rejection of his binding plea agreement. He argued that the court had improperly inserted itself into the plea negotiation process, failed to provide a sound reason for rejecting the plea agreement, and did not provide enough notice of its rejection of the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments as well, affirming the decision of the district court. View "USA v. Aron" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard who were charged with first-degree murder. They were detained for over a year before being acquitted. They then filed a suit against the City of Chicago and three police detectives, alleging unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.Previously, the Circuit Court of Cook County had found probable cause to detain both plaintiffs without bail. A few weeks later, a grand jury indicted them on charges of first-degree murder, including a felony-murder theory premised on felony mob action. The plaintiffs argued that the detectives deliberately misled judges and the grand jury to secure these determinations of probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that even if the detectives' alleged misrepresentations and omissions were accepted as true, the prosecutors' independent fact-gathering and the remaining undisputed evidence still supported probable cause to detain the plaintiffs. Therefore, the judicial determinations of probable cause were presumed to be valid, and the pretrial detention of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims failed for the same reason. View "Washington v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The case involves Jacob Lickers, who was convicted for transporting and possessing child pornography. The conviction was based on evidence found on Lickers' devices, which were seized during a traffic stop and subsequent arrest for drug possession. The initial search of the devices was authorized by a state court warrant, which later suppressed the evidence due to the unconstitutionality of the initial stop and arrest. However, the case was referred to federal authorities who conducted a second search of the devices under a federal warrant. The federal warrant application did not mention the state court's suppression ruling.In the lower courts, Lickers' attorney challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop and arrest, and the adequacy of the state search warrant. The state court agreed, suppressing all evidence seized during the stop and any statements made by Lickers. The state charges were subsequently dismissed. However, in the federal court, the same arguments were unsuccessful. Lickers pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 132 months' imprisonment on each count.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Lickers argued that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the federal agent acted in bad faith by omitting the state court's suppression ruling from the federal warrant application. The court disagreed, finding that the link between the state court's suppression ruling and the federal warrant application was too attenuated to obligate the attorneys to explore the possibility of bad faith. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief. View "Lickers v. United States" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Anthony Gay, a convicted felon, who was found guilty of possessing firearms and ammunition, both of which he was prohibited from possessing due to his prior felony convictions. Gay was a passenger in a car that was stopped by the police, and upon being pursued, he fled on foot. The police testified that they found a gun where Gay had fallen and later discovered bullets in a motel room he had rented. Gay was subsequently indicted and convicted on one firearms count and one ammunition count, leading to a sentence of 84 months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, plus three years' supervised release.Previously, Gay had contested the admissibility of the bullets found in the motel room, arguing that their discovery violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the district court denied his motion to suppress the bullets, stating that Gay's right to occupy the room had expired, the motel manager had found the bullets before the police were involved, and the manager had the right to admit the police under state law. Furthermore, the court noted that Gay, being on parole, had a diminished expectation of privacy.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Gay argued that the evidence did not support his conviction on the firearms charge, suggesting that the weapon may have been planted. However, the court found that the evidence, including the bullets found in the motel room, supported the firearms charge. The court also dismissed Gay's argument that the reduction of two weeks in preparation time for his second trial was prejudicial, stating that the parties had just been through a trial and the evidence had been assembled.Gay also contended that the prosecution was unconstitutional, arguing that the Second Amendment permits persons with felony convictions to possess firearms and ammunition. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, citing precedents that upheld the validity of "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." The court concluded that Gay, having been convicted of 22 felonies and being on parole, did not fit the description of a "law-abiding, responsible citizen" who has a constitutional right to possess firearms. View "United States v. Gay" on Justia Law

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the drugs, initially from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought a new source. Connelly was among the distributors. The government conducted one seizure and nine controlled buys from members of the conspiracy during its investigation.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, both defendants pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The main dispute at Yates’s sentencing was the classification of the methamphetamine attributable to him as “ice” or “actual” (i.e., pure) methamphetamine, as opposed to its generic variant. The district court found that all 737.1 grams of methamphetamine for which the conspiracy was accountable was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly raised two objections to the PSR at his sentencing hearing. He argued that the court could not rely on the statements of his coconspirators, Amber Phelps and Jeanna Rechkemmer, for purposes of determining the amount of methamphetamine handled by the conspiracy. He also contended that the full drug weight attributed to the conspiracy was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court denied both objections.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Yates challenged the district court’s finding that the methamphetamine attributable to the conspiracy was “ice” methamphetamine. Connelly once more attacked the district court’s calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him. The court vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded. The court found that the government must supply reliable evidence making that approximation reasonable. Because such evidence was lacking, Yates is entitled to resentencing. The court affirmed Connelly’s sentence. View "United States v. Yates" on Justia Law

The case involves two defendants, Christopher Yates and Shawn Connelly, who were convicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The conspiracy operated out of Macomb, Illinois, and lasted thirteen months, from January 2019 to February 2020. Yates supplied the methamphetamine, initially purchasing the drugs from an unknown source in Joliet, Illinois, with alleged Mexican cartel connections. After the arrest of that supplier, Yates sought out a new source. Connelly was among the distributors.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced both defendants. Yates argued that the government failed to prove the purity of all the methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy, having only tested a small, unrepresentative amount. Connelly argued that the court should not have relied on his coconspirators’ statements to calculate the total drug weight, and that the full weight was not reasonably foreseeable to him. The district court rejected both arguments and sentenced Yates to 168 months in prison and Connelly to 188 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated Yates’s sentence and remanded the case. The court found that the government did not provide reliable evidence to support the district court's finding that the conspiracy involved at least 737.1 grams of “ice” methamphetamine. Therefore, Yates was entitled to resentencing. However, the court affirmed Connelly’s sentence, finding that the district court did not err in its calculation of the total drug weight attributable to him. View "United States v. Connelly" on Justia Law

The case involves Harold McGhee, who was convicted and sentenced for drug trafficking. In August 2021, law enforcement received information from a confidential source about a drug dealer distributing large amounts of cocaine in Peoria, Illinois. The dealer was said to drive a Chevy Malibu and supplied cocaine to a house on West Millman Street. With this information, along with details from other informants and a tracking warrant, the police identified McGhee as the suspected dealer. They conducted three controlled buys and a trash pull at McGhee's residence, which led to the discovery of rubber gloves and baggies with a white powdery residue that tested positive for cocaine. This evidence led to a search warrant for McGhee's residence, vehicle, person, and electronic devices, resulting in the discovery of nearly a kilogram of various drugs, a handgun, and other drug trafficking paraphernalia.McGhee sought to suppress the evidence recovered at his residence and moved for a hearing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. He argued that the affidavit's use of "SUBJECT PREMISES," in reference to both his residence and the Millman Street house, was impermissibly ambiguous. The district court denied the motion. McGhee later renewed his motion to suppress, arguing that the trash pull was constitutionally unreasonable because it was executed without a warrant. The court denied this motion as well.On appeal, McGhee raised ten challenges to the criminal proceedings resulting in his convictions and sentence. The court considered some of his arguments on the merits and resolved others on procedural grounds. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States v. McGhee" on Justia Law

The case involves Jay Liestman, who was convicted for transporting child pornography, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Liestman had a prior conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law. The district court imposed an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment under § 2252(b)(1) due to his prior conviction. The main issue was whether the state conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 2252(b)(1), which prescribes enhanced penalties for certain recidivist child sex offenders.Previously, the district court had ruled that Liestman's prior conviction for possessing child pornography triggered 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)’s enhancement for repeat sex offenders, which increases the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to ... the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Liestman argued that the enhancement did not apply because the Wisconsin statute reached offense conduct that Congress did not expressly enumerate in the text of § 2252(b)(1). The district court disagreed and sentenced Liestman to the enhanced mandatory minimum of 15 years.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in § 2252(b)(1) brings within the ambit of the enhancement any prior offense that categorically bears a connection with the conduct enumerated in § 2252(b)(1), regardless of whether it sweeps more broadly than that enumerated conduct in some respects. Therefore, Liestman's prior offense of conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law can serve as a predicate offense under § 2252(b)(1). View "United States v. Liestman" on Justia Law

A group called Protect Our Parks, Inc. (POP) has been challenging the location of the planned Obama Presidential Center in Chicago's historic Jackson Park. The Center, which is currently under construction, is being built on a site selected by the Barack Obama Foundation. POP argues that the park should have been off-limits and that the Center could have been placed elsewhere. They have raised multiple arguments based on federal and state law to prevent the construction of the Center in the park.Previously, POP had asked the court to halt construction until its federal-law theories were resolved. However, the court declined to grant the preliminary injunction as POP failed to show that it was likely to succeed with those contentions. The district court also refused POP’s request to amend its pleadings and dismissed the state-law causes of action. The district court then awarded summary judgment against POP on the federal-law theories.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, POP asked the court to overturn the district court’s final judgment in its entirety. However, the court found that POP’s arguments remained unpersuasive and identified no legal error in the earlier analysis of POP’s case. The court also concluded that POP’s state-law theories were rightly dismissed and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied POP’s motion to amend the complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law