Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs David Vance Gardner and Gary Merchant filed a lawsuit against MeTV National Limited Partnership, alleging that MeTV violated the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) by disclosing their personally identifiable information without consent. MeTV operates a website where users can watch classic TV shows. Users can sign up with their email addresses and zip codes to personalize their experience, which includes receiving reminders and using a channel finder feature. Plaintiffs claimed that MeTV embedded a "Meta pixel" in its videos, allowing Facebook to link users' viewing habits to their Facebook accounts for targeted advertising.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that they were not "consumers" under the VPPA because they did not pay for MeTV's services. The court allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, which was also dismissed on the same grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the term "consumer" under the VPPA includes anyone who subscribes to services from a video tape service provider, regardless of whether they pay money. The court found that providing personal information, such as an email address and zip code, in exchange for personalized services constitutes a subscription. Therefore, the plaintiffs are considered "consumers" under the VPPA, and their complaint should not have been dismissed.The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the plaintiffs' claims to proceed. View "Gardner v MeTV" on Justia Law

Jaron Jackson pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of a minor and transportation of child pornography. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Jackson appealed, arguing that the district court should have suppressed evidence found on his cell phone, claiming the police took too long (40 days) to seek a search warrant after his arrest. Jackson conceded that the warrant was supported by probable cause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied Jackson's motion to suppress, concluding that the delay did not allow the police to obtain any evidence they would not have received had they sought a warrant immediately. The district judge also found the motion untimely, as it was filed ten months past the deadline for pretrial motions. The court held a hearing to consider whether "good cause" justified the delay and concluded it did not.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the 40-day delay in seeking the warrant did not make the search unreasonable, as the phone had been in official custody since Jackson's arrest, and there was no risk of evidence being altered or destroyed. The court also noted that Jackson did not attempt to regain possession of the phone or express concern about the delay. Therefore, the district court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the phone. View "USA v Jackson" on Justia Law

John Johnson pleaded guilty in 2020 to distributing large volumes of cocaine on two occasions in 2014 while he was on supervised release for a 2001 crack cocaine conviction. His guilty plea led to the revocation of his supervised release. The district court held a combined sentencing hearing, imposing a 180-month imprisonment and six years of supervised release for each count of the new offenses, to be served concurrently. Additionally, the court imposed a 24-month imprisonment for the supervised release violation, also to be served concurrently with the 180-month sentence.Johnson filed a motion to reduce the 24-month sentence under the First Step Act, which the district court denied, believing he was not eligible for a reduction. Johnson appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Johnson's revocation sentence is eligible for a reduction under the First Step Act because the revocation penalties relate to the original offense, which is a covered offense under the Act. However, the court found that the district court's error in denying the reduction was harmless because the 24-month sentence runs concurrently with the 180-month sentence for the new offenses. Therefore, even if the 24-month sentence were reduced, it would not affect the total length of Johnson's imprisonment. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

Jacob Powers was convicted by a Wisconsin jury in 2006 for enticing and sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl. Powers challenged his convictions in state court, claiming he was incompetent at the time of his trial and that his lawyer was ineffective for not raising this issue. After exhausting his state court remedies, Powers sought federal habeas corpus review on the same grounds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied Powers's habeas petition. The court considered three post-trial evaluations of Powers's competency, his demeanor at trial, and the fact that his appellate attorney, after consulting with his trial counsel, chose not to pursue an incompetency claim. The district court concluded that Powers was competent at the time of his trial and that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that Powers's trial testimony and behavior did not indicate incompetency. Additionally, the court found that the evaluations conducted by Dr. Schoenecker and Dr. Dolezal, which concluded that Powers was competent, were more persuasive than Dr. Glassman's inconclusive report. The court also emphasized that Powers's trial counsel did not raise any concerns about his competency during the trial, and his appellate attorney found it frivolous to argue incompetency.The Seventh Circuit held that Powers was competent at his 2006 trial and that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of competency. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Powers's habeas corpus petition. View "Powers v Noble" on Justia Law

Vonzell Scott was shot while waiting in his car at a Wendy’s drive-thru in Chicago around 3:00 am on December 31, 2018. Scott had a brief altercation with another driver, but it ended peacefully. Shortly after, two armed individuals approached Scott’s car and opened fire, injuring him. Scott sued Wendy’s, alleging negligence for not providing overnight security guards, which he claimed could have prevented the shooting.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Wendy’s. The court found that while Wendy’s owed a duty to protect Scott from intentional third-party assaults, the specific shooting incident was so aberrant that Wendy’s failure to provide security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court concluded that the shooting was unforeseeable and that additional security would not have prevented it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the extreme, isolated, and unprovoked nature of the shooting made it unforeseeable as a matter of law. The court noted that while there was evidence of prior crimes in the area, none were similar to the shooting Scott experienced. The court concluded that Wendy’s could not have reasonably foreseen the attack, and therefore, the lack of security guards did not proximately cause Scott’s injury. The court emphasized that the foreseeability of an injury is context-dependent and that the specific type of violence Scott endured was not reasonably foreseeable based on the prior incidents. View "Scott v Wendy's Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Gregory Johnson was convicted by a jury of attempting to use a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography. At sentencing, the district court found Johnson indigent and waived a fine under 18 U.S.C. § 3571 and a discretionary assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. § 3014. However, the court imposed a $5,000 assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act (AVAA), 18 U.S.C. § 2259A, despite Johnson's indigency.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, adopted the facts in the presentence investigation report (PSR) without objection. The PSR indicated Johnson had no income apart from occasional support from his mother and minimal assets. The court recognized Johnson's inability to pay a fine and excused him from the JVTA assessment but imposed the AVAA assessment without further discussion of his financial condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court clarified that the AVAA assessment is mandatory regardless of the defendant's ability to pay, but the amount is discretionary and must consider factors including the defendant's financial condition. The court found that the district court did not adequately explain why $5,000 was an appropriate amount given its findings about Johnson's financial condition for other penalties. The Seventh Circuit vacated the AVAA assessment and ordered a limited remand for the district court to reconsider the assessment and provide a reasoned explanation for the amount imposed. View "USA v Johnson" on Justia Law

Dyson Technology, Ltd., a UK-based company, filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against multiple e-commerce stores for selling counterfeit Dyson products. Dyson sought remedies under the Lanham Act, which allows trademark holders to recover profits, damages, and costs from infringing parties. The defendants did not appear in court, leading to a default judgment in Dyson's favor. However, the district court awarded only $1,000 in statutory damages and denied Dyson's request to recover the infringing sellers' profits, stating that Dyson had only provided evidence of revenue, not profits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, handled the initial case. The court's decision to limit Dyson's award was based on its interpretation that revenue and profits are not the same, and it declined to assume that all revenue equaled profits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Lanham Act. According to the Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to the defendant's profits, and the defendant bears the burden of proving any costs or deductions. The appellate court found that Dyson's evidence of revenue was sufficient to establish profits, as the defendants did not provide evidence to the contrary. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the district court to adjust the award if deemed just based on the case's circumstances. View "Dyson Technology Limited v David 7 Store" on Justia Law

Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trusteeship. The plaintiffs, members of NABET-CWA Local 41, claimed that the national union imposed the trusteeship in bad faith following a local officer election. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary restraining order, later converting it into a preliminary injunction. The parties eventually settled, resulting in a consent judgment that dissolved the trusteeship and required the national union to pay Local 41 approximately $26,000 in trusteeship costs. The only unresolved issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. The court acknowledged its broad discretion and the American Rule, which presumes against fee shifting. It considered two exceptions: bad faith and common benefit. The court found that while the national union acted in bad faith in imposing the trusteeship, both parties litigated the dispute in good faith, thus not justifying fee shifting. Additionally, the court recognized that the plaintiffs conferred common benefits on Local 41 and the national union but concluded that these benefits were not substantial enough to merit an award of attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the lower court had appropriately applied the American Rule and its exceptions. The district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees was deemed reasonable and within its broad discretion, as it provided a sound explanation for its conclusions. The appellate court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for such decisions and upheld the district court's judgment. View "Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec" on Justia Law

Valerie Thomas received a notice claiming she owed $187, which she disputed. Resurgent Capital Services notified TransUnion about the debt before opening Thomas's letter and reported the dispute 29 days later. Thomas sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, seeking statutory damages for the delay. A jury awarded her $250. The clerk delayed entering the judgment, which was eventually entered on June 11, 2024. Resurgent filed a notice of appeal four days earlier, narrowly avoiding missing the appeal deadline.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Resurgent should have notified TransUnion earlier. Resurgent appealed, arguing that Thomas lacked standing because the delay did not injure her. District Judge Bucklo initially ruled that Thomas was injured as a matter of law, referencing Ewing v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, which treated the absence of a dispute notice as defamation. However, the court noted that injury must be proven and not assumed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Thomas did not provide evidence of injury before or during the trial. She did not attempt to show that her credit score or insurance costs were affected by the delay. Judge Bucklo had precluded Thomas from introducing evidence of actual injury, and Thomas did not challenge this ruling or seek a new trial. The appellate court held that Thomas lacked standing to sue due to the absence of evidence showing injury. Consequently, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. View "Thomas v LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law