Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Shannon Agofsky robbed a bank in southwest Missouri and kidnapped the bank president at gunpoint, ultimately drowning him in Oklahoma. A federal jury in the Western District of Missouri convicted Agofsky of bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, resulting in a life sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, and subsequent motions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were denied. In 2001, while serving his sentence in a Texas federal prison, Agofsky murdered a fellow inmate and received a death sentence in the Eastern District of Texas, partly based on his prior firearm conviction.Agofsky later sought to challenge his Missouri firearm conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, arguing—based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)—that bank robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). His claim did not meet the conditions for a successive § 2255 motion. Previously, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport allowed such statutory claims to proceed via § 2241, but the Supreme Court overruled that approach in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Accordingly, the district court dismissed Agofsky’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether § 2255(e) is a jurisdictional bar or merely a venue provision. After reviewing precedent and circuit splits, the court held that § 2255(e) constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the court’s power to entertain habeas petitions outside the strict confines of § 2255. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Agofsky’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Agofsky v. Baysore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a microbrewery and its owner, operated a seasonal business in a tourist town and became known for engaging in political advocacy. The business applied for various permits to operate both an indoor retail outlet and, later, an outdoor beer garden. Despite being granted permits that included specific conditions—such as restrictions on outdoor operations—the plaintiffs repeatedly violated these conditions, operated without proper permits, and explicitly stated their intention to continue doing so regardless of regulatory decisions. Throughout this period, the owner was vocal in criticizing local officials on social media.After several rounds of permit applications, denials, suspensions, and revocations, the plaintiffs’ most recent permit application for an outdoor beer garden was denied by the county committee, which cited the plaintiffs’ ongoing and willful violations of permit conditions and their declared intent to continue such violations. The plaintiffs appealed administrative actions to the Oneida County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the revocations. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, asserting that the permit denials and revocations constituted retaliation for protected political speech, in violation of the First Amendment. They sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate their permit and prevent further alleged retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and affirmed it. The Seventh Circuit held that, while the plaintiffs engaged in protected speech and suffered adverse permit actions, they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim. The court concluded that the permit denials and revocations were based on the plaintiffs’ repeated and admitted violations of permit conditions, not on retaliatory motives, and that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of disparate treatment or pretext. View "Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v Hess" on Justia Law

After the dissolution of their marriage, Jane and Kenton Girard became involved in prolonged legal proceedings regarding custody of their two minor children. Following Kenton's remarriage to Marissa Girard, the Illinois state court added Marissa as a party to the postjudgment custody dispute in 2023. The situation grew more complicated when Kenton filed a cross-claim against Marissa over a postnuptial agreement, which he argued did not obligate him to indemnify her for legal expenses or lost earnings related to the custody litigation. Marissa responded by removing the entire case to federal court, asserting the existence of a federal question.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the removal and determined that the case did not present a federal question. The court found that the dispute revolved around state-law issues of contract and domestic relations, and therefore remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marissa appealed this remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. However, the Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal, noting that remand orders are generally not appealable unless the case was removed under specific statutory provisions, which did not apply here.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit then addressed a motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, filed by Jane Girard. The court held that Marissa’s appeal was frivolous, both because removal to federal court was unwarranted and because the remand order was not appealable. The court awarded Jane damages in the amount of $2,808.75 for fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal. View "Girard v. Girard" on Justia Law

Donald Felton was investigated after a confidential source informed law enforcement that Felton made trips from Taylorville, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine for resale. The source described Felton’s routine, including his use of a white Mazda SUV registered to his girlfriend and referenced a prior traffic stop involving Felton. Inspector Brown corroborated some details by reviewing police records and speaking with another officer about the earlier stop, but found no drugs during that encounter. Relying on this information and Felton’s criminal history, Inspector Brown prepared an affidavit seeking a warrant to install a tracking device on the SUV.The affidavit, submitted to the Circuit Court of Christian County, supported the issuance of the warrant. However, it omitted substantial information about the confidential source’s credibility, such as payments to the source, the source’s cooperation in exchange for consideration in legal matters, and the source’s own criminal history and pending charges. Based on the warrant, the tracking device was installed, and later, Felton was stopped and methamphetamine was found in the vehicle. Felton was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and requesting a Franks hearing regarding omissions in the affidavit. The district court denied both requests, concluding the affidavit was sufficiently corroborated and that Felton failed to show material omissions affecting probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause because it relied almost exclusively on the confidential source and omitted material information regarding the source’s credibility. The court further concluded that Felton made a substantial preliminary showing warranting a Franks hearing. The appellate court reversed the denial of Felton’s suppression motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Felton" on Justia Law

James Cohen accepted monthly payments from an individual who was required to register as a sex offender, in exchange for falsely representing to authorities that this individual lived at his address. Cohen knew that the person had been convicted of a sex offense and was required by law to register his place of residence. When United States marshals investigated the individual's compliance with registration requirements, Cohen knowingly lied to a marshal, claiming the individual resided with him, despite knowing this was untrue.Cohen was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, with making a materially false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He entered a plea agreement, admitting to an offense with a maximum sentence of eight years, and agreed to a sentencing guidelines calculation that included a four-level enhancement for matters relating to a sex offense under chapter 109B. At sentencing, Cohen objected to the application of this guideline, arguing that his offense did not constitute a sex offense under federal law, but withdrew his other objections. The district court overruled his remaining objection, applied the guideline, and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cohen’s arguments that the sentencing guideline was improperly applied. The court held that guideline § 2J1.2 properly applied because Cohen’s false statement related to failure to register under chapter 109B, which falls within the guideline’s scope. The court found no merit in Cohen’s remaining arguments, determined that certain claims had been waived or forfeited, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Cohen" on Justia Law

A woman in Indiana was placed on probation in 2011 and assigned to probation officer Miroslav Radiceski in late 2012. Prior to this assignment, Radiceski’s supervisors, Chief Probation Officer Jan Parsons and Judge Clarence Murray, were aware of a previous complaint from a female probationer (A.R.) who reported that Radiceski had behaved inappropriately by asking personal questions and touching her to view her tattoos. After investigating, Parsons and Murray found no concrete proof and considered the incident an unsubstantiated allegation. They temporarily restricted Radiceski from supervising female probationers, but this was later lifted due to staffing shortages, and he was reassigned to supervise women, including the plaintiff. In 2013, Radiceski sexually assaulted and raped the plaintiff during her probation meetings. The plaintiff did not report the misconduct at the time, fearing retaliation and possible incarceration, but Radiceski was later suspended, fired, indicted, and convicted of official misconduct.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials, including Parsons and Murray, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to her safety in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Parsons and Murray, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law indicating their actions were unconstitutional. The plaintiff’s claim against Radiceski proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict in her favor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that Parsons and Murray were not deliberately indifferent because, although they were aware of troubling conduct, their response did not amount to a conscious disregard of a known risk of rape. The court concluded that qualified immunity protected the supervisors from liability. View "Bostic v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

The case concerns three heirs of Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a Jewish German art collector persecuted by the Nazi regime, who seek to recover Vincent van Gogh’s painting “Sunflowers.” Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was forced to liquidate his art collection in the 1930s due to Nazi policies. The painting was sold through a Parisian dealer, later purchased at auction in London in 1987 by Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which subsequently became Sompo Japan Insurance. The painting was exhibited briefly in Chicago and Amsterdam in 2001–2002 before returning to Japan, where it remains on display.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Sompo Holdings and its affiliates, seeking the painting’s return or compensation, alleging various state and federal claims. The district court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims because the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act) does not create a federal cause of action, and the plaintiffs had not shown a conflict between state law and federal policy to justify federal common law claims. For the state law claims, the district court held (following a Pennsylvania district court’s reasoning in Holtzman) that the HEAR Act’s extension of limitations periods could confer federal question jurisdiction, but ultimately dismissed these claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, finding insufficient connection to Illinois.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the federal claims failed for lack of a federal cause of action or basis for federal common law. As for the state law claims, the Seventh Circuit declined to address subject matter jurisdiction and instead affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding the defendants’ contacts with Illinois were unrelated to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a further amended complaint. View "Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A labor union representing Chicago public school employees, along with one of its members, alleged that a nonprofit organization dedicated to limiting union power contributed money to recruit and promote candidates in a union election, in violation of federal law. The union claimed that the nonprofit’s actions interfered with the union’s internal election process and would continue to do so in future elections. The plaintiffs brought suit under a federal statute prohibiting employer expenditures to promote candidates for union office, as well as under Illinois law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, considered the case after the nonprofit moved to dismiss. The district court found that the relevant federal statute did not provide an express or implied private right of action for the type of pre-election relief the plaintiffs sought. The court reasoned that the statute’s enforcement mechanism required union members to exhaust internal remedies and then file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who could bring a civil action if warranted. The court also dismissed the state-law claims, as they depended on the dismissed federal claims. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action—express or implied—for individuals or unions to enforce the statutory prohibition on employer expenditures in union elections. Instead, the statute’s exclusive enforcement mechanism is through post-election complaints to the Secretary of Labor. The court distinguished this provision from another section of the statute that expressly allows private pre-election suits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, v Educators for Excellence, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted in Wisconsin state court for first-degree reckless homicide after selling heroin that resulted in a fatal overdose. The defendant, along with another individual, sold heroin to the victim, who was then injected with the drug and became unconscious. Instead of seeking immediate medical help, the two men drove around with the unconscious victim, later returned to the defendant’s house, and only after several hours did the other individual take the victim to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. The defendant was arrested about a month later and charged with multiple offenses, but only the homicide conviction is relevant here.After his conviction and sentencing, the defendant sought post-conviction relief in the Wisconsin trial court and then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His appellate counsel filed a “no-merit” report, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no deficiency in trial counsel’s performance. The defendant then attempted to petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, but his petition was filed after the deadline. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the petition as untimely and denied reconsideration.Subsequently, the defendant filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, again raising ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the defendant had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to timely exhaust state remedies and had not shown cause to excuse the default. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendant’s reliance on a prison law librarian’s miscalculation of the filing deadline did not constitute cause to excuse procedural default, and that the defendant had not preserved any alternative argument regarding lack of law library access. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Jannke v Gierach" on Justia Law

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law