Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Jaryan Gills, an inmate at East Moline Correctional Center, was assaulted by another prisoner, suffering a broken arm that required two surgeries. Following the incident, Gills was placed in medical segregation for a month in a cell lacking a sink or toilet, relying on guards for bathroom access and provided with portable urinals and waste bags. He alleges that prison staff frequently denied him timely bathroom access, resulting in unsanitary conditions. Gills also contends that he received delayed or inadequate medical care for his injuries and other health issues, and that a prison doctor and staff were deliberately indifferent to these needs.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its decision, the district court disregarded Gills’s declarations, which largely repeated allegations from his complaint and added details not disclosed in his deposition, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court determined that Gills failed to present sufficient evidence to establish genuine disputes of material fact regarding his Eighth Amendment claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care, as well as his conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Gills’s declarations under the sham affidavit rule. While the conditions Gills experienced may have been unpleasant, the appellate court found that the evidence did not support a finding of deliberate indifference by prison officials or the medical director. The court also concluded that Gills’s conspiracy claim failed because no underlying constitutional violation was proven and there was no non-speculative evidence of an agreement among defendants. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Gills v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Grusd" on Justia Law

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Farhan Sheikh, a college student and active iFunny user, posted a series of public messages threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago abortion clinic, naming the clinic and specifying a date. He repeatedly emphasized in follow-up posts and private messages that his threats were genuine and not satirical, even stating his intent to carry out the actions. After his posts were reported to the FBI, the clinic was warned, canceled appointments, increased security, and an employee took time off in response to the threat. Sheikh was arrested and indicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sheikh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional and the grand jury had not been properly instructed on the law's requirements regarding true threats and criminal intent. The district court denied his motion and proceeded to trial, where evidence included employee testimony and images of security changes at the clinic. Sheikh testified that he did not intend to carry out the threats, but the jury convicted him. His motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Sheikh’s constitutional challenge to § 875(c), his grand jury process objections, and his evidentiary complaints. The Seventh Circuit held that § 875(c) is constitutional when interpreted to criminalize only true threats made with at least reckless intent, consistent with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court found no reversible error in the grand jury process or the admission of evidence at trial, concluding that any evidentiary mistakes were harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sheikh" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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CLEAResult Consulting, Inc. engaged NEXT Payment Solutions, Inc. to create a customized appointment scheduling software called the FAST Tool. After several years of use, CLEAResult acquired another company with its own scheduling platform, the DSMTracker, and decided to transition away from NEXT’s software. CLEAResult analyzed the FAST Tool’s functionality to enhance the DSMTracker, but was never given access to the FAST Tool’s underlying source code or algorithms. NEXT alleged that CLEAResult had secretly misappropriated trade secrets and brought claims for misappropriation under federal law and unjust enrichment under Illinois law.Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois first granted CLEAResult partial summary judgment on the trade secrets claim, finding NEXT had failed to sufficiently identify its alleged secrets. The court narrowed the claim and required NEXT to provide more detail, but NEXT submitted only vague descriptions of software modules. The court then granted summary judgment in full to CLEAResult, concluding NEXT’s descriptions did not specify protectable trade secrets. The court also granted CLEAResult’s motion in limine, precluding NEXT from pursuing an unjust enrichment claim based on a theory of misusing “other proprietary information,” determining this was a new theory not previously pled. NEXT then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims, and final judgment was entered for CLEAResult.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that NEXT failed to identify trade secrets with sufficient specificity to survive summary judgment under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. The Seventh Circuit also found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding NEXT’s late-developed unjust enrichment theory, as this constituted an improper new claim. The final judgment in favor of CLEAResult was affirmed. View "NEXT Payment Solutions Inc. v CLEAResult Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

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Matthew Metzler, an undergraduate student at Loyola University Chicago, was expelled in January 2017 after a university hearing board found him responsible for sexual misconduct involving another student, referred to as Jane Roe. The university’s Title IX process began after Roe reported feeling pressured into sexual acts without her consent. Initially, Roe declined to file a formal complaint, but later decided to do so after continuing distress. The university investigated, interviewed both parties, and considered evidence, including text messages and witness names provided by Metzler. The hearing board credited Roe’s account over Metzler’s based on the perceived consistency and credibility of her statements and found him responsible, resulting in expulsion. Metzler’s appeal was unsuccessful.Metzler filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, asserting claims under Title IX for unlawful sex discrimination and breach of contract due to alleged procedural irregularities in the disciplinary process. The district court granted summary judgment for Loyola, finding insufficient evidence that Metzler had been discriminated against based on sex or that contractual standards had been violated in a manner lacking rational basis. The case was briefly remanded for jurisdictional review and to determine anonymity, after which the district court reaffirmed its decision for Loyola.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Metzler failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Loyola discriminated against him on the basis of sex under Title IX, even when considering generalized public pressure and procedural errors. The court further found that Metzler’s breach of contract claim failed because Loyola had a rational basis for its disciplinary decision. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Metzler v Loyola University Chicago" on Justia Law

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Police in Milwaukee searched Michael Yumang’s car and home in 2019 and 2022, finding distribution quantities of methamphetamine, a handgun, and ammunition. Before the 2022 search, a postal inspector intercepted a package containing a quarter pound of meth addressed to Yumang’s residence from California. Yumang admitted to regularly obtaining meth from California and reselling it in Wisconsin. He was charged with three drug-trafficking offenses related to each meth seizure and the intercepted shipment, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime.After an indictment and pretrial proceedings, Yumang waived his right to a jury trial and had a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The government called multiple witnesses, including three forensic chemists who analyzed the seized meth, confirming its purity and quantity. Prior to trial, the government disclosed—subject to a protective order—that the DEA chemist who tested the 2019 meth had been placed on a performance improvement plan in 2023. At trial, Yumang’s attorney sought to cross-examine the chemist about the plan, but the judge ruled the information irrelevant since the performance issues arose years after the chemist’s work on the case. The judge found Yumang guilty on all counts and imposed a sentence of 180 months.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Yumang argued that briefly closing the courtroom to make a record of the sidebar discussion about the chemist’s performance plan violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, and that the exclusion of the proposed cross-examination was both evidentiary error and a Confrontation Clause violation. The Seventh Circuit held that the five-minute courtroom closure was too trivial to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation and that excluding the cross-examination was neither an evidentiary nor constitutional error. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v Yumang" on Justia Law

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Charles Cui was charged with bribery and related offenses after he attempted to secure the assistance of Edward Burke, a powerful Chicago alderman, in reversing a permit denial by the Chicago Department of Buildings (CDOB) regarding a pole sign at his commercial property. Cui’s financial interests were jeopardized by the permit denial, which threatened both a lucrative lease with Binny’s Beverage Depot and tax increment financing from the City. To influence Burke, Cui offered to retain Burke’s law firm for property tax appeal work, explicitly seeking Burke’s intervention in the CDOB matter.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over a six-week trial in which a jury convicted Cui on all counts: bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), violations of the Travel Act, and making false statements to the government. The district court admitted evidence over Cui’s objections, including a photoshopped photograph sent to the CDOB, and denied Cui’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. The court sentenced Cui to 32 months’ imprisonment and applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement for failing to produce key emails in response to a grand jury subpoena.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cui’s challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and sentencing. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the law’s requirements—including the quid pro quo element and the definition of “corruptly”—and that the admission of the photoshopped photograph was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the sentencing enhancement and the disparity between Cui’s and Burke’s sentences were justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Cui" on Justia Law

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Indiana amended its laws in 2022 to prohibit and criminalize the use of telehealth and telemedicine for abortions, requiring that abortion-inducing drugs be dispensed and consumed in person by a physician in a hospital or qualified surgical center. The Satanic Temple, a Massachusetts-based religious nonprofit, operates a telehealth abortion clinic serving only patients in New Mexico but seeks to extend these services to its Indiana members. It does not run, nor intends to operate, an in-person abortion clinic in Indiana or maintain ties to Indiana hospitals or surgical centers. The Temple filed suit against the Indiana Attorney General and Marion County Prosecutor, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the criminal statute (§ 16-34-2-7(a)) and to obtain declaratory relief under Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the case and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court found that the Satanic Temple failed to identify any specific member who suffered an injury from the challenged law, thus lacking associational standing. It also held that the Temple itself lacked standing, as it could not show an injury in fact and could not demonstrate that favorable relief would redress its alleged harms due to other Indiana laws independently barring its intended conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Seventh Circuit held that the Satanic Temple lacked both associational and individual standing. The Temple failed to identify a specific injured member and relied only on statistical probabilities and generalized claims of stigmatic injury, which were insufficient. Additionally, the Temple did not present concrete plans to violate the law, and even if § 16-34-2-7(a) were enjoined, other statutes would independently prevent its telehealth abortion services in Indiana. Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple, Inc. v Rokita" on Justia Law

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In June 2021, police officers in Aurora, Illinois responded to a 911 call from a woman who reported, based on information from her nephew, that Antron Cannon was violently assaulting a woman inside his home. Officers arrived to find Cannon and a companion inside the house. There were discrepancies between Cannon’s account and that of other witnesses regarding what occurred, but responding officers heard loud noises, received confirmation that no one had left the home, and were told a side door was unlocked. They entered the home without a warrant, detained Cannon, and interviewed his companion, who alleged that Cannon had assaulted her. Physical evidence of injuries was documented, and Cannon was arrested for domestic battery, though the charges were later dropped.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed Cannon’s subsequent civil lawsuit against the officers and the city. Cannon claimed the officers unlawfully entered his home and arrested him without probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and probable cause supported the arrest. The court also dismissed Cannon’s indemnification claim against the city and awarded defendants their costs, rejecting Cannon’s argument that his indigency should exempt him from the cost award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the appeal. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held that the officers’ warrantless entry was reasonable under the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment, given the information available to them at the time. It further held that probable cause existed for Cannon’s arrest based on statements and observed injuries. Finally, it found no abuse of discretion in awarding costs, as Cannon did not demonstrate inability to pay now or in the future. View "Cannon v. Filip" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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A former lieutenant in a county sheriff’s office was accused of using excessive force during two arrests. After an internal investigation was initiated, he was suspended and scheduled for a public hearing before a merit board, which is required under Indiana law for disciplinary actions. The lieutenant alleged that the sheriff manipulated both the investigation and the merit board to ensure an unfavorable outcome for him. Faced with the possibility of an unfair hearing and negative publicity, the lieutenant negotiated a severance agreement with the sheriff: he would resign and waive his hearing in exchange for withdrawal of the charges and a promise of a neutral reference.Despite the agreement, on the day the resignation became effective, two county prosecutors and the sheriff broadly disclosed the excessive-force allegations to local legal professionals and the lieutenant’s current and prospective employers, including through Brady/Giglio disclosures. The disclosures described the alleged misconduct and claimed issues with the lieutenant’s credibility, leading to his suspension from his part-time job and the loss of other employment opportunities. The lieutenant claimed these actions were part of a premeditated scheme to render him unemployable in law enforcement.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint was dismissed. The district court found that absolute and qualified immunity protected the prosecutors and that the sheriff could not be liable because the lieutenant had voluntarily resigned, waiving his due process rights. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity only for Brady/Giglio disclosures made in pending criminal cases. For disclosures to the bar association and employers, neither absolute nor qualified immunity applied at this stage because the alleged coercion through misrepresentation could constitute a procedural due process violation. The appellate court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martin v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law