Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deppe, a punter, enrolled at Northern Illinois University (NIU), a National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I school, in 2014 without an athletic scholarship. Deppe decided to “red shirt” his first year; he practiced with the team but did not compete, so the clock did not run on his four years of NCAA athletic eligibility. In 2015 NIU signed another punter, so he looked for a new program. Coaches at the University of Iowa, another Division I school, told Deppe they wanted him if he would be eligible to compete during the 2016–2017 season. The NCAA indicated that under its year-in-residence rule, Deppe would be ineligible to compete for one year following his transfer. An exception permitting a one-time transfer with immediate athletic eligibility in limited circumstances was unavailable to Deppe. A player who transfers under extenuating circumstances may obtain a waiver of the NCAA’s requirement that a student’s four years of playing time be completed in five calendar years; the school to which he transfers must initiate the process. Iowa's football staff notified Deppe that the team had decided to pursue another punter who had immediate eligibility and would not initiate the process for him. Deppe sued the NCAA on behalf of himself and a proposed class alleging violations of the Sherman Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The year-in-residence requirement is an eligibility rule clearly meant to preserve the amateur character of college athletics, is therefore presumptively procompetitive, and need not be tested for anticompetitive effect under a full rule-of-reason analysis. View "Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty in 2007 to possessing digital images of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), Canfield was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release, with conditions requiring that Canfield participate in sex offender treatment, avoid unsupervised contact with minors, and not possess “any material, legal or illegal, that contains nudity or alludes to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing material.” While on supervised release, he violated the conditions by viewing adult pornography on unauthorized smartphones. Canfield consented to 180 days of home confinement and an additional year of supervised release. Canfield was discharged from his sex offender treatment program for smoking marijuana, holding an infant without disclosing his offender status to the infant’s mother, and for again watching adult pornography. The district court then revoked Canfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment, followed by five more years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated three special supervised release conditions: a requirement that he notify third parties about the risks his offender status poses; a condition that he undergo drug testing and substance abuse treatment at the direction of his probation officer; and a prohibition on all access to sexually explicit material. The court upheld a ban on using the Internet to access sexually explicit material. View "United States v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Sutula‐Johnson sold office furniture. In 2010, OfficeMax adopted a compensation plan that paid a commission rate depending on the sale’s profit. Commissions were earned either when a customer paid or 90 days after the customer was invoiced, whichever came first. Sutula‐Johnson negotiated better terms and earned commissions upon invoicing. OfficeMax and Office Depot merged in 2013. Office Depot continued paid Sutula‐Johnson and her colleagues under the terms of the old OfficeMax plan. In July 2014, Office Depot announced a new compensation plan for furniture sales, effective immediately. Sutula‐Johnson claims she did not receive a copy of the new plan for several weeks. The new plan significantly changed how Sutula‐Johnson was paid and reduced her total pay. She initially refused to sign it, complaining about its application to sales already in the works but not yet invoiced. Sutula‐Johnson continued working for Office Depot for more than a year. In 2015 Sutula‐Johnson resigned and sued for breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS. 115/1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Office Depot on the breach of contract claims but reversed as to the statutory claims. Sutula‐Johnson accepted the new terms by continuing to work but offered evidence that Office Depot violated the Wage Act by failing to pay her commissions monthly and by failing to pay her commissions earned before she resigned. View "Sutula-Johnson v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

When Goplin began working at WeConnect, he signed the “AEI Alternative Entertainment Inc. Open Door Policy and Arbitration Program,” which referred to AEI throughout; it never mentioned WeConnect. Goplin brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. WeConnect moved to compel arbitration, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), attaching an affidavit from its Director of Human Resources stating, “I am employed by WeConnect, Inc.—formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI.” Goplin claimed that WeConnect was not a party to the agreement and could not enforce it. He cited language on WeConnect’s website: WeConnect formed when two privately held companies, Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (AEI) and WeConnect Enterprise Solutions, combined in September 2016… we officially became one company. WeConnect asserted that WeConnect and AEI were two names for the same legal entity, stating: This was a name change, not a merger. The court held that WeConnect did not establish that it was a party to the agreement or otherwise entitled to enforce it. The court rejected subsequently-submitted corporate-form documents and affidavits, stating that new evidence cannot be introduced in a motion for reconsideration unless the movant shows “not only that [the] evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goplin v. WeConnect, Inc." on Justia Law

The Defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, plus six other counts. The court gave a multiple conspiracies jury instruction and refused to give a proposed “meeting of the minds” instruction. The jury convicted the Defendants on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the government lacked sufficient evidence to prove the conspiracy between them and Rodriguez, a cooperating defendant and that the district court erred by refusing to give a “meeting of the minds” jury instruction. Mistrust, deceit or dishonesty amongst the Defendants did not negate their shared common objective of distributing cocaine. View "United States v. Masias" on Justia Law

Fiorentini is the owner and president of a small technology company. When cancer treatment left him unable to perform his job, he received total disability benefits under a Paul Revere policy. Five years later, after Fiorentini was back at work and exercising full control of the company, Paul Revere notified him that he no longer qualified for the benefits. Fiorentini argued that he still satisfied the policy’s requirements for total disability because, although he could perform most of his job duties, he was unable to do what it takes to generate new business. Paul Revere rejected that argument, encouraging him to apply for “residual disability benefits,” which would have required Fiorentini to show that he was either unable to perform “one or more of the important duties” of his occupation or could only perform his important job duties for “80% of the time normally required to perform them” and that he earned at least 20% less than he did predisability. Fiorentini instead sued for breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Paul Revere. The total disability provision does not cover the insured who has a diminished ability to perform his occupation, but rather the insured who is unable to continue it. View "Fiorentini v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Simpkins began working for DuPage Housing Authority (DHA) in 2009 under an “Independent Contractor Agreement” for “general labor” to rehabilitate vacant properties to make them suitable for occupants. In 2011, the rehab work slowed and Simpkins began working primarily at Ogden townhome community, for which DHA served as on‐site management. Ogden’s property manager and maintenance supervisor, DHA employees, gave Simpkins instructions and prioritized the order in which he needed to complete tasks. In May 2012, Simpkins and DHA entered into another “Independent Contractor Agreement,” covering “general labor” at Ogden. Simpkins worked full‐time and exclusively for DHA; reported his hours by invoice; and was paid bi‐weekly via check. DHA issued Simpkins 1099‐MISC tax forms, while others received W‐2 forms. Simpkins knew that DHA considered him an independent contractor and repeatedly requested to become an employee. DHA did not provide him with pension, insurance, or other benefits. In 2015, Simpkins was injured in a car accident; his relationship with DHA ended. He filed suit, claiming that DHA had repeatedly failed to pay him overtime and was required to provide him with disability benefits. The district court ruled that Simpkins was not an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejected all of his federal claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact as to the control exercised by DHA, questions concerning the origin of tools and material, and ambiguity as to the termination date of the second contract. View "Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority" on Justia Law

In 2003, Pain Center contracted with SSIMED for medical-billing software and related services. In 2006, the parties entered into another contract, for records-management software and related services. In 2013, Pain Center sued SSIMED for breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the implied duty of good faith, and four tort claims, all arising out of alleged shortcomings in SSIMED’s software and services. The district judge found the entire suit untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on all but the claims for breach of contract. The judge applied the four-year statute of limitations under Indiana’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), holding that the two agreements are mixed contracts for goods and services, but the goods (i.e., the software) predominate. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. Under Indiana’s “predominant thrust” test for mixed contracts, the agreements in question fall on the “services” side of the line, so the UCC does not apply. The breach-of-contract claims are subject to Indiana’s 10-year statute of limitations for written contracts and are timely. Pain Center licensed SSIMED’s preexisting, standardized software but received monthly billing and IT services for the life of both contracts. View "Pain Center of SE Indiana, LLC v. Origin Healthcare Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

Kenosha used Comsys as its information-technology department. Comsys had its offices inside City Hall and stored its electronic information on the City’s servers. Their contract automatically renewed from year to year unless terminated, and provided that either party “shall have the right, with or without cause, to terminate the Agreement by written notice delivered to the other party at least twelve (12) calendar months prior to the specified effective date of such termination.” In 2014, hostilities broke out between the parties: a Comsys employee because a city employee with plans to bring the IT department in-house and there were allegations of stolen email and a search of the servers. The City’s Common Council voted to end the contract. The Mayor delivered formal notice days later. The contract ended a year later. Comsys sued, alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed several claims on the pleadings and dismissed the Council’s members on the ground of legislative immunity but denied motions for summary judgment on the First and Fourth Amendment claim and official immunity claims by the Mayor, City Administrator, and the City Manager. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to those officials, finding that they did not violate clearly established law and cannot be ordered to pay damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and noting that trying to isolate contract administration from speech may be impossible in this situation. View "Comsys Inc. v. Pacetti" on Justia Law

Norton was part of a cocaine and heroin distribution conspiracy, driving to Chicago and Akron to move drugs and proceeds, and distributing drugs at his Indiana home. Law enforcement recruited a conspiracy member to record conversations; the informant stated that Norton planned to move $400,000 of drug proceeds. Federal officers contacted Indiana State Police Officer Shultz for a traffic stop. Federal officers trailed Norton for 20 miles, identified Norton’s vehicle to Shultz, told Shultz that Norton was driving 72 mph in a 55 mph construction zone, and instructed Shultz to make the stop. Shultz testified that he used radar to confirm Norton's speed. Shultz pulled Norton over. Norton allowed Shultz to search his car. Shultz found an unusual wire near the gas pedal and a shell casing. His drug-sniffing dog signaled to the vehicle. Shultz did not arrest Norton, but impounded the vehicle. After obtaining a warrant, officers conducted a thorough search, discovering $400,000 in cash. Months later, officers arrested Norton in a house near the Mexican border, where they found $179,000 in cash. At a hearing on Norton’s motion to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle, an Indiana Department of Transportation employee testified that the speed limit in the construction zone was 70 mph at the time of the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Norton’s conviction and sentence to a mandatory life term of imprisonment, upholding the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of recorded statements made by the confidential informant. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law