Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Capps sued six law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for failure to intervene in an unlawful search and for use of excessive force. The parties attempted to negotiate a settlement: the defendants offered $47,500; Capps countered with $2 million. The defendants then offered $200,000, Capps demanded $3.5 million. Capps’s final settlement demand was for $3.6 million, which the defendants rejected. At trial, Capps succeeded on eight of his 10 claims, including his failure-to-intervene claims against each defendant and on his excessive-force claims against two defendants. A jury awarded Capps $22,000 in compensatory damages and $10,092 in punitive damages. After trial Capps sought to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1988(b). After a failed settlement conference before a magistrate, the trial judge sua sponte “referred” the fee petition Chief Judge Reagan. No party objected. Judge Reagan explained that he was hearing the motion because he has a special interest in attorney’s fees based on his work with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission and other experiences. Judge Reagan denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Capps was awarded substantial damages and thus should have been awarded attorney’s fees. View "Capps v. Drake" on Justia Law

In 2006 Conway contracted to sell land in Broadview to Donahue, who assigned the contract to Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC. Chicago Joe’s sole manager applied for the required special-use permit. Broadview denied the application in 2007. The land sale contract never closed and the planned strip club never opened. The LLC and Conway filed suit in 2007 alleging that Broadview violated the First Amendment. Broadview amended its ordinances multiple times during the lawsuit. One amendment led District Judge Gottschall, to conclude that Broadview’s amendment to its adult-use setback ordinance was “aimed solely at Chicago Joe’s.” After the case was transferred to Judge Lee, the parties litigated renewed summary judgment motions. Judge Lee granted Broadview summary judgment on Chicago Joe’s declaratory judgment and injunction claims, but denied summary judgment on the damages claim. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the claim for injunctive relief that established interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is actually moot, and affirmed its dismissal. At every stage of the process, Chicago Joe’s has proposed a use of property prohibited by then-current local law, so it has no vested rights. Since 2007, Chicago Joe’s has proposed to use the property in a way prohibited by Illinois statute, without challenging that statute. View "Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview" on Justia Law

The Union sought to represent Jam’s employees, part-time stagehands who handle equipment at various venues; their employment is sporadic. On September 30, 2015, Jam and the Union identified the potential bargaining unit as full-time and regular part-time production employees at specific venues, employed during the payroll period ending on October 4, 2015. The petition was held in abeyance pending the investigation of the Union's unfair labor practice charge, based on Jam’s termination of a crew leader and 53 employees.The charge was resolved in April 2016; Jam would reinstate the employees by offering them immediate, full participation in Jam’s “on-call list.” In the May 2016 election, Jam included on its voter eligibility list five stagehands hired during two weeks after October 4, 2015. The Union prevailed 22-10; an additional 21 ballots were challenged. Five were ballots cast by employees hired during the two week period. The Board’s Acting Regional Director concluded that Jam’s challenge fell short of requiring that the election be aside. The Director sustained the Union’s challenges to the ballots of four of the “two week” employees and certified the Union. An NLRB panel affirmed. The Seventh Circuit declined to enforce the order requiring Jam to bargain with the Union, finding enough evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on Jam’s argument that, in the period before the election, the Union attempted to influence the election outcome by steering premium union jobs to Jam employees. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Jam Productions, Ltd." on Justia Law

McCaa suffers from mental illnesses, with a history of suicide attempts. In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, he alleged that prison officials and staff were deliberately indifferent to his self‐harm on four occasions. After screening McCaa’s pro se complaint, the court allowed some claims to proceed, relating to officials’ failure to prevent McCaa’s self‐harm and failure to obtain medical assistance after self‐harm. McCaa’s unsuccessful motion to recruit counsel posited that the issues were complex, that he has serious mental illnesses, a fifth‐grade reading level, little legal knowledge, and extremely limited access—as a segregation inmate—to the law library and witnesses. McCaa's second unsuccessful motion added that he has a learning disability, had been transferred to a new prison, and did not know where his witness was located. After discovery began, McCaa's third unsuccessful motion noted that another attorney had joined the defense and that he previously relied on other prisoners for assistance but was having difficulty getting help. McCaa continued through discovery pro se. He did not conduct depositions. Defendants moved for summary judgment, McCaa filed his fourth unsuccessful motion, stating that he was having difficulty contacting witnesses who were no longer incarcerated and that his case was worthy for a jury. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When denying McCaa’s third motion, the court did not specifically address circumstances that bore on McCaa’s ability to competently litigate his case. View "McCaa v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In 1995, Orchard purchased the Warmke Parcel, 13 acres of wetlands, for residential development. Orchard requested a determination from the Army Corps of Engineers that the wetlands were not jurisdictional “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). Before 2015, the Corps defined waters of the United States to include waters “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” “rivers” that could be used for interstate recreation or commerce, “tributaries” of such waters, and “wetlands adjacent to” other waters of the United States, including tributaries. The Warmke wetlands are surrounded by residential development. The closest navigable water, Little Calumet River, is 11 miles away. In between the Warmke wetlands and Little Calumet River are man‐made ditches, sewer pipes, and Midlothian Creek—a tributary of the Little Calumet River. The Warmke wetlands drain, via sewer pipes, to Midlothian Creek. While the Warmke issue was pending, the Supreme Court decided that a wetland’s adjacency to a tributary of a navigable‐in‐fact water is alone insufficient to make the wetland a water of the United States, “the Corps’ jurisdiction over [such] wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” The Seventh Circuit reversed the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction, finding that the Corps has not provided substantial evidence of a significant nexus to navigable‐in‐fact waters. View "Orchard Hill Building Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Moose solicited investors with a stock tip; instead of investing all the $680,000 he received from 16 investors, Moose invested only $200,000. The remaining $480,000 he took for himself. Without a plea agreement, Moose pleaded guilty to defrauding investors in violation of the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court gave him a below-guideline sentence of two years in prison plus two years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the prison sentence and the length of the supervised release term, but remanded for the limited purpose of considering several conditions of supervised release that had not been adequately explained. The court rejected Moose’s challenges to the loss amount the district court used in calculating his guideline sentencing range and the fraud guideline’s treatment of loss amounts more generally. Though Moose admitted that he pocketed the $480,000, he argued for a loss figure of just $70,000, claiming to qualify for the discount based on returning stolen property before the crime was detected. View "United States v. Moose" on Justia Law

Khowaja was an Immigration Enforcement Agent, 2008-2012. He then began employment as an FBI Special Agent on a two-year probationary term. Khowaja’s lack of judgment was frequently cited as a concern by his immediate supervisor, SSA Green. In June 2013, Green and Assistant Special Agent in Charge Jones approved a recommendation for removal report, listing several examples; Khowaja did not dispute the examples. The report concluded Khowaja’s arrogance, avoidance of senior agents, and defensiveness had hindered his judgment. Jones and Green informed Khowaja that his removal was being sought. Days later, Khowaja contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In July 2013, the Assistant Administrative Director of the FBI’s Human Resources Division terminated Khowaja's employment. Khowaja alleged that Green, a white Christian, asked Khowaja during their first meeting if he was Muslim, questioned him about his faith, used Arabic holy phrases in a derogatory manner; mocked Middle Eastern accents, and pointed out that Khowaja is Muslim during a presentation to other agents. Khowaja noted a remark by Jones to a police chief that Khowaja was “not our typical agent.” Khowaja asserted that he was held to a different standard than his peers. Khowaja alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated against because he is Muslim, (Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)), and that he was intentionally, unlawfully terminated in retaliation for beginning the EEOC process (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. View "Khowaja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against TCSPP, alleging breach of contract and negligence after the school disciplined plaintiff for posting an image to her personal Instagram account that TCSPP considered offensive. Plaintiff later alleged in her amended complaint claims related to her dismissal from the school for plagiarism. The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff could not meet Illinois's high burden for student plaintiffs in relation to the decision to dismiss her for plagiarism, and summary judgment was proper as to that issue. Consequently, summary judgment was also appropriate concerning plaintiff's entitlement to living expenses and tuition as damages. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding three motions in limine. View "DiPerna v. Chicago School of Professional Psychology" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging that several state judges and officials have been unfair to him in divorce and child custody proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action and held that, to the extent plaintiff's suit implicated its own subject matter jurisdiction, the court was free to entertain his appeal; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar this case; even if Rooker‐Feldman applied to interlocutory orders, the doctrine still would have no bearing on plaintiff's appeal because he has not asked the court to reject any such order; and the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction was not applicable. The court held that the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff's complaint before the date it had set for him to respond to the sheriff's motion to dismiss the claims against them, but the error was harmless. On the merits, the court held that Judge Boliker could not claim the protection of judicial immunity where she acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction, but that Judge Dickler's alleged actions fell within its scope; plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any adverse consequences to his parental (or other) rights as a result of his allegedly prejudiced judge and thus his section 1983 claim failed; and section 1985 did not apply to plaintiff's case. View "Kowalski v. Boliker" on Justia Law

This appeal arose after the district court approved a settlement in an action alleging that Target violated consumer protection laws by making false claims about the efficacy of glucosamine dietary supplements. Objector-appellant suspected that three objectors, in bad faith, voluntarily dismissed their appeals before appellate briefing began. Objector-appellant moved for a limited reopening of the case but the district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court mistook the scope of its discretion and the nature of the problem before it denied the motion. Therefore, the motion should have been granted. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Frank v. Target Corp." on Justia Law