Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Elder and co-defendants were charged with having conspired to traffic large quantities of methamphetamine from Arizona to southwest Indiana. His co-defendants pleaded guilty. Elder was found guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. Elder had a 1997 Arizona conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and a 1999 Arizona guilty-plea conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs. The court concluded that Elder was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under section 841(b)(1)(A) based on two prior “felony drug offense” convictions. The Seventh Circuit concluded that his paraphernalia conviction did not qualify as a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. 802(44). On remand, the court concluded that the 1999 conviction qualified as a felony drug offense so that he was subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court calculated Elder’s guidelines range as 324-405 months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to 260 months. The Seventh Circuit issued a limited remand on the question of whether the error was harmless, finding that the 1999 Arizona conviction is not a “felony drug offense” as defined by section 802(44). View "United States v. Elder" on Justia Law

Williams was accused of offenses relating to a wide‐ranging sex‐trafficking scheme. He lured women in desperate circumstances into prostitution by convincing them that he would take care of them and maintained control through brutal physical abuse. Before trial, the government filed a notice of its intent to call FBI Agent Mentzel as an expert witness, adequately describing Mentzel’s credentials but listing only broad topics without explanation of what she would say about each. Williams argued that the disclosure was inadequate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G); that Mentzel’s testimony was unnecessary— jury instructions would define the crime of human trafficking; and that her testimony would be impermissible character evidence. The court overruled these objections. Mentzel testified about how human traffickers operate but did not testify about Williams or his actions. Three of Williams’ victims testified. There were pictures of injuries that Williams had inflicted on his victims and online prostitution ads for each testifying victim, all linked to Williams’ email addresses. There were text messages and Facebook messages in which Williams admitted to being a pimp and referred to the victims who later testified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. While the government did not violate the rules prohibiting the use of character evidence, it probably did violate the expert disclosure requirement but any error was harmless. The evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the jury would have convicted Williams even if Mentzel had not testified. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Walker has degrees in robotics and electrical engineering and worked for 21 years, primarily as an engineer, before suffering a stroke in 2008. Walker was not able to return to work after his stroke. Medical records show that his physical and cognitive condition has gradually worsened since 2008. In 2012, medical professionals documented his cognitive and memory deficits, and difficulty with balance and walking, dizziness. By 2013 Walker was unable to live alone and moved in with his mother. The Social Security Administration determined that Walker became disabled in December 2014. An ALJ, in a separate proceeding, determined that Walker was not disabled before that date. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ’s conclusion sweeps too broadly by not accounting for medical and other evidence strongly suggesting that Walker’s condition and residual functional capacity had worsened to such a degree that he became disabled by approximately the middle of 2012. View "Walker v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Penrod applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2010, at age 45, after having a heart attack. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. Penrod filed a second application for disability insurance benefits only, alleging that he was disabled because of arthritis, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, short‐term memory loss, and asthma, from April 2012-June 2013. Medical evidence was sparse. After his heart attack, Penrod received a stent and regular follow‐up care. Penrod’s poverty and lack of health insurance complicated his treatment. After reviewing Penrod’s medical records, two consultative doctors agreed that he could perform light work, with postural and environmental limitations. At a hearing, Penrod focused on the difficulty of finding a job with his limited education, noting his inability to stand or sit for prolonged periods, limited grip, fatigue and dizziness from his medications, pain in his hips and back, and kidney stones. He had suffered another heart attack in 2014. After the hearing, Penrod died from cardiac arrest. The ALJ denied Penrod’s application, finding that although Penrod’s impairments could result in the types of symptoms he alleged, the medical evidence did not support his testimony about his limitations. The ALJ noted Penrod’s smoking and his frequent reports that he was unable to afford medications and recommended tests in assessing his credibility. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported a finding that Penrod retained the capacity to work through his last insured date. View "Penrod v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Emerson, a Cook County Department of Corrections corrections officer, alleged that County employees unlawfully discriminated against her during her “tumultuous” tenure at a County detention facility. During that time, she twice filed formal personnel grievances. She claims that she was subsequently the victim of retaliation. She was on paid medical leave from September 2012 until March 2014, and she has remained on unpaid leave ever since. While her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, were pending, Emerson took to Facebook to threaten potential witnesses with legal action if they testified against her. The district judge sanctioned Emerson ($17,000) for the threat and eventually entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Emerson’s grievance regarding scheduling did not qualify as protected activity under Title VII because it did not allege that Grochowski (who made the schedule) targeted her because of her race, sex, or other protected characteristic. Emerson had no proof that Grochowski ever knew of her earlier grievance, so she cannot establish that they harbored the retaliatory motive necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim. View "Emerson v. Dart" on Justia Law

Fuery, her friends Sciortino and Tomaskovic, and Chicago police officer Szura were involved in an altercation on the side of the road. The three women were arrested for battery of a police officer; each was acquitted. The women sued the City and Officer Szura under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. At trial, the defendants objected to various testimony as violating the court’s rulings on motions in limine, moved for a mistrial, and requested dismissal of all claims and attorneys’ fees as a sanction. The judge stated, “[t]here are plenty of options once the trial is concluded to deal with the misconduct … I am not letting it go.” The jury awarded Tomaskovic $260,000 against Szura on her excessive force claim, finding that Szura was acting within the scope of his employment, but found in favor of the defendants on all other claims. The court entered judgment in favor of the City and Szura on all claims but denied the claims for attorneys’ fees. The court found misconduct by plaintiffs’ attorney and that “plaintiffs actively participated.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it was apparent, “even from the two-dimensional record, the judge’s patience being tried.” District courts “possess certain inherent powers, not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. That authority includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” View "Fuery v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Undercover officers conducted several controlled buys of methamphetamine by contacting Jones and obtaining the drugs from either Jones, Jones’s girlfriend (Rowland), or their housemate. A jury convicted Jones of possessing and conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 145 months, considering Jones’ possession of a gun carried in Rowland’s purse and also several quantities of methamphetamine for which Jones claimed he was not responsible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rowland’s possession of the gun and the drugs were foreseeable to Jones and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court found that the co-conspirators operated as a team. A district court calculating drug quantities at sentencing need only support its findings by a preponderance of the evidence and district courts may make reasonable though imprecise estimates based on information that has indicia of reliability.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In December 2003, Chicago detectives separately questioned Johnson about a shooting death. Johnson admitted that he drove the shooter to the scene but claimed not to know anything about the plan. Johnson was charged with murder under an accountability theory. Johnson unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements based on noncompliance with Miranda. At a 2007 trial, the detectives testified about Johnson’s statements. The jury found him guilty. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed in 2010. At a second trial in 2012, the detectives repeated their testimony. Johnson was convicted. The appellate court reversed in 2014, citing insufficient evidence. In 2015, Johnson sued the detectives under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that they violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by interrogating him without Miranda warnings and giving testimony about his unwarned statements. The district court found the claims untimely because Johnson filed suit more than two years after his statements were introduced at trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Precedent (Heck) blocks a section 1983 claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been invalidated; if a claim is Heck-barred, accrual is deferred until the conviction is overturned. Claims of this kind necessarily imply the invalidity of the convictions, so Heck’s deferred accrual rule applies. The first conviction was reversed in 2010, so those claims are untimely. Claims relating to the second trial are timely. View "Johnson v. Winstead" on Justia Law

Helping Hand filed suit against Darden Restaurants, Mid Wilshire Consulting, Kang, and Jones, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, asserting that Mid Wilshire, through Kang and Jones, sent an unsolicited fax advertisement to Helping Hand on behalf of Darden. The district court granted Darden summary judgment and dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that would hold Darden strictly liable because its goods or services were advertised in a fax regardless of its authorization of such advertisement. Nothing in the statute allows the imposition of liability on an entity wholly unaware of the use of its logo in a fax. The court noted the lack of any evidence connecting Darden to the fax and Helping Hand’s lack of diligence in conducting discovery. View "Helping Hand Caregivers, Ltd. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

Heishman was high on amphetamines and running naked in the street. Indianapolis police tried to subdue him. A paramedic administered a sedative to Heishman so he could be moved to an ambulance to be taken to a hospital. Soon, Heishman’s heart and breathing stopped. Despite efforts to revive him, he died days later. Heishman’s estate sued, asserting federal Fourth Amendment claims and state-law tort claims. The district court denied the paramedic qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and allowed all but one of the state-law claims to proceed against the paramedic and the hospital without requiring the plaintiff to comply with the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed as to both issues. Case law does not clearly establish that a paramedic can violate a patient-arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights by exercising medical judgment to administer a sedative in a medical emergency. All of the state-law claims are subject to the substantive terms of Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, including damage caps and the requirement to submit the claim to a medical review panel before suit is filed. The undisputed facts show that the paramedic was exercising medical judgment in dealing with a patient in a medical emergency. View "Thompson v. Cope" on Justia Law