Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sloan began working for the Association in 2014. She received multiple merit raises. In 2016 she was promoted, making her an exempt salaried employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 213. Sloan’s relationship with Wilson, the Association’s president-CEO, deteriorated. Wilson became confrontational, unfairly criticized Sloan, and antagonized her in front of colleagues. At a meeting, Wilson asserted that Sloan “bring[s] [her] personal problems to work.” Sloan complained that the Association did not have a human resources department to help resolve the conflict. Wilson sent Sloan home and informed Sloan that she was suspended for six days without pay. Sloan stated, “I don’t even know if you can do this.” Wilson replied: “I’m the President ... I can do whatever I want.” Days later, Sloan emailed the Board of Directors, stating that she believed Wilson’s actions violated federal law and attacking Wilson’s leadership. Sloan's attorney emailed the Board regarding “potential legal claims” and “actionable defamation.” Wilson sent an email to the entire staff stating that "Sloan is no longer employed. Sloan alleged that she was fired in violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sloan attacked the substantive basis for her suspension, criticized Wilson’s leadership, and protested the absence of a human-resources department. These complaints expressed Sloan’s frustrations with Wilson and the Association, but no reasonable employer would recognize them as assertions of FLSA-protected rights concerning wages and hours. View "Sloan v. American Brain Tumor Association" on Justia Law

B.G. lived alternately with his mother (who speaks only Spanish) and siblings in a small apartment, and with his father, who apparently left B.G. to his own devices. He repeated first grade. B.G. was diagnosed with a specific learning disability and had significant behavior and attendance issues. B.G.’s father died in 2014. B.G was hospitalized with diagnoses of morbid obesity, hypertension, severe hypoxia syndrome, Type 2 diabetes, and obstructive sleep apnea. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services received a report that his mother was not able to care for her children. B.G.’s mother requested a Due Process Hearing with the State Board of Education, alleging that the Chicago Public School District had violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act. The District gave B.G. an aide, moved him to a classroom with a teacher familiar with “multisensory approaches,” and performed assessments of B.G.’s educational needs. Although she did not object to the report, B.G.’s mother requested Independent Educational Evaluations at public expense in seven areas. The State Board of Education concluded that the District's evaluations were appropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The hearing officer conducted a five-day hearing, heard the relevant evidence, and concluded that the District’s experts evaluated B.G. appropriately; the record shows that the District’s evaluators were competent, well-trained, and performed comprehensive evaluations. Particularly under the deferential standard of review applicable here, there is no cause to set aside the hearing officer’s well-reasoned decision. View "B.G. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Ward injured his shoulder and back when his seat collapsed in the train he was operating. Ward is a U.S. resident who is employed by a U.S. railroad, normally covered by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51. Because Ward’s seat collapsed across the border in Ontario, the FELA does not apply. Instead, Ward pursued his tort claims under state common law. The district court rejected Ward’s claims by holding that another federal law, the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701, preempted all state tort law remedies for injuries caused by locomotive equipment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal railroad-safety statutes left plaintiff one path that is viable and not preempted: He could assert state-law tort claims against the defendants that borrow the applicable standards of care from the federal LIA and its regulations governing the safety of locomotive equipment. Plaintiff pursued that viable theory in the district court, but, on appeal, waived any claim based on this theory. View "Ward v. Soo Line Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Within months of her arrival at St. Andrew, a residential community for older adults, Wetzel physical and verbal abuse from other residents because she is openly lesbian. She repeatedly asked St. Andrew’s staff to help her. The staff limited her use of facilities and built a case for her eviction. Wetzel sued St. Andrew, alleging that it failed to provide her with non‐discriminatory housing and that it retaliated against her because of her complaints, citing the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601–3619. The district court dismissed Wetzel’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reading the FHA “more broadly.” Not only does the FHA create liability when a landlord intentionally discriminates against a tenant based on a protected characteristic; it also creates liability against a landlord that has actual notice of tenant‐on‐tenant harassment based on a protected status, yet chooses not to take any reasonable steps within its control to stop that harassment. View "Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC" on Justia Law

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Thompson's 1982 murder and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions. Thompson filed a state post-conviction petition in 1992. In 1997, the final of several public defenders withdrew. Thompson’s petition languished until 2001 when he requested a copy of the record. The public defender would not represent Thompson because his prior attorneys had “found no meritorious issues.” In 2005, Thompson requested leave to proceed pro se then hired an attorney. Court-ordered DNA tests were completed, but apparently, no hearing was held. The proceedings again fell into limbo. In 2012, Thompson retained a new attorney, who filed another amended petition. The state again raised the defense of laches. The parties stipulated that the delay had prejudiced the state. Thompson argued that the delay was the fault of attorneys who had abandoned him. Indiana courts rejected Thompson’s petition. Thompson sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court dismissed, finding that Thompson’s claims were procedurally defaulted, without addressing the potential distinction between laches based on a prefiling delay and laches based on delays in prosecuting an action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. When the state court dismissed the petition there was not yet a firmly established rule in Indiana that laches applies to delays to an already-filed action; precedents dealt only with delays in filing a post-conviction petition. Thompson’s petition is not barred by an adequate and independent state ground. View "Thompson v. Brown" on Justia Law

Curtis led a crew that robbed cell-phone stores in suburban Chicago. He was arrested after the last of the heists and stood trial for four counts of robbery, four counts of aiding in the brandishing of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, a count for conspiracy, and a count for being a felon in possession of a firearm. A jury convicted him on all counts except one for robbery and one for aiding in the brandishing of a firearm-- each related to a robbery of a store in Joliet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court should have excluded evidence of cell-site location information, which Curtis alleges was obtained under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the district court prohibited him from cross-examining witnesses about a potential source of bias, violating the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Although it is now established that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the type of cell-phone data present here, exclusion of that information was not required because it was collected in good faith. Because Curtis made his desired arguments and impeached his co-conspirators, any error in denying the cross-examination was harmless. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Wisconsin officials arrested Scott for attempting to have sexual relations with a boy who Scott (age 58) believed was 14 years old. The “boy” was a state Department of Justice agent, impersonating a teenager in response to an ad that Scott placed on Craigslist. Scott sent Kyle sexually explicit emails and sexually graphic photos and asked Kyle to reciprocate. Executing the warrant issued by a state judge, agents found child pornography in Scott's home. A federal judge denied a motion to suppress and sentenced Scott to 178 months in prison; he had an 11-year state sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The decision of the judge who issued the warrant receives “great deference”. Scott offered to host a sexual encounter and sent Kyle a picture of a man on a bedspread; it does not stretch credulity to infer that the picture had been taken at Scott’s home and that other pictures also could be found there. Many cell phones are set up to transmit the pictures they take to home computers, which have larger screens and access to file-sharing software. Scott argued that there is no reason to think that pedophiles create or acquire child pornography but Scott asked Kyle to send a picture of himself with an erection. The state judge did not exceed the bounds of “great deference.” View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Arnold was convicted of repeated sexual assault his son, M.A., who testified that in 2004-2005, when M.A. was 13-14 years old, Arnold engaged in mutual masturbation with him. Arnold had five prior convictions, including for two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. M.A. (17 at the time of trial) had six prior convictions and/or juvenile adjudications of delinquency. Arnold was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Arnold’s conviction, M.A. signed a notarized, witnessed affidavit, recanting his testimony. At the time that M.A. reported the assaults, M.A. was under the supervision of a juvenile court and participating in a treatment program, based on adjudications that M.A. himself had sexually assaulted children. M.A. represented that he had falsely accused his father to ensure his successful discharge from the program. Arnold sought a new trial. A federal district court dismissed, as untimely, his habeas corpus petition, filed beyond the one‐year deadline, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1); Arnold alleged that his actual innocence supported an equitable exception. The Seventh Circuit granted relief, rejecting an argument that M.A.’s recantation could not meet the standard for relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence, however credible a factfinder might determine it to be. The court remanded for a hearing at which the credibility of M.A.’s recantation can be assessed with the probable impact that the recantation would have had on reasonable jurors. View "Arnold v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Rowlands worked at the UPS for 25 years before she was fired in 2012, for changing her time card. Rowlands filed an EEOC Charge and a union grievance. She was reinstated. Rowlands had suffered several injuries, starting in 2005 when she was hit by a semi-truck and needed a hip replacement. Immediately before her firing, Rowlands suffered three knee injuries, one at work, and required surgery. Rowlands returned to work but her employee ID was never reactivated and UPS allegedly established new rules that applied only to Rowlands. Rowlands claims that she requested accommodations for her knee injuries, which were not granted. In January 2013 Rowlands was fired for violating UPS’ “zero tolerance” Violence Prevention Policy by brandishing a taser before she walked to the distant, dimly-lit parking lot. Rowlands’ coworkers corroborated that for 10 years she had carried the taser as personal protection. Rowlands’ car had been broken into twice. According to her co-workers, other employees carried similar devices on a regular basis, believing that the Policy prohibited only firearms. The district court rejected her suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 14 U.S.C. 12111 on summary judgment, finding that she did not have a disability, had waived her failure to accommodate claim and failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There are genuine disputes of material fact on Rowlands’ failure to accommodate and retaliation claims, neither of which were waived. View "Rowlands v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

New arrivals at the jail must surrender their possessions. A class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 charged that the Sheriff did not do enough to prevent guards and other employees from stealing or losing those belongings. Evidence showed that the loss-or-theft rate had been falling as the Sheriff implemented additional controls. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a jury’s rejection of the suit. The thefts are a crime, a tort, and a Due Process Clause violation (depriving prisoners of property with no process) but the class did not contend that the Sheriff personally stole anything or even tolerated a known thief; no guard is a defendant. Failure to prosecute thieves does not violate the Constitution; a guard’s negligence does not violate the Constitution. The jury concluded that the Sheriff had taken “reasonable measures.” The court upheld a jury instruction that the Sheriff could be found liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment if there was a widespread custom or practice which allowed plaintiffs’ property to be lost or stolen, that was the moving force behind plaintiffs’ losses, and the defendant was deliberately indifferent to those losses. Another instruction said: “The Office of the Sheriff ... need not have formally approved the conduct so long as Plaintiffs prove that a policy-making official knew of the pattern and allowed it to continue.” The court noted a problem with state remedies, but state remedies are not a constitutional entitlement. View "Elizarri v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law